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MOVEMENT OF 5 INFANTRY BRIGADE TO
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

29

The attached paper prepared by DDOMS will be tabled for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on Friday 30 April 1982..

Attachment:

Paper by DDOMS (5 pages).

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Matched by new draft.

Mr Wright

We can agree to pursue

we recommend at para 23 b.

30/4

30 April 1982

COS S7(7)

MOVEMENT OF 5 INFANTRY BRIGADE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDSBACKGROUND

1. Following the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 29 April 1982 (1) it was felt that it may be of assistance to outline the options examined by DOMS for the movement of 5 Infantry Brigade (Inf Bde) to the Falkland Islands area to meet the operational needs of the Task Force Commander.

2. ORBAT. We have been advised that a likely ORBAT for 5 Inf Bde will be as follows (2):

- a. 3,961 men, including 552 as 3rd line support
- b. 1,067 tons ammunition
- c. 1,129 tons supplies (for 35 days)
- d. 205 vehicles
- e. 19 helicopters, including 10 RAF Puma SH

An alternative 'slimline' Brigade would reduce the force by some 1,000 men and the quantity of vehicles and freight support.

3. Shipping Resources. The main limiting factor is the availability of passenger vessels on the UK register, although we are advised that the use of ships of EEC countries should not be ruled out and FCO has been asked (3) to pursue this option.

4. A summary of UK registered shipping available for the task is at Annex A.

5. Harrier Deployment is not included in this paper, although the feasibility of shipping these aircraft to the operational area is under consideration.

AIM

6. The aim of this paper is to outline possible options for the movement of 5 Inf Bde to the Falkland Islands.

Notes:

1. COS 36th Meeting/82.
2. OPC/ARMY OPS/105 dated 28 April 1982 (NOTAL).
3. AUS(PL) 190/82 dated 28 April 1982.

MAED
are
working
into
126.

MOVEMENT OPTIONS

7. The following movement options have been considered by DOMS:
- a. Option 1. Sea movement from UK of complete ORBAT.
 - b. Option 2. Sea movement from UK of 'slimline' ORBAT.
 - c. Option 3. Air move to Ascension Island and sea move from Ascension Island to the Falkland Islands using shipping already allocated to Operation SUTTON.
 - d. Option 4. Combination of sea movement from UK direct to the Falkland Islands, linked with elements by air to Ascension Island and onward movement by shipping allocated to Operation SUTTON.

OPTION 1 - SEA MOVEMENT FROM UK OF COMPLETE ORBAT.

8. This option involves the use of:
- a. QUEEN ELIZABETH 2 (QE2) - available for sailing 8 May.
 - b. 2 x Ro Ro Ferries (BALTIC/NORDIC FERRY) - available for sailing 4/5 May.
 - c. 1 additional passenger ship (RANGATIRA or SEA PRINCESS).

The earliest availability of SEA PRINCESS is 13 May and RANGATIRA is still subject to survey and repair.

9. Timings. Based on these factors:
- a. BALTIC FERRY - Depart 5 May ETA Falklands 28 May.
 - b. NORDIC FERRY - Depart 5 May ETA Falklands 28 May.
 - c. SEA PRINCESS - Depart 15 May ETA Falklands 5 June.
 - d. QE2 - Depart 20 May ETA Falklands 5 June.

10. Limitations

- a. Depends on uncertain availability of RANGATIRA or SEA PRINCESS.
- b. Possible political implications of requisitioning QE2, although this option does allow a further cruise sailing.

OPTION 2 - SEA MOVEMENT FROM UK OF 'SLIMLINE' ORBAT

11. As for OPTION 1 less additional passenger liners.
12. Timings
 - a. BALTIC FERRY - Depart 5 May ETA Falklands 28 May.
 - b. NORDIC FERRY - Depart 5 May ETA Falklands 28 May.
 - c. QE2 - Depart 8 May ETA Falklands 24 May.
13. Limitations. Depends on immediate requisitioning of QE2.

