

Enigma
pr



cc: Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore

Head Defence Dept

PS/PUS

RATIONALISATION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

59

1. The paper copied to us under cover of Simon Webb's letter of 7 May to David Wright is likely to be for discussion in Sir Robert Armstrong's Group early next week, and you have asked for advice.

2. Our comments on this paper, at the time when it was circulated in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, are set out in the attachment to my letter of 7 May to the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, copy attached. These have not been taken into account, and therefore remain valid as comments, with the exception of the point about the area on the high seas within which the Argentine carrier would be free from attack: the present text is consistent with the position announced yesterday by the MOD. Subject to these points, the proposed rationalisation is satisfactory.

No trace of Flag A or B refs.
T-3 memo 15.8.84.

3. A further problem arose over the weekend which may be considered at Sir Robert Armstrong's meeting in the context of the same item. The background is set out in Mr Omand's letter of 8 May to Mr Coles at No 10 on 'Enforcing the Falklands Blockade', copy attached. The gist of this letter was reported by telegram to the Secretary of State in Belgium. — *att'd.*

Already authorized by staff

4. At present the rules of engagement applying to fishing vessels within the TEZ state that:- 'Authority is delegated to attempt to warn off all enemy units which constitute a threat (merchant ships within TEZ)'. If application of this rule is ineffective Commanders are allowed to resort to the rule which states 'May take such action as is necessary to achieve their military task but are not to exceed it'.

5. It is hard to feel that these rules of engagement need formally to be changed in order to meet the Force Commander's point about fishing vessels engaging in resupply of the Falklands. The ROE enjoin the Force Commander to 'attempt to warn off'. They do not say that he is to succeed before taking the further action. On the other hand, to alter his ROE so that no provision at all is made for the possibility of warning off first seems draconian, and will lay us open to criticism if as seems likely Argentine fishing boats are in fact sunk during the next week or two. CDS needs to be pressed on whether it is really impossible for a Lynx helicopter to make its intentions clear, i.e. by warning shots from a machine gun, before firing a missile. At the very least the Force Commander should have an incentive to go through these motions first in conditions other than night or poor visibility. This would be an added safeguard, notwithstanding our further warnings to Moscow and Warsaw, against the possibility of sinking Soviet or Polish fishing vessels inadvertently.

P J Weston

IA 3
11/v

8 May 1982

P J Weston
Defence Department

to succeed in issuing

w warning.



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See 66

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BA 7/5
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Hd Defence Dept for advice psl
C.M. Gillmore
PS/PUS

D J Wright Esq
Private Secretary to
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO
Cabinet Office
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

ALQ	50/6
MAY 1982	

7 May 1982

Dear David

RATIONALISATION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

We think that the time has come to try to rationalise the Rules of Engagement for the South Atlantic. These have developed progressively from a number of individual decisions and are now complex and not entirely consistent. I attach the draft of an OD(SA) paper which tries to consolidate and simplify them. It also addresses the problems of potential attacks on our forces at Ascension Island or in transit from there to the TEZ.

- The document has not been finally cleared within MOD, but we think you should see it at an early stage in case discussion in Sir Robert Armstrong's group is thought necessary prior to OD(SA).
- Copies go to Andrew Burns and David Brook, as well as to Sir Michael Palliser and Robert Wade-Gery.

Yours ever
S Webb

S WEBB
Private Secretary

58

COS(Misc)203/742/1

Copy No. 64 of 76 copies

OPERATION CORPORATE - RATIONALISATION OF ROE

1. In accordance with the instructions (1) of the Chiefs of Staff, the attached draft OD(SA) paper has been prepared by the Navy Department.

2. Unless the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee hears to the contrary by telephone (Ext 6347) by 1000 on Friday 7 May 1982, it will be assumed that the Chiefs of Staff have approved the draft.

Attachment:

Draft OD(SA) Paper (16 pages).

