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FALKLANDS

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**REPORTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS:  
OPERATION CORPORATE-  
OPERATIONS  
IN THE  
SOUTH ATLANTIC  
MARCH to SEPTEMBER 1982**

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS VOLUME 600THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 1982:OPERATION CORPORATE

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- 60A            General Index to Operation CORPORATE papers held by the  
                 Naval Historical Branch.
- 60B and C     Daily Summary of Events.
- 60 D           Flag Officer First Flotilla (CTG 317.8)
- 60E            Commander Land Forces, Falkland Islands  
                 Commodore Amphibious Warfare
- 60R            Type 42 Destroyers.



H.M.S. ANTRIM  
BFPO SHIPS  
LONDON

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The Commander in Chief Fleet  
Eastbury Park  
Northwood  
Middlesex

8 July 1982

Sir,

OPERATION PARAQUET - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

1. I have the honour to submit the Report of Proceedings of Task Group 317.9 under my command from 7 April 1982 to 3 May 1982.
2. The Task Group was formed on 7 April 1982 when, with HMS PLYMOUTH (Captain D PIENITREATH Royal Navy), I was ordered to detach from Task Unit 317.8.1, to rendezvous with RFA TIDESPRING (Captain S REDMOND Royal Fleet Auxillary), and to proceed at best speed to ASCENSION ISLAND to arrive by 100800Z Apr 82.
3. The outline plan for Operation PARAQUET (CinCFleet AAA/19F 072230Z Apr 82) detailed HM Ships ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH, ENDURANCE (Captain N J BARKER Royal Navy), and RFA TIDESPRING, with a RM Company Group embarked, to form a forward combined force to re-establish British presence in SOUTH GEORGIA. RFA FORT AUSTIN (Commodore S C DUNLOP, MBE, Royal Fleet Auxillary) was to sail ASCENSION by 091200Z Apr to rendezvous with HMS ENDURANCE pm 11 Apr for solids replenishment, and to transfer sixteen personnel of No. 2 Special Boat Section RM and the Arctic rations/naphtha fuel for the RM Company Group. ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING were to embark the RM Company Group, stores and ammunition, additional naval personnel for ENDURANCE, and two Wessex 5 aircraft in TIDESPRING, at ASCENSION on 10/11 Apr and to sail by noon 11 Apr to rendezvous with ENDURANCE in vicinity 2600S 02000W on 14 Apr for RAS(L) ENDURANCE/TIDESPRING. Thence the Task Group was to proceed in company for SOUTH GEORGIA to arrive am 21 Apr and to be prepared for landing operations on arrival.
4. While on passage to ASCENSION ISLAND signals were received/intercepted (MGRM CDO Forces 19F/IRD 071340Z Apr 82 and CinCFleet 19F/IRD/QEX 080047Z Apr 82) from which the numbers of men and amount of ammunition/stores to be embarked were established. Proposals for embarkation were made in my 19F/IRD/QEX 082310Z Apr 82 which were not liked by MGRM Cdo Forces, who forwarded his preferred solution at his 19F/IRD/QEX 091254Z Apr 82. A compromise solution was forwarded at my 19F/IRD/QEX 091520Z Apr 82 which was the one eventually implemented and worked reasonably satisfactorily, although the accommodation and sanitary/hygiene arrangements of RFA TIDESPRING were severely stretched over the period of embarkation.

5. Also while on passage work was put in hand to convert the Admiral's day cabin in ANTRIM to become the military operations room, by the erection of wall boards for maps etc and the provision of additional tables for planning teams. These arrangements were subsequently improved during the course of the operation to include a full military communications centre. For this a hole was cut through the deckhead into the starboard bridge wing to run aerial leads for VHF, UHF, and HF circuits, jury aerials being rigged on the bridge roof and foremast. This ad hoc arrangement proved very successful during the recee and landing phases.
6. It was apparent that HM Ships ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH would require a substantial amount of essential stores/ammunition to bring both ships up to eight weeks endurance with the addition of the RM personnel. I therefore forwarded my intention to replenish both ships from RFA FORT AUSTIN after leaving ASCENSION (ANTRIM AAA/19F/LMM 082205Z Apr 82), demands to be placed after FORT AUSTIN had sailed to avoid compromise of Operation PARAQUET (GingFleet AAA/ACA/19F 080112Z Apr 82).
7. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH anchored off ASCENSION ISLAND at 100900Z Apr 82. A liaison party and stores working party were landed by helo prior to arrival to establish the embarkation programme, and embarkation of troops/stores by helicopter commenced at 1000Z. TIDESPRING, having been delayed by adverse weather, anchored off GEORGETOWN at 101400Z Apr 82. Embarkation of heavy stores and ammunition and M COY 42 Cdo personnel to her commenced on arrival by lighter and helicopter, and proceeded until 102200Z Apr, when work was terminated for the night to recommence at 110600Z Apr. During the evening of 10 Apr a MAGNAVEX Satellite Navigation installation was transferred from HMS SHEFFIELD to HMS ANTRIM by ship's staff and set to work after some initial problems. This equipment has proved invaluable in the South Atlantic.
8. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH weighed and proceeded at 110930Z to clear the anchor berth PLYMOUTH proceeded to rendezvous with RFA APPLELEAF to collect stores and replenish, while ANTRIM remained in the vicinity of ASCENSION continuing vertrep operations, and awaiting the completion of the stores lift and the embarkation of 845 Sqn C Flight in TIDESPRING. This was completed at 111130Z and TIDESPRING then weighed and proceeded being joined by ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH to the SW of the island. ANTRIM fuelled down track at 111330Z and then returned to the vicinity of ASCENSION ISLAND to await the arrival of further essential stores (cold weather clothing for all ships), while PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING proceeded towards the rendezvous with FORT AUSTIN. While awaiting the arrival of the aircraft with the cold weather clothing, I was advised from ashore that ANTRIM was also to embark the Arctic equipment for D Sqn SAS, embarked in FORT AUSTIN. This was done concurrently with the cold weather clothing, completing at 120100Z Apr. ANTRIM then departed ASCENSION ISLAND at 22 knots to rejoin PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING down track.
9. ANTRIM re-joined PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING at 130700Z Apr shortly after the rendezvous had been made with FORT AUSTIN. Fortunately the weather allowed a southerly replenishment course and ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH both replenished stores/victuals/ammunition during the forenoon of 13 Apr. FORT AUSTIN had rendezvoused with ENDURANCE on 12 Apr and had transferred one troop of D Squadron 22 SAS and No. 2 Special Boat Section RM together with their command/signals/liason teams and stores for M Company 42 Commando.

10. During the replenishment with FORT AUSTIN, Major C N G DELVES, Officer Commanding D Squadron 22 SAS, came on board and, in consultation with Major J M G SHERIDAN, Second in Command 42 Commando and Commander Landing Force, advised me that in view of the latest intelligence regarding Argentinian strength in SOUTH GEORGIA (CTG 317.0 AAA/19F 121230Z Apr 82) it was the military opinion that Task Group 317.9 should embark the whole of D Squadron SAS, together with the surgical team from FORT AUSTIN. Accordingly I discussed this with your Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral D J HALLIFAX, on the Satellite Communication secure speech facility and received his approval so to do. This unscheduled transfer of an additional 70-odd men and a very large quantity of stores/ammunition took some time to prepare and could not be conducted while alongside FORT AUSTIN. Accordingly it was conducted by helicopter vertrep commencing at 131500Z; the HQ/signals elements and two troops of D Squadron SAS, together with all SAS equipment/ammunition and the personnel of the surgical team, were transferred to ANTRIM, one troop of SAS to PLYMOUTH, and the surgical team's stores and equipment to TIDESPRING. It was a long and complex operation, hindered by weather and aircraft availability, and was not finally completed until 140015Z Apr, when FORT AUSTIN was detached to join TG 317.8.

11. During the initial planning for the operation I became concerned about the capability of TIDESPRING to support the task group should the landing be delayed, or become extended through weather or other problems. Accordingly I sent my signal 19J/LNM 140133Z Apr proposing that BRAMBLELEAF be diverted for pumover to a waiting position 500 miles NE of SOUTH GEORGIA. This was amplified in my 19J/142020Z Apr 82, after CLF and his staff had completed their initial assessment which indicated the requirement for up to five days covert reconnaissance before the main landing.

12. HMS ENDURANCE joined the task group during the forenoon of 14 April and successfully conducted RAS(L) with RFA TIDESPRING that afternoon, using an ad hoc astern rig. Fortunately the weather conditions were favourable with only a slight swell, otherwise it is doubtful whether the fuelling could have been achieved.

13. The task group was now complete and proceeded south at ENDURANCE's best speed of 13 knots. A strict EMCON policy was imposed including measures against the SOSS. It is assessed that these measures were successful and that the group's approach to and presence off SOUTH GEORGIA was undetected until after the initial recon parties had been inserted, and that even then its exact composition was not established by the Argentinians.

14. Your orders for Operation PARAQUET (CinCFleet Op Order 2/82 dated 121800Z Apr 82) was received by Nimrod airdrop at 0930 on 15 April and detailed planning commenced. The following threat assessment was made:

- a. Surface: negligible, as intelligence indications were that all enemy surface forces were redeployed in home waters or involved in operations within the FALKLAND ISLANDS MEZ. These forces were being progressively out flanked the further south TG 317.9 penetrated undetected.
- b. Sub Surface: slight. It was assessed that enemy submarine effort would be deployed in support of the FALKLAND MEZ.

## o. Air:

- (1) the offensive air threat from land based aircraft was assessed as nil from the mainland, and very slight from the FALKLAND ISLANDS. Intelligence indicated that progress in improving airfield facilities for the letter was slow, and in any case the weather pattern forecast for the SOUTH GEORGIA area militated against effective air operations. Carrier-based air attack from ARA VEINTICINO DE MAYO was possible if the carrier was deployed to within range, but this was assessed unlikely because of the UK SSN threat.
- (2) there was a significant air reconnaissance threat from ARGENTINIAN P2 and C130 aircraft, and from the SOSS, it being assessed that information from the latter would be communicated to the ARGENTINIANS. The Task Group's strictly covert EMCON policy and routing was designed to minimise this threat.

d. Land Forces: intelligence reports on the forces in SOUTH GEORGIA were conflicting but it was assessed that there were probably 50-60 Marines at GRITVIKEN and up to 20 in LEITH, with a further 15 "scrap metal workers" at the latter. This was based on the original landing figures and it was possible that reinforcements had been landed. Intelligence suggested that SOUTH GEORGIA might be stiffly defended but not "to the death" if confronted by superior force levels.

e. Weather: it was assessed that the weather would be a significant factor in the conduct of operations. Small boat/gemini operations from offshore would be impracticable, and most movement would have to be by helicopter. There was a likelihood of ice-bergs to the North and East of the island but discussion with HMS ENDURANCE indicated that our approach from this sector was feasible with proper caution, and would further increase the chance of remaining undetected. This approach was therefore made though in the event it proved that the ice-berg limit at that time was further to the East than forecast.

15. The main problem exercising my mind at this time was that of resolving the requirement to be in position to conduct the initial landings at first light on 21 Apr, against my perceived need to achieve the pumpover from BRAMBLELEAF before this, so that TIDESPRING, with the main landing force helicopter and troop elements embarked, was not impeded from quick reaction operations if required. Accordingly in my signal AAA/19J 162358Z Apr 82 I recommended implementation of an option to delay the landings to first light on 23 Apr which would allow both for the pumpover to be completed, and for a reduced speed of advance of the force. The latter was as a result of advice from ENDURANCE that the forecast weather en route would severely reduce his SOA.

16. Meanwhile military planning was proceeding, and the concept of operations was forwarded at my AAA/19J 171202Z Apr 82. This envisaged a three phase operation Phase 1 was the helo insertion of D Sqn SAS 19 Troop (M and AW) on the Western edge of the FORTUNA GLACIER with recon objectives at LEITH, HUSVIK and STROMNESS, and the helo/boat insertion of 2SBS RM in HOUND BAY with the objective of recon in CUMBERLAND BAY and the approaches to GRITVIKEN. Phase 2 was the gathering and correlation of intelligence by these teams, to be followed by Phase 3, the main landing. The plan for the latter depended on the results of the recon teams, but envisaged covert night insertion of the RM M COY Group and remaining SAS to conduct a daylight assault on the main Argentinian defensive position, probably at GRITVIKEN, and dealing with other enemy positions subsequently. The timescale forecast for Phases 1 and 2 was 5-6 days which meant that the military operation was planned to take at least a week. This further reinforced my desire to achieve the BRAMBLELEAF/TIDESPRING pumpover as early as possible.

17. To meet the pumpover requirement you diverted BRAMBLELEAF towards South Georgia ordering her to rendezvous at 5300S 03400W (about 100 miles NE of the island) in your AAA/I9J 171700Z Apr 82 and assigning TACON to me in your AAA/I9J 172035Z Apr 82. BRAMBLELEAF reported her ETA at this rendezvous as 211500Z Apr which would have permitted the pumpover before landings took place in accordance with my proposed option to delay them until first light 23 Apr. I inferred implicit approval of this later date from your AAA/I9J 172120Z Apr 82, which referred to "capitalizing on your later date of approach"

18. However, on 18 Apr your Chief of Staff informed me on the satellite secure speech system that, because of political requirements, I was to be in position for the original date of 21 Apr. The pumpover was to take place as early as possible, compatible with operational requirements, so that BRAMBLELEAF could be released to support other elements of TF 317. Accordingly the course of the group was altered to the direct track for SOUTH GEORGIA, accepting our earlier entry into Argentinian air recon cover, and I reported my intentions in my AAA/I9J 181959Z Apr 82. I assessed that, given favourable weather conditions, the group would arrive 30 miles North of CUMBERLAND BAY at 210600Z Apr, ready to commence recon insertions if ordered, and that the main landing would be on the night of 26 Apr. The pumpover would be conducted 22 Apr, or as soon thereafter as circumstances permitted, though this might entail retaining BRAMBLELEAF as late as 30 Apr. My priorities for the VICTOR MRR aircraft tasked in support on 20 Apr were for a shipping / ice-berg plot North and East of the island in advance of the group, thereafter to give advanced warning of any Argentinian surface deployments.

19. The next two days were spent in detailed planning and briefing, and in completing a considerable intership exchange of personnel and equipment to get the right people and things into the right places at the right time. It was decided that the insertion of the SAS troop on the FORTUNA GLACIER would be conducted by Wessex 3/5 from ANTRIM and TIDESPRING from a position 10 miles North of ANTARCTIC BAY, while PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE proceeded to the East of the island to land 2 SBS from the later by helo/boat into HOUND BAY.

20. During the latter stages of the approach on 20 Apr the weather started to worsen with rapidly falling pressure and wind NW 25 knots. However, it was possible to maintain a sufficient SOA to reach the launch positions on time. Codeword DANDELION, the authority to initiate landing operations, was received p.m. 20 Apr.

21. ANTRIM and TIDESPRING were in position for the first recon insertion at 210800Z Apr, but the weather was unsuitable with 25 knots of wind from the NW, 2 miles visibility with 400 feet cloudbase and a rapidly falling pressure at 965 mb. A weather recon was flown by ANTRIM's Wessex 3 at 0930Z, which found suitable conditions and was followed by an insertion attempt at 1100Z using this aircraft and TIDESPRING's two Wessex 5s. This was aborted by a heavy snowstorm. However, a further attempt was successful during a temporary improvement in conditions.

22. ANTRIM and TIDESPRING then retired to a holding position 30 miles off CAPE CONSTANCE from which SAS recon communications could be monitored. The weather rapidly deteriorated during the afternoon and evening with the wind backing SW and gusting up to 70 knots, both ships having to heave to until the storm abated during the morning of 22 Apr.

23. Meanwhile PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE had proceeded to the East of the island during the day of 21 Apr conducting an ice and marship recce during daylight hours. The British Antarctic Survey base at ST ANDREW'S BAY was also visited and the personnel there warned that British warships were in the vicinity and that, for security reasons, this should not be revealed in conversations on the BAS field radio circuit. They reported having seen no Argentinian movements since the day of the invasion. ENDURANCE then proceeded into HOUND BAY to land the 2 SBS advance recce team at last light while PLYMOUTH remained covering to seaward. This landing was also delayed by the weather but was finally achieved at 0300Z on 22 Apr. ENDURANCE had to anchor to launch the geminis and suffered a windloss motor failure, as a result of which she had to buoy and slip her starboard anchor and three shackles of cable.

24. It had been intended to rendezvous with BRAMBLELEAF for pumpover on 22 Apr but, because of the weather, it was decided to postpone this. PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were ordered to remain in the comparative shelter to the East of SOUTH GEORGIA, while ANTRIM and TIDESPRING remained to the North, with BRAMBLELEAF holding in the rendezvous position.

25. At 221100Z Apr the commander of the SAS recce troop on the FORTUNA GLACIER called for immediate evacuation. The appalling weather experienced had prevented any progress, and casualties were expected due to the extreme cold. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 and both Wessex 5's from TIDESPRING were launched at 1200Z, but could not locate the party in heavy snow showers. After refuelling they were relaunched for a further attempt at 1330Z. The party was found and embarked, but on take-off one Wessex 5 ran into whiteout conditions and crashed. Its aircrew and passengers were transferred to the remaining aircraft but, on relaunching, the second Wessex 5 also crashed. The Wessex 3 returned to ANTRIM, landed its passengers and returned to the scene with a medical team. It was unable to reach the crash area because of the conditions, but made contact with the survivors on emergency radio and established that, miraculously, there were no casualties. Having recovered to ANTRIM and refuelled the aircraft launched again at 1630Z, and successfully recovered all the remainder of the party ashore. The circumstances of this incident were reported in my signals AAA/19J 221500Z, 221547Z and 221725 Apr 82.

26. The loss of these two aircraft considerably reduced my flexibility in conducting the operation but did not compromise its completion, as the concept was for the main landing to be made at night by boat and gemini. The immediate priority was to gather intelligence on the enemy dispositions ashore, and it was therefore decided to land another SAS recce party against LEITH by gemini from ANTRIM into STROMNESS BAY during the night 22/23 Apr. Accordingly I issued revised orders for the night in my AAA/19J 221958Z. PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were to land the back-up element of the SBS recce troop at HOUND BAY, and ANTRIM was to land an SAS recce troop in STROMNESS, while TIDESPRING and BRAMBLELEAF held clear to the North. All ships were to rendezvous in position at 230900Z Apr for RAS and pumpover.

27. ANTRIM entered STROMNESS BAY at 230400Z and disembarked D Sqn SAS Boat Troop by gemini to GRASS ISLAND. Considerable difficulty was experienced with starting the outboard engines although they had been running on deck prior to launch, to the extent that at one stage it appeared that the operation might have to be abandoned. Indeed at 230800Z Apr, while proceeding to rendezvous

with the rest of the group, I received a distress call informing me that one gemini and crew were drifting uncontrollably out to sea from STROMNESS BAY. Accordingly I closed the coast and launched my Wessex 3 to search, while PLYMOUTH was ordered to take charge of the BRAMBLELEAF/TIDESPRING pumlover. The gemini was located in the vicinity of JASON ISLAND, off the entrance to CUMBERLAND BAY, and its occupants successfully recovered. ANTRIM then opened from the coast but remained within 25 miles to monitor the communication nets for both recce parties.

28. At about 231130Z Apr I received a report from ENDURANCE that the BAS party at SCHLIEFER BAY had seen an unidentified aircraft overhead at 231030Z. This correlated with an I-Band aircraft racket held by ANTRIM and reported in my AAA/19J 231147Z Apr 82, which was identified as probable C-130 HERCULES in your AAA/19J 231345Z Apr 82. This aircraft, relieved by a second one, continued surveillance throughout daylight hours, closing PLYMOUTH and the tanker group to visual identification range at 231155Z Apr. All ships maintained radar silence and it is believed that the composition of the force was not established by the enemy.

29. At 231456Z Apr ENDURANCE intercepted an HF RAFT transmission equating to a submarine emission, which was replied to by the shore-based submarine broadcast. Signal strength was strong and indicated that it originated within 100 miles. Shortly afterwards your AAA/19J 231450Z Apr 82 was received warning that the ARA SANTA FE might be in the vicinity of SOUTH GEORGIA and ordering me to take appropriate precautions. This was further amplified by a DSS call with your Chief of Staff who informed me that there was firm intelligence to indicate that the SANTA FE was in the area and that it was most important to safeguard the two tankers. I also discussed with him the problem of the HERCULES/707 air surveillance that the group was under, and the vital need to be allowed the Rules of Engagement to deal with them as military assistance aircraft, particularly as they could locate and target the force for the SANTA FE.

30. Meanwhile I ordered PLYMOUTH, about 60 miles to the East with the two tankers and ENDURANCE, to break off the pumlover and withdraw south to clear the submarine area. Subsequently I ordered all ships to rendezvous about 40 miles North East of the island, which was accomplished at about 2200Z.

31. During the course of the afternoon a message was received from the 2 SBS recce party reporting that the ice and glacier conditions in EAST CUMBERLAND BAY were such that no progress could be made and requesting withdrawal.

32. The whole aspect of the SOUTH GEORGIA operation had now changed completely. The problems with the shore recce parties meant that no intelligence on enemy dispositions had been gained, or would be in the immediate future except at LEITH. Both of the group's Wessex 5s had been lost reducing the lift capacity drastically, the force was under surveillance from the air, and there was a high submarine threat. The group's ASW capability was very limited, particularly since the sonar equipment had been removed from ANTRIM's Wessex 3 in favour of troop lift capacity, and HMS BRILLIANT (Captain J F COWARD, Royal Navy), who had been detached to reinforce TG 317.9, could not join before a.m. 25 Apr.

33. I therefore made a complete re-appreciation which was outlined in my signals 19J 232225Z (SITREP and intentions) and AAA/19J 232235Z Apr 82 (Appreciation). I assessed that SANTA FE could be in position to threaten ships off CUMBERLAND BAY a.m. 24 Apr and that, with my remaining helo lift I could not re-dispose the landing force in time to make a viable landing beforehand. I further assessed that it was important to get a military base established ashore as soon as possible and that the assets available in ANTRIM would be sufficient to take LEITH. However, it would be disastrous military and politically to lose a ship without

having achieved the aim of re-capturing SOUTH GEORGIA, and so the LEITH operation could only be conducted if the risk was minimal.

34. I therefore issued the following instructions for the night of 23/24 Apr:
- PLYMOUTH, BRAMBLELEAF and TIDESPRING to clear the MEZ to the North East overnight, complete pumpover during 24 Apr and rendezvous with BRILLIANT.
  - ANTRIM to enter STROMNESS BAY to land troops at first light 24 Apr at STROMNESS to take LEITH, to provide NGS as required and, on completion, withdraw at best speed to rendezvous with main group.
  - ENDURANCE to proceed to HOUND BAY to recover SBS recce party at first light 24 Apr, then to withdraw to East and remain covert in the shelter of the ice.
  - In the longer term the group would assume an ASW posture to prosecute the SANTA FE.
35. Shortly before ANTRIM was to detach for the STROMNESS task the group again came under C130 HERCULES air radar cover. It was assessed that the risk of ANTRIM thereby being targetted to the SANTA FE and possibly trapped while conducting the landings was unacceptable. This operation was therefore cancelled by my AAA/I9J 240220Z Apr 82, and ANTRIM proceeded North with the RAS group.

36. During the night further intelligence received from you indicated that SANTA FE's tasks were to land troops in SOUTH GEORGIA (presumably reinforcements) and to attack British ships in the vicinity. As all ships had been withdrawn from the approaches to GRITVIKEN and LEITH I assessed it probable that he would land his troops first and that there was a possibility that this would be during daylight on 24 Apr. LEITH was covered by the SAS recce team, and I ordered ENDURANCE, recovering the SBS recce party from the vicinity of HOUND BAY, to conduct covert surveillance of CUMBERLAND BAY and GRITVIKEN during daylight hours with AS12 armed Wasps, in the hope of catching the submarine on the surface as it entered. Also during the night the authorisation to engage Argentinian C130 and 707 aircraft engaged in surveillance of operations was received.

37. HM Submarine CONQUEROR (Commander C L WREFORD-BROWN, Royal Navy) was moved by you from his covering position North West of SOUTH GEORGIA into the areas immediately North of the island to conduct operations against the SANTA FE. Welcome though this was, I was somewhat concerned about the danger of friendly interaction and the resultant implications of surface ship ASW capabilities. I therefore made a further re-assessment of the situation and my intentions in my AAA/I9J 241400Z Apr 82. The key to the situation was the neutralisation of SANTA FE, about which I could do little unaided reinforced by BRILLIANT, and until ANTRIM's Wessex 3 was re-configured for ASW. I therefore decided to conduct the BRAMBLELEAF/TIDESPRING pumpover clear of the MEZ on 24 Apr and to replenish ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and BRILLIANT on completion, before the warships returned South to commence operations against SANTA FE on 25 Apr. The plan was to operate clear of, but adjacent to, CONQUEROR's area in the hope of forcing SANTA FE to snort/use high speed to close us, thereby allowing detection opportunities to CONQUEROR. Concurrently we would attempt to draw the Argentinian

recee aircraft into missile range. TIDESPRING, with the main elements of M Coy RM embarked, would remain clear of the MEZ to the North, while ENDURANCE would take shelter among the ice-bergs on completion of operations in HOUND BAY.

38. During the afternoon of 24 Apr ENDURANCE reported being overflowed by a BOEING 707 recee aircraft while in HOUND BAY and assessed he had been detected. Shortly afterwards he relayed an intercepted message from the BAS personnel at BIRD ISLAND reporting the sighting of two warships, two small jets and a BOEING 707 aircraft in their vicinity. ENDURANCE assessed that he was in a possible multi-threat situation and requested support. There was no collateral for the presence of enemy warships in the area, nor was it considered likely that the Argentinians had the capability to deploy in-flight refuelled ground attack aircraft over SOUTH GEORGIA, particularly since intelligence indicated that little progress had been made in improvements to the PORT STANLEY runway in the FALKLANDS. Nevertheless the threat could not be discounted. The pumpover was stopped and I issued revised instructions in my AAA/19J 241656Z Apr 82. BRAMBLELEAF was to proceed North West to replenish BRILLIANT en route and then as ordered by CTO 317.8. BRILLIANT was to close SOUTH GEORGIA at 25 knots on completion. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH were to replenish from TIDESPRING and then proceed at 25 knots to join ENDURANCE in the vicinity of HOUND BAY, leaving TIDESPRING holding in a position clear of the MEZ to await further orders.

39. While ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH were replenishing contact was made with BRILLIANT through his Lynx helicopter, revealing that he was closer than anticipated. Accordingly the plan was changed, BRAMBLELEAF being released completely and BRILLIANT being ordered to replenish from TIDESPRING en route.

40. Shortly after this your AAA/19J 241525Z Apr 82 was received informing me that CONQUEROR's areas were being extended to cover the whole of the North and North East coasts of SOUTH GEORGIA. This effectively closed the whole of these sea areas to me for ASW operations except against surfaced submarines, and caused a further revision to my overnight plans. Nevertheless, ENDURANCE having reported no sign of SANTA FE during daylight on 24 Apr, I assessed it probable that the submarine would enter CUMBERLAND BAY that night, and that it was vital that we should be in a position to catch him on the surface at first light, when he could be expected to be departing.

41. Accordingly I ordered ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and BRILLIANT to rendezvous in a position about 25 miles North East of CUMBERLAND BAY, clear of CONQUEROR's expanded area, at 250800Z Apr. ANTRIM's Wessex 3, armed with two Mk II depth charges, was to launch at 0800Z to be off the entrance to CUMBERLAND BAY by first light, one of BRILLIANT's Lynxes with Mk 46 torpedoes was to launch at 0830Z for surface search, to confirm or otherwise the presence of enemy surface units, and the Wasps from PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were to be at Alert 10 from 0830Z, armed with AS 12 in the anti surface role. ENDURANCE had again to be in the vicinity of HOUND BAY, which was in CONQUEROR's revised area, and so I obtained your permission for this. ASW weapons were tight except against a surfaced submarine, or a positively identified conventional submarine if submerged, although I assessed that it was unlikely that CONQUEROR would actually reach the CUMBERLAND BAY area much before 251600Z Apr.

42. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 launched at 0810 and shortly afterwards detected a surface contact 5 miles North of the entrance to CUMBERLAND BAY. This was positively identified as SANTA FE on the surface at 0855Z and the Wessex immediately attacked with its two Mk II Depth Charges both of which exploded very close to the submarine, one infact bouncing off the casing into the water. BRILLIANT's Lynx was called in and dropped one Mk 46 torpedo which was believed to have run but did not acquire the surface contact (It is of interest that the SANTA FE's Captain, Capitan de Corbeta BICAIN, later admitted that on sighting the helicopter he decided to remain on the surface to avoid the torpedo threat; he did not bargain on Depth Charges and air to surface missiles!). PLYMOUTH's and ENDURANCE's Wasps were launched and made a number of AS12 attacks on the submarine, which was by this time returning to GRITVIKEN on the surface leaving a trail of oil. Several hits were made on the fin and it was assessed as disabled. However, the pressure was kept on until it had berthed alongside the BAS jetty at KING EDWARD COVE.

43. It was now obvious that our presence must be known to the Argentinian garrison, so the opportunity was taken while the helicopters were in CUMBERLAND BAY to conduct reconnaissance of any military dispositions. It was reported that there was no sign of any activity ashore, nor could any distinct observation posts nor defensive positions be seen although machine gun fire was reported. In consultation with the Commander Landing Force, Major J M G SHERIDAN, and Officer Commanding D Squadron 22 SAS, Major C N G DELVES, I decided to land troops to secure GRITVIKEN as soon as possible. Preparations were immediately put in hand, with all available embarked forces being brought to one hours notice for landing at 1040Z. I also ordered TIDESPRING, with the main elements embarked, to close SOUTH GEORGIA forthwith and, with SANTA FE neutralised, requested you to clear CONQUEROR from the area to avoid possible interaction.

44. It was decided to conduct the initial landing with the troops available in ANTRIM, comprising M Coy Command element and mortar troop, D Squadron command and signals troop and the M and AW troop, 2 SBS command and signals element, 148 Battery RA, and ANTRIM's RM detachment - a total of 79 men. The remaining SAS and SBS personnel and RM detachments in PLYMOUTH, BRILLIANT and ENDURANCE, totalling a further 62 men, were to be held in reserve ready to conduct flanking landings if required. The main landing was to be made on the flat ground of the HESTESLETTEN to the South of GRITVIKEN. Pre-bombardment of the landing zone and of the high ground between it and GRITVIKEN was to be conducted by ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH with spotting provided by an NGSFO in one of ENDURANCE's Wasps.

45. Planning, briefing and preparations took about three hours and at 1400 the pre-bombardment of the HESTESLETTEN and the approaches to GRITVIKEN commenced. The assault helicopter lift, provided by ANTRIM's Wessex 3 and both of BRILLIANT's Lynxes, launched at 1430Z and landed the first troops on time at 1445Z. These three aircraft landed all 79 men from a range of around 8 miles in 45 minutes which was a very creditable effort. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH continued supporting NGS ahead of the advancing troops, ANTRIM entering CUMBERLAND BAY at 1640Z to improve communications and to open arcs into the GRITVIKEN/KING EDWARD COVE area if necessary. The troops ashore met no opposition, and at 1705Z a white flag was observed to be hoisted alongside the Argentinian flag at KING EDWARD COVE. The advance continued with caution and at 1715Z the Argentinian commander ashore notified surrender on VHF Channel 16

and warned that the area around KING EDWARD COVE was heavily land-mined and that British forces should take care and be led through by the Argentinian garrison. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 was launched immediately with a medical team to evacuate any casualties. Fortunately there was only one, a sailor from the SANTA FE, who had been injured during the attacks on the submarine. He had been badly injured in the right leg, which had been amputated above the knee by the Argentinian medical team ashore, and was brought onboard ANTRIM for medical attention overnight, being transferred to the surgical unit in TIDESPRING a.m. on 26 Apr. There was some suspicion that he had trodden on one of their own mines at the time, but this subsequently proved to be false.

46. At 1730Z the Union Flag and White Ensign flew together over GRITVIKEN and the task of consolidation began. ANTRIM anchored off KING EDWARD POINT and commenced to ferry equipment and stores to the troops ashore who had some 140 prisoners to secure and guard. Structurally the buildings and facilities ashore were largely intact but there had been some looting/vandalism by the Argentinians and a major cleaning up operation was required. Technical Assistants from ANTRIM was provided to service the generating plant, electrical and fresh water services which were near breakdown because of neglect.

47. The surrender at 1715Z had, it was understood included all Argentinian forces in SOUTH GEORGIA. At 1815Z I therefore detached PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE, with one of BRILLIANT's Lynxes embarked, to secure LEITH with their embarked SAS and SBS troops who were not required at GRITVIKEN. BRILLIANT was ordered to remain at sea to patrol the offshore areas overnight while TIDESPRING, closing from the North, was ordered to an area inshore of BRILLIANT to prepare to disembark the remainder of M Coy and receive casualties.

48. PLYMOUTH's report of proceedings of the securing of LEITH is at Annex A. Suffice it to say that after, some initial defiance over the radio, the 13 Argentinian Marines, commanded by Captain ASTIZ, agreed to surrender without fighting. Together with 39 civilian scrap metal workers this now meant that the task group had nearly 200 detainees and prisoners of war.

49. The Argentinian Commander Land Forces (Capitan de Fregato LAGOS) and the Commanding Officer SANTA FE (Capitan de Fregato BICAIN) were brought onboard ANTRIM at about 2030Z. In accordance with your instructions they were not interrogated. However, in conversation while being given a meal, LAGOS admitted that he had been sent with 20 men in SANTA FE to reinforce GRITVIKEN, but that he had not had time to strengthen the defences. (There was a great deal of weaponry and ammunition ashore). BICAIN was ambivalent about his orders in regard to sinking our ships but, although he alleged that he was returning to ARGENTINA, I was quite sure from his manner that he was tasked against us. Both officers had spent some time in UK on various courses, BICAIN having dtdod by one of the Argentinian Type 42's in build, and spoke rather better English than they admitted. Regrettably, such had been the pace and unexpectedness of events, I had not had time to prepare a formal instrument of surrender before they were returned ashore that night, and this had to be completed on an opportunity basis on 26 Apr.

50. The 26, 27 and 28 Apr were spent in a complex and time consuming ship to shore, shore to ship and ship to ship transfer of personnel and equipment,

aggravated by gale force winds and snow showers which made conditions very difficult and, on occasion, distinctly hazardous. A further complication was added by the force continuing to be under surveillance by enemy reconnaissance aircraft, necessitating a continual air defence posture in case the aircraft could be lured close enough to engage, and in case an air attack was mounted.

51. Your I9F 261531Z Apr 82 ordered me to embark all SAS, SBS (including section from CONQUEROR), and NGFS personnel and stores into BRILLIANT and PLYMOUTH for transfer as soon as possible to TG 317.8. Fortunately it was decided not to garrison LEITH as well as GRITVIKEN, but in the prevailing conditions it was not possible to complete all transfers until 281330Z Apr at which time both ships detached.

52. On 26 Apr I tasked Captain J E COWARD, Royal Navy of HMS BRILLIANT to conduct a survey of the SANTA FE, assisted by technical officers from ANTRIM. He did so and reported to me that the submarine was in a dangerous state and likely to sink alongside the BAS jetty, but that the thought it feasible to move it across the bay to the old whaling station at GRITVIKEN. I approved this course of action and accordingly Captain COWARD, assisted by Capitan de Fregato BICAIN and a number of key Argentinian ratings moved the submarine under its own power later that day. While moving the submarine began to lose buoyancy and there was a tragic incident when the RM guard in its control room shot dead a senior Argentinian technical rating, Chief Petty Officer ARTUSO. The latter moved quickly to start the LP air pumps to maintain flotation, which was misunderstood by the guard as an attempt to scuttle the submarine. I reported this unfortunate affair in my CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/wsc 262012Z Apr 82 (Fatal Accident), and convened a Board of Inquiry, the results of which were forwarded at my letter 502/4 dated 5 May 1982. Chief Petty Officer ARTUSO was subsequently buried in the GRITVIKEN cemetery with full military honours on 30 Apr. The Guard, bugler and pall-bearers were provided by ANTRIM, and the ceremony was attended by Capitan de Fregato BICAIN and a number of his shipmates.

53. On completion of the SAS/SBS transfers on 28 Apr, ANTRIM, ENDURANCE and TIDESPRING continued with consolidation of SOUTH GEORGIA. ANTRIM provided additional support to M Coy, RM in clearing up and setting to work in GRITVIKEN, AND SUPPLIED ENOUGH FOOD TO BRING THE GARRISON UP TO 60 days endurance. TIDESPRING completed disembarking M Coy personnel and stores and embarked all the Argentinian prisoners of war and detainees. ENDURANCE started work at LEITH, clearing a considerable amount of booty-trapping, explosives and ammunition, and contacted all BAS/TV personnel on the island on the BAS radio net acquainting them of the situation, and warning them to be ready to be collected at short notice. I was therefore less than enchanted to be shaken in the middle of the night 28/29 Apr for a Prime Ministerial enquiry on behalf of Lord Buxton (MODUK 19F/19J 282225Z Apr 82) which alleged that no contact had been made with the BAS/TV personnel since the island had been re-captured. Indeed the party from the LYELL GLACIER walked into GRITVIKEN on the morning of 29 Apr, and I met them there.