OPTION 3 - AIR MOVE ASCENSION/SEA MOVE ASCENSION TO FALKLANDS USING OPERATION SUTTON SHIPPING.

14. This would involve the use of:

- a. SS CANBERRA.
- b. 5 x LSLs.
- c. MV NORLAND.

15. Timings. On assumptions shipping released by 24 May from Operation SUTTON and an 18 - 26 day return passage, movement of the force could be achieved by 19 June at the earliest.

16. Limitations

- a. Will depend on extensive airlift to Ascension which will preclude all other air transport tasks.
- b. Force will be limited to airportable scales.
- c. A heavy administrative load on Ascension for transshipment (including extensive use of helicopter force).
- d. WMR would have to be moved separately by sea.

OPTION 4 - COMBINATION OF SEA MOVEMENT FROM UK DIRECT TO FALKLANDS LINKED WITH ELEMENTS BY AIR TO ASCENSION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT BY SHIPPING ALLOCATED TO OPERATION SUTTON

17. This option involves:

- a. BALTIC FERRY)
- b. NORDIC FERRY) Vehicles, freight, ammunition, helicopter and advance party.
- c. Airlift to Ascension)
and onward move by) Main body.
CANBERRA and MV NORLAND)

18. Timings

- a. BALTIC FERRY - ETD UK 19 May ETA Falklands 11 June.
- b. NORDIC FERRY - ETD UK 19 May ETA Falklands 11 June.
- c. CANBERRA) Released from Operation SUTTON 24 May
- d. NORLAND) Return to Falklands 11 - 13 June.

19. Limitations

- a. Force arrives later than OPTIONS 1 and 2.
- b. In spite of the move of heavy lift items by sea, this option still has considerable impact on Air Transport lift and places a heavy administrative load on Ascension.

CONCLUSIONS

20. Option 1 moves the complete force but depends on the uncertain availability of additional passenger vessels. Option 2 meets the requirement in fastest possible time, but with a reduced force level. Both these options require the use of QE2.

21. Options 3 and 4 both depend heavily on Air Transport lift and impose a considerable administrative burden on Ascension. Furthermore, the time scale is greater than either Options 1 or 2.

22. It is concluded that on balance Option 2 provides the most suitable means of moving 5 Inf Bde to the Falkland Islands.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23. It is recommended that the Chiefs of Staff agree that:

- a. Arrangements be made to requisition the necessary shipping to implement Option 2. In particular obtain agreement to use of QE2.

- b. FCO be invited to pursue the feasibility of chartering EEC shipping should it be required.

Annex:

- A. Movement of 5 Inf Bde - Shipping Availability (1 page).

MOVEMENT OF 5 INF BDE - SHIPPING AVAILABILITY

	SHIP (a)	CAPACITY (b)	AVAILABILITY (c)	EARLIEST ARRIVAL FI (d)	FITTING OUT REQUIREMENT (e)	REMARKS (f)
(1)	QE2 (Cunard)	2500 pax	Returns Southampton 4 May Earliest sailing 8 May Next availability 15 May Next sailing 20 May	24 May 5 June	i RAS ii Hel (3 days) iii Comms	Assuming crew reduced to 50
(2)	RANGATIRA	1000 pax	Earliest (at Falmouth) 14 May Estimated sailing 20 May	5 June	i RAS ii Hel iii Comms	Subject to satisfactory survey
(3)	SEA PRINCESS	1000 pax	Earliest (Southampton) 14 May Estimated sailing 20 May	5 June	i RAS ii Hel iii Comms	At present in dry dock, but assume no untoward delay
(4)	BALTIC FERRY) NORDIC FERRY)	300 pax All vehicles and most of the ammunition and freight	Within 48 hours sailing 13 May	5 June	i RAS ii Hel iii Comms	
(5)	MV LAERTES	4000 tons + freight/WMR	Within 7 days	(23 days passage)	i RAS ii Comms	Only required if freight shut out from BALTIC/NORDIC FERRY