S. Gillmore

Note:

1. COS 43rd Mtg/82, Item 8.

pa

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37
38
39
40-46
47
48
47-50
51-53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62-64
65
66-76

6 May 1982

DRAFT OD(SA) PAPEROPERATION CORPORATE:
RATIONALISATION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND AREAS OF APPLICABILITY

1. The ROE currently in force for all units engaged in Operation CORPORATE have been developed progressively in response to OD(SA)'s diplomatic and military plans. Their implementation and monitoring are liable, however, to become increasingly complex unless they are rationalised. The time is now right to rationalise the existing ROE to cover two distinct operational requirements:

- a. Enforcement of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), and
- b. Military operations on the High Seas.

The Total Exclusion Zone

2. The ROE currently authorised for the enforcement of the TEZ remain valid, and no change is proposed to them. They take account of the potential need to launch attacks on targets inside the Zone from surface ships outside it.

The High Seas

3. The new limits proposed for the High Seas embrace all previous ROE areas outside the TEZ (10°S - 35°S, 35°S - 60°S and PARAQUET) and extend the scope of Operation CORPORATE North and East to include Ascension Island. The threefold aim is:

- a. to simplify Command and Control in the next stage of the Operation;
- b. to enhance the security of our own forces from pre-emptive attack; and

c. to counter possible action against prime "soft" targets such as our troopships and support ships and Ascension Island itself.

4. The proposed surface ROE to cover the new High Seas area are those already in force for the High Seas area South of 35°S. These have the following implications for areas not previously covered by them:

a. Rule 104 (Take only necessary action to achieve military task) would replace Rules 102 and 103 (Respond to aggression, but without excessive use of force) currently in force for High Seas North;

b. Argentinian combat aircraft would be deemed to be demonstrating hostile intent if they were to be detected within 40 miles of any of our forces (currently this distance only applies to combat aircraft detected by units enforcing the TEZ. 25 NM is the distance currently applicable in other cases).

c. For the purpose of assessing hostile intent, submarines detected outside a limit of 200 NM from the Brazilian and Uruguayan coasts (and the Islands of Trinidad and Martin Vaz) which were assessed to be conventional would be presumed to be Argentinian. This suffix (JULIETT) does not currently apply to High Seas North; and

d. Rule 206 (One enemy attack may be assumed to be the first in a series and other threatening enemy units may therefore be attacked) would enhance security against a multiple attack throughout the CORPORATE area.

The proposed SSN ROE to cover the High Seas differ from those in force inside the TEZ in that they exclude naval auxiliaries from attack as at present.

Additional ROE

5. The proposed instructions covering Argentinian surveillance and intelligence-gathering vessels are those already in force for the current CORPORATE area. Those for Argentinian surveillance aircraft have been slightly amended to provide for surveillance against UK units other than the Task Force (eg Ascension Island) and for the use of any type of UK interceptor aircraft.

Recommendation

6. OD(SA) is recommended to:
- a. Agree that the area to which ROE on the High Seas apply be extended to include operations around Ascension Island;
 - b. Agree that action against conventional submarines may be authorised within this extended area;
 - c. Approve the amended instructions at Annex C covering Argentinian surveillance aircraft;
 - d. Note that the Secretary of State for Defence has authorised the rationalisation of ROE in force as indicated at Annexes A and B and that this will take effect forthwith.

Annexes:

- A. Rules of Engagement for Enforcement of Falkland Islands TEZ.
- B. Rules of Engagement for Operation CORPORATE on High Seas outside Falkland Islands TEZ.
- C. Additional Rules of Engagement.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FALKLAND ISLANDS
TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

1. a. Exclusion Zone Limits. A circle 200 nm radius centred on position 51° 40' South 59° 30' West, from seabed to unlimited height.
- b. Applicability. Applicable to all UK forces directly engaged in enforcement of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ).
2. Time Limits. On receipt until further notice.
3. Recommended Policies.

POLITICALMEANINGEXPANSION

CHARLIE

Escalate

Enforce the Total Exclusion Zone, establishing a blockade to prevent the entry or exit of Argentinian surface ships, submarines and aircraft.

MILITARYSurface Ship and Aircraft

104

Commanding Officers and Aircraft Captains may take such action as is necessary to achieve their military task, but are not to exceed it.