54. The Master of TIDESPRING and I were becoming increasingly concerned about the conditions under which the prisoners had to be accommodated in TIDESPRING. Besides severe overcrowding, discomfort and lack of sanitary facilities, the extreme cold, against which little protection could be provided, was thought to be a danger to health. Some unrest and defiance had occurred, particularly in the group in which was Captain ASTIZ and, at the Master's request, I transferred ASTIZ to ANTRIM where he was kept in close custody in a spare cabin. Because of the requirement to pumpover between BRITISH BSK and BLUE ROVER it appeared probable that the latter and PLYMOUTH could not arrive at SOUTH GEORGIA

before 7 May to take over guardship duties. Delaying the departure of ANTRIM and TIDESPRING until then would mean that the prisoners would remain in these poor conditions for nearly three weeks, ten days of which would have been spent, apparently doing nothing, in the extreme conditions off SOUTH GEORGIA. I therefore made my signal I9J 301810Z Apr 82 proposing that ANTRIM and TIDESPRING departed early for the latter to reach warmer water, which would leave SOUTH GEORGIA with only ENDURANCE as guard ship for 2 - 3 days until PLYMOUTH arrived. In the circumstances, with the main group approaching the Falkland TEZ and under surveillance, I considered this a justifiable risk.

55. ENDURANCE was ordered to cease operations at LEITH p.m. 29 Apr, and to proceed to pick up BAS/TV personnel from their various locations around the island, so that they could spend a day at GRITVIKEN to sort personal belongings, stores, equipment, etc before embarking in ANTRIM for an estimated departure date of 3 May. Meanwhile ANTRIM collected BAS stores from LYELL GLACIER, and recovered SAS equipment from the crash site on the FORTUNA GLACIER.

56. Your I9F/LDQ/LMQ 011045Z May 82, which ordered ANTRIM to embark BAS parties and sail from SOUTH GEORGIA not later than 021200Z May, was received at 1300Z on 1 May. ANTRIM immediately closed ENDURANCE, who was at the Western end of the island, for an early transfer of BAS personnel, and returned to GRITVIKEN to land them for their visit. TIDESPRING was also sailed, to proceed North towards warmer water as soon as possible.

57. BAS personnel, plus ANTRIM personnel who had been ashore assisting M Coy, were re-embarked from GRITVIKEN a.m. 2 May, and ANTRIM departed at 1200Z to re-join TIDESPRING. ENDURANCE was left in local command to progress the tasks required, which were detailed in my I9J 011630Z May 82.

58. ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING rendezvoused in position 5000S 04400W, about 200 miles North West of SOUTH GEORGIA, at 031200Z May. PLYMOUTH replenished from TIDESPRING, who then detached in company with ANTRIM for ASCENSION ISLAND. On detaching the duties of CTG 317.9 were assumed by Captain D PERTREATH, Royal Navy of HMS PLYMOUTH.

59. ANTRIM and TIDESPRING made an eventful passage North, coming under intermittent surveillance by Argentinian BOEING 707 reconnaissance aircraft. Rendezvous was made with TU 317.0.4 (HMS ANTELOPE, RFA's SIR GALAHAD, SIR LANCELOT, SIR TRISTRAM, SIR PERCIVAL, SIR GERAINT and PEARLEAF) at first light on 7 May. Captain ASTIZ, all BAS/TV personnel, mail and stores were transferred to ANTELOPE. I then assumed the duties of CTU 317.0.4 and proceeded South with the LSL group, while ANTELOPE and TIDESPRING continued to ASCENSION ISLAND. ANTRIM's participation in Operation PARAQUAT was complete.

60. The following comments are submitted:

- a. Bad weather was expected off SOUTH GEORGIA, but that experienced during the week of the operation exceeded all expectations. High winds and frequent snow showers made flying operations marginal for much of the time, and boat/gemini operations impossible except in sheltered bays. Many risks had to be taken and safety considerations ignored, in order to achieve the aim. It was very fortunate that no casualties resulted.

b. The terrain of SOUTH GEORGIA is much more inhospitable than it appears to be according to the maps, as the reconnaissance parties discovered. Both GRITVIKEN and LIETH are land locked by rugged mountains making frontal approaches the only viable option in winter conditions. Had the Argentinians made any significant preparations, these natural defensive positions would have proved hard nuts to crack, and the task group, even before the loss of the two Wessex 5s, would have been short of assault helicopter lift.

c. The presence of the SANTA FE put a completely new complexion on the operation and, had we not been able to neutralise it so early, it would have resulted in a very extended timescale.

d. Communications with you through the satellite MRL and the secure speech link, were excellent throughout. The latter was particularly useful for exchanging real time intelligence and information, particularly in regard to the SANTA FE, and contributed greatly to the successful conclusion of the operation. The CT team in ENDURANCE made an extremely valuable contribution, but were very over-worked. The provision of back up, or of a further team with in the group, would have been very welcome.

e. An unexpectedly large number of prisoners and civilian detainees were taken. Processing this number without trained personnel and linguists proved difficult and time consuming. As many of them were illiterate and of low intelligence, getting the bare information required by the Geneva Convention was not easy, let alone attempting to elicit the additional facts requested by MODUK.

f. The mounting and conduct of the operation was at a very high need to know classification throughout. No press releases were therefore made, or even considered, by me as CTG, it being assumed that your staff would extract what facts were required from my situation reports. After the landing a few press releases were made at your request, which were difficult to compile within the continuing high classification. This led to an acerbic exchange of signals between myself, the Captain of the Fleet, and the Fleet PRO. It was appreciated that disinformation regarding the composition of the force was important, but some of the factual inaccuracy of the media reports that filtered back was disappointing and annoying. The BBC World Service was very valuable in keeping me informed of diplomatic events, but its speculation about military movements was not so welcome - and positively the reverse when it was announced on the very morning on which we arrived and inserted the first recon landings that: "a British force is poised off SOUTH GEORGIA". The difficulties are well appreciated, but it is recommended that in future operations of this covert nature all press releases are made by your staff, based on filtered factual information from the commanders on the spot, and that the latter not be invited to make them separate from his operational reports.

61. In conclusion I am glad to report the successful completion of Operation PARQUET, in accordance with your directive for the minimum loss of life and damage to installations. I am also proud to record that the officers and men of the task group, and of the embarked forces, conducted themselves magnificently during the operation in very arduous and unpleasant conditions.

OPERATION BRAYO - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

OPERATION BRAYO

LIST OF ANNEXES

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

- A. COMMANDING OFFICER, HMS PLYMOUTH'S 230 DATED 24 APRIL 1982
- B. INTRODUCTION
- C. SUMMARY
- D. DETAILED PROCEEDINGS
- E. COMMUNICATIONS

B G YOUNG, DSO  
Captain, Royal Navy

Annex:

- A. Commanding Officer HMS PLYMOUTH's Report of Proceedings for the re-occupation of LEITH 25-26 Apr 82.

Information:

Flag Officer First Flotilla

- J. WEAPONS ENGINEERING
- K. LOGISTICS
- L. STAFF
- M. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
- N. MEDICAL
- O. PUBLIC RELATIONS

UK EYES BRAYO

SECRET

SECRET  
UK EYES BRAVOHMS ANTRIM'S 226 DATED 8 JULY 1982 - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGSOPERATION PARAQUATLIST OF ANNEXES

- A. COMMANDING OFFICER, HMS PLYMOUTH'S 226 DATED 29 APRIL 1982
- B. INTELLIGENCE
- C. WARFARE
- D. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- E. COMMUNICATIONS
- F. AVIATION
- G. METEOROLOGY
- H. PREPARATIONS
- I. MARINE ENGINEERING
- J. WEAPON ENGINEERING
- K. LOGISTICS
- L. PEOPLE
- M. PRISONERS OF WAR
- N. MEDICAL
- O. PUBLIC RELATIONS

UK EYES BRAVO

SECRET

UK EYES BRAVO

CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX A to the Captain  
HMS ANTRIM's letter number  
226 of The Captain  
8 July 82 Sixth Frigate Squadron  
HMS Plymouth  
BFPO Ships

22

226

The Commanding Officer  
HMS ANTRIM  
South Georgia

29 April 1982

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings of Her Majesty's Ships PLYMOUTH, under my command, and ENDURANCE (Captain N J Barker, RN) for the period 25-26 April 1982 when detached from HMS ANTRIM, while reoccupying Leith, South Georgia.
2. The action off Cumberland Bay on 25 April 1982, when PLYMOUTH's and ENDURANCE's Wasps had successfully engaged the Argentinian submarine SANTA FE with AS-12 missiles, and PLYMOUTH had subsequently fired 166 rounds of HE at various NGS shore targets in the Grytviken area had whetted our appetites for further action, and it was with eager anticipation that I received your orders to proceed to Leith at 1815 with ENDURANCE in company.
3. PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE proceeded to the west and stood off Leith while PLYMOUTH's Wasp carried out an armed recce of the area, which appeared from the air to be totally deserted. Having heard of the mining at Grytviken, I decided against any airlift of SAS/SBS into the immediate surroundings of Leith, and so while ENDURANCE was able to make contact with the enemy on VHF Ch 16, I flew 8 SAS to an LZ at Stromness where they encountered some of the Floaters whom you had landed on Grass Is two days previously.
4. Meanwhile the Argentinian Military Commander at Leith was invited on the radio to surrender owing to the presence of far superior forces and the earlier capture of Grytviken. The reply came back that 39 civilians at Leith were willing to surrender but that the Argentinian Marine detachment was not prepared to do so. The civilians were then ordered to clear the area and proceed to Stromness while the Argentinian Marines later announced they were ready for whatever action was necessary! The scene was therefore set for military action and it was decided to hold a combined O Group on board HMS PLYMOUTH at 2100Z, both ships being anchored in Husvik at that time. Plans were made to land all troops by boat at 2300 on the promontory between Husvik and Stromness, but this was later changed when O i/c D Troop SAS ashore reported that the Floaters recommended that the area to the SW of Harbour Point in Stromness Bay offered by far the best landing facilities. Troops would then mount an attack at first light, preceded by NGS bombardment.
5. However just as PLYMOUTH was getting under weigh at 2245, the Argentinians at Leith reported that they were after all prepared to surrender and it was agreed that they would call again at 0800 to receive detailed instructions for surrender. PLYMOUTH then landed the remainder of D Troop SAS by Searider and Gemini near Harbour Point, and proceeded to sea for the remainder of the night, while ENDURANCE landed her troops comprising 2 SBS and 16 SAS Troop at 0600, having re-anchored at the entrance to Stromness Bay. The combined SBS/SAS detachments took up defensive positions overlooking Leith to await the Argentinian surrender. As a magnificent multicoloured dawn broke at 0900 on 26 April 1982 the white flag could be seen at the flagpole set before the only inhabitable building in Leith and a party of 12 Argentinian Marines then moved in single file behind the buildings and made their way towards Harbour Point and surrender. Two other Marines who had been 'missing' for some hours, were later traced nearby. It was also learned that Leith had been heavily mined by the Argentinians.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


6. PLYMOUTH had by this time anchored off Leith and at 1100 a formal Surrender Instrument was signed onboard by the Senior Argentinian Marine Officer (a Lt Cdr ASTIZ) in the presence of ENDURANCE and myself and a number of officers and men from both ships. This brief and most unusual ceremony was followed by urgent discussions with the Argentinian Officer over the safe and timely removal of the demolitions and mines which cluttered the foreshore and approaches to Leith. It was agreed that a party of six Argentinians would make safe the 500 - 600KG of explosives together with ENDURANCE SES, while PLYMOUTH arranged to embark 37 of the 39 civilian scrap metal men and 6 of the marines as POW. ENDURANCE took the balance of 8 Marines and 2 civilians as POW, and remained at Leith throughout 26 April to complete mine-clearance operations.

7. Having re-embarked, D Troop SAS (who had conveniently come across a magnificent reindeer and whose carcass arrived by vertrep) mounted guard on the extremely smelly and dishevelled POW's. PLYMOUTH proceeded to Grytviken to land the captives; however, this proved impracticable as neither TIDESPRING nor Grytviken camp was prepared to take them. Conditions ashore at Leith, Stromness and Husvik were also unsuitable for housing these men and since the weather had deteriorated making boating impossible and anchorage in Leith was thoroughly unpleasant, I retained the 43 onboard - thus PLYMOUTH had a very trying 24 hours as a prison-ship, and no one was sorry to see them leave the following day.

8. ENDURANCE sailed from Leith on 27 April having marked all outstanding mines remaining to be cleared; two further days work will be required to complete this operation.

9. Both ships were very pleased to have been so directly involved in the re-occupation of Leith and although military action was not after all required to dislodge the enemy forces, the conduct of all concerned in the re-occupation was most creditable. I was also glad to have the advice and local knowledge of ENDURANCE.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your Obedient Servant



D PENTREATH  
Captain

Enclosure:

- 1. Photos (already handed to the Commanding Officer HMS ANTRIM)

Information:

The Commanding Officer HMS ENDURANCE  
Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Branch

ANNEX B TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

INTELLIGENCE R.O.P. FOR OPERATION PARAQUET

GENERAL

1. 35 years of intelligence effort directed largely against a single target has produced a generation of officers at sea, ill-prepared to assess the capabilities and efficiency of a non Warsaw Pact country such as Argentina. Janes', the wardroom encyclopaedia, and hearsay from Portland did not provide a reassuring basis for threat assessment during the initial planning stage. There was a strong feeling that more information should have been readily available including orbat, availability and disposition of forces in what was essentially a friendly country. Having no microfiche capability, ANTRIM lacked even the background information of 'Form at a Glance'. The days before the comprehensive DIS briefs arrived were spent briefing from library, magazine and personal information. This provided a good basis for subsequent INTREPS and the deluge of techint. BRITMISS provided a useful updating facility although subsequent allocation of an MRL and poor HF reception prevented it being monitored after the first week. CTF 317 daily Intreps were avidly read and provided valuable background as well as current intelligence.

ASSESSMENT

2. In the absence of any hard information about enemy force disposition and intention the worst case of Soviet-Argentinian collusion was assumed and SOSS countermeasures conducted - apparently successfully. Boeing 707's were not taken into account as military long range recon assets until actually detected. The submarine threat was assessed as possible, but unlikely providing the group was routed far enough east of the direct route between Ascension and South Georgia. A move eastwards by the Argentinian carrier group was confidently expected either in response to a detection of TG 317.9 or to intercept the amphibious task group later. Having remained clear of long range air attack, the SOSS, and passed the period of likely interception by the carrier group, only the submarine threat remained. As time passed and the likelihood of invasion of the Falklands grew - providing a promise of many more submarine targets much closer to Argentina - the threat appeared to diminish. Against this background the information on the SANTA FE provided by ENDURANCE and CTF 317 was timely and had an immediate effect on planning. Despite the limited staff available in ENDURANCE and the need for offline encryption in ENDURANCE, GCHQ, CINCPLEET and ANTRIM, the promptness with which this vital intelligence was processed and promulgated was very commendable.

INTERROGATION

3. A valuable opportunity was lost as a result of the initial instruction (CTF 317 AAA/19J 171950Z APR 82) to confine questioning to ascertaining identities. After capture many prisoners, whether through shock, natural disposition or lack of training showed willingness to talk, explain and justify themselves. Unfortunately by the time further guidance was received (CTF 317 AAA/19J 271305Z APR 82) the prisoners had been transferred to TIDESPRING and to some extent, regained their confidence and were less likely to volunteer information. A fear of a hostile reception, and other possibly more serious consequences on their return to Argentina, rendered officers such as HICAIN (CO of SANTA FE) susceptible to sympathetic handling. In retrospect this could have been much more effectively exploited.

ARA SANTA FE

4. Considerable quantities of technical and communications material were recovered from the submarine. Current crypto material, the TGN associated offline cryptographic machine and recent logs had been ditched. As the submarine was watched more or less continuously from the initial attack until returning to King Edward Cove and nothing was observed to have been thrown overboard, the submarine's immediate vicinity alongside was searched by ANTRIM's divers but without success, apart from recovering the BAS Base Commander's bag of crypto presumed to have been ditched during the Argentinian invasion. A limited amount of analysis was carried out onboard by the ship's SCO and Flight Observer. The results were signalled (Appendix 1) and the original material transferred to the CT element in HERMES. The value of this is not yet known.

BBC

5. Great credit is due to the BBC World Service for the speed and accuracy of their reporting, which on occasion exceeded both immediate precedence and TOP SECRET CODEWORD classification. Although generally informative the service was inopportune and, in speculating about an imminent South Georgia invasion while recon was being conducted, positively counter productive. The wider political comment did however provide a useful background to ROE signals which could otherwise have been read in a vacuum.

SECRET

UK EYES BRAVO

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX B TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

LIST OF SIGNALS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE  
ARISING FROM SANTA FE

(All DTG's APR 82)

CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/UJ 161445Z (DINNER TALK)  
" " 271233Z (SITREP 1)  
" " 271620Z (SITREP 2)  
" " 271700Z (GENERAL)

HMS BRILLIANT 19J 171703Z (CO's ASSESSMENT)

CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/UJ 281140Z (TORPEDOES)  
" " 282240Z (SITREP 4)  
" " 282245Z (SITREP 3)

SECRET

UK EYES BRAVO

WARFARE R.O.P. FOR OPERATION PARAQUET

TASK

1. The nature of the objective of Operation PARAQUET, the forces at our disposal, the assessed threat against us and the requirement to remain covert for much of the time dictated that many of the procedures and tactics regularly practised to counter the Soviet threat were just not appropriate. Consequently, each decision, whether it be related to posture, reaction to threat or strategy was of necessity thought through as the operation progressed.

COMPOSITION OF FORCE

2. Until the arrival of HMS BRILLIANT, detached from Task Group 317.8 to provide additional helicopter lift capacity and improved ASW, the PARAQUET task group comprised:

- a. HMS ANTRIM
- b. HMS PLYMOUTH
- c. HMS ENDURANCE
- d. RFA TIDESPRING

3. All RN units carried elements of SBS/SAS with TIDESPRING accommodating M Company 42 Commando Royal Marines. The command element were carried in HMS ANTRIM.

4. Although the task group possessed an AAW, surface warfare and ASW capability, this was thinly spread with two main body ships to protect.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

5. a. Surface It was considered unlikely that the limited resources of the Argentine Fleet would be committed to supporting a distant operation in South Georgia when the potential threat to the Falklands loomed larger. Daily intelligence sitreps supported this assessment.
- b. Air Reconnaissance aircraft (C-130 and 707) had the capability to keep the force under surveillance. Canberra bombers were assessed as having the range to conduct bombing attacks but without radar the threat was minimal and the requirement to remain covert dictated a passive AAW policy.
- c. Anti-submarine In view of the small number of submarines available to the Argentine Navy, the distance from their base and a considered higher priority around the Falklands, the submarine threat was estimated to be almost non-existent. Subsequent events proved this to be a serious miscalculation. A passive sonar policy was adopted on passage to South Georgia. This was changed to an active policy, with decoys streamed and activated once the submarine threat became apparent.

OVERALL POSTURE

6. It was decided that State 2 Condition Y provided the answer for normal passage/cruising in the low threat environment. This provided adequate weapon crews to react initially to a developing threat and a degree of watertight integrity, bearing in mind also the increased risk from ice around South Georgia. Action stations, State 1 Condition Z was frequently practised and was assumed when the threat from the SANTA FE was at its greatest.

7. On passage to South Georgia the need to remain undetected remained paramount. A totally silent EMCON was therefore adopted, with ships darkened. When crossing shipping lanes deceptive lighting was also used. Until an assessment by CINCPLEET that the force was outside RORSAT coverage, regular reactions were taken to deny the SOSS information - these included closing all ships to within 1200 yards of each other at the appropriate times. Apart from one BEAR D sortie which overflowed just before arrival at Ascension, our passage to South Georgia was undetected as far as we know.

8. During the insertion phases a largely silent posture was adopted again, tailored only to allow the objectives to be achieved.

9. After South Georgia had been recaptured the air threat was considered at its greatest. During daylight both radars and sonar were active to achieve early warning of an impending attack. At night the ship went silent, relying on ESM for warning.

#### SIGNALLED ORDERS

10. The usual range of OPGENS were produced to signal CTG intentions although the overriding aim was to remain flexible in our response to situations as they developed. It was noted that some of the Opgen formats are heavily slanted towards a Soviet threat and needed some careful thought to order, for instance, ASMD reactions against an enemy using our own EXOCET system.

11. Daily sitreps and intentions were sent both to CTF and the task group.

#### TRAINING ON PASSAGE

12. It was difficult to conduct regular training for ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH with such a restrictive EMCON. However, SAG procedures, NGS drills and SAU approaches were practised. ASMD was also rehearsed internally on a regular basis. Recognition training took place daily.

#### AAW

13. No AAW occurred other than the tracking of several reconnaissance flights by Hercules aircraft before and after the taking of South Georgia. These flights never closed within 42 miles, remaining well outside Seaslug range. The use of fictitious call signs and imaginary supporting ships was employed on AAWC net to confuse any comint capability possessed by the Hercules.

#### ASW

14. 184 sonar was operated in the passive mode for most of the time, although a full SCR crew was closed up throughout. The opportunity was taken to identify several sources of self-noise which had led to false alarms in the early stages. 184 was used in the active mode to detect ice whilst patrolling off South Georgia after the reoccupation. Uncharted pinnacles and the coastal shelf caused several non-sub contacts whilst operating close inshore. Water conditions were reasonable throughout with an average layer depth of 70 metres.

#### ASV

15. There was no anti-surface warfare activity, although a confusing report from BAS on Bird Island indicated they had sighted 2 small warships and small jet aircraft on or about 22 April.

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ANNEX C (Contd)

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NGS

16. At 231330Z Apr ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH closed Cumberland Bay in order to establish an east/west gunline to the north of the bay. Airborne spotters requested harrasing fire on Brown Mountain which commenced at 1414Z. With H-hour established as 1445Z PLYMOUTH commenced the bombardment of the foreshore (Horse Head) whilst ANTRIM provided spreading bombardment on the assault landing site (Tussock Flats). Engagement of Tussock Flats ceased 30 seconds before first helicopter touchdown. On completion of the landing, indirect bombardment was provided to Brown Mountain and Brown Ridge until ANTRIM entered Cumberland Bay for direct bombardment at approximately 1640Z. On entering the bay it was noted that the 'white flag' was flying at Grytviken and 'hold fire' was ordered. In all, 69 rounds were fired by ANTRIM and 120 rounds by PLYMOUTH.

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ANNEX D TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

OPERATION PARAQUET - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. The following ROE signals received were relevant to PARAQUET Forces.
  - a. MODUK AAA/J9F/JEE 161938Z (HIGH SEAS ROE SERIAL 1/82)
  - b. CTF 317 AAA/19J 191820Z (ROE WITHIN 200NM ZONE SERIAL 2/82)
  - c. CTF 317 AAA/19J 192105Z (ROE WITHIN 200NM ZONE POST APPROVAL FOR OF PARAQUET SERIAL 3/82)
  - d. CTF 317 AAA/19J 201430Z (INSTRUCTION TO USE ROE 3/82 PRIOR TO AUTHORIZATION OF PARAQUET)
  - e. MODUK AAA/19J/JEE 270735Z (ROE POST REPOSSESSION OF S.GEORGIA SERIAL 4/82)
  - f. MODUK AAA/19J/JEE 010740Z MAY 82 (PARAQUET ROE UPDATED SERIAL 5/82)
  - g. CTF 317 AAA/19J 201359Z (DEFINITION OF HOSTILE INTENT)
  - h. MODUK AAA/19F/JEE 141446Z (EXTRA ROE AND DEFINITIONS)

All DTG's APR 82 unless stated.

2. The ROE received were easily understood, requiring only one clarifying signal (CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/JEE 202020Z APR 82) to redefine the status of the varied aircraft used by the Argentinians for reconnaissance. Whilst no specific reply was received, the request was overtaken by the directive to close South Georgia and ambush the Hercules (CTF 317 AAA/19J/ 241455Z APR 82).
3. The lack of the ROE to "Hack the Shad" at an early stage served to illustrate the many adjustments to be made to the modus operandi we have learnt to expect. Similarly, the aggressive definition of 'hostile intent' and the early granting of rule 205 was a welcome and unexpected increase to the flexibility of operations allowed to the Task Group.
4. It is felt that a more extensive brief on the diplomatic negotiations would have been a useful adjunct to the political policy statement included in the ROE. This greater awareness, from a more reliable source than the BBC World Service, would have served to increase local confidence that the Task Group was implementing the given rules with the same intent as they were issued.

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OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Despite difficult conditions, an unfamiliar task and high traffic loads communications during the operation were generally satisfactory and met command requirements.

Strategic Communications - SCOT

2. SCOT was essential to the conduct of the operation for the following reasons:

- a. HF conditions deteriorate rapidly south of 35S and regularly become impossible across the band in these near auroral conditions particularly during frequent magnetic storms and at night from about 0300Z to sunrise. Even with directional aerials, wide frequency changes and the use of forward facilities at Ascension daily outages were unavoidable.

- b. HF silence was essential to achieve surprise.

- c. CROWLER, fitted at FOP1 request for SPRINGTRAIN, was initially viewed with some suspicion as likely to encourage 'back seat driving'. In the event it proved indispensable for 'crisis management' at a time of overloading of circuits and special handling cells. The long delays and unreliable connections through Oakhanger and UKZE improved steadily, but the dedicated access afforded by the MRL was essential for achieving timely response on sensitive issues such as ROE.

3. The importance of SCOT is not reflected in its onboard support in terms of documentation, spares and personnel training. All appeared wanting in the light of defects that occurred. Remote diagnosis using the engineering channel was not really effective and the single very competent and willing maintainer was worked to his limit over long periods. The rapid provision of an FDMA channel during the period of the CDMA fault was however most impressive. The stronger signal this provided also improved reception which on CDMA had been frequently degraded during weather and atmospheric disturbances. It was fortunate that after 6 months of not being used FEME worked immediately. An initial delay in setting up an SRL is caused by having to solder a bridge to achieve 50 rather than 75 baud working. While the reasons for 50 baud working on HF MRL's is understood, it appears unnecessary at SHF, where it results in the loss of one third of circuit capacity at a time when such capacity is important.

4. The workload generated by non-SCOT fitted ships in company and joining under HF silence was considerable. Although both an area broadcast rerad and a task group broadcast were provided at UHF, ships were frequently required to operate out of range and backlogs quickly accumulated. Combined with the offline crypto problem (see below) the MCO workload for @31 units exceeded that when providing flag and TG broadcast facilities for over 20 SPRINGTRAIN units. The moral is that a non-SCOT fitted warship becomes a liability when operating covertly at long range whether alone or in company be it off South Georgia or in the Iceland-Faeroes gap.

Offline Traffic

5. The supersession of the KL7 by outfit TLA has generally been successful - neither of ANTRIM's equipments gave any trouble, but a literalised message when garbled or incorrectly encrypted offers less scope for patching, and is more likely to require rerunning. The combined effects of TARE loading and many rerun requests lead, on occasion, to Immediate precedence traffic taking over 24 hours to be received and decrypted. There were many instances of incorrect system indicators and incorrect encryption of Northwood originated traffic and Northwood failing to break traffic correctly received elsewhere within the Task Group. Standards soon rose however and delays reduced accordingly as the operation progressed.

Morale

6. Mindful of recent concern over LRO and R01(G) retention the effect of prolonged 1 in 2 watchkeeping was closely monitored. Although the cumulative tiredness of 50 days continuous and busy watchkeeping produced occasional mistakes and frayed tempers attributable to tiredness, there were remarkably few problems. (Even after this operation the 16-18 year olds particularly showed commendable resilience after lengthy air attack and knowing there was an unexploded bomb in an adjacent compartment - some 70 days of continuous 1 in 2 rota). The only conclusion that can be drawn is that providing the aim is clear they are well motivated and make light of the unfavourable comparison between their watchkeeping load and that of other members of the ship's company.

Land Forces

7. During this and subsequent operations ANTRIM embarked considerable numbers from a wide variety of land force units. The particular requirements of SAS forward communications required jury rigging a number of aeriels above the Military Ops Room (Admiral's Day Cabin) and the relocation of one of the ship's AN/ARC-52s. Control of the assault was achieved quite effectively using this equipment. CLANSMAN serviceability was good throughout. The ship provided rear link communications for all embarked units (including subsequently CLIFFI & Staff) without difficulty. UHF TACSAT was used effectively from the bridge roof.

Equipment

8. After the various UHF, HF and SCOT problems experienced in January and February there was a certain amount of apprehension about likely equipment availability, which in the event was unjustified. Extreme weather conditions led to frequent intermittent drift in the SCOT transmitter local oscillator which was eventually alleviated by providing extra heating in the SEC. The defect in CDMA was the result of a power surge following a generator failure. However, overall equipment availability was excellent. The continuous use of both SCOT outputs prevents an HF standby broadcast being kept in sync. and it was fortunate that neither HID 940 had defects. There would now appear to be a requirement for a third HID 940 in ships such as a DLG regularly using both SCOT outputs.

ANNEX F TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

AVIATION R.O.P FOR OPERATION PARAJET

EMPLOYMENT

1. Prior to PARAJET the aircraft was configured for maximum range with the 195W Sonar removed and a drop-tank fitted to the port carrier. Considerable practice was achieved in the surface search and targetting role. A completely silent and darkened launch sequence was developed with a low level transit to 15nm before the first climb and radar transmissions of two sweeps. The "pop-up" technique for building the surface picture was found to be effective and free of EW interception. The need for HF silence, however, required the helo to stay at height during targetting to gain good UHF communication.
2. The helos were employed during the transit to SOUTH GEORGIA mostly in the HDS/loadlifting role meeting the constant military requirement for troop and equipment movements between ships. The removal of the aircraft sonar equipment produced a lift potential of approx. 2000lbs and judicious removal of some of the support framework for the sonar allowed easy access to the rear of the aircraft. A stick of eight fully kitted troops was found to be a comfortable balance between power, bulk and weight accepting the lack of seating in the aircraft and the slight restriction to the ease of use of the cabin mounted GPMG.
3. Prior to the main force landing the aircraft was reverted to the full ASW role, the equipment being refitted and set to work in approx. 13 hours. The expected time was in the order of two to three days based on previous experience. Even with the sonar refitted, 6 troops in fighting order could be carried if a slow evacuation is accepted on arrival at the LZ.

DECK OPERATIONS

4. Ranging and spreading of the aircraft posed the greatest problem in achieving a completely darkened operation, the hangar and deck lighting being biased to the retention of night vision rather than visual concealment. Start up, engagement and take-off was achieved silently and darkened by a sequence of torch flashes from the pilot. The Secure deck lights and Horizon Bar were required for recovery but rigidly controlled by the PDO.
5. The requirement for Gridlock prior to launch placed high reliance on the tele-briefing system which proved to have a low serviceability in high humidity and was extremely prone to corrosion. The Ops/Flight Deck CCU was employed to pass tactical information to the Observer. A system of hand signals was devised to pass wind speed and direction to the pilot prior to launch.

ENGINEERING

6. Conversion of the aircraft to surface search role was achieved within 24 hrs. The sonar equipment was found to be relatively easy to remove. However, the framework of the submersible unit, anti-vibration mountings for the Control Indicator and support frames took approx. 12 hrs to extract, and although saving little weight, gave greatly increased access to the aircraft cabin for emplaning/deplaning.

7. Although the circumstances of Operations Paraquet and Corporate provided more than adequate preparatory time, it is considered that the adoption of war-time paint schemes is an unnecessary drain on training and maintenance time. It is recommended that R.N. aircraft should be finished 'as close as possible' to the war-time scheme at all times. If this is not considered desirable, then all flights should hold paint schemes and paint as permanent stores.

AIRCRAFT SERVICING

8. Prior to guidance from the Air Engineering authority, servicing was carried out on a 'common sense' basis. Flexible servicing operations were never extended beyond the 10% allowance and in such cases where extension could be necessary, for operational reasons, the possible consequences were scrupulously examined. Although defect rectification increased working hours as it arose, the continuance of the Flex-op servicing routine was not found to be a problem.

ARMAMENT

9. A GPMG was fitted to the aircraft at the starboard after cabin window. The gun mounting, aquired from RFA TIDESPRING Flight required the local manufacture of a lower mounting bracket which was not available at the time.

To achieve light exclusion for the Observer's benefit and reduce wind and temperature loss in the cabin, a locally manufactured plywood insert was made for the window frame. This fitted outboard of the mounting with the gun removed and was located by the normal window jettison lugs. It was removed by operating the jettison lever and pulling the panel inboard.

METEOROLOGY

11 APRIL - 3 MAY 1982

1. The major problem encountered was the collection of sufficient relevant data from which to formulate a forecast. At ASCENSION there were no RATT or FACSIMILE broadcasts that were both relevant and readable. On the way south BUENOS AIRES FACSIMILE transmissions were readable from 30°S but all their products were not drawn up east of 70°W and south of 40°S. Their RATT transmissions were readable south of 45°S and included observations from the "excluded facsimile zone". These, together with CINCFLEETWOC information, provided sufficient to be able to draw up one chart per day to establish cyclonic and anticyclonic centres. Frontal positioning was generally not achieved, leaving the barograph and veering winds as the only reliable indicators of a front upwind.
2. HMS ENDURANCE being equipped with a SATFAX receiver was better able to achieve frontal positioning and was thus made Met forecaster for the Task Group. However, her SATFAX reception was frequently degraded by interference, and with the reallocation of all her communication equipment to the operation, her forecaster was left with no dedicated Met RATT receiver, thus HMS ANTRIM forwarded all relevant observations and information, including forecasts translated from Spanish transmitted on the BUENOS AIRES RATT.
3. CINCFLEETWOC products improved slowly throughout the period as the amount of information getting to them improved. Of particular value was the synoptic review produced later in the period. FACSIMILE reception on the promulgated frequencies was never achieved.
4. The attached sheet show a 12 hourly record of conditions experienced.

OCEANOGRAPHY

5. Initially the submarine threat was considered as very low so bathy stocks were reserved. Later as the threat was assessed higher bathies were taken inside the military exclusion zone which showed a layer at between 50 and 70 Metres.

OPERATION CORPORATE - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>WIND</u>	<u>WEATHER</u>	<u>VISIBILITY</u>
110600ZAPR	8S 14W	E 3	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	8S 14W	E 5	FINE	GOOD
120600ZAPR	10S 15W	E 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	14S 16W	E 6	FINE	GOOD
130600ZAPR	18S 18W	E 6	CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	21S 18W	E 5	CLOUDY - SHOWERS	MODERATE
140600ZAPR	25S 19W	E 7	CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	26S 20W	NE 4	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD
150600ZAPR	29S 21W	E 4	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	32S 22W	NE 5	FINE	GOOD
160600ZAPR	34S 23W	NE 4	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	37S 23W	N 6	FINE - HAZE	GOOD
170600ZAPR	40S 24W	S 6	OVERCAST	GOOD
1800Z	41S 25W	W 3	CLOUDY - SHOWERS	GOOD
180600ZAPR	43S 27W	S 3	OVERCAST - RAIN	GOOD
1800Z	45S 27W	W 4	CLOUDY	GOOD
190600ZAPR	46S 28W	W 4	CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	49S 31W	NW 5	OVERCAST - DRIZZLE	POOR
200600ZAPR	50S 32W	NW 3	OVERCAST, - MIST/FOG	POOR
1800Z	52S 34W	SW 7	OVERCAST - RAIN	POOR
210600ZAPR	54S 37W	NW 6	OVERCAST - RAIN	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 37W	W 10	CLOUDY - SHOWERS	MODERATE
220600ZAPR	54S 37W	S 9	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	W 6	PARTLY CLOUDY - SHOWERS	MODERATE
230600ZAPR	54S 36W	SW 6	OVERCAST - DRIZZLE	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 36W	SW 8	FINE	GOOD
240600ZAPR	53S 35W	SW 8	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	51S 34W	NW 4	CLOUDY	GOOD
250600ZAPR	53S 35W	NW 5	PARTLY CLOUDY - MIST	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 36W	N 5	CLOUDY - FOG	POOR
260600ZAPR	54S 36W	NW 5	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 36W	SW 5	CLOUDY - SNOW SHOWERS	MODERATE
270600ZAPR	54S 36W	SW 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	SW 10	FINE - BLOWING SPRAY	GOOD
280600ZAPR	54S 37W	W 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 36W	W 3	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD

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OPERATION CORPORATE - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

DATE/TIME	POSITION	WIND	WEATHER	VISIBILITY
290600ZAPR	54S 37W	W 4	PARTLY CLOUDY - MIST	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 37W	W 5	PARTLY CLOUDY - SHOWERS	GOOD
300600ZAPR	55S 36W	W 5	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	SW 6	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD
010600ZMAY	54S 37W	S 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	W 4	PARTLY CLOUDY - SNOW	MODERATE
020600ZMAY	54S 38W	SW 5	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	53S 38W	SW 9	FINE - BLOWING SPRAY	GOOD
030600ZMAY	51S 43W	SW 7	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	49S 43W	SW 6	CLOUDY	GOOD

WINDS ARE GIVEN IN BEAUFORT SCALE

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ANNEX H TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

PREPARATIONS

1. ANTRIM's preparations for CORPORATE and PARAQUET involved all departments and covered many aspects in the transition from peacetime operating to being ready for war.
2. The following subjects are in note form for ease of reading and brevity.

