

TOP SECRET

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UK EYES A

5 May 1982

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Copied to L2
1-5/82

H1 J1 K K2 M21 P S V2 Z GCOL GCLO

FALKLANDS : NOTES OF MEETING HELD ON 5 MAY 1982

Present: DR H1 ASO P J1 V2 K2 K Z D1A

1. Current Intelligence. There had been no Sigint indication of the sinking of the SHEFFIELD, though J1 indicated that the aircraft delivering the Exocet missile had been picked up on the ship's radar. The SAN LUIS had received orders to go to the area of the SHEFFIELD and sink any surface vessels.

There was further evidence of AR Sigint activity against the Task Force. Northwood had already been informed but K would mention the matter to GCREP again.

Action: K

Z was asked to keep a file on AR exploitation of British communications.

Action: Z

In addition, details of fixes on the Task Force had been intercepted and had been more accurate than before. The Argentinians were continuing to contact the SOBRAL so it must be presumed that it was her sister ship that sank.

2. V2 reported the normal Elint coverage. [REDACTED] had detected about seven individual ELTA radars active and it was known that ten had been bought. There was now no sign of the aircraft carrier group.

3. The Elint 2/3 coverage was continuing and indeed the Elint 3 coverage of the South Atlantic had been expanded. Two TU-95s had left Luanda but their destination was as yet undetermined.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Action: J1.(J3)

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5. H1 reported two 2-hour delays on HECTRA which had sorted themselves out. X had been asked by H1 to investigate the case.

Action: H1 (X)

On overhead, about six [redacted] messages had been received (as yet unbroken) and X was investigating the possibility of automatic transfer of the messages to HECTRA.

Action: H1 (X)

An ARN [redacted] message had been partially decrypted. On [redacted], HERMES had reported that the keys supplied by GCHQ had been used successfully - though no useful intelligence had emerged. There was very little HF intercept available, only VHF. The shipborne intercept resources were reviewed. K2 confirmed that we were receiving very little from them and P expressed concern about the inability of existing resources to provide comprehensive cover. It was generally agreed that there was very little we could do in the present circumstances to improve the situation. DR considered that we had to determine the level of intercept we were receiving and just how much was missing and it was only after this we could provide firm instructions to the Naval intercept operators if so requested. K2 re-confirmed the position that on broadcast material we were well covered but poorly covered on everything else. In addition, it was not possible to re-task the facilities under our control as they were physically unable to hear the required signals. K added that signals had already been sent pointing out to the Fleet that adequate cover should be given to cipher traffic on HF for GCHQ and accordingly felt that a further signal would do little good. The matter would, therefore, be left with H1/K2.

Action: H1/K2

6. Ops (Recce) had contacted ASO with regard to the Maritime NIMRODS. ASO had requested that the flights continue with the possibility of the introduction of refuellable NIMRODS.

[REDACTED]

8. H1 reported that there may be problems over the purchase of the 3 extra [REDACTED] as the previous purchase had been the last of the stock held by the manufacturer. However, H1 had a record of the purchase by MOD of two such machines. H1 would pursue the matter with I4/DD Sigs 3 (Air) and was to prepare a list of options if he was unsuccessful in tracing these two machines or acquiring them from the manufacturer.

Action: H1

[REDACTED]

9. Q8 had been impressed with the Navy technician who was to install the equipment in FEARLESS. Nevertheless, it was proposed to continue with the contingency plans for the provision of a civilian technician - Q8 had confirmed that the technician at present on Ascension was willing to go.

10. P described the communications fit of the HERMES and confirmed that both FEARLESS and BRISTOL had similar fits; the difference was beneficial from GCHQ's point of view and provided an on-line circuit which did not interfere with the other three channels.

W was proposing to direct any signals received from the ships at the earth terminal at Oakhanger and bring them directly to GCHQ (as opposed to via [REDACTED]).

11. The problem of the receipt of tactical EW information via EWOSE had been resolved as far as was possible.

12. On the provision of a GCO for the QE II, P7B was contacting GCLO and a signal had been sent for a statement of requirement. If, as was expected, the requirement was for a selective service on the course of the crisis, the Northwood summaries would suffice. There was, however, a minor problem over the number of indoctrinated people in the Marines.

Action: P (to progress)

13. K was to prepare a signal for DR to send to SUKLO on the release of sensitive operational information received from Northwood/MOD but emphasise that as yet it was not cleared with CDS.

Action: K

14. DGI is not now going to the USA.

15. Z was to ask R to assemble a list of the latest information leaked to the press and if possible details of those responsible (especially the Daily Mail article).

Action: Z

16. DR asked for briefing before the JIC (6/5) on:

- (a) what other options are there for AR to get nasty with UK;
- (b) [REDACTED]
- (c) effects of the crisis on GCHQ.

Action: K

17. The question of the issue of sanitised versions of JIC assessments was raised, particularly the phrase relating to issue to "allies". Z said that he thought "allies" here referred to "intelligence allies" but would check.

Action: Z

18. V2 had sorted out the problem over the BLUE FOX/Harrier radars.

19. The visit by Mr D Hurd, FCO on 13 May had been cancelled.

20. As there would undoubtedly have to be a post facto write-up of the crisis, DR requested everyone to make notes as they went along of any points considered of value.

Action: All