- 123 Carry out attacks against designated
 ta ets with conventional weapons.
- and Caveat: Applicable to targets within TEZ only.
- with Suffixes:
- INDIA All vessels positively identified as
 ARGENTINIAN warships, submarines and
 naval auxiliaries (latter as
 designated separately).
- LIMA All aircraft positively identified
 as ARGENTINIAN AIR FORCE or
 ARGENTINIAN NAVAL aircraft.
- PAPA All aircraft which can be
 positively identified (eg by
 unloading on the ground or by
 dropping from the air stores
 or personnel) as carrying
 military supplies or military
 personnel.
- SIERRA All aircraft on the ground in
 the Falkland Islands.
- TANGO Runways and airport installations
 including airfield defences in the
 Falkland Islands.

UNIFORM All aircraft that cannot be positively identified because of cloud or light conditions.

123

With Suffixes:

GOLF All vessels positively identified as ARGENTINIAN warships and submarines (warships are to include only aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates, corvettes and armed patrol craft, MCM vessels, amphibious ships and craft).

HOTEL All aircraft positively identified as ARGENTINIAN combat aircraft. (Combat aircraft are to include only fighter, bomber, ground attack and LRMP aircraft and armed and ASW helicopters).

JULIETT All submarines detected which are assessed to be conventional may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN.

202 Authority is delegated to attempt to warn off all enemy units which constitute a threat.

(MERCHANT SHIPS WITHIN TEZ) (COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT WITHIN TEZ)

And Caveat: If application of Rule 202 is ineffective resort should be made to Rule 104.

205 Authority is delegated to attack any Non ARGENTINIAN ship, submarine or aircraft that units are included. demonstrates hostile intent.

With Suffix:

JULIETT All submarines detected which are assessed to be conventional may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN.

And Caveat: Any Argentinian warship or submarine detected within 25 miles and any Argentinian combat aircraft detected within 40 miles of UK Warships, RFAs or Supporting Ships is deemed to be demonstrating hostile intent.

206 Authority is delegated to assume that one attack by an (enemy) unit is the first in a planned multiple attack. All threatening units may be attacked in order to prevent a pre-emptive attack and ensure survivability (ARGENTINIAN).

207 For the purpose of self defence attack on one unit may be considered an attack on all other units in company.

- 208 Notwithstanding other Rules which may be in force the commander of a unit has the inherent right to use such force in self defence as may be necessary to protect his command and the lives of his men.
- 403 Maritime International Law is not to be broken unless it is necessary in order to achieve the aim.

<u>SSNs</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>EXPANSION</u>
THREE	All vessels positively identified as either an ARGENTINIAN aircraft carrier, destroyer, frigate, corvette or submarine may be attacked.	
FOUR	All vessels positively identified as ARGENTINIAN warships, submarines and naval auxiliaries may be attacked.	
	and Caveat: Applicable to targets within TEZ only.	
FIVE	Any submarine detected not classified nuclear may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN and may be attacked.	
TWELVE	After the first successful attack on a vessel continue patrol in accordance with ROE in force.	
THIRTEEN	Situation reports are to be made at discretion on all ARGENTINE units.	

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE ON HIGH SEAS
OUTSIDE FALKLAND ISLANDS TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

1. a. Area Limits. The South Atlantic between 5° and 60° South, and 5° and 70° West, excluding:
- (1) 12 nm territorial waters of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil.
- (2) Where Suffix JULIETT or SSN ROE FIVE is in force, the 200 nm claimed territorial seas of Brazil and Uruguay.
- b. Applicability. Applicable to all UK forces not directly engaged in enforcement of the TEZ.
2. Time Limits. On receipt until further notice.
3. Recommended Policy.

POLITICALMEANINGEXPANSION

CHARLIE

Escalate

To ensure success
of the mission to
restore UK
administration of
the Falkland Islands.

Surface Ships and Aircraft

104 Commanding Officers and Aircraft Captains may take such action as is necessary to achieve their military task, but are not to exceed it.