FCD 1

3. This charge document was of no real value in ANTRIM's preparations for war against the Argentine. It is related almost exclusively to the UK, NATO, Soviet scenarios and the graduated response to a state of tension.

ANTRIM War Orders

4. Proved adequate as a 'check off list'.

Paint Scheme

5. Considerable man hours were expended painting/toning down "pretty" colours on the upper deck and on the helicopter.

War Planning Briefs

6. A series of briefs were prepared on a variety of subjects and presentations given to officers, Senior and Junior Rates as appropriate. Subjects covered listed in CTM 14/82 (Appendix 1).

General Drills

7. These periods of quite short duration proved effective and "popular". They included:

- Action Stations
- Emergency Stations
- Fire/Flood/Emergency Cable Runs in both Section Bases
- First Aid Party Training
- Weapon Drills - Chaff C/D, NGS, Surface/AA, Exocet, OTHH
- Torpedo Countermeasures

RECOGNITION TRAINING

8. Frequent training periods allocated for OOW's and Upper Deck Crews.

Cold Weather

9. a. Notes from Iceland Ops are adequate to ensure units are well prepared for the weather. Probably overprepared since icing risk around S.Georgia and Falklands is not as high as that experienced during the Cod War.
- b. Cold weather clothing provided is adequate. The suits for lookouts and aimers etc are particularly good and liked by the wearers. As ever "pussers" sea boots, whilst big enough to accommodate the extra socks, are dangerous to use whenever a degree of agility is required.

RAS

10. a. RASing using all the likely rigs before arrival in the area is essential; in particular check of rigs to provide Avcat and oils. ANTRIM changed one of TIDESPRING's rigs - No. 8 - to provide 3 inch Avcat supply. Selecting rigs to be used is helpful, allowing ship to remain rigged for probe, Jackstay QRC and stern fuelling. Whilst unfashionable, do not forget Jackstay QRC, it will remain connected better than probe in bad weather.
- b. POST's insistence on training two defence watch fuelling crews has paid off; both now very proficient.
- c. Storing - became the art of "embarking anything given the will". In particular ammunition transfer methods have included:

- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| (i) Seacat      | : Vertrep in net                                |
| (ii) Cartridge  | : Vertrep in RAS bag                            |
| (iii) Torpedoes | : Vertrep on DDT recovery strop                 |
| (iv) Shell      | : On light Jackstay using emergency supply bags |

Boatwork

11. Upper deck crews were exercised in lowering a number of geminis quickly and quietly using two rigs. Required for 'real' when inserting SAS 23 April.

Darken Ship

12. Screens and deadlights rigged and left rigged from 4 April. Effectiveness checked by Night Vision Aid. Darken ship discipline became a quickly accepted part of life onboard.

HMS ASPTRIM  
at Sea

CTM 14/82

7 April 1982

WAR PLANNING BRIEFS

1. It is in the interest of us all to be both materially and mentally prepared for Operation CORPORATE. To that end, a cell has been set up, consisting of the Navigator and SCO, to direct a series of briefs on selected subjects. These briefs will normally be held in the Wardroom at 1730 after my daily brief, and all officers are invited to attend. Selected briefs may then appear on CCTV.
2. Officers nominated at Annex A are to assume a "special responsibility" for their particular subject, and may be invited to brief it themselves or to prepare a written brief.
3. Some subjects are by their nature "one off" whilst others are a continuing daily story. An effort has been made to indicate a priority system.
4. The planning cell is available for guidance on length, pitch and content of briefs.



B G YOUNG  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Annex A to  
CTM 14/82  
dated 7 April 1982

Brief Title	Title Expansion	Responsible Officer	Periodicity	Priority
Ascension I preps	Welfare - Familygram Wills - Letters	Cdr/Cdr S All DOs	1 Off	High
ANTRIM Preparations for War	"Whole ship" training Readiness	Cdr/HODs	Daily	High
Warfare Preparations	State of training State of preps Lessons learnt Areas of concern	Ops	Daily	High
Weapon effectiveness	State of weapons Radars-ESM-Comms Confidence level	WEO	Daily	-
Opdefs	-	MEO/WEO	Daily	-
Enemy Forces	a. Orbat, hardware tactics	1st Lt	Daily	Pre Asc
	b. Morale, preparadness	SCO	1 Off	Pre Asc
Political State	Present & forecast moves by UK and Argentinian and other Govts	Cdr/Cdr S SCO	Regularly	-
Courses open to Task Gps.	Extrapolate ANTRIM's likely employment if possible	Ops/ 1st Lt	Regularly	Post Asc
Environment	Met Oceanog & effects on ships	SIO/NO	1 Off	Pre Asc
Whereabouts	Popular place names Distances to steam Escape routes with action damage	DWEO/NO	1 Off	Post Asc
Exposure	Survival Seasickness Life raft drill & conduct	MO/ 1st Lt	1 Off	Post Asc
Geography Lesson	Argentina -all	FLOBS	1 Off	High
	Chile -Orbat	FC 1/2		
	Chile -Background	S/Lt W	1 Off	Post Asc
	Brazil -Orbat	FC 1/2		
	Brazil -Background	S/Lt B		
S Africa -Orbat & Background	S/Lt P			

SECRET

ES BRAVO.

Brief Title	Title Expansion	Responsible Officer	Periodicity	Priority
Geography Lesson	NZ & Aus -Orbat only	S/LT T	1 Off	Post Aso
Electronic Deception	Own Radar & Comms Effect of Weapons performance,	WEO/DWEO	1 Off	Pre Aso
Weapon effect planning	Own Air Assets - incl Barrier	Flt Cdr	1 Off	Post Aso
Foul/Cold weather Ops	Ship preparation and operational effects	MEO/WEO/ NO/1st Lt		Pre Aso
Prisoner Handling	a. Argentinian survivors b. Our own reaction to interrogation	Cdr/FLOBS		Post Aso
Intelligence/Reference Library	Useful back copies of Ni sums/NIR/Int defence review/Air magazines ets	CBO/SIO		Now
Table Top Tactics	Teams to discuss and play out possible scenarios	All Warfare Officers	Regularly	

OPERATION PARAQUAT

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - MARINE ENGINEERING

1. Machinery Operation and Availability

Throughout the period the main machinery has been reliable although every opportunity has been taken to shut down boilers and other machinery as the tactical situation permitted for normal maintenance tasks. Whilst in Defence Watches, the G6s have been at immediate notice and one ODG has been running continuously. This has had the effect of more than doubling the normal running hours per engine. The prolonged periods of steady steaming have been beneficial to fine system tuning and for a 7 day period feed losses were reduced to a consistent 16-18 ton/day.

2. Significant Defects

The failure of the starboard main feed pump on 26 April 1982 (OPDEF ME 16-82) was the most serious defect during the operation. Coming as it did whilst the ship was at the furthest point from the airhead, the delivery of the replacement rotating assembly took one month to reach the ship. The removal of the old TWL pump shaft was particularly difficult and showed up a lack of high grade hacksaw blades and suitable heavy duty burning gear onboard. The port evaporator fresh water pump also gave considerable cause for concern (OPDEF 19-82) until such time as a complete replacement pump arrived. The use of 6Po ballast tank as an extra fresh water tank holding 50 tons greatly cushioned the potential problem as did the marked drop in fresh water consumption as the temperature dropped and defence watches commenced.

3. POL

RFA TIDESPRING supported the ship superbly during this operation and supplied good clean water free fuel throughout. Maintaining adequate stocks of lubricating oils however was somewhat of a problem. To reduce usage of NEOX a policy of only running stabilisers when absolutely necessary was adopted with success. In addition the slow reception rate of bulk lubricating oil (600 gal/hr) made it necessary to embark at every opportunity. It is most fortunate that the embarked military force provided their own supply of petrol for Geminis because during the earlier phases of the operation very few RFAs carried petrol stock for issue.

A very limited supply of petrol was subsequently found at the BAS Base, King Edward Point.

4. Cold Weather Preparations

The advice given in C in C Fleets Cold Weather Manual was most valuable although the weather proved to be much milder than anticipated. In retrospect some of the upper deck preparations, in particular the use of LG 380 and Kilfrost, were undertaken too soon whilst the weather was mild resulting in excessive wastage of these materials. It was found essential to place black heaters in the engine compartments of all boats and to store the batteries in the warm if the boats were to start when required.

5. Hull Aspects

The heavy weather encountered off South Georgia was responsible for opening up several hull cracks which are known Class defects but also one in the deckhead of the cabin flat at 84 Station starboard. The excessive flexing of the ship also caused several firemain leaks in the midships portion of the ship. The overall hull preservation has proved very satisfactory although some areas of grey paint applied in less than ideal conditions at Ascension washed off during the period.

6. Personnel

The ships policy of a freeze on job changes during the period ensured a high degree of proficiency throughout the operation. In addition there was a refreshing amount of ingenuity and initiative displayed throughout the department in the knowledge that any form of base support was far away. Machinery breakdowns drills could not be programmed but opportunities have been taken to exercise on a limited scale as frequently as possible. Task book training continued throughout and Fleetboards for A/LMEM and A/POMEM were conducted towards the end of the Operation.

7. Assistance to BAS Base

A party of ME personnel spent 5 days ashore in the BAS Base King Edward Point restoring facilities shortly after the recapture. They made a significant contribution to the rapid restoration of essential services to the Base.

SECRET  
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ANNEX J TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

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OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - WEAPON ENGINEERING

Preparations for War

1. Preparations for war began on 2 April when SPRINGTRAIN 82 was terminated and ANTRIM was ordered to proceed south. They continued until a Defence Watch posture was assumed on 19 April. There was thus plenty of time to bring weapon equipment and the department to a state of readiness.
2. Transfer of ammunition and other essential stores took place on 2 April between ships proceeding south and those returning to UK. Vertrep and light jackstay were used without difficulty.
3. The following preparations were completed by 19 April:
  - a. All uncrated Seaslug missiles prepared for firing.
  - b. Seacat missiles in Ready Use magazines fitted with appropriate guidance crystals. Launchers loaded.
  - c. 2 in no. Mk 46 torpedoes prepared for firing and 2 in no. depth charges stowed in stretchers in the magazine at 15 mins notice (the time taken to fit primers and detonators).
  - d. Weapon systems prepared for firing, maintenance in date wherever possible with particular attention being paid to PSL routines.
  - e. Balloon tracking was carried out on passage to Ascension Island, as were GWS2 overall system tests.
4. Because of the covert nature of the operation, emitters were silent for the passage south from Ascension Island. The following arrangements were made:
  - a. UHF - 1 transmitter in use, remainder stand by.
  - b. HF - Stand by.
  - c. SCOT - No restrictions.
  - d. 965 to dummy load, 278, 1010, 1011 and 978 stand by.
  - e. 992 is degraded by long periods at stand by and was run into dummy load for 30 mins each watch. Even so the magnetron had to be changed on 3 May after only about 3500 hrs (nominal life is 10000 hrs).

Cold Weather Preparations

5. These were carried out in accordance with BR 2553 Chap 4 and CincFleet's Cold Weather Preparations publication which provided much good guidance. In fact weather conditions in the South Atlantic were not as severe as had been expected and ingress of water into upper deck fittings was the biggest problem throughout the period.

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Unusual Requirements

6. A MAGNATOX SATNAV MX 1102 RN was transferred from HMS SHEFFIELD at Ascension Island and fitted. Aerial rigging and provision of ship's course and speed inputs were required.
7. A Military Ops Room was established in the Admiral's Day Cabin requiring HF and UHF communications. Additional wire aerials and the ship's spare AJE UHF aerial were rigged between the bridge roof and foremast yards. There were no RADHAZ or apparent mutual interference problems but it is possible that MF DF accuracy was degraded.
8. After the re-capture of South Georgia it was discovered that the Grytviken BAS Base telephone exchange had been vandalised by the Argentine invaders and the field telephone network was in a state of disrepair. Services were restored over a period of two days.

Major Defects

9. OPDEFS WE 77/82 and 82/82. Sonar 182 cables were initially prone to water ingress until this was prevented by fitting additional 'O' seals, grease packing connections and sealing them with self-vulcanising tape. Two cables were expended before these lessons were learned and equipment unfamiliarity through under use was the cause of early difficulties.
10. OPDEF WE 80/82. SCOT was defective in the ODMA reception mode for a period of 2 weeks. Although SATCOMS were maintained in the FDMA mode, the Secure Speech (GROWLER) facility was not available from 27 April to 13 May. Diagnostic advice provided by the SCOT Field Services Team using the FDMA engineering channel and a defective pec in the CDMA receiver replaced.

Defence Watches

11. A two Defence Watch posture was assumed from 19 April to 3 May. The following worked a straight 1 in 2 routine:
  - a. WEO/DWEO in the Ops Room.
  - b. GWS 2 and DAB teams.
  - c. Junior ratings.

The remaining specialist officers and senior ratings worked a 24 hour call-out routine and a Chief Petty Officer ran the watch from the Weapon Section Base (EMR).

12. Local SOC's were carried out every watch by Weapon Controllers and Quarters Officers as were T.I. checks by Directors. Additionally daily PSL checks were carried out every watch by the GWS 2 teams. The remaining equipment was taken for PSL checks whenever the situation allowed and within EMCON constraints. A generally high equipment availability was achieved throughout the whole period due to the stable environmental conditions and constant attention.

OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - LOGISTICS

Victualling

1. HMS ANTRIM had no solids support during Operation PARAQUET. A RAS(S) on 13 April 82 from RFA FORT AUSTIN, herself already somewhat depleted after 5 months in the Gulf, provided a basic endurance of 60 days for the ship's company of 500 and an additional 150 Marines and SAS embarked within the Group, but no fresh fruit, vegetables or eggs were available and few potatoes. As re-supply dates were not known, rationing was introduced. Breakfast consisted of an egg (until they ran out) bacon or sausage, beans or tomatoes, and one slice of bread. No cereals. Lunch was reduced to soup and rolls and the main meal was taken in the evening, without puddings. Apart from prolonging the endurance, this pattern of feeding lent itself readily to instant conversion into action messing or action snacks for the inevitable day light air raids or other threats: it also proved enduringly popular with the ship's company.
2. A good stock of rolls, oggies, pies and sausage rolls was made and frozen down for use as additional action snacks and was replaced as soon as possible after use. The deep fat fryers were shut down when the ship went into defence watches although the lack of fresh potatoes would have curtailed the supply of chips anyway.
3. The lack of fresh fruit and vegetables caused some concern and no bran, wholemeal flour or other substitutes were available to provide roughage. The ship was without fresh potatoes for 10 days, eggs for 15 days, vegetables for 30 days and fruit for 34 days, but this had no obvious impact on health or morale.
4. The Senior Rates' Dining Annex, 1N Stbd, and B Shell Room beer cage, 4Ea, were taken up as additional victualling stores, the former containing 18 days balanced dry diet above the water line and the latter bulk stores of flour. The Floodlighting Store in the Exocet Power Room, 1D1, was also utilised for toilet rolls and some dry provisions. In addition to dispersing victualling stocks around the ship to minimise the likelihood of action damage depriving the ship's company of food, these measures increased the endurance from 45 to 75 days.

Stores

5. The 13 Apr RAS(S) with FORT AUSTIN provided few naval stores and stocks were about 50% on starting the Operation. A MATCONOFF organisation was set up within the group but with three such disparate units as a DLG, Type 12 and a TIDE class tanker the degree of mutual support was limited. No other support was available.
6. The initial UK red colour coding given to the group failed to take into account that it was already well south of Ascension. In the event no urgent requirements arose which could only be satisfied directly from the UK.

7. Less urgent demands placed on the UK were promptly airfreighted to Ascension but there was no means of sea-freighting them to South Georgia. Even after the despatch vessels arrived the lengthy sea journey meant that this remained the weak link in the logistic chain.

Cold Weather Clothing

8. ER 96 Appendix 21 scales of cold weather clothing are broadly sufficient for a DLG. Detailed refinements will be proposed separately. The clothing gave adequate protection against South Atlantic weather provided extreme cold weather top garments were worn.

Extreme Cold Weather Clothing

9. None is scaled to be carried in a DLG but it is essential for operating in extreme latitudes and served its purpose well in the South Atlantic. A DLG has the capacity to carry some sets and this should be utilised. Separate proposals will be made.

Support for Other Units

10. The SAS, SBS, and M Company Group of 42 Commando, Royal Marines, whose own stores had been hastily assembled on leaving the UK, required a range of naval and victualling stores and these were provided where possible from ANTRIM's already depleted stocks. Specifically 300 man/months of food, canteen and general naval stores were supplied to the South Georgia garrison and a large quantity of bedding, outlery and messtraps to RFA TIDESPRING to assist her with transporting 200 POW from South Georgia to Ascension.

Organisation

11. The Supply Department was not run in Defence Watches, there being no advantages and some penalties in keeping up half the personnel overnight. Two cooks worked throughout the night baking bread and preparing the night meal; one steward remained on duty overnight to cater for the needs of the defence watch officers and the duty SA slept in the stores office, on immediate call. One steward was given to a Type 22 frigate to make good her complement, one was provided to the laundry when the Chinese left, three extra were given to the Communal Party to release defence watch seamen, and a cook and an SA, SMAC 233 trained, became full time members of the flight deck crew. Defence watch working and the operational situation reduced the normal demands on the Supply Department and a satisfactory level of service was maintained despite the severe dilution of supply personnel.



'Don't shoot ! I think it's a dinner invitation.'

## Secret weapon of the wardrobe

I began to invest high hopes in the effect on the enemy's morale of that dinner which our officers served those captured Argentine officers on board one of our ships after we took South Georgia. Word might by now have spread among the Argentine forces that this is what they can expect unless they quit the islands immediately. They'll think twice about taking us on now that some of them have felt six inches of cold, British food inside them. They'll know that a nation which can serve up lethal stuff like an average British service dinner is not a nation to be trifled with, that is, if they ever dared to eat one of our trifles.

And there's plenty more where that dinner came from. Panic could even now be spreading among the Argentine brass hats that this is how the barbarous British treat captured officers. The choice is theirs. There is still time for them to avoid raising knife and fork against us.

Taylor says his own pilot surveys showed early signs of B group vitamin deficiencies in more than one third of naval personnel, and inadequate vitamin C in almost a third. Studies in the United States, he says, show that hypochondriasis, hysteria and depression occur when blood levels of vitamin C begin to fall, even before such visible clinical signs as he noted appear. Stress and heavy smoking depress vitamin C levels and diminish resistance to cold conditions, which, like sea sickness, will make things even worse.

According to official figures, the standard mortality rate in the British Armed Forces for cancer, coronary heart disease, gastro-intestinal diseases and cirrhosis of the liver is the highest of any occupational group in the UK.

If we want to be sure of winning, Taylor says, we should send a nutrition unit to the task force, make sure the men's intake of vitamin C is boosted to the 150 mg daily the Russians

recommend for cold conditions, provide whole wheat bread and stop overcooking the vegetables.

## Under the weather

Geoffrey Taylor, who was the consultant physician to the 14th Army in Burma in the last war, is worried that the Falklands task force may be riddled with malnutrition. He cites nutritional studies in a National Maritime Museum publication, *Starving Sailors*, as showing that obesity, alcohol and over-consumption of refined carbohydrates afflict the Navy.

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OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PEOPLE

When the signal to proceed south was received on 2 April the initial concern was for family reaction to the unexpected programme change and how they were to be informed: particularly crestfallen were the 18 members of the ship's company with Easter weddings planned. Too much reliance was placed on 'Link Wires' for informing NOK, particularly those living outside the Base Port areas. Some people took time to accept the high level of security suddenly imposed on ANTRIM's movements and many considered their families had a right to know exactly where the ship was and her expected employment: this view was mainly held and voiced by a minority of Senior Rates.

In addition to intensive warfare preparations there was a major assault on a range of administrative matters including, Wills, Power of Attorney, Geneva Convention ID Cards, Boarding School Allowance claims etc, to ensure all was cleared by the time we reached Ascension Island. Ascension Island was a significant milestone on the way to South Georgia: it virtually signified the point of no return with the total failure to date to achieve any diplomatic solution: many were now well aware that the likelihood of armed confrontation was very real indeed. The initial bravado of "Stuff it up the Junta" was slowly replaced both by a greater degree of realism and apprehension: much of the apprehension was caused by concern for families and girl friends and was largely dispelled when the first very supportive batch of mail was received. BBC World Service broadcasts were listened to avidly, the Daily Oak extracts from the press assumed great importance and the Commander's nightly CCTV "SCUTTLEBUTT" programme became compulsive viewing.

Overcoming ingrained, almost intuitive peacetime attitudes was difficult but gradually a hardening of attitude was achieved: part of the problem was due to the 'it will never happen to us philosophy.'

Interest, involvement, excitement and anticipation mounted as the group headed south, met FORT AUSTIN and ENDURANCE, and embarked SAS, SBS, and X Company Group 42 Commando, Royal Marines. The bravura and presence of these specialists put the ship's company on its mettle and they responded well.

Throughout the period 21 April - 2 May when ANTRIM was involved in the South Georgia operation morale was high, professionalism was manifest, disciplinary problems were non-existent and the performance, attitude and response of the young sailors was moving and very encouraging.

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ANNEX M TO  
HMS ANTRIM'S 226  
DATED 8 JULY 82

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OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PRISONERS OF WAR

References:

- A. CTF 317 AAA/19J 171950Z APR 82 (POW GUIDELINES)
- B. CTF 317.9 AAA/19J 201345Z APR 82 (POW/BAS CIVILIANS)
- C. MODUK AAA/19J 221345Z APR 82 (POW AMPLIFICATION)

1. Once the guidelines had been established (References A - C) the problems encountered were:
  - a. Number anticipated was doubled after crippling of SANTA FE and capture of her ship's company.
  - b. Ashore in GRITVIKEN M Coy and the numbers of prisoners strained accommodation available to the limits.
  - c. The 'ARTUSO INCIDENT' complicated the already tortuous administrative process.
  - d. Requirement for separate handling of the military element, the 'Scrap Merchants', the non-Argentine nationals and Captain Astiz.
  - e. Collation of information required by CTF, MODUK and the FCO, already difficult due to language barriers and comprehension, was further hampered by weather, geography and communications between detached units.
  - f. Habitability standards, required by Geneva Convention, were of constant concern particularly when prisoners were embarked in the somewhat spartan accommodation available in TIDESPRING.
  
2. That the prisoners arrived in good order at Ascension Island without any deterioration in health or morale owed much to the unstinting efforts of the Captain of TIDESPRING, his officers and men.

SECRET

SECRET

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OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - MEDICAL

Medical Staff: Surgeon Lieutenant A B MACLEAN, Royal Navy  
POMA(O) S H BUTTERFIELD  
MA A MILBURN

Additional Surgeon Lieutenant Commander(D) G RHIMES

The operation was highly successful from a medical view point. Foul and cold weather briefings plus commonsense, prevented any serious injuries up to the first troops insertion.

On 22 April the SAS mountain troops requested evacuation from Fortuna Glacier due to imminent cold injury. During this exercise both Wessex 5's crashed at low speed on the glacier. All survivors were rescued within two hours, and after rewarming, one minor case of frost nip, the odd jarred shoulder and back, and a laceration of RT cheek and eye was the total casualty list.

On 25 April 82 the submarine SANTA FE was attacked with depth charges and AS12 missiles. She returned to Grytviken which was subsequently captured. There were reports of a hundred plus casualties and the Medical Officer HMS ANTRIM joined the Medical Officer 42 CDO M Coy ashore to assess the situation. Thankfully only one casualty was found - a Leading Seaman submariner who had his right lower leg shot away by an AS12 missile through the fin of SANTA FE. An Argentinian Medical Officer had already debrided and packed the above knee amputation. He was casevaced to ANTRIM for further resuscitation and thence to TIDESPRING for care by the surgical team. An Argentinian CPC was shot dead on the submarine during a move on 27 April 82.

Medical facilities in Shackleton House for M Coy 42 CDO was found to be good, dental treatment being given before our departure.

Overall a successful operation with minimal casualties.

OPERATION PARAQUET

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. Experience during Operation PARAQUET and CORPORATE indicated that, conditioned by peace-time practices as we are, a major re-think of policy and procedures is necessary when engaged in hostilities, particularly when the operation concerned is covert, as was PARAQUET.
2. Because PARAQUET was conducted under a high security caveat, no press releases were made, or even considered, until a request was received from Northwood. As the operation was still being handled at high classification, a suggested release at the same classification was therefore signalled for vetting and dissemination as seen fit in UK. It was understood that it was still necessary to conceal the actual details of how the operation had been mounted and of the composition of the task group, so as to deny any information to the enemy.
3. ANTRIM was informed that making press releases at high classification to CinCPleet inhibited their handling at home, and that they should be made in the normal way to MODUK(Navy). However no classified information was to be released, but there was no clear guidance as to what was classified and what was not. Two further daily reports of activities were therefore made to MODUK(Navy), classified CONFIDENTIAL on the assumption that appropriate vetting would be applied. (It was felt that UNCLASSIFIED releases about penguins, albatrosses and ice-bergs would be fatuous in the circumstances).
4. This procedure was also declared unsatisfactory so, after an acerbic exchange of signals between ANTRIM, the Captain of the Fleet, and the Fleet PRO, no further press releases were made by ANTRIM during Operation PARAQUET, or indeed during the remainder of Operation CORPORATE. It is noted that this procedure has not been followed by many other ships, reading the July 1982 edition of the Navy News it almost appears as though this publication has been included in the distribution of their Reports of Proceedings!
5. The difficulties in this age of mass media and high speed communications are appreciated, particularly when a large press and TV contingent is embarked in the force. Fortunately ANTRIM's "faceless men of the South Atlantic" reacted with cynical amusement, rather than active resentment, to the widely inaccurate and misleading reports about the re-capture of South Georgia, accepting that it was valuable 'disinformation' at that stage - and their forbearance was rewarded when the awards for the operation were announced.
6. However the sensational, inaccurate and, too frequently premature reports of damage and casualties, which caused much distress to our people at home, were most strongly resented, and press-pestering of next of kin was seen as a gross invasion of privacy.
7. It is strongly recommended that, in any future conflicts or operations of this nature, the policy be firmly established and understood by all concerned for all news releases to be centrally controlled and vetted, either by MOD or the Fleet Commander, and that they should be based on the factual reports made by the Commanders on the spot. "Human interest" and eye-witness accounts have, undoubtedly, an important part to play, but there is a proper time and place for them - which is not necessarily while the events described are still going on.

080700Z

POLITICAL

Chile and Brazil may discuss - Chilean request for repairs  
bolt hole Puerto Montt? Message to King arrives

UK GROUP See groups attached.

AGENCY OF ... HMS ANTRIM.

080800Z

FORMEX 100/101

6 April - 18 June 1982.

2100

- 52 CHAMP V
- 59 HP 2070 LHM
- 180 HP 2070 LHM
- 181 HP 2070 LHM

2200

... be detached ahead to ...

080900Z

... Argentina is working a program of ...

080900Z

Argentine Interior Minister stated that ...

080900Z

UK Government established ...

080900Z

Details of troop numbers for ...

OPERATION CORPORATE - OPS ROOM NARRATIVE

TIME/DATE

6 April pmPOLITICAL

Chile and Brazil now friendly - Chilean support base/repair bolt hole Punta Arenas? Embargo on Argy goods.

UK GROUP Air groups embarked.

ASCENSION NP 1222 set up Wx5 6 in No. 1 SKA 4 gunship sets  
2 Resource 845 gunships SKUA 0 CROP available for filling at sea.

1500

NEWS HMG prior knowledge of invasion postulated. SM could have stopped invasion!

EEC sanctions and united front asked for by Mrs T.  
£1200 Million worth of Argy imports.

ENDURANCE message to Islands via BEC.

More troops and equip Argy to F.I. More jobs, banks, medicine, GPO facilities for F.I. New Governor - Mendes - Spanish to be official language. RM booby traps been set.

2100

EMCON plans for ST cancelled, MAYFLOWER cancelled. New plan WHISKY.

52 CHAFF H  
89 HF DATA LINK  
180 UHF COV RATT  
181 UHF SEC SPEECH

2200

TID to be detached ahead to Ascension? Group speed 16½ kts.

070200

Soviet NA TASS and El Salvador both blamed UK for Falklands crisis - Argentina is conducting a programme of de-colonisation. UK/Argie Ambassadors in Washington have both seen Gen. Haig. Argies have said compensation will be paid to any Falklander willing to leave.

070700

Argentinian Interior Minister stated that Argentina would be "unlikely" to remove troops from Falklands before negotiations began. MODUK 071615Z - CORPORATE - AIM.

080700

UK Government established 200NM Exclusion Zone around Falklands. Argentina established new S.Atlantic Naval Command incorporating Falkland area. Press opinion pessimistic on diplomatic solution + forecast SSN's could start shooting when Exclusion Zone comes into force Monday 120400Z APR. High level of diplomatic activity including planned Gen. Haig visits to UK + Argentina. ANTRIM/TIDE/PLY detached to ASCENSION - form TG 317.9. OPERATION PARQUET.

092100

Details of troop numbers for ANTRIM TG asked for 091520 APR 82.

11 April

Two long days of Vertrep  
Have embarked as follows:

M Coy + 845 Det TIDESPRING  
HQ + NGS + Attack Units ANTRIM  
NGSLO PLYMOUTH  
Plus ENDURANCE Survey Party in ANTRIM  
1 + 2 Kit and Ammo in TID  
SAS kit in ANT for END

Vast quantity of stores transferred in good order.  
Landed liaison + Clansman both days - Land Rover landed for NP 1222.  
TG 317.9 removed from latest Intreps.  
Because of late arrival last stores loads. TID + PLY detached at midday downtrack. ANT remains to collect departing Ascension at 0110Z at 22 kts to rejoin. Stores were critical - cold weather, extreme weather and medical stores.  
En route to invade S.Georgia.  
CINCFLEET signal on OPODER - OPODER run expected 13 approx.  
Report when ENDURANCE RAS(L) completed (CINCFLEET AAA 110411Z AI

12 April

FORT AUSTIN completed Vertrep with ENDURANCE - FA confirmed RV 130600. ANT preparation for War : NBCDX

13 April  
0605

Signals from Fleet re KRIVAK  
Sighted lights on horizon - TID/PLY instructed to burn stern lights.

0630  
0730  
0820  
0845  
0900  
0950

406 being launched for OTHH  
406 on deck to pick up RM'S for TIDESPRING  
406 land on - shut down - AL 30  
Major Delves SAS onboard. Wants to embark D Sqdn  
Commenced RAS(S) with RFA FORT AUSTIN  
Captain on Growler to COS Fleet re:

SAS  
ENDURANCE RAS(L)

TIDESPRING Pumpover  
Second Growler conference later in forenoon covered wide range of PARAQUET aspects:-

ROE  
Timescale  
SAS  
Weather  
SSN's  
Pre landing, landing, Post landing plans

1500

Commenced transfer of D Sqdn SAS from FORT AUSTIN to ANTRIM/  
PLYMOUTH plus full outfit of stores.

2110

WX 5 requested precautionary landing. Ship response very good.  
Aircraft landed safely FORT AUSTIN. Vertrep delayed until 2nd  
WX 5 ready. Vertrep continued by FORT AUSTIN Lynx - one load  
81mm mortar bombs jettisoned - lost control of load, subsequent  
loads fitted fluorescent lights. Vertrep complete 140015Z.

Concern about TIDESPRING fuel vis a vis duration of PARAQUAT - Pumpover pre landing will increase flexibility - BRAMBLELEAF reported ETA 202000 at ASC I, now rounded C of G Hope - bid to 317.8 to allocate 317.9 for early pumpover. CTF 317 131730Z AAA/19J Commanders Evaluation - for planning purposes in advance of OORDER - OORDER delivery 151000 by Nimrod.

April 14

FORT AUSTIN detached 140015 - one load jettisoned by Lynx - RAS(s)/VERTREP 0800-0015 - ANTRIM received over 300 loads - including a) SAS D Sqdn(40) + Gear(30 000lb +) - (20) to PLY - remainder in ENDURANCE.

b) Surgical Team - ANT - stores TIDE  
600+ onboard - CB 04826 looks shaky.

ENDURANCE RV 1100 - 1200 outlook favourable.

0630

Grid Origin change ordered for 140800Z.

0430

Two Bears reported airborne ex Angola hdg NW

1100

RV ENDURANCE

1215

CO ENDURANCE to ANTRIM for briefing

1400

Grid Origin change ordered

1600

CTG 317.9 Operation PARAQUAT warning order issued to embarked forces (ANTRIM 250/3/1 dated 14 Apr 82).

1900

ENDURANCE refuelling complete - 90% fuel. Large Fenders embarked in TIDESPRING not used: a modified astern RAS rig was the method used in v.favourable conditions.

April 15

Maintenance Day

0800

Trooplift to TIDESPRING - stores/personnel to ENDURANCE

0900

Airdrop of OPORD by Nimrod 2.

BRAMBLELEAF instructed by CINCFLEET to report PCS.

151758Z

CINCFLEET assumes OPCODE BRAMBLELEAF to RV 5000S 09500W reporting ETA.

BRAMBLELEAF 151300 - 33445 00351E - 267 - 14. Looks like ETA in order of 211300Z at promulgated RV - adjustment likely vis a vis Recce landing. BRAMBLELEAF PCS based on instruction from CTG 317.8 to RV 35005 03245W with BRILLIANT Group.

April 16

0015 - RORSAT formation

0600

o/c PLY/ANT detached for SAGEX

406 launched for surface search - Targets END/TID - END prime target.

BRAMBLELEAF acknowledged CINCFLEET directive for RV ANT Group  
BRAMBLELEAF report ETA 211300Z.

1030 - 1230

COs meeting/briefing in ANT

1400 - 1600

ANT + PLY RAS(L)

1830

Gemini drill - this could be an important aspect particularly for the landing phase - silent lowering under darken ship conditions must be achieved. BRAMBLELEAF PO and allocation of a Victor Tanker for MRR. Replies sent on both - B'LEAF requested to PO before Recce landings - increase our flexibility particularly since TIDESPRING has M coy gp and 2 wx 5 embarked. Request to Thermal Imagary in victor - ANT to identifying likely areas of hostilities around Leith and Grytviken. CINCFLEET sitrep indicates that TG 317.9

Anti - SOSS measures could be working - signal CTG 317.9

161935ZAPR sent to CTG 317.9 'pour memoire'!

April 17

0600

RORSAT formation around 0030 and 0420.

Two Bear Deltas departed Luanda for probable Southlant Recce - EW Office alerted.

0855 - 1001

2 Bears reported in vicinity Ascension Island

1230

RORSAT pass

1330 -

SAS/SBS/M Coy Gemini Drills - trial of FLOBS/FLT transponder "Gizzit"

Gemini drills achieved. SAS not good at getting in and out of ships

Gizzit worked well. GIZZIT is the ANTRIM transponder device

1930

1800 HDS and troop lift cancelled owing to heavy rain and 406 defect. Outstanding lifts to be completed 180800 HDS.

April 18

O/NIGHT

RORSAT passes at Midnight and 0430 ROMEO Conducted

0440

Two sweeps unidentified E/F radar

0830

RAS(L) astern method with TIDESPRING. Cold weather clothing worn for first time. RORSAT pass 0826 - RORSAT formation prior to RAS(L)

181005Z

GLAMORGAN, INVINCIBLE, BROADSWORD, ALACRITY, YARMOUTH ordered by FOF1 to weigh and chart Ascension to NE. Submarine detected off Ascension?

BRAMBLELEAF now under CTG 317.9 TACON for PO - before/after insertion under review. GROWLER call to CINCFLEET may resolve/clarify intended date for insertion vis a vis PO. Military need ANT/PLY in close proximity to respond quickly to any compromise of Recce patrols.

TG 317.8.2 instructed to proceed with despatch within constraints fuelling weather to VIC405 35W. Are they in distant support, or a honey pot lure?

Captain had 2 Growler conversations with COS Fleet to clarify BRAMBLELEAF options.

CTG 317.9 AAA/I9J 181925ZAPR 82 sent to CTG 317.9 - APPROACH INTENTIONS TO SOUTH GEORGIA 19 - 21 APR.

CTG /\*&amp;. (AAA/I9J 181925ZAPR 82 SITREP/INTENTIONS for approach/insertion phases to CTF 317. Political pressure for Recce landing 21 Apr. Weather will be critical.

2110

Total Steam Failure.

CTF 317 AAA/I9J 181615ZAPR 82 - PCS required every 12 hours.

April 19

0600Z just within max range of ARG Neptune Patrol

0800Z ANTRIM in 2Y/Full Defence Watches - Lifejackets/Survival Suits/Anti Flash being carried.

1000Z - HDS Troop lift complete - Bookings still being made with anyone, but the correct person! Further briefing to embarked force officers on HDS booking procedure??

1100Z - Both seacat launchers loaded - 4.5" hoist loaded HE - Turret provided with HE, RE + Star Shell - We are now in business!

1430

Launch 406 for Sagex PLY - OCE.

0800 - 1600 Captain, CLF (Major SHERIDAN) 2 i/c SAS visit TIDE, END, PLY to discuss recce phase.

CTG 317.9 AAA/I9J 191810ZAPR 82 Intentions for insertion/post insertion phases.

CTF 317 191820Z received giving ROE when inside ARG MEZ 200 on S. Georgia.

CTF 317 191555Z contained sitrep on Gritviken and Leith. Ice free, No Growlers, No Warships.

CTG 317.9 191815Z Contained Navigational Details for vicinity S. Georgia, including codenames for placenames.

April 20

0100

Fog - Viz to one cable. END radiating India Band - Sector scan.

0145

END Radar ceased.

0200 CINCFLEET reports two Bear Deltas departed Luanda to shadow UK Task Force.

0319 Assessed Bears heading for Cuba (NW) as part of normal re-deployment.

0705 Visibility remains poor - ENDURANCE continuing radar guard-ship reports. Visibility  $\approx$  1 mile.

0800 - 1000 General Comment - All political sitreps gleaned purely from World Service - a CINCFLEET appreciation would be helpful. Victor MRR on task 0800 - 1000Z CTF 317 191555Z Watch set on revised frequencies - amend 1 to Op Order.

1000 New ROE Post DANDELION issued.

0900 RAS(L) with TID. Viz poor in fog but improving. Yet another long HDS.

1115 Practised alarm procedures/Chaff drills using AA practice - 5 secs for Chaff Charlie - 8 secs for AA Previous record 6 secs Fleet standard which is 30(includes safety reports).

1200 Meeting with embarked forces to discuss mounting of Recce teams and requirements for the quick reaction force.

1345 CTG 317.9 201345 to CTR/MOD re prisoner handling - idea of a POW camp does not appeal. Question re civilians and BRANSFIELD.

1402 Report from PLYMOUTH UNIDENT Nav Radar 035 as at 1350Z. 1Z sounds.

1410 Action Stations 1Z in ANTRIM  
406 brought to alert 10 - launched to investigate.  
TG 317.9 just in vicinity ARG 200 MEZ from S. Georgia - intelligence does not indicate likely presence of ARG Warships ANT EW office classified 1 band as from ARG CMS, A69 or Patrol boat. Perhaps the BRANSFIELD? - Radar classified as RAYTHRON/KELVIN HUGHES.  
Comment: First real Action Stations for nearly everyone onboard 4 mins to Action Stations - 10 minutes to 1Z from 2Y (5 mins faster than the best time achieved at Portland).  
1504 Vis decreasing to  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile - Poor visibility approach for 406. Comment: The cluster at Action Stations and the dreadful AWD requires investigation - an all in one fire proof suit (a la Jackie STEWART) could be an answer to the trousers in socks Anti Flash guard we have at present.  
1520 406 did not find anything. Secure from Action Stations  
1600 HDS/SOOTAX - followed by ice probe.  
ROE - TF 317 and 324 has at one stage today been under 6 different sets of ROE - TG 317.9 now under post DANDELION rules CTF 317 201359ZAPR has given the ground rules for rule 205 with respect to "hostile intent" as it affects TG 317.9.  
2010 "DANDELION" received - CTF 317 DTG 201940Z - We're in for a bit of "Argy Bargy":  
2015 406 landed on after surface plot recce. No surface contacts 120' ahead or up to 80' to West.  
2300 SGR report HE Contact brg 270. Classified surface ship, single screw 140rpm, very faint but distinct. Continued to monitor for brg change. Captain informed - No further UHF t/x without permission of Captain via PWO. MCO and Mil Ops Room informed of UHF silence.  
2345 Original contact faded brg 270. Second contact gained brg 325, single screw - 150 rpm. Brg drew aft and faded.

April 21

0245

Speed reduced to 8 knots - 6 making silence on Tac UHF to achieve.

HE bearing 330 - ENDURANCE?

0410

END radio check (PWO - no reply UHF silence)

0420

EW report 3 sweeps, off 3 sweeps Type 975 (MCMV?) or Decca 626 - March.

0440

Action Stations. Position 017 Gritviken 35 miles.

0445

Blue on Blue engagement averted - NARROWLY.

HE contact 180' rev count 127 radiated 184 - contact 3000' TIDESPRING turned away W.

Radiated 978 - 2 contacts 180', 160'

illumination by Star Shell ordered, cancelled.

PLY + END?

PLYMOUTH reports suspicious electronic emissions - us on tactical. ID established of PLY & END

EWO wash up. parameters did not agree 2 earlier sets of END 829 (P.I. out of 16)

0330

HE detections of ship RPM 130 bearing East. Initially classed as twin screw, then refined to one screw. Bearing down my right quickly.

0600

BBC World News - What the papers say - Daily Mail" Leading units of UK Task Force could be in a position to attack South Georgia tomorrow" - reflects clearly to the security breach at Northwood reported in CTF 317 202150Z APR 82. What price D notices!

0715

Flying brief foe FOXHOUND insertion conducted. Weather considered unsuitable at present and decision made to 'hold' at 15 minutes notice until weather can be further assessed. No 'Action Stations' but midships section base mustering to assist with SAS in moving equipment.

PARAQUET INTREP 3 (CTF 317 201731Z APR) - indicates ARGs have been monitoring plain language comms from BLANDFIELD including UK enquiry on 18 April about Arg shipping and aircraft in Grytviken area. This type of communication, use of insecure telephone at Northwood, and Daily Mail speculation must have alerted Args. Good job that there is only 50 or so around Grytviken and Leith.

It could be a case of so near and yet so far with respect to our opportunity successful COVERT posture.

0930

406 launched to conduct recce.(weather conditions) inshore. Silent routine - intermittent radar policy only. If conditions for insertion considered suitable, he will return to collect FOXHOUND.

0958

Conditions reported 'suitable' by Flight Commander.

1022

First Wessex from TIDESPRING airborne - inbound for South Georgia. FAUGH A BIG ARGENTINA BALLAGH.

1036

Second Wessex from TIDESPRING airborne.

1040

406 airborne.

1045

Weather - wind 35kts from 240, 8/8 cloud cover, driving rain, intermittent sleet, vis 1 - 1 1/2 miles, surface temp 3°C, QNH 965.1, swell 4 metres with 2 metre sea, driving snow.

1058

From 406 on Helo FREQ(ABORT). Heavy snow - assume conditions too bad to land FOXHOUND. Message passed by 406 to 2 x Wessex 5's.

1105 2 x Wessex 5 to TIDESPRING (SAS to remain in TIDESPRING)  
 1106 Standing by for PVA  
 1114 406 landed on, rotors running in case problems with Wessex 5's  
 in TIDESPRING  
 1125 Both Wessex 5 safe on deck in TIDESPRING - 406 shut down  
 1215 Flying brief. Aim to try again to insert FOXHOUND (SAS x 15)  
 at 1300. Wind now 240 - 35 gusting 45 - looks as if front is  
 passed through - visibility increased although heavy snow  
 showers are around.  
 1255 First Wx 5 airborne TIDESPRING  
 1300 2nd Wx 5 ranged rotors spread on TIDESPRING  
 1301 Starting 406  
 1302 Cape Constance 165° 22 mls  
 Engaging rotors  
 1306 Launching 406  
 1307 406 airborne port  
 1309 2nd Wx 5 airborne  
 1310 All a/c inbound  
 1338 Lost 992 rotation  
 1348 992 restarted  
 1407 Heloes vis port beam  
 1418 Recovering 406 - 406 on deck  
 1418 Shutting down 406  
 1423 2nd Wx 5 on deck TIDESPRING  
 1426 White out in hail storm

In first 24 hrs in operation area the barometer fell from  
 1012 Mil Bars to 961 Mil Bars. Barometer trace to be put  
 into log.

21 APRIL 1982

LANDING OF FOXHOUNDS ON FORTUNA GLACIER, SOUTH GEORGIA

0930 Take off for recce of POSSESSION BAY, ANTARCTIC BAY, and  
 FORTUNA GLACIER and landing site for FOXHOUNDS. Weather  
 clear, bright and w/v steady 320/26 as the mouth of POSSESSION  
 BAY approached. Some turbulence encountered on crossing  
 saddle between ANTARCTIC and POSSESSION BAYS. Snow slurries  
 occurred as 406 climbed up FORTUNA GLACIER to projected LZ  
 at ½M west to spot HT. Conditions considered suitable for  
 transit and landing. Landed on ANTRIM 0958. Western slope  
 of FORTUNA GLACIER very crevassed and irregular.  
 1040 Airborne with FOXHOUNDS and with Wx 5's YA and YF in lower  
 echelon port heading for POSSESSION BAY. Conditions at mouth  
 of bay were appalling. Wind 250/220 42kts gusting 55kts -  
 visibility less than 200mtrs and heavy snow showers. ABORT  
 ordered at 1058. Land on at 1115.  
 1306 Airborne again with two Wessex V's routing via SKUA ISLAND  
 and OUTER LEE ISLAND to POSSESSION BAY. Weather clear w/v  
 240/42kts gusting 60kts. Considerable turbulence in POSSESSION  
 BAY. A violent hailstorm seemed imminent. On approaching  
 FORTUNA GLACIER it became apparent that the severe crevassing  
 on the western side of the Glacier would preclude a FOXHOUND  
 insertion in the original LZ. A site ¾m south of spot ht was

1306 (contd)

selected. The area seemed relatively clear of crevasses and good visibility seemed assured. On descending to 300ft above ground, it became increasingly difficult to pilot the aircraft as snow began to blow across the LZ and by 100ft near white out conditions occurred with the 1st pilot rigidly adhering to instrument information. A difficult landing was actioned between two crevasses in very badly recirculating snow. 406 provided the static reference for the two Wx V's to land and all FOXHOUNDS were let loose. Return was via ANTARCTIC and POSSESSION BAYS to a position 340 Cape Constance 21 miles, recovering 1418.

1430

Continue east 10kts to R/V PLY/END in LL13

1745

Altered course to close coast in case Foxhound patrols attempt to call on HF ground radio component. Weather/sea still rough.

1930

Hove-to in storm force 10/11 as second depression approached.

2300

Remaining hove-to in storm. Average winds have been 45kts (gusting 55kts average). At 2300 wind on the 'stops' at 70 knots.

22 APRIL

0528

Signal received from ENDURANCE reporting successful insertion of 2 SBS Recce party at Hound Bay by helo and gemini at 220300Z.(ENDURANCE AAA/19J 220405).

0606

Sitrep covering SAS/SBS insertions 21/22 April sent to CINCFLEET.

0600

Report on World Service - HERMES/INVINCIBLE might have to go to Defence Watches on Friday 23 April - "Daily Mirror" ships so far as ANTRIM ship's company concerned.

CTF 317 211800 indicates BRISTOL, ANDROMEDA, EXETER, CARDIFF, PENELOPE, MINERVA, ACTIVE, AVENGER, INTREPID, FORT GRANGE and OLNA (Reinforcement Group) will sail UK 10 May.

Plus ARGONAUT and ARDENT with stingray.

1125

Hands to Flying Stations to evacuate SAS. SAS called to request evacuation. Apparently have made no headway since yesterday and hypothermia setting in fast. Immediate evacuation required. (see attached signal).

406 rotors run refuel.

1202

406 airborne

1205

Helo's radar bears 154° reported by EW office. Helo on its return trip.

1250

Helo's radar bears 162°.

1254

Helo's radar bears 162° continued TX

1255

Helo's radar bears 168°

1257

Helo's radar ceased bearing 170°

1304

Helo bears 164

1305

Helo radar ceased bearing 164°

1322

Helicopters visual and returning. Hopefully SAS recovered.

1325

Helicopters returned SAS not recovered.

1333

One Wx 5 launched from ANTRIM's flight deck 406 landed on to refuel.

1343

406 airborne to carry out search for SAS

1344

Fire reported under No. 2 Exocet launcher.

1346

Fire extinguished - short in heater system - missile undamaged

1430

406 reported on ASWA 2 A/C crashed picked up crew off 1 A/C.

Returning to ship with survivors. SAS still not found

1435 406 on deck disembarking survivors (2). 406 refuelling and having disembarked survivors from one Wx 5 will launch to search for other Wx 5 survivors.

1439 First Wx 5 survivors received in ANTRIM

1444 Stretchers and medical packs being embarked in 406

1445 406 launched

1450 Wx 5 pilot debriefed - following events occurred - SAS picked up by Wx 5's. One Wx suffered 'whiteout' and crashed. SAS personnel transferred into second Wx 5 and 406. Second Wx 5 then crashed. 406 now returning to look for survivors. 4 SAS medica plus 4 SAS in 406.

1500 Flash signal sent to CINCFLEET with initial details

1504 TIDESPRING told to prepare hospital facilities

1509 406 has found second helo, reports 'NO CASUALTIES'

1530 406 landed on. At present conditions unsuitable for recovery of further survivors. 406 intends holding on deck for approx. 1 hour.

1542 Apparently crashed aircraft not yet located visually. Short conversation indicates no major casualties.

1637 406 airborne. Bound inshore to collect survivors.

1649 406 in contact with survivors on 246.8 and 243.6

1700 406 called on ASWA(2328) to report he was returning with all survivors.

1710 406 on deck. Survivors all well - one man with a cut.

1830 ANTRIM RAS(L) with TIDESPRING

2045 - 2130 Briefing for landing of SAS Troop on Grass Island, Stromness Bay.

2205 CTF 317 221900 - BRILLIANT to join ANTRIM by 242000  
ENDURANCE reports second floater insertion complete.

23 APRIL 82

0215 Action Stations. Closed up for SAS insertion to Grass Island. Hands to Action Stations for landing recce party on S.Georgia - Blind Pilotage entry of Stromness Bay.

0229 Navigator makes Black Rocks at 4.8mls. We are slightly south of track.

0235 Rocks approximately 4mls altering course to steer 202.

0242 Cease transmitting 978.

0245 Delay as gemini will not start. Turning back north.

0255 Problem now solved gemini engines started. Turning south again to make our approach.

0258 Radiate 978

0305 Steer 204. We are on track.

0306 5 miles to drop. All stations reminded no broadcasts or intercom to take place

0312 Slightly port of track but still safe.

0313 Altering to 206.

0313 Still very slightly port of track. Altering course to regain Nav track.

0315 2.8 miles to run. White light reported on shore.

0319 Steer 205 to regain Nav track.

0320 Still slightly port of track.

0323 Steer 208 to regain Nav track.

0324 Still safe but still port of track.

0325 Steer 210 approx 1/4 cable port of track but regaining.

0327 Revolutions 68 come down to 8 knots.

0328 Slightly to port of track.  
 0329 Just entered Stromness Bay approx 1.3 miles to run, Black Rocks visual. Passed Cape Saunders approx 25yds port of track. Should be on track as we reach Black Rocks.  
 0330 Black Rock  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile.  
 0330 Approx 1 mile to run.  
 0334 Very slightly starboard of track but still safe.  
 0335 Approx. 3 cables to run still safe.  
 0336 2 cables to run.  
 0338 Ship maneuvering inside bay for position to drop gemini craft.  
 0345 Ship now stopped in water facing to sea now dropping gemini's off.  
 0346 Ship drifting slowly. We can afford to drift for approx.  $4\frac{1}{2}$  cables before we are unsafe (S.W.)  
 0350 Harbour reported quiet nothing moving. Ventilation crash stopped as noise on upper deck was quite loud - in addition all upper deck broadcasts and repeats isolated prior to entry. Essential ventilation being restarted (Mainly radars and computer).  
 0356 3 geminis in water  
 0401 Nearest danger through drifting is Black Rocks approx. 6 cables to north.  
 0413 4 geminis in water none of which are started yet.  
 0415 All five geminis in water engines running. Just casting off, Rocket bearing 235 probably reflection of our own radar on the glacier.  
 0416 Now  $3\frac{1}{2}$  cables from Black Rocks.  
 0422 2 gemini engines running probably towing other 3 inland.  
 0423 Ship now maneuvering in Stromness Bay for safety reasons (rockets)  
 0427 Stop both engines.  
 0429 Geminis returning to port quarter.  
 0433 Geminis still with us but do not seem to know where to go!  
 0435 Geminis on route to shore ship proceeding to sea.  
 0437 Port of track by approx.  $\frac{3}{4}$  cable.  
 0438 Cannot see geminis on 978.  
 0440 Maintaining track.  
 0442 OOW to PWO. Start falling out from Action Stations - no pipes will be made.  
 0443 Cease transmissions on 978.  
 0444 Cleared Cape Saunders, heading out to sea.  
 0800 Prepare for Flying - SAS gemini has broken adrift - recover to prevent risk of compromise.  
 0900 406 launched.  
 0951 E/F racket brg 050.  
 1015 406 on deck - revert to alert 30.  
 1220 HE POS TIDESPRING and BRAMBLELEAF.  
 AM Repeated intercepts of 1 band racket assessed as ARGY C130. Query to FLEET ref. ROE hastened.  
 406 recovered crew of one gemini, they had drifted  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles out of Stromness Bay: all kit recovered - gemini sunk.  
 3 boats on Grass Island - one elsewhere on Stromness Bay.  
 PLYMOUTH refuelled today.  
 Pumpover in progress down sea to ENE.  
 ANTRIM headed NW looking for group whilst awaiting.

1356 END 231448Z - PLYMOUTH racket/END intercept S/M bearing 330°  
within 100'.

1445 C130 still around - EWO report - Sector Scan Mode - associated  
with 3rd party targetting but for whom? No indications on  
ERITMIS. Assessed as provocation and an attempt to persuade  
us to illumine with E/F radar - C130 has not identified  
group? Weather over Fortuna Glacier probably prevented  
sighting of wrecked Wx 5. Was he targetting for a S/M?

1525 PLYMOUTH 19J 231200Z reports C130 within 8 miles of PLYMOUTH/  
TIDESPRING/BRAMBLELEAF.  
Recce parties - SAS/SBS Recce parties HF reports may have  
resulted in the givaway - World Service/Voice of America also  
postulating. S.Georgia option has lost few days.  
ENDURANCE picked up S/M radar vicinity pumpover group - 182n  
ordered in group - ANTRIM preparing 406 with 2 x Mk46 - C130  
racket ceased.

1605 RAS group told to break off pumpover and head south out of  
submarine probability area, streaming 182.  
0/c Captain conducted discussions with Northwood to negotiate  
options. Likely attempt will be made to take Leith at earliest  
opportunity.

2100 R/V BRAMBLELEAF, TIDESPRING, PLYMOUTH K14(5358s 03531w)  
2125 TG 317.9 + BIF formed into screen.  
Planning considerations:

1. Protecting tankers from S/M
2. Is S/M real?
3. Achieving some gain
4. Option of landing with ANTRIM resources - 60ish people -  
Land at Stromness ANTRIM depart to gather ASW assets and  
hunt S/M.
5. Bombard Grytviken.  
182 streamed and activated.

2200 TIDESPRING reported contact 058 8 from her  
2355 Hands to Action Stations. Target illuminated - identified  
0010 as PLYMOUTH  
0035 2Y.

AN EVENTFUL DAY : A NEAR THING

Some thoughts:

1. C130 still inviolate - our signal of 202022Z asking for  
ROE not answered by CINCFLEET.
2. ARG C130 sighted PLY/TIDE/BRAM - he came within 8 miles  
but then reported position of ANTRIM some 60 miles away as  
his contacts - we did not think he had identified us.
3. S/M threat was assessed as low between ASCENSION/S.GEORGIA  
but since 12 Apr when SANTA FE had not been located he was  
always a threat after 22 Apr - ARGY resolve has been clearly  
demonstrated or perhaps it has been underestimated.
4. PARAQUET flaws:
  - a. Subsidiary considerations did not fully support the aim  
- particularly minimum damage vicinity GRITVIKEN.
  - b. Recce requirement in face of continued intelligence  
wrt numbers at GRITVIKEN and LEITH, slightly puzzling.

5. Approval to Recce overestimated ARGs OP's etc and resulted in choice of LZ's which underestimated the weather in places like Fortuna Glacier resulting in loss of Wx 5's.
6. PLY/ANT v well handled GUPPY would have been more even if Wx 3 had been in ASW role - just.
7. Option of ANTRIM landing troops via STROMNESS rejected once Hercules arrived on scene about 240200.
8. SAS Gemini engines (insertion 0430 23 Apr) are as bad as ours.
9. MTS Report vis a vis S.Georgia option almost borne out - DIS considered ARGs had given up S.Georgia as a 'lost cause'.
10. Today's Int has been almost 'Real Time' via Growler.
11. If SSN can remove SANTA FE - Assault can be achieved if 'restrictions' re LEITH/GRYTVIKEN are removed - also 'Hack the Shad'.
12. The Diesel Threat again - did CONQUEROR get a sniff or had he moved to NW too soon.
13. Loss of a ship or ships TODAY has been very much on our minds - CTG fully aware of political implications of a setback of this nature - also restrictions/limitations in PARAQUET concept.
14. Military Advice has been uncertain - Assault plans dependant on Recce - Recce LZ's were not bold enough - too much attention paid to unlikely ARG OP options.

24 APRIL 1982  
240340

0700

C130 racket ceased bearing 030°. New ROE received - but still very 'wishy washy'. Hercules may only be engaged if obstructing our aim of repossessing S.Georgia. Intentions signal received from ENDURANCE. She will retrieve SBS at 0830 then deploy Wasp for recce/attack against SANTA FE. Lack of windloss will slightly hamper operations. ROE: CTF 231820Z - stressed you are not authorised to engage Hercules C130. Revised ROE being sought.

0916

MODUK 232200(CTF 317 PASSEP 232250Z) - MOD interpretation of ROE 104 qualified by Suffix November gives Commander authority to engage Argentinian aircraft if he considers this necessary to achieve his task of repossession of S.Georgia. This does not really accord with definition of combat aircraft. Received CTF 317 Sitrep 9 re SANTA FE - assessed as landing his troops before taking up his patrol area (CARLOTA = Area Charlie) - assessed as covering LEITH/GRYTVIKEN. Aim for today to pumpover TIDESPRING/BRAMBLELEAF - detach BRAMBLELEAF <sup>o</sup>/c to Ascension. R/V BRILLIANT.

1100

World Service reports "Two warships one Tanker sunk". CTG signal "Not us" EXCLAM.

1305

TIDESPRING/BRAMBLELEAF started. Estimated completion 1700.

1430

ENDURANCE assesses detected by Boeing 707 overflying. Reports Floaters being withdrawn. Reports no submarine or activity in Cumberland Bay.

1455

ANTRIM ordered to proceed south at best speed to ambush the morning recce flight.

1525

CONQUEROR patrol areas extended.

1530

Cry for help from ENDURANCE. Assessed in a 'Multi - Threat' situation. BAS report (231415) 2 warships, 2 small jets and Boeing 707.

1605

ANTRIM reports 'on my way' to ENDURANCE.

SECRET

1900

RAS complete. PLYMOUTH replenished - ANT/PLY proceeding south at 24kts. BRILLIANT being fuelled by TIDESPRING and will join us am 25th.  
General directive - splash reconnaissance aircraft then proceed mission of re-taking S.Georgia. (CTF 317 241555Z APR)

Appreciation

1. Overall aim to repossess S.Georgia still stands.
2. GUPPY remains undetected and despite intelligence that she may be 'below par' we must assume the worst. She poses a considerable threat to surface forces both directly and indirectly inasmuch as she is hindering the overall landing plans in addition to threatening to carry out attrition.
3. Although CONQUEROR has been given the task of sinking the GUPPY her 'exclusion area' hampers our manoeuvring of shipping to achieve the aim. Nevertheless, she remains our best bet.
4. The surface threat (2 warships?) reported by BAS (Bird Island) remains a mystery - both to Fleet and ourselves. But it must not be discounted. Hence BRILLIANT Lynx patrol am 25th.
5. Air threat assessed as minimal - one area where we can perhaps baulk the Argentinian recce effort and keep them guessing.
6. A cautious reinforcement of our troops on the ground is considered prudent prior to the main landing. This will provide extra recce and bottle up the enemy, reducing his options for withdrawal and counter attack.

PWO's orders night 24/25 Apr (by Captain)

1. Defence Watches all systems stood to/relaxed. Helo at alert 30 (converting back to ASW role). Silence except TAC and intership Ratt.
2. PLYMOUTH in company transmitting to south (track as in Bridge Night Order Book) Zigzag Plan 15. Sp 12 Sectors onboard.
3. BRILLIANT also transmitting south to R/V at 0900 (track on bridge chart).
4. Both sets of intended tracks to be on GOP to avoid interaction.
5. 978 may be used 5 sweeps max 3 times per hour for checking PLYMOUTH and looking ahead for ice. Visibility about 2 miles.
6. There is risk from Guppy SANTA FE but intelligence makes this low. 182 is at long stay. Sonar policy silent.
7. Call Captain for any enemy indications or reports particularly HERCULES/707 which we are allowed to engage.
8. PWO is delegated authority to:
  - a. initiate TCM's if required.
  - b. turn force if enemy within 10'
  - c. "guns tight" except in immediate self defence otherwise Command approval.
  - d. Command approval required for any change of EMCON and for "deliberate" engagements.
  - e. Captain is to be shaken before any action taken except as in c above. I am being shaken by OOW at 0630.

SECRET

25 APRIL  
0500

World Service published detail of telegram sent via Swiss to ARGY's with intention to shoot aircraft down.

Meetings with Haig continue.

Fleet's 250045Z TSU

Args have twice identified ANTRIM as type 42 at 240020 HMS EXETER. Mixed blessing. A/C will keep outside our 40' Sea Dart range but they are not crediting us with Exocet.

Note: EWO has not so far detected the 707. BRILLIANT lynx thought he had it when he was 50 nm south of us yesterday afternoon.

CTF 250230 gives report from all Press on activity in GRYTVIKEN - is this the start of a major DISINFORMATION campaign?

0800 PLY reports transmission on Chan 16 - language unidentified - S/M?

0810 406 launched for recce of Grytviken area. Have we trapped the Guppy submarine? ENDURANCE Wasp at alert 8 with AS12 as required by 406.

0855 Guppy submarine detected on surface by 406 radar at 5' from Harbour entrance. 406 taking BRILLIANT Lynx for VECTAC with Mk46 torpedoes. Tacsig sent to ENDURANCE to launch AS12 Wasp for attack.

0900 Reported that 406 has depth-charged Guppy and damaged him. At any rate he is still surfaced. Wasp with AS12 ordered to attack S/M. S/M nows bears 250 35 miles.

0903 PLYMOUTH and ANTRIM proceeding at 24kts towards S/M. All guns crews ordered to close up. Instruction is to sink with gunfire if necessary. 978 radar switched on to indicate target.

0906 406 in contact with ENDURANCE to ensure Wasp attack. ANTRIM gets ready more depth-charges to rearm 406 for further attack. Ship not full closed up at Action Stations. General ops room atmosphere of euphoria.

0911 Battle Ensigns hoisted. Plymouth Wasp airborne. Flash signal to CINCFLEET ordered to inform him of attack on S/M.

0912 Comms difficult with 406. Apparently S/M is unable to dive Transmitter U/S.

0913 Cameramen to close up on the bridge to ensure that all know ANTRIM's success. Ship proceeding at high speed for S/M.

0917 Realised that 978 not on. Inexplicable why radar not switched on earlier.

0948 PLYMOUTH Wasp launched despite comms problems

0920 406 informed that aim is to hit and disable Guppy, not necessary to sink.

0921 Torpedoes not yet arrived on Flight Deck. Told to chase up ASAP - although depth-charges ordered.

0921 BRILLIANT wants to close to join attack. Told by Captain that we're proceeding at 30kts and have guns!

0922 Intention to switch on 992 and engage with guns. 406 has control of PLYMOUTH Wasp which is armed with 1 x AS12. Aiming point judged best to be base of fin to incapacitate Guppy. "He better not miss" - Captain. 965 ordered to transmit.

0929 Again Comms problems - transmitters u/s. Constant Comms problems marred this stage of attack, making our ship Comms with 406 impossible.

0931 406 ready to land on. FDO asks for information of flying checks (peacetime) before recovering 406! Ship comes to Starboard to make recovery easier - appears flight deck net not secure.

0933 Intention is to refuel 406 and load Depth Charges, then to launch and control Wasp. Appears not enough DCs made ready, although command believed we were ready to rearm immediately. 406 rotors running refuel.

0935 Comms OK with PLYMOUTH. Comms available also with BRILLIANT Lynx.

0938 Sitrep reports that Guppy is losing oil and therefore unlikely to be able to dive. Intentions are to force the submarine crew to surrender.

ENDURANCE reports that transmission intercepted saying that S/M has been attacked by helos - transmission jammed. 406 launched.

0939 From BRILLIANT CO - Guppy hit in fin by AS12 and leaking oil. BRILLIANT intention to go alongside S/M to stop him beaching himself. Is S/M on channel 16 as earlier?

0940 Unclear whether SANTE FE has surrendered or is a further three

0942 BRILLIANT believes S/M is sinking, but that another DC attack is required. Appears DCs will not be ready for 25 Mins.

0945 E/F racket bearing 180. 992 ordered to transmit. EW BRILLIANT

0947 406 on deck. BRILLIANT has target 165 12 miles a racket possible PFB racket, although more probably a helicopter or even ENDURANCE.

0949 406 launched to await DCs while ship proceeds at 30 knots towards target, which is apparently trying to make Grytviken harbour. Confusion and problems with 406 operations, not helped by lack of Depth Charges for immediate loading.

0952 406 investigating contact reported by BRILLIANT.

0953 Link flashed up to receive info from BRILLIANT Why wasn't it on earlier? Accordingly EMCON Plan SPAM in force.

0956 Sitrep on DCs - one totally unprepared in hanger, one ready in 5 mins. Intention to reload 406 with one DC - Mk 46s proved useless, since dropped by Lynx without success - not surprising as target on surface.

0957 BRILLIANT's contact 165 12nm is ENDURANCE.

0958 406 told not to follow Guppy into harbour - "We will deal with it when we get there" - Capt

1000 ENDURANCE reports that one Wasp airborne for AS12 attack; second one to follow.

1000 3 hits with AS12s, 2 straffing mission with machine guns reported from BRILLIANT. With fin smashed can SANTE FE dive?

1002 PLYMOUTH Wasp to investigate contact to South (from BRILLIANT) visual confirmation that contact is ENDURANCE is required.

1002 BRILLIANT told can send Atlantic with RMs armed with Carl Gustav against S/M - provided that they stay out of range of shore based enemy.

1003 PLYMOUTH Wasp told not to investigate contact - 406 visually confirmed as ENDURANCE.

1004 Computer failure - Good time to have it.

1006 Computer back on live.

- 1009 406 on deck. Guppy well into harbour and therefore DC attack unfeasible. Told required for surface search - contact 180 10 nm BRILLIANT 4 miles astern of Guppy, told not to enter harbour.
- 1011 Ordered to load DCs - intention now to launch 406 for further DC attack. Originally not going to attack, due to risk of confusion with BRILLIANT's Atlantic in harbour.
- 1013 Guppy apparently alongside with no activity reported ashore PLYMOUTH Wasp told to attack again with AS12. BRILLIANT Lynx told to continue recce of North coast around GRITVIKEN as previously ordered.
- A hit wanted on fin to prevent S/M from sailing - would prefer hit on casing if possible but not feasible to fire at target less than 10' high.
- 1015 PLYM Wasp airborne with 2 X AS12.  
406 to recce to determine risk in Cumberland Bay area.
- 1018 ENDURANCE Wasp reports AS12 hit.
- 1019 BRILLIANT reports two people on ridge 200 from him - only sign of life in the area. BRILLIANT told to hold 5 miles from entrance Intention is for ANTRIM to enter Cumberland Bay. R/V to be 10 miles from entrance and then ships to enter led by ENDURANCE.
- 1020 Men sighted on Southern side of harbour on Brown Mountain.
- 1021 BRILLIANT told that if Lynx fitted with CPMG to engage men on Southern side of harbour - assuming not BAS civilians.
- 1024 Military force to be stood to. BRILLIANT requested to give an info on men around GRITVIKEN.
- 1026 S/M alongside King Edward Pier with smoke coming from side - possibly an explosion.
- 1027 Intention to pull out aircraft, although surveillance ordered on shoreline for Ops and personnel. Possible that SANTE FE is being scuttled alongside.
- 1028 Military force, including ANTRIM RM Detachment, put at 30 mins notice for landing.
- 1029 R/V for entry HM12.
- 1030 Intend open fire direct NGS onto Brown Mountain. Ship's boats to be ready for landing.
- 1032 No Ops in Gritviken area.
- 1032 Assessed possible EXOCET air threat from Super ETENDARD. Air Raid threat YELLOW. (can reach S Georgia with in flight refuelling)
- 1035 S/M spilling oil, appears to be settling, smoke from For'd section. Most of S/M appears to be under water, S/M still settling.
- 1039 Lynx told to continue with surface surveillance. Wasp (PLYM) told to retain AS12 at alert 8 for action against possible surface contacts. Lynx told to standby surveillance for air + surface rackets.
- 1040 Intention for 406 to unload DCs and then pick up ship's Captains.
- 1042 Unidentified A/C bears 130 - 2 miles.  
Air Raid warning RED.  
Lynx reports being fired on.
- 1043 Racket reported bearing 130.
- 1044 BRILL. told to recover Lynx.
- 1049 Regrouping and heading North West.
- 1050 406 on deck to disarm; shut down. Intention to launch at 1115 to collect RN personnel for debrief and rebrief for further action.
- 1052 Aircraft TRACKER?? - by EW. I Band reported by BRILLIANT.
- 1056 "Well done Mate", "Well done FLOBS" Capt to FLYCO + FLOBS.  
406 crew in Ops Room. Report on personnel in Gritviken, Maiviken area.

SECRET

Report by FLOBS:-

- 1058 0845 saw S/M on radar 350 Bath Pt 5 miles - first sweep of radar. Immediate attack with 1 DC - 1 down port side by fin, attack with GPMG and DC five minutes later, burst on casing - S/M <sup>diving</sup> ~~wearing~~ at the time. S/M then returned to Gritviken. Intention to land troops ASAP.
- 1101 CO 060 Sp 12 Ship into Ops control.
- 1105 ACTON, BRIXTON, KEW checked by BRILL Lynx - no activity reported.
- 1107 PADDINGTON + STRAND clear (406 Report).
- 1109 965 strayed - perhaps EW racket was our own radar.
- 1111 Believe that EW racket caused by our own 965 radar. BRILLIANT does not hold racket with 965 strangled.
- 1113 Air threat assessed possible, not immediate.
- 1114 BRILLIANT confirms racket was our 992 (not 965).
- 1117 Problems with operations current though possible air threat and later too long winded reports and reporting, esp. noted from EWD. Need is for shorter speech for better fighting capability.
- 1118 Air raid warning yellow - no hostile air contact within 60 miles.
- 1128 ENDURANCE second Wasp told to relieve other on task over Gritviken, but to stay clear at about 3000' to stay out of range of GPMG, etc. fire. Wasps have been fired upon by GPMG while over Gritviken.  
BRILL Lynx air surveillance back to ship to convert both Lynxs to troop carrying role.
- 1134 Due to manning problem (Action and Defence at same time) lower quarters crews stood down for meal - if required to close up at short notice. This problem unforeseen at start of engagement.
- 1136 Command intention to bring 406 to alert 10 to launch to stand off while HDS takes place, although first Lynx not expected until 1155.
- 1138 ANTRIM + PLYMOUTH to be made radioed for NGS on Brown Mountain.
- 1140 Ship steering 230, on course for Cumberland Bay.  
Action Wessex to clear flight deck.  
— Meanwhile, ship's boats and Geminis being prepared for landings.
- 1205 Problems with winch transfer because all helos sre fitted for weapon carrying, not winching. 406 may be U/S.
- 1209 ENDURANCE's Wasp told to pick up NGS spotter from ANTRIM. 182 recovery started.
- 1213 BRILLIANT's Lynx on return to BRI, has sighted two surface contacts in MOORGATE area. She is investigating. MOORGATE is in vicinity of Bird Island.
- 1220 "Chatting"heard on channel 16.  
— Over lunchtime period ship's Captain and /or Staff onboard ANTRIM for discussions on future plans. Preparations for military landings in Gritviken area continued apace, along with ship's preparations for NGS of Brown Mountain or landing areas - spotting will be done from ENDURANCE's Wasp(s).
- 1224 BRILL other Lynx confirms that previous two surface targets are infact rocks.
- 1230 → Helos preparing on other ships for troop lift - Wessex and two Lynx. ENDURANCE Wasp will be airborne for spotting throughout Intention is for ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH to enter Bay as guardian for NGS, with BRILL and ENDURANCE keeping well clear, until action over.
- 1239 Ship course 305 heading to Bay to begin NGS. As usual problems with Comms to PLYMOUTH.