123 Carry out attacks against designated targets with conventional weapons.

With suffixes:

GOLF All vessels positively identified as ARGENTINIAN warships and submarines (warships are to include only aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and armed patrol craft, MCM vessels, amphibious ships and craft).

HOTEL All aircraft positively identified as ARGENTINIAN combat aircraft. (Combat aircraft are to include only fighter, bomber, ground attack and LRMP aircraft and armed and ASW helicopters).

JULIETT All submarines detected which are assessed to be conventional may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN.

IMPLICATIONS

There is a remote possibility that a neutral submarine may come under attack.

IMPLICATIONS

With Caveat: Suffix JULIETT is automatically
in abeyance within the claimed
200 nm territorial seas of Brazil
and Uruguay.

Lessens risk
of engaging non-
ARGENTINIAN
submarines.

202 Authority is delegated to attempt
to warn off all enemy units which
constitute a threat.
(MERCHANT SHIPS) (COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT)

205 Authority is delegated to attack any
ship, submarine or aircraft that
demonstrates hostile intent.

With Suffixes:

INDIA All vessels positively
identified as ARGENTINIAN
warships, submarines and
naval auxiliaries (latter as
designated separately).

JULIETT All submarines detected
which are assessed to be
conventional may be presumed
to be ARGENTINIAN.

With Caveat: Suffix JULIETT is
automatically in abeyance
within the claimed 200nm
territorial seas of
Brazil and Uruguay.

- And Caveat: Any Argentinian warship or submarine detected within 25 miles and any Argentinian combat aircraft detected within 40 miles of UK Warships, RFAs or Supporting Ships is deemed to be demonstrating hostile intent.
- 206 Authority is delegated to assume that one attack by an enemy unit is the first in a planned multiple attack. All threatening units may be attacked in order to prevent a pre-emptive attack and ensure survivability.
- (ARGENTINIAN)
- 207 For the purpose of self-defence, attack on one unit may be considered an attack on all other units in company.
- 208 Notwithstanding other Rules which may be in force the commander of a unit has the inherent right to use such force in self defence as may be necessary to protect his command and the lives of his men.
- 403 Maritime International Law is not to be broken unless it is necessary in order to achieve the aim.

SSNsMEANING

THREE All vessels positively identified as either an ARGENTINIAN aircraft carrier, destroyer, frigate, corvette or submarine may be attacked.

FIVE Any submarine detected not classified nuclear may be presumed to be ARGENTINIAN and may be attacked.

IMPLICATIONS

With Caveat: ROE FIVE is automatically in abeyance within the claimed 200 nm territorial seas of Brazil and Uruguay.

Lessens danger of engaging non-ARGENTINIAN submarines, but may put SSN at risk.

TWELVE After the first successful attack on a vessel continue patrol in accordance with ROE in force.

THIRTEEN Situation reports are to be made at discretion on all ARGENTINE units.

ADDITIONAL ROE1. Surveillance Aircraft

OP CORPORATE - ROE against surveillance aircraft.

a. When the ROE in force do not authorise engagement of an Argentine civil or military aircraft which has been positively identified both electronically and by visual observation by an intercepting aircraft as conducting surveillance of UK forces the following action is authorised:

- (1) An intercepting aircraft should use the internationally accepted signalling procedure to order the departure of the surveillance aircraft from the area.
- (2) If the Argentine aircraft does not comply the UK interceptor is to be ordered to fire across its path and to maintain harrassment until the aircraft clears the area.
- (3) If the Argentine aircraft fails to depart after this warning action has been taken it is to be destroyed.
- (4) The area is defined as radius 40 miles from the nearest British Unit.

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2. Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering Vessels

OPERATION CORPORATE - ROE against Argentinian surveillance and intelligence gathering vessels.

When an Argentine vessel is apparently engaging in surveillance of or intelligence gathering against UK forces the following action is authorised:

- a. The vessel is to be ordered to clear the area and warned that force will be used if it fails to comply.
- b. If the order and warning are ignored, minimum force, which may include the firing of warning shots, is to be used to secure the vessels withdrawal.
- c. If the vessel still fails to comply it may be fired upon and fire continued until it complies with the instructions given or sinks.