SECRET

1245 A/C 330 - for flying course, NGS teams are closing up in the Ops Room.

1250 Spotting Wasp launched from ENDURANCE - Spotting teams are on their way to the Flight Deck, BN - spotting Wasp call sign A/C 340 - better flying course for Wasp.

1252 Recover Wasp spotter, ordering BRILLIANT's Lynx to recover her Captain.  
It looks as though we are sorting out, for the assault on Gritviken, NGS by ANTRIM + PLYMOUTH then the assault taken ashore by helos.

1255 Helo has taken the NGS spotters away for air spotting duties.  
1300 My view, Let's go or momentum will be lost, manoeuvring to gain position to give us a good line of fire, weather closing in, speed is of the essence.

1302 BRILLIANT - Lynx is returning to recover her Captain. We are ready in all respects save the HDS for BRILL's Captain.

1303 Navigation control of the NGS will be taken by the Navigator and the Bridge Team.

1305 Lynx on deck passengers embarking.  
1307 Still there are some passengers for PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE - the Lynx must be recalled for this transfer.

1310 Report from the spotters, tells us the target is clear of the weather.

1314 Captain has clarified the object, to be able to NGS Gritviken, yet be able to operate helos at the same time.

1318 Captain is bringing all force helos to a higher state of readiness to be ready for the landing.

1319 Lynx has been ordered back to recover personnel from PLYMOUTH.  
1325 There is confusion as to where the Lynx's are going and what routes to take, Captain wants one Lynx to operate from this ship the other to operate from BRILLIANT picking troops off our deck. Pilots will need briefing.

1328 Lynx on deck in order to pick up more passengers.  
1331 A/C 220 to close the firing area.  
1333 Lt Cdr STANLEY will brief observers of the helos to ascertain destination and routes, this is holding the operation up at the moment.

1344 Captain has gone to await brief in the military Ops Room, also awaiting observer from the BRILLIANT Lynx.

1355 The briefing continues.  
1357 Brief complete.  
1400 Captain briefing CO of BRILLIANT, 406 will lead the helos in - start time 1445.

1405 Intelligence suggests, Super Etendard with IFR capability have been despatched, threat from AM39s, radar surveillance of paramount importance.

1407 Problem with 978, hallyard caught in the aerial of the 978.  
1410 4.5s about to engage in the harassing fire made on Brown Mt.  
1414 4.5s have engaged, spotters and NGS teams must now do their job.

1415 Radar teams must not be distracted - there is still an air threat  
1416 Captain confirms helos know where they are going.  
1418 ANTRIM turning to engage the target, entering Cumberland Bay.  
1422 PD must get 406 ranged and away ASAP, and be ready for rotors running refuel

1429 Submarine confirmed alongside the wall in Gritviken.  
1430 406 on deck, spreading and loading for the off.  
1434 It is a tight schedule to get the helos off the deck, will have to turn running out of sea room.

1437 Firing 20 salvoes for effect.  
1439 All aircraft ready.  
1440 406 airborne, Lynx on deck and loading, the helos will go in as a wave. To Tussock flat.  
1443 2nd Lynx on deck and loading.  
1444 H Hour - 1445 stands, the operation will start on time.  
1446 All the aircraft enboud to Tussock flats for landing.  
1445 - 1450 Engaging Tussock grass for effect prior to helo landing.  
1453 Bombardment complete helos going in now to Tussock flats.  
1456 Problems with landing 406 on this course, it will have to land facing aft, this course is necessary to give us more sea room.  
1502 The helos are returning they will load with troops for the second wave.  
1503 Both Lynx back and loaded up awaiting 406 to load up.  
1510 Second wave on the ground, the helos are returning.  
1511 Engaging the target Brown Mountain.  
1513 From BRILLIANT 342' 8 miles, target/contact this is going to be investigated by the PLYMOUTH Wasp.  
1519 There are 3 sticks of troops left to land.  
1520 BRILLIANT to radiate searcher and investigate contact to the NW HE from our 184 also being investigated if it is a possible Submarine.  
1521 4.5s engaging Brown Mountain.  
1524 Last wave going ashore, all helos will return and refuel.  
1526 Major Sheridan will go ashore to command the land battle, the idea is to surround Gritviken, the sticks of troops from PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE will then be sent ashore, to end with they hope the Argy's will surrender when they see ANTRIM rounding King Edward Point. Everything so far, so good.  
1530 Contact to North of force thought to be spurious, BRILLIANT patrolling using 2016.  
1534 Finished with the Brown Mountain target, 4.5s ceasefiring.  
1536 50 minutes, all sticks ashore from ANTRIM.  
1541 406 on deck and shut down, Alert 10 ready for immediate use.  
1605 All troops are now ashore - continuing the NGS - target is the OP on top of Brown Mountain.  
1606 Faint reports are coming in on reporting team ashore to the Military Ops Room. Investigating the possibility of launching an aircraft to act as a relay. Frequency 357.6.  
1609 Report from Foxhound Company that owing to the lie of the land our fall of shot is not effective - they say that direct bombardme is essential. The Captain has been informed and is making a decis now.  
1612 406 is being launched ASAP on action launch to act as a Comms link to the troops ashore on 357.6. Possibility that ANTRIM will have to sail into Cumberland Bay and direct bombardment Navigationally happy - No threat as the bay is clear of Argy's on the Eastern side.  
1616 As 406 is being fitted with a cargo hook launch will not be able for 15 - 20 minutes and once 406 is airborne. We will enter the bay.  
1619 On completion of 406 launch BRILLIANT's Lynx will land on to pick up GPMG and MAD boom.  
1624 406 will go and look at OP on Brown Mountain to see if anyone is there - if not then no bombardment. At present intention to launch for Comms link and enter bay for direct NGS. Believe that the SAS ashore may only wish the OP taken out.  
1625 Putting 406 in shore for Comms may upset the next troop lift which is being coordinated from ANTRIM.

1630 Sitrep to ship's company - all hands off the upper deck that are not weapons crews - on Anti Flash.

1632 Troops ashore are now talking on HF to military Ops Room.

1635 Do not wish to enter the bay any further than necessary to give the Line of Sight for direct bombardment.

1636 Message from Cedric saying that he is on Brown Ridge request direct bombardment and how to improve comms - 406 airborne - commencing turn into Cumberland Bay to help possible target near Gritviken or OP on Brown Mountain.

1640 Another pipe to close upper deck openings threat from ashore considered slight.

1641 20mm being loaded. Entering bay now.

1644 Problems with Comms from 406 - being passed to contact troops on 357.6.

1645 All helos being launched to land extra troops to Canary zone passing close to stbd side - maintaining alert watch. First 2 helos go as a wave to gain strength on the ground.

1647 Both BRILLIANT's Lynx airborne for ENDURANCE to land SBS - Major SAS now on Brown Mt. Approx 35 troops from ENDURANCE.

1650 Now well into bay not far from Gritviken commencing direct bombardment - difficulties at identifying target area.

1653 Turning now in the bay - direct bombardment not allowed of Gritviken firing at the mountain behind,

1656 Lynx now have troops from ENDURANCE - 406 returning - ship moving astern to open target - spotter wishes us to engage submarine, not prepared, as too near to property.

1700 Major Sheridan on top of Brown Mountain - no resistance seen. Still no bombardment.

1702 SAS are going to put down mortar fire on the submarine - hopefully not destroying BAS Pier.

1704 Lynx will be held on ENDURANCE and BRILLIANT deck until called for from ashore - Another request to engage submarine with 4.5s.

1706 To the left of the Argentinian Flag there is a white flag flying behind a house - Troops ashore have also seen it - ceased fire and moving cautiously. ANTRIM is holding off the bay to Gritviken.

1710 Through the 275 sight there is definitely a white flag.

1711 No targets from ashore - spotting helo is going to observe Gritviken while the troops advance. Major Sheridan on HF in military Ops Room to speak to the Captain.

1717 Argentinians are calling us on Channel 16. The plan at the moment is to put a few salvoes onto Canary before landing the troops. Spanish interpreter to the Bridge.

1720 Cedric and the SAS are moving forward to accept the white flag now.

1721 The Argentinians are surrendering - being told to clear all build and lay down their arms including the submarine.

1724 The Argentinians have been told to pull down their flag which it appears they are doing - Many badly wounded at the submarine.

1726 406 to alert 10 - MO to the Bridge.

1728 Cedric will be in Gritviken whaling station in 15 Minutes.

1731 406 at alert 10 to fly in medical teams if required - troops in front of the church possibly ours.

1733 406, action Wessex - medical team ashore to bring casualties to ANTRIM - Argentinian flag hauled down Yahoo!! God save the Queen - Faugh - Ballach.

1735 Argentinians are singing their National Anthem on Channel 16.

- 1739 Telling us that there are some mines ashore - telling  
Argentinians to lead our advance troops through the minefields.
- 1741 406 told not to land on the H as the vibration may set off  
the mines. There are 104 men in Grytviken and the S/M crew.
- 1745 Due to the numbers ashore ENDURANCE will be brought in to aid  
the evacuation. 406 being brought back onboard.
- 1750 Apparently some of the Argentinians trod on their mines  
causing major casualties.
- 1752 406 airborne he is not to land until waved in by our own  
troops who are being led through the minefield now.  
- Intention that BRILLIANT stay as seaward guardship and  
ENDURANCE and PLYMOUTH proceed to Leith to accept surrender of  
Argentinians there. Appears that all enemy on S.Georgia have  
surrendered to the force. Intention is for ANTRIM to anchor  
to land stores. However need to escort TIDESPRING.
- 1759 Troops ashore to hold positions until the Argentinians come to  
them: this because of danger of mines of which someone spoke  
on UHF.
- 1801 PLYMOUTH to proceed with ENDURANCE to Stromness Bay to receive  
surrender. On completion to join TIDESPRING as escort.
- 1805 Area reported heavily mined to the left of the flagpole, also  
the approaches and the beaches are mined.
- 1810 Troops ashore in contact with Argentinian guide again in  
attempt to establish a mine-free area for the helicopters to  
land. At any rate ANTRIM medical parties winched ashore onto  
minefield! 406 had asked military where to land, told "Your  
guess is as good as mine". FLOBS reports that disgruntled  
submariners sitting on SANTA FE casing - they too are unable  
to proceed through the minefield. General difficulty about  
minefield is in fact landing of First Aid parties. Union  
flag seen flying again in its proper place - a pity no White  
Ensign! FLOBS reports S/M casing very badly damaged and low  
in the water - definitely unable to sail anywhere.
- 1821 Cedric requests ship comes to position more favourable for  
comms.
- 1822 Procedure for handling POW's and casualties put in notice  
under charge of MAA. Signal also sent to other ships of the  
group. Total 170 POW's in Grytviken, numbers unknown in Leith.
- 1832 Ship proceeds to anchor to facilitate storelift and CASEVAC.  
ENDURANCE after a dramatic, if late, entrance into the bay,  
having been told to proceed to Leith, turned round and proceeded  
to sea. BRILLIANT, whose rashness and 'bravery' noteworthy  
throughout the day has also held off and is patrolling the  
entrance to the bays.
- 1835 Appears that area around King Edward Point free of mines and  
that medical teams (2 x surgeons) landed at that place.  
Lynx was operating in Grytviken for CASEVAC etc. Only one  
seriously injured casualty brought onboard into Wardroom -  
apparently he has lost a leg. Although there are a few other  
Argentinian casualties, they are not assessed as being seriously  
injured. British forces have suffered no casualties in the  
assault.

- 1853 Ops room reports that military has reported that Grytviken and its surrounding area is secured.
- 1857 Cedric and troops want their Burgans - they are obviously ready for a long stay.
- 1903 White Ensign flying on King Edward Point alongside Union flag. "The Navy's here".
- 1909 HMS ANTRIM came to with starboard anchor off King Edward Point.
- 1910 Shoreside military reported that kit at least could be passed ashore if ship's boats go alongside SANTA FE. Any other approach is mined.
- 1914 Reported from ENDURANCE that Argentinians in Leith have not in fact surrendered at all. ENDURANCE ordered to hold off. It appears that the group will have to regroup and attack Leith tomorrow.
- 1916 While taking Burgans ashore attempts will be made to retrieve any crypto from SANTA FE.
- 1926 From CINCFLLEET "Very well done indeed" - unsure whether this will mean a doubling in our LOA, although doubtless unlikely.
- 1928 Apparently fighting going on at Leith. Unfortunately the force is fast running out of assets and manpower and TIDESPRING badly needs. In particular when Leith taken eventually we are going to be short of guards for the S.Georgia POW camp - Stalag Luft 18?
- 1934 Celebration of colours in an HM ship at Grytviken again. Admittedly half an hour late (sunset at 1914 by Nautical Almanac), but in view of tactical situation it was felt possible to delay it. In any case it was far more impressive to the POW's and troops ashore to do it when the light had faded that bit more. Needless to say the RM bugler who joined the ship in Portsmouth for three weeks of Exercise SPRINGTRAIN performed the ceremony (Bugler BROWN) under the supervision of Lt J SAUNDERS.
- 1945 Possibility that SANTA FE had off-loaded a midget submarine of some sort some time in the day, therefore the SCR crew is at peak readiness to watch out for any sneak attacks. The ship is of course darkened.
- 2000 184 dome lowered ready to transmit. Sound signal lockers unlocked in readiness.
- 2024 Two contacts reported on port quarter - possibly rocks. Message from shore by light, "Call me UHF". Identity unknown.
- 2030 Contacts confirmed as rocks via night sight.
- 2045 Various contacts reported on HE and visual. All investigated. Report of 'clonk' from MCR on hull in SK section. Prepare to drop scare charges.
- 2300 White light seen by the GDP outside the harbour entrance, possibly an aircraft. White and Green also saw the light and aquired it on radar. In the event it turned out to be a planet and the systems aquired an island directly below it! All first watch running a boat routine shipping stores and personnel ashore. The Captain of the SANTA FE and the Major of the Argentinian Marines dine onboard with our Captain. Apparently the CO of the SANTA FE hadn't eaten a proper meal for 40 hours! Both went ashore with Major Sheridan on the final boat.

26 APRIL

0446

Overnight ships patrolled area sectors immediately to north of Grytviken. ENDURANCE at anchor Huisvik harbour. 1 band air racket to NW - parameters C130 Hercules. Racket held intermittently until 0510 in both circular and sector screen. BRILLIANT held same racket - when she radiated 967/8 for 5 mins, racket grew weaker and quickly faded all together. CO's assessment that C130 probably frightened off by BRI radar t/x.

0930

TG 317.9 Exit PLY/END for Cumberland Bay conducting RAS and HDS. PLY/END off Leith receiving surrender. Report received that 3 SAS missing have been recovered by END Wasp.

AM

Conducted numerous HDS as ever. ANTRIM refuelled. Move TIDE into anchor to disembark stores etc. Endeavouring to establish who and what to disembark.

1015

ANTRIM RAS(L) o/c TIDESPRING to Grytviken preparing to disembark M COY GP RM.

1355

Injured Argentinian transferred to TIDESPRING.

Alerted to presence of CONQUEROR - preparing to embark her SES unit. All ships/helo's warned to avoid Blue on Blue.

1600

First reports of shot Argy in SANTA FE - see separate reports. Signal received telling us to transfer all SAS/SES to BRILLIANT and PLYMOUTH if necessary for return to CTG 317.8 as soon as possible. UGH!

1745

Surveillance by Argy Hercules until 1915. Orbited to north of S.Georgia closest approach 50nm.

2100

Helo ops complete for the day owing to deteriorating weather conditions -  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile vis 100' cloud base inshore. 17 Troop SAS and several ships personnel left ashore and will have to be lifted out tomorrow. CONQUEROR to R/V first light to continue transfer of SES and gear to ANT. Transfer of M COY TIDESPRING to shore will also continue first light.

2200

BRILLIANT and TIDESPRING will remain in company outside Cumberland Bay overnight. Weather will be reviewed at 2359 - if suitable flying ops will recommence and transfer of M COY gear will continue.

2320

TIDESPRING conducting operation on medical case with severe abdominal pains (CASEVAC from BRILLIANT). Duration of op 4hrs, therefore no flying will now be considered overnight. She will steer whatever course necessary to remain stable, returning to ordered position to resume transfers by 270900Z.

Summary: Some comments/thoughts by CDR.

1. CTG 317 262244Z received re Garrison Grytviken and Leith - not necessary to occupy both: Comment - a good job since support Leith from Grytviken without a full time escort + helicopter would be almost impossible - one look at the geography and the Winter weather says it all.

2. Direction from CTG 317 to transfer SES/SAS - Total 126 to BRILLIANT/PLYMOUTH to proceed to TG 317.8 - 3500 cft stores! A very conservative estimate since DSQN SAS filled a Hercules full of gear to Ascension and it is all in ANTRIM. SAS unhappy about leaving ANT - Military Ops Room/Comms all well established.

3. The "incident" has tarnished the whole operation - much regretted.

4. Viciousness of weather amply demonstrated - zero wind → 50 knots in 25 minutes.

5. CONQUEROR - signals just received in time! Transfer until dull weather at 2000Z. Pity - We nearly made it.

checked DSE to

Note: PLYMOUTH useful as despatch vessel to collect mail/stores, Forces from 317.8

6. 3 Hercules surveillance runs today - never closer than 50 miles - are they puzzled, checking or building up for the attack? We will add c/s on AAWC next time in case they are engaged in any COMINT.
7. TIDESPRING has done well to off load 50% M Coy, all stores, 80% ammo in 6 hours. She is a very supportive, CANDO RFA.
8. Just a feeling that Northwood slightly unaware of extreme nature of the S Georgia land, sea environment.
9. Flying conditions again V difficult - from SAS to BRILLIANT Lynx - VMT - superb flying: from Lynx - TY. Never again! 180' wind steer is very common.
- BLUE ROVER on way to join TG 317.9 - could be used for Air drop of stores if required.

2620000

April 27

1345 - 1700  
1700  
1930

AM: Transfers hampered by extremely poor visibility and high, unpredictable winds. All trips by 406 inshore so far unsuccessful. Continuing TX SBS from CONQUEROR to PLYMOUTH/ANTRIM to PLYMOUTH and SAS PLYMOUTH to ANTRIM.

Transfers terminated due weather - but progress made.

SOOTAX/VERTREP restarted.

SOOTAX/VERTREP stopped to rest aircrew/aircraft. Following still outstanding for tomorrow:-

1. Remainder SAS ANT → BRI.
2. SBS ANT → PLY.
3. POW END/PLY → Gritviken.
4. TID marines to shore.

BRILLIANT RDVU TIDESPRING to RAS tonight.

Comments:

1. It is a slightly unreal environment - half at war and half dealing with major admin matters such as:

- a. Board of Inquiry
- b. POW register
- c. 200 POW shore to TIDESPRING
- d. SAS/SBS Transfer
- e. Support M COY
- f. Embark/Evacuate BAS
- g. Disposal of SANTA FE

2. BRILLIANT/PLYMOUTH detach tomorrow - in spite of weather we have done well to transfer so much gear/people.

3. When PLYMOUTH returns and BLUE ROVER joins from Ascension - ANTRIM/TIDESPRING will depart - leaving TG 317.9 (PLYMOUTH, ENDURANCE, BLUE ROVER) in support of M COY.

4. It looks as if we plus BAS personnel will accompany TIDESPRING plus POW to Ascension. Will we join the Fearless group?

5. Still no political assessment from CINCFLEET or MOD - we rely heavily on World Service - it is compulsive listening. CTG 317.0 19F/NAJ/EMA 261726Z expressed a similar sentiment. 272324 - 280030

28 April

Surveillance by possible BANDEIRANTE aircraft approached from SW did not cross Island. Detected at 110 Miles closed to 80 Miles opened to west - held out to 220 Miles.

0310

TACSIG/001 from ENDURANCE reports suspicious emissions (HF) from possible Arg. surface unit. Bearing 268 from ENDURANCE and 328 from PLYMOUTH. This does not add up! When quizzed further PLYMOUTH stated it was skywave (HF)

0325 BRILLIANT reports emissions may have been from her awaiting TACSIG.

Action. 1. 6 sweeps 992 every hour (nothing seen within 60 miles on first set).  
2. 184 in ripple.

0400 TACSIG from BRILLIANT reporting that she was source of emission (her MGO) - report follows.

0440 Flash received from CTF 317 requiring action on a reference (PASEP) which is not held. Signal partly garbled. SCOT inop in both T/X and R/X. Commander informed - subject is incident in SANTA FE, possibly. Re-run of signal plus PASEP of reference will be requested as soon as SCOT available.

0510 Reference to above signal received. Requirement is names, ranks nationalities of Argy prisoners, civilians and details of 2 possible Uruguayan civilians. Unable to pass this requirement to shore until ship/shore circuit manned again this forenoon.

0500 Signal requesting CONQUEROR sitrep received from CTG 324.3. At same time CONQUEROR called VHF stating she had received orders to depart but had urgent traffic (SITREP) to pass through us or PLYMOUTH. All her attempts (including closing us) were unsuccessful. I spoke to her CO and he decided to depart without clearing traffic. I have sent a signal sweeping up whole CONQUEROR incident as we saw it. Presumably CONQUEROR happy to work on her defects on passage/do without HF/SSIX transmit facility?? Not aware of content of her intended sitreps.

0915-1200 SBS/SAS Vertrep to PLY/BRILL.

1030-1215 Under C130 surveillance.

1338 PLY/BRILL detached to join CTG 317.8.  
Will Argies be fooled when PLY/BRILL head NW or will they return to recce S.Georgia by 707 perhaps?

1414 Hercules radar racket bearing 330. Passed 120nm to north eventually fading on bearing 018 at 1435. Assessed probably attempting surveillance of Main Group to the north as well as S.Georgia. Comms spoofing carried out using SHEFFIELD callsign.

1530 ANT/TIDE/END all off Grytviken to continue boat transfer of stores + personnel, and embarkation of POW's in TIDESPRING.

2120 ANT/TID RASON areas L10/11(ANT) K10/11(TID) R/V for RAS 290900 at KK11. END remain at anchor Grytviken, proceeding to Leith 290 to clear explosives.

29 APRIL

0930 RAS(L) - o/c proceeded to Grytviken to make arrangements for provisions/supply M COY with stores.  
Anchor Grytviken. Stores transfer to shore.  
Ship's Diving Team to BAS Jetty to search for ditched Argy crypto material. Found one weighted bag of Brit. Diplomatic Service off-line material ditched when Argy invaded S.Georgia!  
Material returned to ship and in custody of SCO.

1815 Weighed anchor Grytviken - proceed to patrol area vicinity Cumberland Bay. No C130 surveillance today.

30 April Brit 200nm Total Exclusion Zone in force at 1100Z today. Arg has retaliated by declaring a military zone including 200nm limit around mainland. BBC World Service reports Haig proposals unacceptable to Arg - hopes for peaceful settlement fading. Americans producing statement in support of Great Britain.

1100

Funeral ashore of CPO Felix Artuso, SANTA FE crew member killed when S/M moved to whaling str.

Comment: POW

- 1. ASTIZ (OIC Marines at Leith) arrived as potential troublemaker now in ANTRIM. 2 Uruguayans are causing just a little trouble in TIDESPRING - PRERARA has a Uruguayan ID card, a piece of paper saying he is an ARG resident - also looks as if he has a Peruvian ID card!
- 2. MOD have now asked for NOK details, DOB, father's name, mother's maiden name etc - will not be easy as T'SPRING report many are almost illiterate.

3. Health/Hygiene TIDESPRING has done well to cope with this considerable influx and has done everything possible to make them comfortable - temperatures in hold/magazine areas are low and the sooner ANT/TID head north the better - delaying factors are:

- a. Embarkation of BAS.
- b. Return of PLYMOUTH from 317.8 - now 3 May
- c. Arrival of BLUE ROVER to support PLYMOUTH.

1430-1730

- 406 employed:
  - a. Recovering BAS gear from Grytviken.
  - b. BAS gear from Lyall Glacier.
  - c. Batch Ensign/Plotex.

1730-1810

406 completed transfer of BAS gear (failed to find gemini in Stromness Bay), and collected SAS kit from Fortuna Glacier. Sonar contact - 'chased' for 10 minutes - assessed non-sub - bottom pinging.

2200

General:

- 1. Awaiting CINCFLEET reply to our BLUE ROVER/ESK/ETA Ascension proposals so that we may detach TIDESPRING (plus POW's) on completion RAS tomorrow.
- 2. Ship assumed 'relaxed' defence watch posture. My requirements are to fire:
  - a. Seaslug
  - b. Seacat
  - c. 4.5"

immediately whilst full team close up. Ops Room team reduced to minimum and hands off-watch will turn-to during working hours part of ship.

3. Night intentions to check with ENDURANCE whereabouts of CDR'S/LWTR PRESCOTT. Are they in Grytviken or still in ENDURANCE? If latter, they will probably be retrieved pm Sunday.

1 MAY

1100

World News reports Port Stanley bombed - Vulcans? or Harriers? or both?

1430

1. Signal received telling ANTRIM to leave vicinity S.Georgia by 021200 and then to carry out the various RAS's/handovers with TID/PLY/B ROV on the way to Ascension.

2. 406 delivered signal to M COY and transferred stores TID to M COY.

3. Intention is to head west, R/V ENDURANCE, carry out HDS transfer of BAS females.

1700

Transfers from ENDURANCE complete - only 3 BAS to go

SECRET

2 May  
020200

News: Successful bombing raids carried out on Port Stanley and Goose Green airstrip. Fierce air-air battles over Falklands. 1 Mirage shot down plus possibly 1 by Argentinian forces. All British personnel safe.

Pucara aircraft closed ASW group but as they were intercepted by Harrier, dropped weapons and 'beat it' back to Falklands.

Minor damage to 1 Harrier and minor splinter damage to 1 ship.

1145

Argentinian version considerably different.

All transfers to/from Grytviken complete. Sailed Cumberland Bay for R/V 5000S 04400W 031200 Radar/Sonar policy active.

3 May  
0100

World Service Newsflash - "General BELGRANO has been torpedoed and is severely damaged.

1000

World Service News - 2 x patrol boats sunk by missile firing helo's.

1058

TIDESPRING detected 992 bearing 342 - 21nm - agreed with EW intercept of 1 band radar.

1107

PLYMOUTH detected 992 bearing 294 - 19nm.

1124

Comms established PLYMOUTH on Rep UHF.

PM

PLYMOUTH/TIDESPRING/ANTRIM stores/mail transfer.

1545

Appleleaf R/V

1615

Commenced Vertrep Stores/personnel from APPLELEAF.

2045

World News reports General BELGRANO sunk.

4 May

Overnight News

Argies picking up survivors from BELGRANO with a number of ships. Mrs T to have a cabinet meeting this am on the crisis.

1000-1045

Commenced RAS(L) with TIDESPRING. Completed RAS(L).

1430-1600

HDS/Vertrep tx of stores and mail from BLUE ROVER to ourselves and TIDESPRING. Some stores delivered to us are for onward

transmission to STROMNESS and FEARLESS. BLUE ROVER detached o/c.

2030

News of SHEFFIELD has stunned everyone - the harsh reality of what we are about has struck home - also the confirmed hit on the Sea Harrier.

2150

HE contact green 20 - Zig Zag plan - later sonar contact at 29,000<sup>x</sup> - Soviet Number? More likely Tidespring - blade beat identical.

5 May

0015

BEC News reports sinking of SHEFFIELD and shooting down of 1 Harrier yet no signal received.

1615

Boeing 707, probably Argentinian, flying in vicinity of group.

Initial EW suggests H2S Mk9 but visual identification shows

Boeing 707. Remained with group approx 30 mins, finally

opening to SE at 1705Z. ROE appears to prevent us engaging.

901 acquired and tracked only. Signal to Fleet re ROE.

2015

Boeing 707 racket bearing 032. Same parameters as previous

racket. Radiated 965 - contact 032 at 130nm. Aircraft closed

on steady bearing (ship's head). 901 acquired and tracked.

Closed to 18 nm - passed ship to west at 18nm before opening

to south.

CINCFLEET 052315 gave negative response with 'Hack the shad' on present mission - however once with FEARLESS and LSL's it could be different.

SECRET

6 May

0100

Signal received from Fleet detailing ANTRIM off to hand over TIDESPRING to ANTELOPE am 7 May for escort to Ascension. ANTRIM escorts 'LSL group' south to holding area. PLYMOUTH rejoins 8 May.

0950

Arg 707 radar detected to east. 965 radiated + 901 control teams closed up. Only one point on 965 at 150miles bearing 095. Racket held until 1045 with no further radar contact. Bearing remained approx east throughout.

1400

1430-1535

7 May

CO returned from TIDESPRING.

RAS(L) with TIDESPRING.

MAINTENANCE DAY

Report overnight that 2 more Harriers have been lost. Failed to return from CAP duties (possible collision).

0720

0800

Lynx(from ANTELOPE)flew past - attempting to establish comms.

News reports that Argentina has rejected US/Peruvian proposals for a peace settlement. Possibility still exists of UN initiative.

0800

0800-1200

R/V UGANDA, ANTELOPE, PEARLEAF, REGENT + 5 LSL's (3113S 2611W).

Transferred BAS, POW, Feranti, Spaniard, Chileans + ducks to ANTELOPE. Fortuna Glacier SAS gear to TIDESPRING. Newsgram and Shipgrams to TIDESPRING for UGANDA. Transferred ANTRIM RM Det from TIDESPRING to ANTRIM. Position at 1000 3113S 2616W.

1200-1600

ANTRIM's outgoing mail to TIDESPRING.

BOOBYTRAP NOTEBOOK to REGENT for FEARLESS (CTG 317.1).

RAS(S) with REGENT. TID/UGANDA 100ton water RAS.

Retained ANTELOPE's EMCON PLAN KILO (HF Silence) min. emissions silence during SAT passes pending clarification.

1300

News. MOD reports deployment of extra Harriers to S.Atlantic (some with air - air missiles) and Nimrods capable of air - air refuelling.

1800

ANTELOPE and TIDESPRING detached to Ascension. UGANDA detached to holding area edge of TEZ. World Service ROE change - any Argy Aircraft/ship outside 12nm territorial limit will be considered hostile and dealt with accordingly.

1900

World Service reports 12 mile blockade - no ROE change yet. CTU 319.0.4 072155Z MAY to CTG 317.0 re ETA 50S 48W 161900 - best speed distance would make ETA 122000Z MAY. Question of LSL Ballasting also raised.

8 May

CINCFLEET 080136Z MAY - BAHIA PARAISO officially declared as Hospital Ship under Geneva Convention.

CINCFLEET 080005Z MAY - ROE against shadowers. Declaration at 071700 - 48 hour period will elapse before shadowers v ROE will be amended. If Hercules/Boeing 707 shadowing continues during this period consideration will be given to declaring them "Combat" aircraft.

0900-1010

Round robin HDS.

1140

Boeing 707 returned detected on UA9 seen 965 at 150nm closed to 115nm - departed.

1230

Turned force away from Sov Mership visual on horizon to the east - heading south.

LSL's conducting Vertrep all day.

1530

REGENT ordered by CTF to proceed south to R/V CTG 317.8.

Commenced transfer of mail ANT/REG for TG 317.8 at 1600, followed by stores/pax REG/ANT for FEARLESS - STROM.

1624 EW intercept of 707 radar bearing 250. Radiated 965 - contact at 240 range 140. Closed on almost steady bearing. Action Stations at 30nm. Aircraft closed to 20nm before opening to NE. 965 contact lost at 150nm.

Weak EW intercept at same time bearing 090. 965 contact 090 at 200nm. Low confidence classification C130. Aircraft circled for approx 10min before fading on same bearing.

1800 Message received detailing Nimrod for surface search to SW of our group tomorrow - take off Ascension 0900.

1815 ROE - from 1700 ROE HIGH SEA's south officially applicable right up to 12nm of coast of Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil. Further rationalisation to come.

CTU 317.0.4 081830 NAV INTENTIONS RV PLYMOUTH 091000 then reverse course to meet PLUMLEAF 091900 then deceptive track towards S.Sandwich for 48 hours - eventual RV CTG 317.0 50S 48W 161900Z.

2300 New ROE (3/82) for F.I. blockade received.

2359 Unidentified small surface craft (first detected at 2050 bearing 220 range 8nm) now bearing 014 at 15miles approx. Radar is Warsaw Pact 1 Band - if still in area in morning will send HDS WX to focusle.

9 May  
0230

FORM GREEN FOR NIMROD/MRR TODAY RXD + ACKNOWLEDGED.

SM THREAT - If SANTIAGO (Guppy) sailed on 2 May from P.Belgrano at 8kts to intercept TU 317.0.4 we are now in S/M threat area. (Will need air recce for TACDI).

AIR THREAT - Assessed low with aircraft deployed to Argentine southern airfields. If they move north then we are in possible AAR range.

SURFACE THREAT - Low. only unit outside territorial waters appears to be Hercules 300' N of F.I. as AD picket.

AM All News (second hand) reports Argentine claims that British have started invading Port Stanley. British Government have not commented.

1200 Briefing onboard ANTRIM for LSL Captains and PLYMOUTH.

PM PM News reports 'some action' on Falklands. Details not known. Harrier/SAS softening up?

1800 News reports Argentinian fishing boat (spy ship) fired on by Harriers and crew arrested.

2200 Flash from CTF 317 - Request for 'Hack Shad' ROE fundered at OD(SA) level - ANT to report details of flight pattern, ID confidence etc to CTF 317 info MODUK(ACNS(0)) asap for use at cabinet meeting am tomorrow. Reply sent 2235.

2300 World Service News - confirmed Arg trawler surrendered after bombing attack by 2 Harriers. 1 Arg killed; 25 survivors including 1 Arg Naval Lieut! Trawler is now in hands of RN. Harrier shot down 1 Arg helicopter over Stanley. NGS/Harrier attacks on several military targets continue.

2359 World Service - possibly Puma helicopter shot down by one of the NGS ships.

10 May  
0800

Defence Watches closed up. 2Y - 'Enhanced 2Y' in force: some Z hatches made Y - should ensure a quicker shut down to Z. Anti flas hoods on but relaxed. Overall aim - learn on lessons from SHEFFIELD with respect to:

Readiness  
Clothing  
Anti flash  
Zulu  
Firemains - isolated  
ESM

406 now tasked for ASW Screen - 0900-1030: 1200-1330: 1600 - 1730: ASW Surface Search 0200 DC/46 carried. If SANTIAGO is at sea TG 317.0.4 could be an alternative 'Soft Target' - 2 May departure from Mar del Plata and she could be in our vicinity - position provided by 707?

VLL Zig Zag in force transit towards S.Georgia ans S.Islands for next 48 hours until require to head west towards RV position on 16 May with TG 317.0.

1350 Detection of C130 (Mode 2A O 1236) conducting mail/stores drop to north of force with STENA SEASPREAD.  
1500 ROE received permitting us to engage Argentina surveillance aircraft if we can, by visual identity or by radar and flight pattern, be reasonably certain of its identity.  
2200 Signal received cancelling 'splendid' weapon tight haven - presumably she is now back in business.  
2200 News reports further bombardment of Argentine military positions in the Stanley area. SHEFFIELD and Arg trawler both sunk under tow.

11 May

0150 Launched 406 to search back down track for S(EW) LAYTON who is reported missing. Search of ship continues.  
0230 Rating found in stbd chevy - under guard o/n in sickbay. 406 told to carry on with ASW task.  
0325 Civilian cloud warning radar detected to west. 965 radiated - a/c found at 293 60nm, on a course of 085 speed 45 $\phi$ . A/c cleared to the east.  
0800 News reports(sinking) or large explosion of unidentified contact approaching Falklands by TG 317.8. Engaged by one of our ships in the dark.  
1330-1405 Gunnery drills.  
1445 Nimrod detected to the north - he did not call us.  
1500 Bathy results.

	195	184	177
190'SD	5500 <sup>x</sup>	SD 4500 <sup>x</sup>	Same as 184
110'SS	8000 <sup>x</sup>	SS15000 <sup>x</sup>	
		Layer 160ft	
		V sharp thermocline	

1630 406 reports possible sonar contact. Prosecuted and attacked 1 Mk46. No result. Prosecution continued until 1730 having got PLYMOUTH's Wasp diverted from HDS as weapon carrier. Although 'FLOBS' convinced that it was a submarine, command assessment - whale. Ship sonars remaining active. Was it the SANTIAGO? STD from Mar del Plata quite possible. FLOBS considered decoys deployed. - HI4 was right clasification.  
1915 ANTRIM/PLYMOUTH strangled sonars.

SUBMARINE INCIDENT 406 SORTIE 1600 - 1730

A. 406 launched for a routine ASW 'DUNKING' sortie at 1600 and dipped 195 ANTRIM 10.5nm. After 5 mins contact was gained at 180ft transducer depth bearing 145° 3000yds DOPPLER 2 opening. Solid echoes held - long and short pulse - with good audio response. TGT assessed moving 090° T and classified POSSUB LOW 2 (due to trailing noise and assimilation of transducer around target bearing). All other considerations indicated a higher classification. Transducer continued to 'hunt' around bearing and there was danger of contact being lost. Further anxiety was induced by dome leakage light illuminating periodically.

B. Contact was lost for 3 minutes and regained with ball depth maximum 235ft bearing 160° 2800yds heading 230 speed 5. Contact classified POSSUB H3 painting every 31° echo. Contact held until 180° 3400 opening 180. When contact was 160° 2800yds 'INTEND COBRA' transmitted. Three minutes later 'COBRA' loosed 180° 4200<sup>x</sup> body recovered during torpedo run. On expiry DOGBOX body lowered - no contact.

C. 406 jumped to last known position - no contact. Jumped 3 miles east between force and threat and contact gained 145° 2300<sup>x</sup>. Contact held for 50 minutes and maneuvered violently in course and speed, depth (in layer and below layer) and three decoys experienced. Last known 235° 2900<sup>x</sup> opening 270 sp 7. Recovered HMS ANTRIM for RRRF/RA 1730. I am confident this was S/M as is my aircrewman (Soviet?). Flight Observer.

12 May  
0600

World Service News - UN talks continue - still negotiating cease fire - problem of sovereignty not yet tackled. Pope likely to postpone visit to UK because of F.I. situation. ANTRIM RAS with PEARLEAF.

0915 - 1015  
0945

Attempted to launch 406 - shut down with defect - estim unknown.

1015  
1248

Commenced HDS with PLYMOUTH Wasp. Nimrod reported unidentified 707 (visual) in position 230nm NW of ANTRIM heading 110 FL 380-390.

1500-1645  
1654

RAS/Vertrep/Whipper procedures conducted. Nimrod report heard on Emergency HP (6686) Flash signal sent to interested parties.

1800  
1915

News report that COVENTRY? had shot down 2 A4's. Signal from CEF50 ASO giving text of MPA LB3/1. Text is same as that heard on 6686 (see T1654)

1745

Report that GLASGOW and BRILLIANT attacked this afternoon by A4's whilst on gunline. Details not clear but she appears to have been hit (GLASGOW) - 3ft diameter holes above waterline. Making 13kts to east. Auxiliaries damaged and Tyne intake damaged. Possibly 3 out of 4 A4's shot down. GLASGOW's damage sitreps indicate a v.lucky escape.

13 May  
Am

News reports that Lt Cdr ASTIZ is being held in Ascension (pending enquiries by Swedes/French into his shady activities in the past).

13 May am  
(contd)

General Weapon Readiness Preparations:

- a. Balloon Runs
- b. GDX v WX 3
- c. H~~Q~~ planned for tomorrow
- d. Run up Jammer v LSL Radars
- e. Chaff/Anti Exocet drills
- f. NBCDX - HQ1 taken out

Leading Question - Will increased military presence include air attacks on Rio Grande or Callegos? The military answer would be YES - the political answer - ?

Both modes 182 checked with PLYMOUTH and correct.

Ground run complete.

1740

2255

0030 14 May

Intercept of 10min tx in Spanish on 6686khz Nimrod HF Safety.

Reported part of TX signal to Fleet etc reporting source.

Message probably between two hours but in code.

0125

Percival speed  $\beta$ .

0135

Percival speed 12.

0300

CTG 317.0 RAS proposals/intentions received. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH, plus 2 LSL's now RAS(S) 16 May. 18 May all warships RAS(L). O/C PLUMLEAF will be detached re R/V BRITISH DART in position.

4748S 4527W at 170700Z. REARLEAF will pump over late PM 17 May.

0500

Repeat of 0030 Spanish Tx on 6686Khz. Taped by EWO.

0535

10 sweeps I band astern. Radiated 978 - contact 6nm astern. PLYMOUTH sent to investigate. No contact where PERCY should be.. suspect he missed last zig zag alteration +lumbered off into bundu by himself!

0547

Contact confirmed lost PERCY. Rounded up and directed to his sector by PLYMOUTH.

0600

Speed of force reduced to 9kts - LSL's max speed in this sea state. R/V with FORT TORONTO delayed until approx 1200.

0900

HDS postponed due to weather.

0930

R/V with TORONTO retarded to 1130 approx.

1300

R/V FORT TORONTO.

2359

World Service News. UK Ambassador to UN returned to UK to discuss situation. Argentina states that discussions are "at a very delicate stage". UN Sec Gen expects replies from both parties to proposals by 152359.

SAT 15 May

AM News

Reports of further attacks by Sea Harrier aircraft on Port Stanley airfield. Argies report about 300 seaman lost in Belgrano incident. Also report they have lost radio contact with one of their Supply ships in the Falklands - presumably the contact sunk by ALACRITY in Falkland Sound.

PM News

6 x Pucara, 1 x Skyvan, 3 other aircraft (and radar installation and ammunition dump) destroyed by "special forces" last night on Pebble Island.

1700 approx

FEARLESS group report Argentine 707 on task to NW of them. Laying Chaff Hotel, but unable to launch Sea Harrier as weather unsuitable. Unfortunate that we have been detected at this stage. NOTE: Assess Argentine surface forces off Puerto Belgram may now be moving South to intercept us. SSM's over to you!

2130

Tx on 5476 (HF reporting)  
325T (Nimrod Green 030) this is NP1R. Nuco SDPO.  
Followed by foreign voice Spanish? saying "Attention Attention NP1R" repeated.

0400 approx

FEARLESS group delayed by weather - now 100nm North of us at 5kt. R/V delayed until 17/18 May. no RAS(S) today. ANT will R/V BRITISH ESK at 0900 and transfer TU 317.0.4 outgoing mail by 406 proceeding o/c to 18 May R/V position to await 317.0.5. R/V with FEARLESS group + commence integration. Commence RAS(S) with STROMNESS. Complete RAS(S). 965 radiated. 184 radiated.

1800 approx

2000

2150

2200

Sunday 16 - Monday 17 May

Transit with CTG 317.0 to RV 317.8

Tuesday 18 May

Concluding: ANTRIM embarked 32 SBS (2 SBS, 3 SBS(3 sections) and 6 SBS) ready for insertion into Fanning, San Carlos, Port Salvador.

Defence of AOA is uppermost in everyone's minds - lack of AIR SUPERIORITY - only redress is bombing of RIO GRANDE/GALLEROS which at this stage is clearly politically unacceptable.

2000

World News - "Troop ships have now joined the main force" Was this pressure or a leak? The Args do not need recce - BBC does it for them!

Lessons of integration of Forces re-learned!

Problems with AAWC/LAAWC in 3 groups.

2 OPGEN P's - one from 317.0 and one from 317.8.

Tuesday 18 May

1. An interesting day of operations forever increasing in complexity. ANTRIM is LAAWC for amphibious group. Hermes, chopped to our AAWC UHF, however, for past couple of days we were in vicinity of GLAMORGAN/INVINCIBLE using Y complan AAWC. GLAMORGAN controlling HERMES aircraft over our group, but not on same AAWC.

The joining of the groups was not good with ANTRIM as pig in the middle we had:

2 Link circuits

2 Opgen Alfes

2 Grid origins

2 DLRPs

Now all resolved

We still have 2 Nestor circuits and both CTGs want us to monitor theirs - we have a diplomatic nestal failure while we resolve! Not with standing all the above a useful day of learning outside TEZ whilst out of threat.

Note: Groups are over using unknown code words whilst super within own force they make joining difficult.

Wednesday 19 May

(OVERNIGHT)

Multiple compromise of TG position integration intention deepens the basic insecurity stemming from lack of air superiority. Force posture still effectively overt (HF data link) despite HF silence.

HMG considering Arg UN proposals but Mrs T not optimistic.

Weather continues to be unseasonably good. Sunrise 1105!

1100

50S 52W continuing to embark SBS and equipment by HDS. TG at E edge of X decking area.

1430

OC SBS brief on insertion operation - 2 SBS vic Fanning Head/ San Carlos - 6 SBS - Port Salvador.

Exchange of Signals - ANTRIM/B'SWORD/ARGONAUT/COMAW

a. Transit TEZ-AOA-Day/Night as threat varies.

b. ASW defence of AOA.

c. AAW defence of AOA.

d. Opgen Mike received.

Thursday 20 May

0930 Captain by Lynx to FEARLESS for AOA discussion with ARGONAUT, BROADSWORD and COMAW.

1100 Action Stations for TEZ transit.

1300 2 Super Etendard + 2 Mirage reported airborne for Stanley.

1514 Later reported to be A4s. Nothing detected subsequently weather deteriorated - NE swell, low cloud vis down to a mile (cloud up to 24000' according to SHAR). Threat reduced to Air White. Defence Stations resumed o/c action messaging.

1900 ANTRIM/ARDENT detach - proceed Falkland Sound for arrival over-night.

2000 Reverted to Defence Watches.

2030 Helo brief for insertion - STD etc has cancelled 6 SBS into Port Salvador area - ANTRIM 201905Z May 82.

2300 406 + WX5 inshore vic Fanning Head/San Carlos

2350 Action Stations ready to enter Falkland Sound.

FRIDAY 21 May - D DAY! H-HOUR 0630 (See action narrative L-HOUR 1130 attached)

Historic signals resumed from CINCFLEET and CTG 317.8.

Insertion comments:

- a. Time achieved - Much longer than anticipated.
- b. WX3 was vital - concept without WX3 was unsound.
- c. T1 seemed to work well - weather improved on time: identified CO strength on Fanning Head.
- d. Fanning Head / Port Salvador was a non starter.
- e. No apparent response from ARGs on ground to helo movements.
- f. Insertion started 2300 - completed 0245.
- g. 1XSK4 would have completed this task very quickly → but not without radar helo to assist.

CTG 317.1 choice of White Rock as IP37 - not accepted as within AOA - proposed EDDYSTONE ROCK (ANTRIM I9N 210232Z May 82)

0905 O/C 5 HAS NGS Fanning Head (268 rounds), SBS reported that 14 survivors were not taking any interest in further proceedings. It appears that we destroyed an ammo dump, fuel dump, mortar line and 80% of a company. SBS now ready to lead 3 Para in.

1100 WX5/6 SBS to INTREPID. WX5 and crew to CANBARA.

1115 Further firing on Fanning Head.

1200 Air Raid Warning Red on BRILLIANT heads up South - a returning GR3 not coming at SWAN ISLAND 1P - Blue on Blue nearly! Soon relaxed to air raid warning yellow. Indications are that Special Forces/Advanced Ops + NGS are resulting in surrender on Fanning Head and other areas around San Carlos settlement.

1240 Air raid warning red. Returning CAP? NO!

1300 THE ATTACK.

o/c ANTRIM attacked by Mirage / A4. One bomb entered aft and lodged (unexploded) in After Heads. Second run - strafed/rocketed - numerous splinter holes - 8 casualties:(2 serious).

o/c Subsequently - ARGONAUT damaged, ARDENT damaged and abandoned.

2330 Bomb lowered into deep water.

Saturday 22 0230 - Proceeded out of AOA in company CANBERRA, NORLAND, STROMNESS, EUROPIC FERRY for CTG 317.8 R/V.

0001 VA detected 070/22M assessed friendly dipper.  
0005 Recovered WX5 having dropped first stick troops inshore.  
Shutdown G6s IMM notice.

0035 Tried launching WX5 with 2nd stick. Delayed - required more wind

0048 Finally launched WX5. Recovered 406 at minute 51.  
0053 Commenced recovering 182.  
0105 Launched 406.  
0130 PLYMOUTH informed of delay in Ops.  
Recovered WX5.

0139 Launched WX5 3rd stick.  
0200 Illuminated by FC radar. Launched WX5 4th stick.  
0205 GDs display lost all power. Maintainers informed.  
0209 GDs consol back on line.  
0225 WX5 launched with last stick.  
0245 WX3 land on, folded and stowed.  
0310 WX5 land on and shut down.  
0317 FEARLESS and INTREPID in position off San Carlos Water.  
0417 Fast moving contact 150 - 12 : No ESM, 4 sweeps only.  
0430 4 contacts sighted 145 - 12 : Air Raid Warning RED.  
0431 Confirming whether contacts are Blue Sea Kings.  
0432 Contacts Lost.  
0444 Request from shore to bombard Fanning Head.  
0452 Bombardment commenced.  
0520 Bombardment ceased while taking up new gun line.  
0540 Bombardment recommenced on same target.  
0809 Recommenced bombardment.  
1050 Action Stations.  
1115 Launched WX5 guns tight.  
1118 Established Comms with Blue Bird. 1st GR3s diverted to another Tgt possibly to us o/c.

1145 1st GR3 reports: 1 Puma, 1 Hooy destroyed, 1 Hooy undamaged.  
1159 Air Raid Warning RED - Heads up South.  
1208 Air Raid Warning Yellow - Aircraft assessed friendly helo.  
1230 Comms with Blue Bird weak and unreadable. One GR3 cleared for attack on West Falkland (eventually).  
1233 Agave radar intercepted by ARGONAUT brg 210 Conf 2.  
1235 Ceased brg 205. Air Raid Warning RED.  
1236 Chaff 'C' sown.  
1246 2 Pucara brg 140 - 8 attacked ARDENT - No damage  
1247 Attacked by 2 Skyhawks - Rocket attack on ARGONAUT - No damage.  
1253 Skyhawks opening to South.  
1300 Air Raid Warning YELLOW. Start attack - 2 X A4, 2 X Mirage  
White Opens Fire.  
1310 Report from ARDENT - Abandoned Merchantman attacked with Sea Skua - badly damaged at 1230.  
1312 Smoke reported 060 from one of the bays.  
1315 Air Raid Warning RED.  
1320 Mirage/A4 raid.  
1330 CAP to intercept.  
1334 Damage Port side Flight Deck. No damage reported by other ships.  
Unexploded bomb Aft.  
Bomb Aft into After Heads. Raids continue - White sow Chaff - White open fire - 2 X Seaslug gash. Casualty on GDP - need First Aid Party. Ship damaged Aft - Fires reported and splinter damage and flooding. Seaslug U/S, 992 and 978 off thru damage. Ship manouvres and attempts to reach BROADSWORD for Goalkeeper. Can't get there, pending air attack indicated locally by GDP. Green U/S. Ship heads towards San Carlos Water for security under attack.

1338 CAP hauled off.  
 1340 Mirage Raid.  
 1342 Fire in Messdeck and Midships Heads.  
 1345 Raid closing from NW.  
 1352 Raid opened SW. Believed to be Mirage/A4.  
 1401 Mirage racket 140 from ARGONAUT.  
 1405 Further raid Pucara/Mirage/A4.  
 1413 406 reported as full of holes.  
 1430 7 casualties - 2 serious - to be casavaced.  
                   3 minor  
                   2 scratched  
 1445 Green back on and 992 and 978.  
       UXB team from FEARLESS.  
 1500 Ship proceeding to San Carlos Waters to keep out of the way.  
 1510 CAP intercept 1 Pukara and splashed.  
       Casavac via Seaking to CANBARRA.  
       Keep in air attack on us and force the attacks not pressed home.  
       Poly on White, Red and Green.  
       Flooding now under control.  
 1550 Reach security of San Carlos Water. Stay clear of invasion,  
       but still hostile aircraft - A4s and Pukara and Mirage attack  
       on ARDENT. Harriers splash 2X Pukara.  
 1556 Red leader return to base. ARDENT bombed by Mirage.  
 1600 Hole being out in Flight Deck for UXB.  
 1603 Tartan leader plus two return to base. Splashed 2 X A4s -  
       possibly 3 and 1 damaged.  
 1605 Harriers splash 2 X A4 returning home.  
 1606 Air Raid Warning YELLOW.  
 1612 Possibly 3 X A4 splashed out of 5 + 1 damaged.  
 1615 Trident leader + 2 on stn 14. Air Raid Warning YELLOW.  
 1623 Black leader + 2 on stn 16.  
 1633 Gold leader + 3 joining to stn 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
 1645 Trident RTB.  
 1650 Blacks RTB.  
 1708 Tartan leader + 2 joining to stn 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
 1715 Air Raid Warning RED. BRILLIANT under attack from possible  
       Pucara.  
 1717 Air Raid Warning RED. 2 X aircraft attacking BRILLIANT -  
       possibly Pucara. CAP will take out on way out.  
 1721 BRILLIANT reports possible raid 250°/120m Possible Etendard.  
 1722 YARMOUTH Wasp brings mortar grabs for removal of UXB.  
 1725 Raid building up from West. BRILLIANT reports possible  
       Etendard closing 285 range 30nm  
 1726 Range 26 miles. BRILLIANT believes approaching N Sound and  
       us. CAP appear to be loitering away in area.  
 1727 Chaff 'D' fired.  
 1728 2 X aircraft 050 speed 400kts. Still nothing from CAP. We  
       go hard left to get A arcs - already stern pointed towards  
       raid.  
 1730 Lone CAP hold lone bogie, but not main raid and lose him also.  
 1731 Alarm aircraft G130 A4s - G100 targets in blind arc.  
 1732 2 X Mirage + Etendard stern. - ARGONAUT hit.  
 1733 1 X A4 splashed by BRILLIANT.  
       Heads up West A4s.  
 1735 2 X A4 splashed - 5 seen + 1?  
       ARGONAUT looks as if beaching. Raid on us classified A4 -  
       15 miles.  
 1736 ARGONAUT beached.  
 1737 Alarm aircraft Red 100. RED locks on - Told to engage when  
       ready. Nothing happens.

1738 O20 3 X aircraft closing. Coming hard left.  
 1739 Raid 3 X Mirage.  
 1740 Sounds like CAP mixing it with raid.  
 1741 Trident on stn 14.  
 1743 ARGONAUT now under control. ANTRIM heading for more open water.  
 1747 ARGONAUT requires a tow - we stand by to prep AX.  
 ARGONAUT at anchor - no need for tow.  
 1749 290 alarm aircraft. White engaged. Seacat near miss - White checked - cos at min elevation. Possible hit in Gas Room - No - We were not attacked.  
 1750 BRILLIANT hit in Ops Room.  
 1751 O60 - 12nm aircraft possible raid.  
 1753 Harrier splashed 2 Mirages. BRILLIANT Ops Room direct hit.  
 1754 CAP splashed 2 Mirages 3rd damaged.  
 1755 Possible dogfight out at 270. ANT patrol N to S and W across mouth of bay.  
 1758 Further raid coming up through South of Sound - CAP approached and attack.  
 1759 3 aircraft raid from S.  
 1802 Alarm aircraft Green 50 - birds - ARDENT hit.  
 1803 2 x A4 splashed by CAP.  
 1804 2 A4s splashed by Harrier at 205 - 2 left.  
 1806 Computer report emerge IFF 1521 150 20 heads up 150 - Weapons tight.  
 1808 2 X Mirage raid intercepting with Silver.  
 273 Mirage strike on BRILLIANT - possible 2 aircraft.  
 1811 EW on Mirage at 282.  
 1812 From ARDENT " Can move and float".  
 1815 A4s dropped bombs on ARDENT.  
 1816 Alarm arc G25 - White engage. Load explosion on a Type 21 - listing (ARDENT).  
 1819 Silver and Black on CAP. ARDENT sinking, YARMOUTH alongside assisting.  
 1820 ARDENT sinking by stern. May have to abandon.  
 1823 YARMOUTH alongside ARDENT.  
 1826 Raid closing 260 24 miles. Negative - it is Black section.  
 1834 YARMOUTH Wasp, WX5 + Seaking 4 picking up ARDENT survivors.  
 1844 Gold leader + 2 to stn 16 then 14½.  
 1848 At minute, picture seems quiet on radar screen. 3 sets of CAP. The CAP appears to be opening to North East.  
 1851 BRILLIANT reports machine gunned from shore - probably a test fire of our stbd 20mm. All survivors lifted from ARDENT.  
 1852 Silver/Black return to base - Tartan to stn 15½.  
 Today's weapon expenditure: 345 4.5", 2 Seaslug, 1 Seacat.  
 Remaining: 226 HE 4.5" shell and cartridge.  
 1854 A Seaking casavacing wounded from BROADSWORD.  
 1855 ARGONAUT at anchor - damage not known, but at least her 965's turning.  
 1858 Air Raid Warning YELLOW.  
 1900 CAP report 2 Mirage splashed (poss 3) with 1 damaged.  
 3 Pukara splashed.  
 1908 ARDENT not sunk yet.  
 1924 Low bogies closing 182' - Air Raid Warning RED.  
 Classified returning ponies. Revert to Air Raid Warning YELLOW.  
 1937 Air Raid Warning RED. Heads up West.  
 1940 Intention is to hide ourselves by the headland at head of San Carlos Water. Suggestion to hide on Western side of Sound.  
 1941 EW unknown aircraft radar brg 238' - unable to analyse at present. It appears there are two unknown aircraft there.  
 1943 BRILLIANT reports contacts 255' - 33 miles from her.

1948

Raid possibly developing from the West. Two groups of Sea Harriers take station over land 30 miles West of the San Carlos Water. Our CAP has only 10 minutes remaining on task. CAP enjoying bogies. Bogies gone low. Lookout brg 280°. Again confusion between CAP and bogies when passing over head. In fact there were no bogies at all - The CAP were avoiding gunfire from the vicinity of Port Howard. Air Raid Warning YELLOW.

2013

2041

Appears that PLYMOUTH may be taking ARGONAUT in tow.

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2100

22 MAY

Afternoon  
First

RAS(A) with REGENT. Embarked HEM3, 3'', 20mm and assorted ammo. RAS(L) with OLMEDA. Riser then Sinker reported 2359 in vicinity of NORLAND. Brg 190 10 miles from us. Dippers sent to investigate contact eventually scrubbed and no datum established. Recommendation made to Captain to alter URG to port away from S/M expected course. CO decided to alter to starboard towards main body/screen for neutral support.

23 May

0330

AMBUSCAPE reported torpedo HE brg 120(her port quarter). ALAGRITY and 2 SK ordered to join. 1 SK held contact briefly at 0334 then established datum (180° 10nm from ANTRIM). MB turned away by CTG. At 0345 AMB/ALA ordered to resume sectors - 2 x SK ordered to investigate for further 10 mins then resume sectors. CTG assessment - AMB was in turn to port when HE detected - almost certainly detecting own 182. SK contact subsequently reclassified non-sub.

0415

REGENT WX 5 collected 4 x walking wounded (shrapnel) for transfer to REGENT and then to CANBERRA at first light.

0420

GLAMORGAN assumed all air duties.

0530

INVINCIBLE assumed all air duties.

1115

Air Raid Warning RED over Falklands.

1400

Air Raid Warning YELLOW over Falklands.

1705

Attacked by enemy aircraft - No - own chaff firing. Hands to Action Stations. Full pattern of Chaff D fired. Rapid reloading Chaff C ordered for 150°.

1715

Reson every 30 seconds - cease Chaff C.

1716

Enemy aircraft 060 from ATLANTIC CONVEYOR - she is north west of us.

1718

Radar contact 055 60 miles.

1720

Air Raid Warning YELLOW. We alter course and speed to match INVINCIBLE.

1725

Harrier launched from INVINCIBLE.

1731

Zig Zag assumed on base course 030 speed 14.

1734

Returning CAO 270 13 - 14 miles.

1735

Agave 3 radar was detected - possibly this was one of INVINCIBLE's radar (1006? Band I), whose nearness to the detecting ship gives the impression of sector scan.

1745

Assessed that action expensive on Chaff D but we did not have an accurate direction.

1749

EWD report C130 bearing 270.

1752

Weapons tight for returning CAP 260 - 20.

1754

Racket suggested by EWD to be friendly helo - INVINCIBLE thinks it is a friendly interceptor.

1755

2Y

1756

COVENTRY holds land-based radar (AMPPS 43) 225° from her.

1759

EWO suggests C130 racket is friendly interceptor or helo.

1802

After much prompting EWO says poss - C130/friendly racket has ceased.

2315 approx.

Large explosion sighted in vicinity of force. After initial assumption that a ship had been torpedoed, it was discovered that one of the Harriers, having taken off from HERMES on a bombing run, had exploded in mid air. Three remaining Harriers approved to close Port Stanley and conduct bombing mission. Signal from BROADSWORD stating that ANTELOPE had been badly damaged by bombs this afternoon in the AOA - she questions the wisdom of our subjecting warships to these attacks in an area totally unsuited to AAW. We must keep our ships clear and let the Rapiers/Harriers have a go.

2345

On the brighter side approximately 6 Mirage and 3 A4's have apparently been shot down this afternoon.

24 May  
0830

1410 Received news that unexploded 1000lb bomb in ANTELOPE exploded during de-fusing by RE EOD team. Ship's company abandoned ship which is still afloat in San Carlos Water but burning. Known casualties 1 dead - 6 injured before bomb exploded.

1413 Action Stations due to EW racket of enemy aircraft closing the force from the west. Air Raid Warning RED. Raid apparently developing over AOA.

1415 Appears that enemy aircraft are opening - possible that approach was to draw the CAP from the AOA.

1416 OTC ordered Air Raid Warning YELLOW.

1417 INVINCIBLE recovering an aircraft in distress.

1418 EXETER holds sonar contact 270°.

1418 Execution signal from Main Force to turn to 140°.

1419 EXETER sonar contact errors - he did in fact fire chaff down that bearing.

1430 No EW rackets held.

1428 Further confusing signal from EXETER cancelling her firing of chaff. Has she actually fired any?

1431 ANTRIM revert to Air Raid Warning YELLOW.

1432 Two pairs of CAP returning to INVINCIBLE and one pair outgoing on task.

1434 GLAMORGAN - all air duties.

1439 EXETER to be LINK 14 control.

1440 Executive signal to start Zig Zag 10 on box course 140°.

1446 Appears that CAP have shot down 3 Mirage over AOA. Ships have reported coming under attack in AOA.

1Y

2Y - Defence Watches.

1615 No threat approached the force this time - we were prepared if they had. It remains to be seen what happens in the AOA. So far our CAP appear to be doing their job.

2100 Signal received from HERMES giving details of this afternoon's engagement. 2 SHAR splashed, 3 x Mirage 5 over Pebble Island. 1 Mirage escaped to the west.

2200 Daily Oak says Goose Green has been taken by British Troops. Commenced RAS (Heavy Jackstay) with REGENT oil 33 and M2 3" rockets.

BRITISH TAY passed 3 miles on stbd quarter on her way to R/V with HERMES group. We were unaware her orders had been changed - we thought we were meeting her in Area TALA. She was very slow to reply to C + R or to set watch on Tac.

25 May  
COVENTRY assessment of yesterday's "bag"-

CAP - 3

RAPIER - 3

FEARLESS 40/60 - 2

+ 1 heard to ditch to west of F.I. (Arg emergency freq.)

0001 World Service news - ANTELOPE has now sunk.

0700 Contact on 965 to north (in TARA) believed to be STENA SEASPREAD. Closing for R/V.

0930 R/V STENA SEASPREAD. Conducted boat transfer for damage assessment.

1000 Contact 8nm NE. Assessed as one of 3 tugs in area TARA.

1120 Complete RADHAZ restricted for maintenance.  
 1330 Instructions received from CTG 317.8 to proceed at 2000 tonight to R/V QE2 north of S.Georgia at 271200. We will embark Commander Land Forces F.I. + 100 staff, and return to HERMES in TEZ at best speed for transfer to her. COVENTRY/BROADSWORD apparently in missile trap north of Pebble Island - reports of 2 Arg aircraft splashed by COVENTRY and 1 splashed over AOA.

1845 Heard on AAWC - COVENTRY in danger of capsizing and BROADSWORD hit aft.

1945 By signal - COVENTRY on beam ends and in danger of sinking. BROADSWORD lost both Lynx but otherwise relatively minor damage. BRO picking up COV survivors, UGANDA proceeding to area. 8 x SEAKING 2 x WX sent ahead to assist in picking up survivors.

2100 Signal from INVINCIBLE reporting detection of 2 x Super Standard NE Falklands + EXOCET attack detected. Followed by signal to TG 317.8.4 requiring details of events leading to EXOCET attack on ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. No mention of hit or damage. Awaiting clarification. GLAMORGAN sent into Stanley to bombard airfield as intelligence suggests S.Etandard may have landed there post attack. (arrester wire rigged).

2140 Confirmed 2 x EXOCET hit ATLANTIC CONVEYOR aft. She is on fire, has lost all power and is abandoning. SALVAGEMAN ordered to proceed to assist with all despatch. S.Etandard assessed coming from Deseado - detected at 28nm - missile launch visual HERMES + BRILLIANT.

2150 BROADSWORD confirmed that COVENTRY capsized and hull awash at last light.

2330 Report received from AMBUSCADE describing her 'near miss' when engaged by Arg 39. Apparently Chaff D deflected the missile fired at her from about 23nm (on to ATLANTIC CONVEYOR).

26 May  
 AM BROADSWORD reported 154 COV survivors onboard + approx 30 CASEVAC to UGANDA. BRILLIANT has 24 uninjured ATLANTIC CONVEYOR survivors.

PM A number of air raid warnings RED from AOA - REDs generally lasted about 10 minutes before YELLOW called. No further details but weather could soon be against Argy Air Force. By all accounts, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR may be salvageable and vital stores offloaded. IRISHMAN called in to standby for salvage. If this is so the 2 x EXOCET largely wasted. AVENGER largely agrees with GLAMORGAN's SAG intentions and will issue her directive accordingly.

27 May  
 Harrier mission report describes destruction of 1 Puma helo on ground in grid position 324076 (Bad Point - opposite San Carlos) Light fire returned by Argies.

0700 Possible iceberg detected 4 miles to south. Active radar/sonar. Signal sent warning other ships in area.

0930 QE2 delayed 3 hours by ice - will R/V same position at 1500.

1330 R/V QE2 - 1345 commenced Vertrep of loads. Recovered 182 in preparation of boat transfer of personnel.

1600 182 streamed and activated.

1630 Air Raid Warning RED in AOA. No further details.

1700 Air Raid Warning YELLOW in AOA.  
 1830 ANTRIM Family Favourites!  
 2000 PLYMOUTH report to INVINCIBLE - beach-head bombed by A4's - bombs hit beach without causing damage - possible minor casualties ashore - no ships hit - 2 x A4 splashed and 1 damaged, all by small arms fire.

O/N ALACRITY ordered to sink ATLANTIC CONVEYOR with gunfire (CONVEYOR's bow having blown off today). Cancelled - IRISHMAN has her in tow.

28 May News - Total 'Blackout' of all reporting from AOA therefore very little news of note.  
 Weapon Drills and DCEX.

2359 R/V FEARLESS for passage to TEZ + transfer of staff to HERMES on arrival.

29 May News that Goose Green/Darwin taken by 2 PARA. 4 own casualties including Col + Adj. Several enemy died and 106 POW.  
 0645 Signal received saying 'Black Buck' cancelled.  
 1130 Vertrep CLIFFI and staff to FEARLESS - also 17 Seacat.  
 317.1.1 "Flash" re surrender at GOOSE GREEN.  
 1600 CTG 317.8 "Shutter" warning - possible ETANDARD - weapon, GDP Action crews closed up as a precaution - Air Raid Warning still YELLOW: is this retaliation for Goose Green? Nothing developed.  
 1800 RAS(L) with TIDESPRING.

30 May CTG 317.8 detailing ANTRIM via Air Drop SALLY and LOLA to reinforce S.Georgia.  
 0830-0930 406 transferred KY8 + maintainer back from HERMES prior to detaching to airdrop R/V.  
 1715 Hercules overhead for stores drop.  
 1800 Hercules completed airdrop and cleared to NE. 406 continued to pick up containers.

31 May  
 0315 All transfers (FORT AUSTIN, CANBERRA, GLAMORGAN)/RAS OLMEDA complete. (Area LOLA).  
 0318 Proceeding to Grytviken to assume duties CTG 317.9, and reinforce S.Georgia.  
 - Silent: 184, 192  
 - Radiating: 965, 978 by bridge (3 sweeps every 15 mins)  
 182 streamed and activated.

1 June  
 Continue on passage to S.Georgia. World Service News reports clashes between Arg/Brit troops in area of Mount Kent. ACTIVE carrying out NGS on Mount Kent targets overnight.  
 0955 Arg 707 detected bearing 350(EW). 965 contact at 1000 bearing 358 - 200nm. Aircraft tracked SE. IFF Mode 3A 46. Lost bearing 080 - 180nm at 1035. ECR to CTG 317.8.  
 1145 Boeing redetected 095 120. Tracked into 80nm and then aircraft NW to remain o/s 80nm.  
 1218 Boeing lost 330 200.  
 1615 Unidentified contact to south identified as Fort GRANGE. Base course and speed resumed.  
 1630 Report of 1 Hercules splashed by INVINCIBLE CAP north of Falklands. Time 1358. Not known if C130 or KC-130.

2 June

0100

Passing through centre of Ice Berg Field 80 N S Georgia.  
Field approx 50.

1100

At anchor HUSVIK. CO/OPS ENDURANCE on board.

SAXONIA, LYCAON, RESOURCE, TYPHOON, PICT, CORDELLA, FARNELLA,  
JUNELLA in the 3 harbours.

No enemy aircraft in TA (fog pm)

CARDIFF recalled from missile trap/airfield policing duties  
because of possible arrival of shore exocet.

Press reports of Napalm a corrosive chemical discovered at  
Goose Green 'ready to deploy'.

Number of shore radios intercepted by AMBUSCADE indicates  
strike attack probably not successful.

Bahia Paraise in Port Stanley for wounded (and other sculduggery?)  
NGS, advance and resupply continue. Little news.

3 June

0/N

Transfer of stores from SAXONIA to RESOURCE continued throughout  
the night by Minesweeper. RESOURCE reanchored at about 0630  
after dragging. Wind gusting on 30kt, but ANTRIM secure.

AM

San Carlos airstrip due to become serviceable.

Vulcan ARM strike.

1030

Carrier group more further East to "parry" range from FI.

Weighed and proceeded to sea for AAW operations. Helo launched  
to assist M Coy transfers. (Subsequently not required).

1500

901M and 904 Balloon runs successfully completed.

1700

406 launched to conduct VERTREP with RFA RESOURCE.

4 June

1030

RAS(L) PEARLEAF in appalling weather conditions - snow/minus  
temperatures.

PM

Mail/Stores transfer conducted with TU 317.0.3 and M Coy tasks  
conducted by 406.

0/N

RASON.

5 June

Hostiles closing Falklands from the West. Originally classified  
'many' - subsequently reclassified 'few'. Went low approx 80 miles West  
of Islands. One CAP pair launched to investigate awaiting  
further sitrep.

0945

AAWC heard to revert to air raid warning Yellow - CAP returning  
to INVINCIBLE. No results reported.

AM/PM

At anchor Gritviken for stores transfer with SAXONIA/NORHELLA  
and maintenance.

Retained at anchor overnight.

6 June

0/N

Attack ashore delayed.

1000

Weighed anchor to patrol NE S Georgia.

1600 - 1753

406 carried out ice search to N/NE and collected PAX from  
Gritviken (ENDURANCE).

7 June

0800

STROMNESS/YORKSHIREMAN/SALVAGEMAN approaching Cumberland Bay  
from the West.

AM

EXETER reported splashed one high flyer with Dart. One a/c  
escaped.

1300

Entered Cumberland Bay for mail/stores Tx - STROMNESS and  
ENDURANCE.

1330

NBCD Exercise.

1430

NBCDX complete. Commence seaboat transfer of stores from SAXONIA.

1645

Sail Cumberland Bay for patrol.

(END and SALVAGEMAN to Hound Bay for anchor.

8 JuneO/N  
1500  
2000

Continued patrol NE of Cumberland Bay.  
WIMPEY SEAHORSE 12 miles from Gritviken - escorted in by ANTRIM.  
World Service News - Liberian registered tanker bombed by unidentified aircraft 400nm North of FI - listing and limping to nearest port (?) - MOD London claim no British aircraft in area.

2300

World Service News reports PLYMOUTH and 2LSLs damaged by aircraft attack this evening. 5 casualties. 2 aircraft shot down. Report also that Fitzroy and Bluff Cove have been taken by British troops - this is old news.

2358

Sitrep signal from CTG 317.0 - Air raids over anchorage (Bluff Cove?) at 1700. PLYMOUTH straffed and hit by 2 bombs which passed through mortar bomb room without exploding, but which detonated DC. Damage to hull and stbd boiler uptake. Mortars + 4.5's U/S - Seacat working.  
Fitzroy also attacked - SIR GALAHAD on fire + abandoned. SIR TRISTRAM 2 x UXB - also abandoned.  
1 Mirage splashed + 2 damaged over TA. Hits on Fitzroy a/c not known.  
Casualties believed to be 5, but no details yet. SIR GALAHAD had large no. Welsh Guards still onboard.

9 June

1100

Enter Cumberland Bay for boat transfer of outgoing mail to ENDURANCE. FORT AUSTIN arrives from TEZ en route ASI.

1100 News

6 Mirage shot down by Harrier/Shore batteries. Apparently just 5 wounded in PLYMOUTH - situation does not look quite so black.

1430

Proceeded to sea to patrol box 'KID': 992 radiating, 182 streamed and activated. Weather overcast 'glass dropping'.

10 June

O/N

1. Weather deteriorated overnight, storing interrupted as ships sailed. Continued patrol between icebergs NE of Gritters.
2. 0400 + 0500. News on BBC indicates British losses in PLYMOUTH and LSL Troopship 'worse than first thought'.
3. PUERTO DESEADO declared as 3rd Argy hospital ship (IRIZAR + B.PARAISO).

11 JUNE

1130-1230

Dogs:  
O/N

406 conducted HDS between ENDURANCE and 'M' COY Helopad.  
Commenced preparations for 4.5" barrel change.  
Remained underway in Cumberland Bay removing first barrel.  
MV GEESPORT arrived (late).

12 June

0640

0642

AAW C/S J overflown by hostile 10' south of ?  
J hit, damaged by EXOCET - single missile shore based, hit aft, fire under control req. CAP versus further attack.

0720

CAP on task for GLAMORGAN.

0730

NGS ships recalled to CVBG/GLAM if able otherwise to Fitzroy under Rapier cover).

1130

Completed transfer of 2 new 4.5" barrels and one old one with REGENT.

PM

ACTIVE, ARROW, AVENGER and YARMOUTH detailed for NGS night 12/13 June. Plan as on previous night.

13 June

0500

World Service has Argie report of "sinking British Frigate" ?GLAMORGAN incident - British Forces reported as having advanced a further 5 miles.

PM

Completed Vertrep with REGENT (mainly beer). o/c proceeded to sea for AAW patrol. (Completed barrel change).

14 June

0445

J2 Generator failure - all ops room displays, 901 +992 switched off.

0500

All power supplies restored, radars + displays operating.

O/N

Neutral Zone established in vicinity of Stanley Cathedral under ICRC organisation. GAL & TRI casualties reported. UK

News

troops advanced 4 miles now consolidating positions. GLAM damaged but operational. Argies inflicting "heavy casualties". Gun functions of 4.5" and 20mm.

Afternoon

1745

Signal received that white flag was flying over Stanley - negotiations at a delicate stage. Order from FOF1 to remain alert - reaction from Argie Mainland not yet known.

2000

BBC World Service News - Arg military leaders in B.A. have announced that cease-fire is being arranged in F.I. and that fighting has stopped. Menendez has left F.I. for B.A. to discuss situation with Chiefs of Staff.

2130

BBC World Service - special announcement - Mrs Thatcher has stated that discussions are underway to negotiate SURRENDER of Arg forces in F.I. No mention yet made of total, unconditional surrender.

2300

BBC World Service - MOD spokesman said this was not an 'unconditional surrender' at this stage but Argentinian forces would not be allowed under any circumstances to leave F.I. with their weapons. Menendez being allowed to go to B.A. to negotiate 'conditions of surrender' with Junta. Argies say that their honour must be maintained.

15 June

FOF1 signal - Menendez reports 14,800 Arg troops in F.I. CANBERRA detailed to ferry all but special category POW's to Santa Cruz Roads (Punta Quilla). Hope to complete in two round trips; NORLAND back up second trip. Args have 3 days food, no tents.

0840

OLMEDA/YARMOUTH proceeding to S.Georgia. REGENT remaining S.Georgia ufn.

ENDURANCE stranded Stromness - exact details of problem not known. 2 tugs proceeding Stromness from Grytviken to assist. Captain of ENDURANCE onboard for discussions. Returned to ENDURANCE 1030.

PM

1600

No RAS/Vertrep conducted today - appalling weather conditions. At sea off Cumberland Bay, patrolling at 6kts in blizzard. World News - Mrs Thatcher reports 15,000 prisoners taken on Falklands - many more than expected. Immediate reassurances being sought from Argentine that all hostilities in S.Atlantic are now at an end and that the war is over.

2200

News report of 1600 edition - Galtieri due to talk to Argy people on TV shortly.

SECRET

SECRET

16 June

0200

World News - Riots continue in Buenos Aires, apparently they are stunned at "cease-fire" in Falklands. Also demanding replacement of Junta. No assurance as yet from Galtieri regarding long term cessation of hostilities, but Brigadier General MENENDEZ says "It's all over"!

Note:

ANTRIM to assume duties QHM S.Georgia as from 161200Z JUNE (CTG 317.9 151820Z) 170001Z JUNE (CTG 317.9 152350Z)

AM

RAS(L) PEARLEAF and Vertrep (REGENT) complete.

1530

Enter Cumberland Bay - Cdr S, Cdr E, NO to ENDURANCE to discuss duties as SNO S.Georgia.

o/c

Proceeded to sea - AAW patrol.

17 June

AM

406 assist Vertrep ENDURANCE/REGENT/M COY.

1330-1450

Action Stations/Flyex/PD emergencies.

1500

ENDURANCE/SALVAGEMAN departed S.Thule.

1920

Garbled "Flash" World Service report that GALTIERI has been toppled and replaced by hard-liner. (confirmed 2000).

Interior Minister Alfredo San Juan as interim President.

Argentina reported sending 2 troopships to assist with evacuation of POW's.

18 June

1100

SCOTTISH EAGLE arrives S.Georgia.

1130

Commenced RAS(L) PEARLEAF.

1430

Commence pax/stores/mail/MRS3 gyro transfers ANT/YAR/REG/AM using 406 and 1 Seaking.

Dogs:

a. Completed transfer of mail/stores/pax to all units.

b. PEARLEAF proceeded north at 1830 (eventually!).

c. YARMOUTH/OLMEDA detached at 1845.

d. ANTRIM into anchor at Grytviken 1900.

2000

Revert to 1 - 4 - Weapons sitrep:-

a. Seaslug

- fallen out

b. 4.5

- fallen out

c. Seacat

- fallen out, launcher loaded, covers on

d. 3"

- Unloaded, RU topped up

e. 20mm

- Unloaded, RU topped up

f. Small arms

- All returned.

1030

406 conducted daily HDS/stores transfer.

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101  
3  
HMS ANTRIM  
BFPO Ships  
London

226/2

Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Fort Southwick  
Nr Fareham.  
Hants

17 July 1982

HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT ROP

1. Forwarded.
2. HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT, with its obsolescent Wessex HAS 3, did extremely well during this testing period, meeting all the diverse tasks out of role, effectively and with marked success. The repair of the aircraft after action damage on 21 May was particularly creditable and well performed.
3. The Flight's performance in the operations off South Georgia 21 Apr - 2 May was recognised by the award of the Distinguished Service Order to the Flight Commander, Lieutenant Commander I STANLEY, and of Mentions in Despatches to the other aircrew. These were well earned.
4. I entirely agree with the recommendations made in this report.

B G YOUNG, DSO  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Enclosure:

1. ANTRIM FLIGHT ROP.

Information:

1. CINCFLEET for FAWO
2. The Captain, HMS OSPREY
3. The C.O. 737 NAS

SECRET

UK EYES BRAVO

HMS ANTRIM

at sea

The Commanding Officer


HMS ANTRIM

15 July 1982

Sir

1. I have the honour to submit my Report of Proceedings for HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT during Operations CORPORATE and PARAQUET from 1 April 1982 to 1 July 1982 as required by FOF3 signal 19F/1AG/KAG 281627z JUN 82.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant



I STANLEY DSO  
Lieutenant Commander  
Royal Navy

## Annexes:

- A. Flight Chronology
- B. Narrative
- C. Flying Hours
- D. Flight Personnel
- E. Problems
- F. Details of Weapons Released
- G. Views on Operational Employment
- H. Relation between Peacetime Rules and Operational Reality

HMS ANTRIM

at sea

The Commanding Officer

HMS ANTRIM

15 July 1982

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ANNEXE A - FLIGHT CHRONOLOGYXP142 c/s 406 of ANTRIM Flight

- APRIL 1 EXERCISE SPRING TRAIN HIGH SEAS FIRINGS (406 TARGET RECOVERY)
- 2 INTENSIVE VERTREP OF STORES AND WEAPONS FROM HOMEBOUND SHIPS TO CORPORATE SHIPS (406 EMPLOYED 6hrs 5mins)
- 4 ASSORTED ASW/OTHT EXERCISES  
VERTREP  
TRANSFER FOF1 TO 'GLAMORGAN'
- 5/6 CONTINUED SURF SEARCH/OTHT PRACTICE/HAG PROCEDURES  
SONAR REMOVED (FOF1 DIRECTIVE)
- 7/9 VERTREP
- 10/11 ARRIVAL ASCENSION. INTENSIVE TROOP TRANSPORT TO SHIPS AND EMBARKATION OF STORES/EQUIPMENT
- 12/13 OPERATION PARAQUET SET UP TO RECOVER SOUTH GEORGIA
- 13/14 FURTHER SURF SEARCH/OTHT PRACTICE. R/V ENDURANCE 141100z
- 14 SURF SEARCH/OTHT PRACTICE. VERTREP (2 SORTIES)
- 15 VERTREP/HDS/TRANSFER OF MILITARY FOR BRIEFS & CONSULTATIONS
- 16-20 CONTINUOUS DAILY OTHT/SURF SEARCH PRACTICE/HDS/VERTREP
- Late 20 ARRIVAL OFF S. GEORGIA
- 21 RECONNAISSANCE OF S. GEORGIA BY 406. INSERTION OF SAS ON FORTUNA GLACIER BY 406 AND TIDESPRING 2 x WX5 AFTER ONE ABORTED ATTEMPT.  
(SEE SEPARATE REPORT)
- 22 SAR RECOVERY OF SAS ON FORTUNA GLACIER AFTER SEVERAL FRUSTRATED ATTEMPTS IN APPALLING WEATHER (SEE SEPARATE REPORT). TIDESPRING 2 x WX5 CREWS RECOVERED AFTER THEY CRASHED IN DRIVING SNOW.
- 23 SAR RESCUE OF 3 SAS IN RUBBER DINGHY OFF JASON ISLAND
- 24/25 SONAR REPLACED OVERNIGHT IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE ARG S/M THREAT
- 25 1. INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED THAT ARG SUBMARINE SANTA FE MIGHT BE IN AREA. 406 TASKED FOR SURF SEARCH BEFORE DAWN/PLYMOUTH WASP TASKED TO BE AL 8. BRILLIANT LYNX SURF SEARCH TO WEST WITH ONE Mk46. SANTA FE FOUND BY 406 AT 0855z AND ATTACKED WITH 2 x Mk11 D.C. S/MASSESED UNABLE TO DIVE AND BOLTED FOR GRYTVIKEN UNDER ATTACK FROM BRILLIANT LYNX/PLYMOUTH WASP AND LATER (1000z) ENDURANCE WASPS.
2. LANDED TROOPS FOR ASSAULT ON S. GEORGIA WITH LYNX OF BRILLIANT FLIGHT.
- 26-30 CONDUCTED SUPPORT OPS AT S. GEORGIA/HDS/VERTREP.

- MAY
- 1 1. CONTINUED SUPPORT OF 'M' COMPANY AT GRITVIKEN  
2. EVACUATION OF B.A.S. PERSONNEL AND STORES FROM OUTLYING STATIONS AND TRANSFER TO ANTRIM
- 2-7 SAILED I/C WITH TIDESPRING FOR ASCENSION. CONDUCTED VERTREP/HDS SORTIES DAILY
- 7 R/V WILL LSL GROUP. TRANSFER OF B.A.S. PERSONNEL AND GEAR
- 9 TRANSFERS/HDS BETWEEN LSLs
- 10-11 INTENSIVE SURF SEARCH/ASW SCREEN  
111630z - POSSUB HIGH 4 GAINED. Mk46 FIRED AGAINST SUBMARINE CONTACT BUT COMMAND ASSESSED MARINE LIFE. SHOWED BRG/RANGE MOVEMENT, DIVING IN AND OUT OF LAYER, DOPPLER SHIFT AND FIRED THREE DECOYS DURING PURSUIT. SHOWED ALL CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBMARINE (SEE SEPARATE REPORT)
- 12-16 CONTINUED SUPPORT OPS WITHIN LSL GROUP
- 16 JOINED UP WITH FEARLESS GROUP
- 17 SOOTAXs FOR TACTICAL DISCUSSIONS. EMBARKED SBS.
- 18/19 ECU CHANGE
- 20 ECU CHECK TEST FLIGHT  
NIGHT OF INSERTION OF SBS ON FANNING HEAD CONTROLLING ONE WESSEX 5.  
2 LANDING ZONES ESTABLISHED BY 406
- 21 DAY OF INTENSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON SAN CARLOS WATER. FLIGHT SMALL ARMS AND GPMG ON FLIGHT DECK. 2 SERIOUS AND 1 MINOR CASUALTY SUFFERED BY FLIGHT. 406 PEPPERED WITH 30mm CANNON AND SHRAPNEL DAMAGE.  
PLACED UNSERVICEABLE!
- 21-28 RECTIFICATION OF ACTION DAMAGE WITH ASSISTANCE OF MARTSU TEAM FROM ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.
- 28-31 SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN CVBG. 30 MAY 406 UNDERTOOK RECOVERY OF HERCULES AIR DROP STORES
- 31 PROCCEEDED TO S. GEORGIA AS AIR DEFENCE SHIP (AFTER ARG C130 BOMBING OF 'BRITISH WYE')
- JUNE
- 1-26 1. DAILY SUPPORT OPERATIONS/VERTREP/HDS AT S. GEORGIA  
2. CONTINUATION PROGRAMME OF TRAINING. OTHT/ASW/NGS  
3. REPLACEMENT OF MRS 3 GYRO AND GUN BARRELS
- 27 RETURNED TO FALKLANDS TEZ
- 28 HDS TO HERMES FOR CONSULTATIONS
- 29 1. 406 INTO PORT HOWARD TO PICK UP ONE PASSENGER FOR TRANSFER TO UK  
2. DEPART TEZ FOR UK

ANNEXE B TO FLIGHT R.O.P.

ANNEXE B - NARRATIVE

1. On 1st April 1982 HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT found itself, towards the end of EXERCISE SPRINGTRAIN, engaged in target recovery for the High Seas Firings associated with that exercise. The substantial remains of an upturned yacht were discovered by the helicopter (406), which were subsequently destroyed by the ship's demolition team after a thorough investigation into the contents of the boat by ship's divers.
2. The night of 1/2nd April brought the news that HMS ANTRIM together with a substantial number of SPRINGTRAIN ships would be required to support Government policy in the South Atlantic. Accordingly, 406 was engaged on 2nd April in replenishing stores, ammunition and personnel from ships which were homeward bound. Large amounts of ammunition, missiles and torpedoes were taken on while ANTRIM returned her practice rounds to home-going ships. During the night and following day, on orders from FOP1, the sonar installation was removed from the helicopter (XP142) and the aircraft converted to the long range surveillance role/OTHT role with the addition of an overload fuel tank. Several non essential brackets and fittings were removed to optimise the space required for possible troop transport.
3. The passage to Ascension Island was marked by sorties devoted to inter-ship vtrep and training in surface search/OTHT/HAG techniques. Particular attention was paid to silent, long-range operations with minimal use of radar - one sweep every fifteen minutes - unless targeting information was being passed. The EXTACS OTHT procedure and the new Whippet procedure produced by FOP1 were perfected and seemed to work well.
4. HMS ANTRIM arrived at Ascension Island early on 11 April and the days of 11/12 April saw 406 engaged in the continuous vtrep of stores, ammunition and the transport of troops to HMS PLYMOUTH, RFA TIDESPRING and ANTRIM. Whilst at Ascension, it was disclosed that these three ships were to combine with HMS ENDURANCE coming up from the south and embark on OPERATION PARAQUET, the plan for the recovery of South Georgia. As the PARAQUET ships made their way south, with 'M' Company Royal Marines embarked in RFA TIDESPRING and elements of the SAS and SBS in HMS ANTRIM, the helicopters practiced techniques which would be useful later. ANTRIM's helo conducted OTHF/ surface search sorties and also HAGs with PLYMOUTH's Wasp. Meanwhile the two Wessex HU 5s in TIDESPRING conducted trooping drills. The period 12 - 21st April was marked by an intensive training period and by a large number of sorties devoted to troop transport between the ships for consultation and training purposes. A GPMG was fitted in the starboard cabin window of 406.
5. After a rendezvous and series of briefings with HMS ENDURANCE on 14th April, the PARAQUET forces arrived off South Georgia (30nm north) on the morning of 21st April. As the ships were working in ZULU time, the sun never rose before 0930 every morning. The initial military plan was to insert a detachment of 16 SAS troops on the Fortuna Glacier so that they could observe Argentinian activity in Leith and Stromness. Accordingly, it was decided that ANTRIM's Wessex 3 would lead the TIDESPRING Wessex 5s using radar up onto the glacier. A preliminary reconnaissance was made on 21st April at first light (0930z) by ANTRIM's Wessex HAS 3 on to the glacier and conditions, although there was some driving rain and wind, appeared suitable for the operation. ANTRIM's Wessex returned to pick up 4 troops and the Wessex 5s alternately landed on ANTRIM and embarked troops. The three helicopters headed into South Georgia, but by the time the formation had reached Possession Bay the operation had to be abandoned due to thick low cloud and driving rain and snow storms. The formation returned to the ships and a later attempt was made to get onto the glacier at 1315. This time the weather had improved somewhat so the formation penetrated Possession Bay, crossed to Antarctic Bay and climbed up onto Fortuna Glacier amidst swirling low cloud. The cloud and visibility problem was exacerbated by frequent driving snow squalls and sudden violent changes in wind speed and direction. Furthermore, spacial awareness was made difficult by the vast layers of white snow, cloud and snow squalls. However, all three helicopters landed on the glacier in the required landing zone and disgorged their troops and equipment. The formation then left the area via Antarctic and Possession Bay to avoid

compromise by possible Argentine Observation Positions.

6. The night of 21/22nd April was quite remarkable. The barometer fell to 960mb in 8 hours from 995mb and we suffered at the hands of a storm force 10 with gusts to 70kts all night. Not surprisingly, the SAS on the glacier radioed to say that their position had become untenable and that they might not survive another 12 hours up there. Thus it was decided to extract them by helicopter from their predicament using the same formation as before. As the three helicopters re-entered Antarctic Bay it was realised that the meteorological conditions would be worse than on the previous day. Swirling low clouds swept across the glacier interspersed with raking snow storms. Also, the violent winds gusting up to 70kts then dropping to 10kts created problems with severe mechanical turbulence over the mountains. The two Wessex 5s were left to orbit in Antarctic Bay as ANTRIM's Wessex 3 made three attempts to get herself onto the glacier. The two Wessex 5s landed on a spit of land between Antarctic and Possession Bay to conserve fuel, but in the end all three aircraft had to return to their respective "mothers" for fuel. A second attempt was mounted immediately and this time all three aircraft successfully succeeded in climbing the glacier. A smoke was ignited by the SAS on the ground and the helicopters landed to embark troops and equipment, in a welcome respite in the weather. Even as the troops were being embarked, the weather closed in again, the snow being whipped up and wind blowing strongly. YA, one of the Wessex 5s (LT M TIDD) decided to lift as he had been the first to embark his troops. As he transitioned forward he seemed to loose his bearings in the ensuing white out and the aircraft was seen to crash in the snow, ending up on its side after a skid of some 50 yards. The other two aircraft, having embarked their troops, lifted and landed next to the crashed helicopter to embark the survivors. The other Wessex 5, YF, dumped fuel and took in half the survivors as did 406. The meteorological conditions were atill severe with visibility down to almost nothing. Once the survivors were onboard, 406 took off and made its way down the glacier with YF in company astern. As 406 transitted a small ridge on the glacier, YF in the descent was seen to flare violently striking the top of the ridge and roll over on its side. There was no reply when called on the radio. 406 with her overload of survivors was committed to returning to the ship 30 miles to the north. 406, having disgorged her passengers and taken on medical stores and blankets, then attempted to rescue the survivors of YF. The weather prevented two attempts at getting onto the glacier, although contact was established by radio and it was confirmed that there were no serious injuries. 406 returned to the ship to wait for a break in the weather. At 1635, about an hour later, 406 returned and managed to locate the remaining survivors. Having picked up 12 survivors 406 staggered back to ANTRIM somewhat overloaded 35 minutes later, to disembark her weary survivors.

7. Later, during the night of 22/23rd April a further SAS insertion was made when HMS ANTRIM, darkened and quiet, crept into STROMNESS BAY. Five Gemini were lowered but, unfortunately, only two engines in the boats started. As a result, the following morning one of the two boats and its occupants could not be accounted for. Consequently, ANTRIM's Wessex was launched to try and find them, at 0840z. After an hour's fruitless search, trying to locate the survivors in the area of STROMNESS BAY and evading any possible Argentine activity ashore, the boat was found 8nm down-wind by radio beacon whilst the helicopter was engaged in a creeping line ahead search. The three survivors and their equipment were recovered by winch, but the Gemini had to be sunk.

8. That afternoon, intelligence was received to indicate that the Argentine Guppy Class submarine 'Santa Fe' might be in the South Georgia area. The commander of the Task Group ordered all ships - except HMS ENDURANCE which was conducting separate operations in Hound Bay - to retire to the north east at 200nm in order to reassess the situation. Further reports indicated that the 'Santa Fe' might attempt to enter Grytviken in the night of 24/25th April were received and it was decided to close the island again to a range of 50nm to launch ANTRIM's Wessex for a surface search/ASW sortie at first light on 25th April. Also, a Lynx from HMS BRILLIANT, which had joined on 14th April to supplement our depleted helicopter capability, was tasked to conduct a surface search simultaneously with ANTRIM's Wessex 3, out along the coast towards Bird Island armed with one Mk46 Torpedo. HMS PLYMOUTH's Wasp was placed at Alert 8 armed with AS12. In view of the submarine threat, the sonar was re-fitted to ANTRIM's Wessex during the night of 24/25th April.

9. At 0810z on 25th April ANTRIM's Wessex 3 launched and transitted 50nm towards

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the mouth of Cumberland Bay. Visibility was about 2nm wind 310/15 with full cover of stratus at 400ft with broken stratus at 1000ft. A totally silent transit was achieved and the area of Cumberland Bay searched visually. One sweep on radar was conducted and a tiny echo was detected at 0855z 350 BARFF PT 5nm. ANTRIM's Wessex closed to investigate and at 2nm the contact was identified as the Argentine Guppy II 'Santa Fe'. The submarine was immediately attacked with 2 x Mk11 Depth Charges which exploded very close to its port casing. (See separate report). After some violent careering, the submarine headed for GRYTVIKEN with oil streaming from the hull. PLYMOUTH was requested to launch her Wasp and BRILLIANT's Lynx was called in to deliver a Mk46 Torpedo if the submarine showed any sign of diving. The 'Santa Fe'; however, showed little capability of diving after the depth charge attack. After a short burst of machine gun fire from NATRIM's Wessex, BRILLIANT's Lynx released its Mk46 torpedo and closed to harrass the submarine with GPMC fire until the arrival of PLYMOUTH's Wasp, speeding in from 40nm under the control of ANTRIM's Wessex. ENDURANCE announced that her AS12 Wasps would be airborne shortly to deliver AS12s. ENDURANCE Wasps subsequently achieved missile hits on the submarine fin which did little damage as they punched through the G.R.P. fin before exploding. The submarine subsequently abandoned alongside the B.A.S. Pier at GRYTVIKEN.

10. After a hurried conference, the Task Group Commander decided to go ahead with the assault on South Georgia. At 1445, ANTRIM's Wessex led BRILLIANT's two Lynx to land troops on the shore opposite GRYTVIKEN after a bombardment demonstration for the benefit of the Argentines had taken place. It took an hour to land our troops and equipment using these three helicopters. Later that day ANTRIM's Wessex flew two more sorties in support of the operation, one as an airborne communication link and another to take ANTRIM's M.O. ashore to deal with the only Argentine casualty.

11. The period 26/30th April was taken up consolidating the areas around GRYTVIKEN and Leith before heading north with TIDESPRING to take the Prisoners of War to Ascension Island. Most helicopter tasks involved the support of 'M' Company and their establishment as a garrison ashore. In addition, ANTRIM took on the evacuation of British Antarctic Survey personnel and two female ITV reporters who were all transferred from ashore and from HMS ENDURANCE on 2nd May. On 2nd May ANTRIM and TIDESPRING headed north meeting up with HMS ANTELOPE and the LSL Group coming south on 7th May. After giving custody of TIDESPRING to ANTELOPE for her return to Ascension, ANTRIM assumed responsibility for the LSL Group's transit to the TEZ in the Falklands. For the flight, this meant frequent HDS/Vertrep sorties and an intensive period of regular surface search and ASW sorties. This continued until the LSL Group rendezvoused with the FEARLESS Group on 15th May. On 11th May, ANTRIM's Wessex had gained what appeared to be a very valid submarine target and had fired a Mk46 with no success against it. This incident is the subject of a separate report in Annex F.

12. During the period 15/20th May the aircraft was employed in numerous HDS/Vertrep sorties as the Task Force converged on the Falklands. On 18th May, it was discovered that the Wessex Gazelle engine had to be rejected due to excessive oil loss and leakage which indicated that the engine bearings had possibly worn to an unacceptable degree. The E.C.U. was replaced by the afternoon of 20th May and a sortie planned that night to insert some 30 SBS behind enemy lines on Fanning Head using ourselves and a Wessex 5 from RFA TIDEPOOL, at the start of the Falklands invasion.

13. Late in the afternoon of 20th May TIDEPOOL's Wessex 5 arrived and was stowed in the starboard waistwhile briefings took place. The SBS wanted to be landed in two positions; one a mile to the east of Fanning Head which was known to hold a company of Argentine troops and another a mile to the north west of Port San Carlos. First it was planned to use a thermal imaging device in the Wessex 5 to assess the strength of the Argentine forces on the ground, before HMS ARDENT and HMS ANTRIM led the assault ships through the small gap which constitutes Falkland Sound. Obviously it was essential to neutralise any potential opposition in Fanning Head which dominated San Carlos Water. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 took off at 2215z and flew while the Wessex 5 was ranged. After take-off, the Wessex 5 was vectored by the Wessex 3 over Fanning Head and around the San Carlos area so that it could use its thermal imaging equipment. Their reconnaissance indicated that Fanning Head was indeed occupied with troops of approximately company strength (about 120 men) and that ANTRIM's Wessex 3 was clear to go in and drop the first party of troops (4) at the first LZ to the east of Fanning Head, only one mile from the enemy positions.

14. Before the Wessex 5 returned to ANTRIM to pick up troops, the Wessex 3 returned for fuel and to pick up the four men who would establish the LZ on Fanning Head. The Wessex 3 then launched and tried to make the LZ while the Wessex 5 loaded up. Initially it looked as if 406 would be unable to land using radar and instruments alone due to the contours of the terrain. However, as some low stratus cleared 406 made a dummy run at 600ft, using PALOMA BEACH as a departure point both visually and for radar. Without actually being able to make out the contours or the type of surface we turned and made a second run, establishing a form of hover over our assessment of the LZ at 100ft. In the end it was decided to use the landing lamp for the final stages of descent to land, as the risk of discovery was considered less than that of landing in total darkness. On landing, the SBS disembarked and established the BARDIC T with torches. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 now held 5 nm to the north while vectoring the Wessex 5 to the LZ three times with troops. The Wessex 3 then recovered to take on more troops for the second LZ 1nm north west of Findlay Rocks, following the same procedure to achieve the LZ as in the first. Simultaneously, further drops to the initial LZ by the Wessex 5 were controlled by 406 until the task was completed at 120245z MAY 82.

15. The 21st May was a heady experience for everyone aboard HMS ANTRIM as the Argentine Air Force attacked the Task Force as it established itself on the beach-head at San Carlos. The flight had drawn small arms and a GPMG and attempted to shoot down incoming Argentine aircraft as they ran in from the unprotected stern sector. Unfortunately, during two strafing runs by Argentine aircraft using 30mm Cannon three members of the Flight were injured (two seriously) and the helicopter peppered with cannon shot and shrapnel. By the end of the day, damage to the aircraft was assessed as repairable although there was still a hole in the Flight Deck through which a 1000lb had had to be removed. With the assistance of a MARTSU team from ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, ANTRIM's Wessex 3 was surveyed and flying again on 28th May 1982.

16. Due to the damage sustained on 21st May HMS ANTRIM was withdrawn from San Carlos Water to the CVBG until 30th May, when she detached to South Georgia to protect the STUFT there after the Argentine C130 attack on 'BRITISH WYE' the previous day. LAGWIN STAPLETON was transferred from 826 NAS in HMS HERMES to replace the injured POACWIN FITZGERALD. For the month of June, 406's task consisted mainly of Vertreps/HDS and general support of 'M' Company ashore while the ship undertook its air defence task. Also, ice patrols and surface searches were undertaken for the protection and information of the STUFT. Interspersed with these secondary roles, the flight undertook an intensive period of ground and air training. On 28th June HMS ANTRIM returned to the TEZ for final transfers with HMS HERMES and one helicopter sortie into West Falkland before leaving the TEZ on 30 June on her way home to England, in company with RFA BLUE ROVER.

ANNEXE C TO FLIGHT R.O.P.

ANNEXE C - FLYING HOURS - OPERATION CORPORATE

1. FLYING HOURS

<u>APRIL</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
P1 (FLT CDR)	55.25	6.35	62.00
P2	61.35	2.30	64.05
FLT OBS	52.40	5.35	58.15
ACMN	64.00	2.30	66.30

<u>MAY</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
P1 (FLT CDR)	28.45	17.55	46.40
P2	28.35	14.00	42.35
FLT OBS	30.05	16.55	47.00
ACMN	26.05	9.20	35.25

<u>JUNE</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
P1 (FLT CDR)	29.30	0.30	30.00
P2	26.05	0.30	26.35
FLT OBS	28.00	0.30	28.30
ACMN	29.55	0.00	29.55

2. SORTIE DETAILS

a. April

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
1	0.45	PTA RECOVERY)
1	2.20	PTA RECOVERY) EX SPRINGTRAIN
2	0.35	CHECK TEST FLIGHT
2	0.30	HDS/VERTREP/LOADLIFTING
2	1.30	" " "
2	0.40	" " "
2	1.25	" " "
4	2.00	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
4	2.05	VERTREP/SURF SEARCH
4	0.45	SURF SEARCH/VIPTAX
5	2.05	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
6	3.35	SURF SEARCH/OTHT/HAG
7	1.45	VERTREP
9	0.35	VERTREP
10	2.25	ASCENSION ISLAND VERTREP
10	2.00	TROOP/STORES LIFT FROM ASCENSION
11	2.30	" " "

<u>DAYS</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
		TROOP/STORES LIFT FROM ASCENSION
11	2-45	
11	2-00	" " " " "
11	0-35	" " " " "
11	1-30	" " " " "
		SURFACE SEARCH/OTHT
13	1-45	
14	2-00	" " "
		VERTREP
14	0-40	
14	1-00	"
15	0-45	"
15	0-45	"
16	2-50	SAGEX/HAG/SURF SEARCH
17	1-00	HDS/VERTREP
18	0-45	" "
18	1-35	" "
19	1-00	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
20	1-30	VERTREP/HDS
20	1-00	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
20	3-15	" " "
21	1-30	SAS INSERTION - S. GEORGIA
21	1-10	" " " "
22	3-20	SAS SAR EXTRACTION - FORTUNA GLACIER
22	0-35	" " " " "
23	1-40	SAR RESCUE OF 3 SAS IN GEMINI
25	2-00	SURF SEARCH. ARA SUBMARINE ATTACKED WITH 2 x Mk11 D.C. AND DISABLED
25	1-00	TROOP ASSAULT - GRITVIKEN
25	0-30	TROOP COMMS LINK
25	0-30	MEDEVAC TO GRITVIKEN
26	2-00	HDS/SOOTAX
26	0-45	LOAD LIFT
26	4-15	TRANSFERS TO HMS CONQUEROR
27	0-25	TRANSFERS
27	3-30	TRANSFERS
27	1-20	TRANSFERS
27	2-20	SAS TRANSFER TO BRILLIANT
28	3-30	HDS/VERTREP/TRANSFERS
30	3-40	LOAD LIFT/STORES/PHOTEX
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	84-00	91-35

May

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
1	0.50	CHECK TEST FLIGHT/SURF SEARCH
1	1.00	VERTREP
1	0.45	TO GRYTVIKEN
1	0.40	TRANSFERS/VERTREP
2	0.35	TO GRYTVIKEN
3	2.20	HDS/VERTREP
3	0.50	HDS/VERTREP
4	1.15	VERTREP/TRANSFERS
5	1.30	JUMPEX
6	1.05	TRANSFERS/DLPs/OAs ON TIDESPRING
6	0.15	TIDESPRING TO ANTRIM
6	0.15	TIDESPRING TO ANTRIM
6	1.00	HDS/CHECK TEST FLIGHT
9	0.25	IN FLIGHT TRACK
9	0.30	TRANSFERS/CHECK TEST FLIGHT
9	0.15	SOOTAX
9	0.55	HDS
10	1.30	ASW SCREEN. ONE Mk46 LOAD
10	1.35	" "
10	1.20	" "
11	1.30	SURF SEARCH
11	0.55	LOAD LIFT
11	0.35	SURF SEARCH
11	1.30	ASW SCREEN
11	1.35	ASW SCREEN. 1 x Mk46 FIRED v. S/M CONTACT (SEE REPORT)
11	0.25	ASW SCREEN
12	2.15	SURF SEARCH/VERTREP
13	2.25	SURF SEARCH
13	1.30	LOW LEVEL RUNS/901 WORK-UP
15	2.35	SURF SEARCH/SONAR C.T.F.
15	0.30	MAIL/HDS
16	1.00	MAIL/SURF SEARCH/SONAR & FCS CTF
16	0.40	MAIL RUN
17	2.30	CAPT & OPS TO FEARLESS/SURF SEARCH
17	0.20	CAPT & OPS RETURN
20	1.45	ECU CTF/TRANSFERS WITH INTREPID
20	4.35	SBS INSERTION AT FANNING HEAD - OPERATION SUTTON
28	0.40	CHECK TEST FLIGHT
28	1.00	JUMPEX
29	2.40	DUTY SAR ON FEARLESS

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b. May (cont'd)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
29	3-35	HDS/MAIL RUN
30	0-30	TO HERMES & RETURN(1 PAX)
30	1-00	C130 STORES PICK-UP
31*	2-45	VERTREP

c. June

3	1-00	'M' COMPANY TASKING
3	2-05	VERTREP
4	1-40	VERTREP/PAX
4	2-10	MAIL TRANSFER/GRITVIKEN & RTN
6	1-50	ICE RECCE/GRYTVIKEN & RTN
10	0-45	HDS
10	1-45	VERTREP
11	0-35	TRANSFERS TO ENDURANCE
11	1-20	IFP
11	0-20	VERTREP
12	1-15	VERTREP
12	1-40	JUMPEX
13	0-30	VERTREP/SOOTAX
14	1-30	NGS/WHIPPET
16	1-15	VERTREP
17	2-30	PAX TRANSFER/VERTREP REGENT TO ENDURANCE
17	0-45	DLP/OA/EMERGS
18	2-45	TRANSFERS/HDS
18	2-30	VERTREP
18	0-10	TRANSFERS
19	2-05	HDS/TRANSFERS
21	2-00	HDS/TRANSFERS
21	1-30	TARGET RUN/JOUT TRAINING
22	0-35	HDS
22	1-00	HDS/PAX TRANSFERS
23	1-45	HDS/VERTREP
23	2-00	HDS/VERTREP
23	0-30	HDS/VERTREP
24	1-55	HDS/VERTREP
24	0-30	VERTREP
26	0-50	PAX TRANSFERS
27	0-30	1 PAX ANTRIM TO RESOURCE + STORES
28	0-35	CAPT & CDR(S) TO HERMES & RTN
29	1-35	'PIMPERNEL' PICK-UP AT PORT HOWARD + MAIL OUT



ANNEXE D - HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT PERSONNEL - OPERATION CORPORATE1. Flight Personnel.

<u>FLT CDR</u>	LT CDR I STANLEY RN	C017793K
<u>P2.</u>	SUB LT S G COOPER RN	C027272M
<u>FLT OBS</u>	LT C J PARRY RN	C021684T
<u>ACMN</u>	A/POACMN D B FITZGERALD(Until 21 May)	
	LACMN T M STAPLETON (29 May - 17 July)D124602A (ex 826 NAS)	
<u>SMR</u>	CAEA(M) D J HERITIER	D063193F
<u>R1</u>	AEMN(R)1 J McKEE	D080539W
<u>L1</u>	AEA(L)1 T BULLINGHAM(Until 21 May)	D058003Y
	AEMN(L)1 A B RUSSELL(1 July onwards)	D067695W
<u>M2</u>	AEA(M)2 L N KURN	D136449G
<u>R2</u>	POAEM(R) A N DAVIS	D078611L
<u>L2</u>	POAEM(L) B P WILLIAMS	D066878G
<u>M3</u>	LAEM(M) A GIGG	D121250W
<u>R3</u>	AEM(R)1 B KINSLEY	D168918G
<u>L3</u>	AEM(L)1 M J T McGREAL	D175582T
<u>M4</u>	AEM(M)1 S V OSMENT	D179096M
<u>M5</u>	AEM(M)1 J CRAVEN	D164682W

2. Casualties.

AEA(L)1 T BULLINGHAM - During an Argentine air attack of 21 May BULLINGHAM was severely wounded by 30mm Cannon shrapnel from a round which exploded one foot from him as he took cover behind the helicopter in the port sidelane. He sustained the following injuries: Multiple shrapnel wounds to both eyes, torso and legs, resulting in permanent total blindness. Casevaced to UGANDA via CANBERRA. Relief - AEMN(L)1 RUSSELLjoined 1 July 1982.

A/POACMN D B FITZGERALD - During the same Argentine air attack of 21 May FITZGERALD was wounded by 30mm Cannon shrapnel as he sought to take cover in the hangar after helping man a GPMG on the Flight Deck. He sustained multiple wounds to legs and buttocks. Casevaced to UK but now fully fit for duty. Relief - LACMN T M STAPLETON joined 29 May to 17 July 1982 ex 826 NAS.

LT CDR I STANLEY - During Argentine air attacks of 21 May Lt Cdr STANLEY took cover in the Avcat Fuel Space to avoid 30mm Cannon fire and he sustained minor shrapnel injuries to right shoulder and right hand small finger.

ANNEXE E - PROBLEMS

1. Complement Qualification and Training. The only complement problem experienced during Operation Corporate was as a result of the CASEVAC of the Flight Lt AEA(L)1 BULLINGHAM. The L2, a POAEM(L), did not have the necessary experience to cope with the inevitable F.C.S. diagnosis and rectification that was required.
2. Own Support. The standard fit of tools and equipment was found to meet all maintenance needs. It is recommended that a CHADWICK HELMUTH dynamic balancing and in-flight tracking equipment be carried by the flight as a permanent item and a number of additional spares be held, namely, spare oleos and FCS and Sonar equipment modules. The addition of a few minor items of test equipment would enable full 2nd Line Sonar equipment servicing to be available.
3. Ship's Support. At least one more Depth Charge cradle is required for weapon resupply, otherwise ship's support was good.
4. UK Support. No problems.
5. Clearances, Modification, New Equipment. Clearance was requested to operate the Wessex 3 up to 14000lbs Max.A.U.W. within the same parameters as the Wessex 5. The service deviation issued constrained the clearance to Operation Corporate only. It is considered that in the light of experience this additional payload, especially in the surface search role, significantly increases the operational capability of the aircraft and it is recommended that the restriction to Operation Corporate only be lifted. After manufacture of the Exocet Radar Reflector the device was fitted to the port Weapon Carrier as a temporary measure pending issue of the NSM as the operational requirement for some form of decoy/defence was considered urgent. This was found to be an unsuitable mounting position, suffering excessive vibration on the carrier and the bracing struts and was subsequently removed. The NSM has not yet been received. It was established that the device produced a tanker size echo on 992 Radar at 15 - 20nm and appeared to be effective although very direction sensitive.  
The inclement weather prompted the manufacture of a plywood insert to replace the starboard after cabin window when the GPNG mounting was fitted. The insert located using the window jettison lugs and with the aid of standard drawer handle centrally positioned allowed the plate to be withdrawn into the aircraft and the gpng and swivel fitted to the mounting. The insert when fitted also reduced the light level in the cabin and thus improved the Observer's operating conditions for the radar.
6. Tasking/Fatigue/Morale. The majority of tasking was generated internally to meet the various Military requirements for HDS, trooplift, Vertrep and in the Surface Search role. During transits south a pre-dawn surface search and OTHH sortie was flown out to ranges of 100nm giving coverage to approximately 130nm. During the short periods with the CVBG, the dunking tasking comprised 2 x 3hr slots in 24hrs which could be achieved when not hampered by sonar unserviceability. The greatest fatigue factor experienced was the constant HDS/Vertrep requirement which when coupled with defect rectification and maintenance required some maintainers to be turned in in their defence watch off-watch period. The requirement to replace the sonar equipment and carry out an ECU change to meet urgent operational requirements required some of the flight to work continuously for over 30hrs. Although the task was most commendably achieved recovery time for those maintainers involved was at least 48hrs. It is recommended that prolonged operations of this nature only be contemplated when a guaranteed long stand-down can be accepted on completion.

Flight morale throughout Operation Corporate was good. The emphasis on individual responsibility is considered to be the biggest simple motivating factor.

ANNEXE F - DETAILS OF WEAPONS RELEASED1. 2 x Mk11 DC Deployed v. ARA SANTA FE

a. On 25th April 1982 Wessex HAS Mk3 (c/s 406) was launched before dawn on a surface search of Cumberland Bay, South Georgia from position 070 BARFF PT 48nm. Conducted total radar/radio silent transit to the mouth of Cumberland Bay in the following weather:

W/V	310/15
Vis	$\frac{3}{4}$ nm
Cloud	8/8 500ft (which lifted from 0920z onwards)
Sea State	$\frac{3}{4}$

The helicopter was armed with 2 x Mk11 Depth Charges

b. After a preliminary visual search of Cumberland Bay, the radar was operated for one sweep. A tiny contact was detected 350 BARFF PT 5nm and 406 closed to investigate visually. Again radar/radio silence was maintained. At  $\frac{3}{4}$  nm the Argentine submarine 'SANTA FE' was identified heading 310°(T) into sea with her casing clear. She appeared about to dive after exiting Cumberland Bay. Her speed was about 8kts and it was decided to allow for ballistic corrections to run in over the submarine and release the Depth Charges when directly over it.

The run in was conducted heading 310° 90kts and at 150ft. The weapons were released together and were seen to explode alongside the port side of the 'SANTA FE' within 15-20ft. The submarine was seen to move heavily sideways through the water and started to yaw violently in a random manner until she gained directional control and headed back to Grytviken.

c. Damage Assessment.(1) First Impressions.

- I. Oil was seen to be streaming from the submarine shortly after the Depth Charge attack.
- II. The violent yawing was due to the action damage which put her port engine out of action.

(2) Subsequent Findings. Conversation with the CO of the SANTA FE and inspection of the submarine confirmed the following:

- I. Port shaft and engine were rendered unserviceable
- II. He was unable to dive after D.C. attack
- III. An oil tank had split
- IV. Electronic gear had sheared off bulkhead mountings throughout the submarine
- V. An HP air line had fractured

(3) Observation. Despite the proximity of the weapon (within advertised 'kill' range), some of the blast effect was dissipated through the surface.d. Recommendations

- (1) That the Depth Charge is still a viable weapon against surfaced or shallow targets.
- (2) That the explosive charge be increased.

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2. Mk46 Torpedo against 'Submarine Contact' - 11 May 1982

a. Wessex HAS Mk3 (406) launched for a routine ASW Screen operation at 1600z and dipped 195 ANTRIM 10.5nm. After 5 mins contact was gained at 180ft transducer depth bearing 145/3000yds Doppler 2 Opening. A solid echo was held in both long and short pulse with good audio response. Target was assessed as heading 090 (T). Initial classification was POSSUB Low 2 but if a submarine was clearly posing a threat to our force of LSLs, the initial low classification was due to problems with the 195M Sonar (due to training noise and slight oscillations of the transducer around the target bearing). All other indications indicated a higher classification.

b. After another five minutes contact the sonar performance seemed likely to degrade further (Dome Leakage light illuminated periodically) and contact still posed a threat to the force. No advice was given by ANTRIM at this stage. PLYMOUTH's Wasp asked to join with Mk46.

c. Contact was then lost for three minutes but regained with ball depth maximum 235ft Brg 160/2800yds Hdg 230 Speed 5kts. Contact reclassified POSSUB High 3 painting every third echo. Transmitted "intend COBRA in two minutes" when contact held 180/3200yds. COBRA loosed and Dogbox established 180/3400yds. Body was recovered during torpedo run but on expiry of Dogbox, was lowered again with no contact gained.

d. 406 next 'jumped' to last known S/M position where no contact was gained. A further jump 3nm further east between the force and the threat produced a good quality echo 145° 2300yds. Contact was held for 50 minutes and manoeuvred violently in course, speed, depth (in and below layer(layer depth 120ft)) and three decoys were experienced. Last known 235/2900yds opening 270° speed 7kts. 406 recovered to ANTRIM at 1730z for rotors running refuel and re-arm. No further contact was gained.

e. Observations. Although the Command considered this target to be marine life, both the Observer and the Aircrewman were convinced that a submarine was held during this action. Although intelligence intimated that an Argentine threat was low in this area, the contact gained seemed to fit all the criteria for a submarine. Possibly it was a submarine from another Navy.

3. POSITION OF HMS ANTRIM DURING ACTION

111000z MAY 82	42°48' S	32°59' W
111700z MAY 82	42°59.5' S	32°58' W
111800z MAY 82	43°00' S	32°56' W

ANNEXE G - VIEWS ON OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

1. Operational employment during Operations Paraquet and Corporate proved to consist almost entirely of the functions not best suited to the Wessex HAS Mk 3. i.e. Vertrep, Trooping and assault ops. However, by removal of the Sonar equipment and associated support framework the aircraft proved to be a most viable proposition and achieved almost 100% serviceability in the non-dunking roles. Approximately 1000lbs of equipment was removed from the aircraft by judicious removal of the Sonar equipment support framework. This weight gain was optimised by carriage of the port weapons carrier and drop tank. This configuration, with the clearance to 14000lbs A.U.W. gave the aircraft an excellent Surface Search capability, (120nm range, 2hrs 40mins endurance). Addition of the H.W.R.2 further improved the search capability although limited to warning only. Troop carrying and load lifting was comparable with the Wessex 5 although there was no form of seating or means of restraint for the troops. The aircraft proved ideally configured for night/dawn covert insertion employing the radar and doppler for accurate navigation to the L.Z. An average example of 8 troops to 50nm range and return with 20 mins endurance in hand is feasible if the Service Deviation to 14000lbs Max.A.U.W. is employed.
2. The removal and refitting of the sonar was achieved remarkably quickly by the flight (approx 24hrs) and when set to work operated well for a short period. It has, however, suffered consistent problems since the initial success which can be attributed to the carriage of troops and equipment or, the as yet undiscovered shrapnel damage to the wiring looms.
3. It is considered that the requirement for an ASW Sonar fitted aircraft embarked in a DLG be reviewed if the ship is to be further employed in Operation Corporate.
4. If the requirement for dunking sonar is confirmed, it is recommended that the Wessex HAS Mk3 surface search capability be enhanced by the fit of Orange Crop ESM equipment and that the feasibility of fitting ARI23163 as an EXOCET jammer be investigated. It is intended to demand FCS and Sonar Equipment spares and modules in excess of allowance to ensure an autonomous 2nd Line and repair capability.
5. In the event of the ASW Dunking requirement being deemed of limited value, then it is considered that the ship's requirement for an aircraft capable of surface search and attack, ESM Search, trooping, Vertrep, Exocet defence and S.A.R. is best met by the embarkation of a Lynx Flight. The advantages of commonality of equipment and the safety aspects of twin engine performance does not require re-emphasis. If an aircraft type change is not considered feasible, it is recommended that the Sonar Installation be removed completely and troop seats fitted where possible in addition to the equipment at para.4.
6. It is further considered that the amount of night Vertrep sorties flown by the most capable aircraft during the operation indicates that it should become an important part of training requirement for shipborne operations. It was found that the height required by the aircraft and the time spent over the deck made the operation considerably more difficult than a normal approach and landing sequence.

ANNEXE H - RELATION BETWEEN PEACETIME RULES AND OPERATIONAL REALITY

1. Inevitably, the achievement of an operational task became the aim despite peacetime rules and regulations. However, the policy of abiding by the rules where possible was adopted and it was only necessary to contravene them where compliance would hinder or extend the task unacceptably. At the event these occasions were found to be surprisingly rare. It is considered that the regulations contained in NHERS were extremely restrictive and that movement and stowage of weapons, ammunition and pyrotechnics could not always be achieved without contravention of the rules. Application of common sense, an awareness of the rules and sound knowledge of the armament stores were the criteria to decide an unacceptable or acceptable action.
2. Flight deck operations also evolved as a compromise between expediency and rigid application of the rules. The emphasis fell firmly on the F.D.O. to employ his experience and common-sense for the control of personnel, stores, lighting, etc. on the flight deck especially during darkened operations. The use of a consistently serviceable loop system and telebrief would have eased his problem considerably.
3. The areas where greatest divergence from the normal Flight Safety practices were experienced were during troop lifts where suitable survival suits, seating and ear protection were not available.

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SECRET

12 July 1982

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HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT S.M.B. MAINTAINANCE REPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATEAIRCRAFT OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. Radio silence during helicopter operations posed many difficulties to Flight Deck Crews at first, due to lack of information and intentions. However, these were overcome by the use of a chalk-board in the helicopter and on the Deck to pass intentions.
2. The letters H.D.S. became a nightmare over the whole period. The advertised HDS taking anything from 1 - 6 hours to complete. The "batting order" given at the start of the serials had changed by the second ship visited and often before take-off, in the earlier cases.
3. The darkened-ship operating procedures became second nature for the Flight Deck teams, once practiced in ranging, stowing, spreading and folding in almost total darkness. The discrete use of torches, however, must be permitted for certain vital operations such as checking Main Rotor Head and Tail Gear Box and difficult stages of aircraft movement around the ship's superstructure.
4. Weapons supply worked well for initial supply of weapons but re-supply was very poor, in particular Mc 11 Depth Charges; the main problem being the lack of Depth Charge Carrying Cradles. The initial supply had already used the ship's only two cradles, hence re-supply could not take place until these had been returned, after the initial loading. Depth Charges cannot be prepared in the Torpedo Body Room and are totally unmanageable without cradles. During the attack on the ARA "SANTA YE" the re-supply was very slow and lack of cradles required "Live" Depth Charges to be prepared in the hangar and being lifted into cradles prior to loading to the aircraft. While in the hangar, the D.C.'s were laid on shock mats.
5. In the light of repeated experiences of air attacks the Depth Charge ready-use stowage is particularly vulnerable. A 30mm Cannon shell missed a "live" Depth Charge on the port R.U. stowage by only 2ft. As a result, the Depth Charges were jettisoned over-board in a "safe" condition between attacks.
6. Many Flight Safety aspects had to be relaxed to enable other operations to be carried out during intense extended flying periods. These included work on the Sea Slug Launcher and Quarterdeck during aircraft launching and recovery and vertreps. The people involved were always briefed beforehand and no Flight Safety incidents occurred due to the relaxation.

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AIRCRAFT MAINTAINANCE PROCEDURES

7. The flexibility of the servicing procedures worked well. The Wartime Servicing Procedures gave good guidance to servicing priorities, giving added flexibility to servicing without the penalties of contingency servicing.

8. All Routine Servicing was completed when due or within the permitted extension periods. The only operations which could not be completed on time were because of the lack of spares or facilities, i.e. instrument calibration or replacement. All deferred operations were entered in the MoD Form 704.

9. S.O.A.P. sampling was continued on a revised basis due to our remote location (poor postal communication) and intensity of flying. I adopted the following procedure:

- a. An oil sample was taken every other Flex-Op M90 giving a base periodicity of 20 hours.
- b. Scavenge Filter and Mag. Plug inspections at every Flex-Op M90 giving a base periodicity of 10 hours.
- c. Every time Mail was forwarded or a ship left for Ascension Is or UK an Oil Sample was taken and dispatched whatever the periodicity at the time.

Replies were inevitably slow with the E.C.U. 80 hours ahead of replies at one stage. However, I was happy with the visual condition of both the oil and the Filter debris at all times.

10. Defect rectification and Major Component Replacement (i.e. E.C.U. and Sonar) added to the other inevitable requirements. H.D.S., Action Stations and Defence Watches presented severe problems to already fatigued maintainers, resulting in men working for up to 48 hours on occasions, without sleep, and then taking at least two days to recover satisfactorily.

11. Main Rotor Blade Erosion and Leading Edge Damage. Main rotor blade erosion and damage was no more severe than already known and experienced with Wessex main rotor blades. The use of clear tape was restricted until the blades showed signs of erosion, and then only taping the areas as required. Once applied, the tape had to be replaced fairly frequently due to delamination brought about by PX24 and water.

AIRCRAFT/EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE & RELIABILITY Esp. WEAPONS SYSTEMS

12. The aircraft performed well throughout the entire period meeting all requirements whenever called for, noting that it has been used extensively as a Sky Crane and Troop Transporter, rather than an ASW asset.

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13. The original E.C.U. remained serviceable through a very intensive period despite several oil leaks and other problems (P.M.U. bracket & Anti-Icing Valve) and did all that was required of it until it finally became unacceptable and was replaced.

14. The sonar with winch and "pit-head" gear was removed to increase load and troop carrying capacity and was then replaced at very short notice. It then performed satisfactorily for a short period, but has given severe problems since, resulting ultimately in OpDef action. Before removal, the sonar had performed well. The main causes of unserviceability were as follows:

- a. Disturbance of plugs and looms and the necessity for looms to be taped back out of their normal lay.
- b. Chafing caused by equipment and troops during operational landings and rescue work.
- c. Battle damage to looms may still be presenting problems which are yet to be resolved.

The rectification of defects was greatly assisted by the installation of a 2nd Line Servicing bench in the Air E.M.R. and sending some equipment to HMS HERMES Workshops for repair when operating with the main group. However, most of the period was spent well outside range of specialist assistance and onboard rectification was hampered by lack of some specialist equipment. In particular, card extension boards would have greatly assisted fault diagnosis and the provisioning of module spares in addition to complete unit spares is recommended.

Persistent problems in the aircraft appear to be looming and plug defects which will require a lot of tedious checking and a degree of luck to rectify.

15. All other Aviation equipment worked satisfactorily.

16. The Flight Control System and Power Supply systems have presented their usual volume of problems but by local repair have been kept running to an acceptable standard.

17. All weapons systems have worked perfectly. Two live Depth Charges and one Mk46 Torpedo were dropped and all performed correctly. The aircraft was rôle-changed many times during Operation Corporate to every conceivable combination of rôles except 600lb Bomb and produced no functional faults at all.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

18. The aircraft electrical system suffered badly for a period from moisture ingress, particularly the Engine T.R.U., resulting in the Rotor T.R.U. failing due to overload. This was overcome by stowing the aircraft and drying out the Electrical Bays

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on every possible occasion.

19. Due to an intense operating period being closely followed by a severe storm, (Force 10-11) it was impossible to stow the aircraft and it rode out the storm chained on deck. The port rear Picketing Point was torn from the aircraft, but it does not appear to have suffered too badly otherwise in the short term. The only exception was the main wheel bearings and the Disc Brake Inserts which are corroding quite heavily.

20. During operations in the extreme cold, fresh water washing of the aircraft was suspended for a period and a PX24 wipe-down was carried out at least every other day, maintaining a wet film of PX24 on the aircraft surfaces. The biggest problem in fresh water washing was the formation of ice on the deck rather than on the aircraft. The hangar heater was remarkably effective at thawing out the aircraft.

21. The wind chill factor on the Flight Deck was very high at times. The Arctic suits worn by the Flight Deck Personnel kept them warm but were very bulky and were not water-proof, resulting in very heavy soaked suits when working in sleet or snow and increased personnel fatigue. The standard Flight Deck Boot is very poor for keeping feet warm, mainly because of the steel toe cap. However, other types of footwear available did not have the same grip and were therefore unacceptable; the cold feet option was accepted. Gloves also had a high failure rate and had to be replaced regularly.

22. Fitting Tip Socks to Main Rotor Blades in high winds and sea states was a very difficult and sometimes dangerous evolution. The Tip Socks and Blade Fold Pole need re-designed for Small Ship operations.

23. The ship's Air Start System became totally unserviceable due to icing of the valves whenever the air temperature dropped below zero.

#### BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR

24. The aircraft suffered a severe blast of shrapnel and two direct hits from 30mm Cannon fire. Fortunately the direct hits were through one Tail Rotor Blade and one Main Rotor Blade, and these were repaired by replacement.

25. All battle damage repairs have stood up well and have shown no signs of deterioration. The use of L72 Pop Rivets, Pressure Sensitive Tape and external frames for structural repairs, and in-line splicing or isolation for loom damage, was carried out quite quickly with the assistance and guidance of a MARTSU team, getting the aircraft back into service in approximately two days from the start of repairs.

26. I would recommend that Battle Damage Repairs be widely taught and that all ship's Flights carry supplies of Pop Rivets, ready-use metal and pre-bent angle to enable repairs to be carried out without external assistance. I think that my previous MARTSU experience helped me to quickly grasp the spirit of B.D.R. Without B.D.R. instruction, the repairs would be very alien and worrying to maintainers.

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27. Tail and Main Rotor Blade repair was by replacement, but required a previously declared unserviceable M.R.B. to be dressed out and re-fitted. It has flown satisfactorily and has shown no sign of deterioration. M.R.B. tracking was achieved with flag. Tail Rotor Dynamic Balance was not carried out due to lack of Chadwick Helmath Equipment and operator.
28. Despite a thorough survey by MARTSU and Flight personnel, small areas of shrapnel damage are still being revealed, especially in electrical looming.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

29. The extreme range and the nature of the operation gave several problems in support resulting in some unorthodox locally devised repair schemes. i.e. F.M.U. Bracket Support Strap, Bomb Carrier Support Brackets and Tail Wheel Brake repair. Materials readily available on the ship were used for these repairs.
30. Despite the already appreciated problems of long range supply from the UK, the support and assistance from other ships, particularly ships' Flights, was very good. As always, the ensuing paperwork gave more problems than the actual acquisition of the stores.
31. Once the ship Supply Dept. appreciated that if a MATCONOFF Demand did not yield a reply, then a Stores Demand was required, the flow of stores improved.



D J HERITIER CAREA(11)  
Senior Maintenance Rating  
HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Washington, D.C. 20535



Enclosed for you

Very truly yours,

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: [Faint text]

[Faint body text]

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RESTRICTED COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

HMS GLAMORGAN  
BFPO Ships

226



Commander-in-Chief Fleet

12 July 1982

Sir,

HMS GLAMORGAN - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 9 MARCH - 10 JULY 1982

I have the honour to report the proceedings of Her Majesty's Ship GLAMORGAN, under my Command for the period 9th March - 10th July 1982. During this time the ship completed a short SMP and participated in Exercise SPRINGTRAIN and Operation CORPORATE.

2. After six days self maintenance GLAMORGAN sailed from Portsmouth on Wednesday MARCH 17th for a useful week of weapon training during Phase 1 of SPRINGTRAIN, arriving in Gibraltar on Wednesday 24th March. In addition to harbour training, the period in Gibraltar allowed the ship's company to prove their overall sporting prowess by winning the SPRINGTRAIN Olympiad. We also had the honour of flying your flag and performing the duties of Fleet flagship from 26th March till 1st April when unfortunately, the worsening political situation curtailed your visit, and terminated Exercise SPRINGTRAIN; however, before GLAMORGAN was diverted south for Operation CORPORATE successful Seaslug high seas firings were achieved but the planned EXOCET firing again had to be cancelled.
3. At 020400Z April GLAMORGAN was ordered to join the CORPORATE forces and CTG 317.8 transferred his flag from Her Majesty's Ship ANTRIM (Captain B G YOUNG, Royal Navy) to GLAMORGAN at 041200Z April. GLAMORGAN remained the flagship of CTG 317.8 till the flag shifted to Her Majesty's Ship HERMES (Captain L E MIDDLETON, Royal Navy) on her arrival in the Ascension areas on 15th April. It was a fascinating experience and a privilege to be at the centre of things during this early and critical phase of the Operation and helped me to understand some of the later decisions. The communications load, in particular, was heavy, but although traffic reached a total of 400 'in' messages and 100 plus 'out' per day the facilities on-board were well able to cope, thus demonstrating, once again, the capability of the DLG Command ship.
4. The advance group reached ASCENSION, for the first time, on 11th April. Two days were spent underway in the areas and a WPP and liaison with the newly established Commander British Forces (Captain R Mc QUEEN, Royal Navy) was conducted on behalf of the CTG, before steaming north again to meet the Carrier Group. It was with some temporary chagrin that we learned that, after all, ANTRIM was to lead the Spearhead to South Georgia!

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
5. HERMES and INVINCIBLE joined and after a brief consolidation period the Battle Group proceeded south and at 0820Z on Monday 1st May - the CTG's birthday! - we entered the Total Exclusion Zone. At 1925Z the same evening, GLAMORGAN fired the first rounds 'in anger' with the initial bombardment of Stanley Airport and came under low level Mirage attack close inshore; several near miss bombs were a foretaste of things to come. Between 1st May and the 21st June when the ship detached for UK, a total of 1243 rounds of 4.5" ammunition, augmented by 6 Seaslug missiles, were fired in support of operations ashore.
6. The majority of our time was spent either in close escort to the carriers or on AAW picket duty, and usually acting as standby AAWC. However, GLAMORGAN was frequently tasked to nocturnal bombardments including support of the Pebble Island raid on June 14/15, and Operation TORNADO (the invasion deception plan). The ship was frequently taken under fire by the shore batteries which included 155 mm howitzers but despite one or two near misses, no damage was sustained from these guns.
7. Replenishment at sea became virtually a daily event in one form or another. It was impossible to determine the number of VERTREP serials conducted as single lifts merged into multi helo/multi sortie events often of very protracted duration. However, GLAMORGAN was physically connected to other ships for RAS a total of 52 times during CORPORATE in conditions which varied from 'decidedly hairy' to a balmy sinecure! (Details of RAS problems and other points are given in Annex G).
8. It was on completion of our twelfth night on the firing line and the penultimate day of the conflict, that GLAMORGAN was hit by an EXOCET missile fired from shore. It was with deep regret that I had to report the loss of thirteen members of the ship's company following the attack at 0636Z on 12th June. However, it was gratifying to note that within three hours of being hit the ship was proceeding in excess of twenty knots capable of detecting and destroying the enemy below, on, or above the surface. A detailed report of this attack was made in my 19F 152255Z June 82, but the significant factors which enabled GLAMORGAN to become the first ship to survive an EXOCET attack were position and angle of incidence of missile impact, the maintenance of ship systems, and the determination of the damage control teams. Recommendations for Awards were forwarded in my ABA/19F/ WAK 230153Z June 82. All but one of the injured (Cook SMITH who remains on the BIL in UGANDA) have returned to UK and most are now fit for duty.
9. Although all of May was spent with the OVBG, GLAMORGAN acted as TAG Repair and Logistic Area (TRALA) Manager for the first ten days of June, and again for a few days after the EXOCET attack. By mid June the TRALA had become a simple and efficient organisation, capable of providing the right support at the right time. The STUFF ships were extremely grateful for any assistance and guidance we gave. Even those without Naval Parties seemed competent to carry out very simple RAS, flashing light and Crypto. All were highly co-operative but, and totally unaware of the progress of the conflict. A daily news-sheet, produced on-board, was delivered whenever possible but the importance of keeping merchant ships and also RPAs, informed, should not be forgotten.

10. After the ship was damaged much help and excellent repair work was afforded by M.V. STENA SEASPREAD whose crew and Naval Party did everything possible to assist us. It is hoped that the considerable sophisticated capabilities of this simple to operate ship will be closely studied as an attractive option to expensive bricks and mortar for Fleet Maintenance Groups ashore. It was fortunate that ceasefire occurred and access to calm waters became available because the problems of welding large plates and beams into position with the ship in a seaway, are considerable.
11. After completing repairs, loading mail and stores for UK and transferring essential items to other ships, GLAMORGAN was ordered to return to UK in company with HMS PLYMOUTH (Captain D PENTREATH, Royal Navy) another "veteran" of the original Spearhead Group, ex SPRINGTRAIN. As the two ships steamed at speed and in close company past the Flagship, GLAMORGAN fired a full calibre salute to the flag of CTG 317.8 and PLYMOUTH blew red smoke rings from her damaged funnel!
12. The passage home included an eight hour stop in Ascension for fuel, damage repair/DED project team visit and the landing of passengers and advance leave party. Neptune made his customary appearance on 1st July and the final - and fifty second! - RAS was conducted with RFA PLOMBERG south of the Canaries by which time both ships were down to 25 percent fuel remaining.
13. PLYMOUTH was detached to Gibraltar on completion of RAS(L) and GLAMORGAN proceeded to PORTSMOUTH, fortuitously passing close enough to the Canaries to receive Spanish TV during the crucial England v Spain World Cup match!
14. Your visit to the ship, as well as opportunity to fly your flag again and your talk to the ship's company, at sea on Friday 9th July was a gesture which was enormously appreciated on-board. I received the Press at Spithead before the ship entered harbour at 1030A on Saturday 10th July and secured at North West Wall.
15. During CORPORATE the ship was underway for 2317 out of 2380 hours and steamed 30,490 miles without any breakdown. The reliability of ships machinery has been satisfactory, and reflects great credit on those concerned. (Marine Engineering details at Annex D). Availability of most sensors (except 992) and weapons systems has also remained high. (Weapon Engineering details at Annex C).
16. Like most other ships involved in CORPORATE, only a handful of men in GLAMORGAN had been involved in any previous conflict. Morale remained generally very high throughout but was remarkably susceptible to temporary change with the ebb and flow of the fortunes of war. The resilience and stamina of the ship's company and particularly the large number of very young, first draft ratings, has been remarkable. Their courage, devotion to duty, initiative, ingenuity, cheerfulness and resolve to get the job done at all costs, has been marvellous. I have seen only one minor disciplinary case since the beginning of CORPORATE, and the health of all on-board has been exceptionally good.

17. The work of NFFS, our own GLAMORGAN wives organisation and so many others at home, was outstanding and played a significant part in the maintenance of morale on-board. (Details of other morale factors at Annex J).

18. Participation in Operation CORPORATE during the twilight of my Service career has been a memorable and valuable experience. Whatever other lessons are learnt or conclusions drawn, it has demonstrated beyond doubt that the spirit and qualities for which our Countrymen have been noted in the past still pertain; well trained, well led British Servicemen who believe in their task, are second to none.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant



M E BARRON  
Captain

Annexes:

- A. Warfare Summary  
Appendix 1 - Aircraft Operating and Maintenance Procedures  
Appendix 2 - METOC
- B. Ammunition
- C. Weapon Engineering
- D. Marine Engineering
- E. Supply Matters
- F. NBCD Recommendations  
Appendix 1 - Sequence of events 12th June. (Copy forwarded separately to NBCD School HMS EXCELSIOR)
- G. Replenishment at Sea
- H. Administration and Organisation
- I. Morale and Amenities
- K. Medical

Information:

- Flag Officer First Flotilla
- Flag Officer Second Flotilla
- Naval Historical Branch

ANNEX A TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

WARFARE SUMMARY

1. summary of major warfare matters follows.

1. Detailed comments have been submitted in the Formex 100 forwarded to the Fleet Operational Evaluation Group, with copies to FOF1, FOF2 and FOST. Separate reports on Air operational and engineering aspects have been forwarded to FOF3.

a. The initial assessment of Argentinian intelligence and intentions was heavily biased towards the surface threat and underestimated the Argentinian Air Force. Ships were generally ill-prepared for low level air attack particularly by AM39.

b. The Harrier was disappointing in its primary role of 'hack the shad'. The inadequate performance of Blue Fox, lack of an all weather medium range Air to Air missile and limited range and endurance raise doubts over the Harrier capability against the Soviet Bear. The achievements of Harrier maintainers and pilots deserve the highest praise.

c. Most successful Argentinian attacks took place on ships whose CAP was late arriving on recently RTB without relief. In a threat area CAP must be relieved on task.

d. Close range weaponry must not be assumed to be an effective counter to the missile, in particular the sea skimmer, for which dedicated, probably missile firing, self-defence systems are essential.

e. There is a requirement for an emergency unpowered shipborne weapons system.

f. The lack of warning against Exocet attack demonstrated the vital need for organic fleet airborne early warning. The ESM fitted Lynx was not effective in this role in the radar environment experienced. The initial disregard for I Band silence degraded group E1 capability to provide warning and information. The speed of events during Exocet attack emphasised the requirement for fully automatic systems to ensure survivability. For example UAA warners provided some warning whereas UAB/9 and SARIB equipment were too slow and therefore inadequate.

g. The inaccuracy of intelligence on radar parameters severely restricted ESM correlation and re-affirmed the importance of this aid for early warning and picture compilation.

h. The avoidance of Blue on Blue was due primarily to the accuracy and trustworthiness of Link 10. More practice is needed in helicopter and weapon integration. Operations' appreciation of helicopter movements was poor even in an uncluttered area.

The fitting of SATNAV considerably enhanced the ships navigational and warfare capability by improving Link, night NCS, OHT and group Eacon

l. OHT continues to cause considerable problems and a better method must be evaluated and adopted if SAG success is to be achieved. Plan Whippet is one such improved method and may be worth including FOTI. It is still not clear whether over the horizon firing will be successful.

k. The Mortar Mark 10 (170 and 162) is the only truly effective shallow water weapons system. Consideration must be given to introducing a larger depth charge with a variable depth setting if it is to be successfully used in the shallow water environment.

l. The use of HF provided the enemy with continuous and tactical information. It is vital that UHF link be progressed and use of a VHF or satellite link be investigated.

m. Comsec was poor throughout. Surprise was lost on a number of occasions when operations passed vital information on uncovered circuits.

n. Secure speech fits must be improved. An enemy with COMINT facilities gains immense tactical advantages by listening to uncovered circuits.

o. Surface ship broadcast vetting must be introduced. Broadcast overloading was severe in the early stages of Corporate.

p. The reliability of SCOT equipment was most impressive.

AIRCRAFT OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURESa. Aircraft Operations General

1. To meet operational and tactical requirements flying and maintenance procedures needed much flexibility and sometimes did not meet normal, acceptable peacetime standards. In this instance care and commonsense had to replace book procedures. An understanding of safety rules allied to normal training standards provided a good base from which to modify procedure however the value of good pilot experience can not be understated.
2. Only those points confined to non-tactical aspects of aircraft operation are covered in this report. Tactical aspects are covered elsewhere.

b. Flight Deck Operations in HMS GLAMORGAN

1. In preparation for heavy weather moves a steel hawser was rigged through flight deck ringbolts. This allowed for a check lashing to be instantly applied with no fumbling. The hawser was not used for normal lashing of the aircraft however it proved a good additional safety feature.
2. Ship movement in roll and pitch was sometimes outside proscribed limits. Take-offs and landings had to be negotiated with care and when the ship was at its most stable point. Slick work by the flight deck team was most important.
3. Although not allowed in the SHOL off centre-line landings had to be accepted at times.
4. Sea King helicopters were landed on 45° cross-deck nose to port. These operations usually involved large passenger transfers and, in the final instance, casualty evacuation. Landings were easily undertaken and proved safe enough in calm conditions with small deck movement but would be more hazardous with a sea running. Refuelling of Seakings is quite possible from a DLG deck.
5. On occasion two Wessex were operated from GLAMORGAN (WX3 and a WX5). This proved feasible for a short period; needed little back up and gave the ship enhanced operational capability. The following points are applicable:

- a. One aircraft has to remain on deck despite inclement weather. (Corrosion factor).
  - b. Deck shuffles can only be accomplished by launching one of the aircraft.
  - c. In the absence of a spare deck HIFR equipment is required for the Wessex 3. (Safety consideration).
  - d. A Wessex 5 with weapons platform fitted can only be manoeuvred into the wharves with difficulty and then only by going tail first.
  - e. Slick deck operations are essential.
6. Deck operations under darken ship conditions required great care. The use of minimum lighting for movement and shielded torches for maintenance meant that supervisory checks had to be absolutely scrupulous in execution.

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7. The two large Fairleads/Fire hydrants and Stop/Go lights positioned at the centre of each side of the Flight Deck are badly placed. They inhibit unusual deck operations in an emergency and in the event of a large flight deck fire the hydrants would be unusable.
8. The requirement to keep fully-prepped ready-use torpedoes and depth charges in the flight deck area when under threat from cannon and machine-gun firing aircraft poses a particular hazard to both flight deck crew and ship. (A DC Mk II exploded on board HMS PLYMOUTH). Consideration should be given to providing an Armoured stowage or Barrier in flight deck areas.
9. Vertrep Operations - A ship allocation of 2 Cargo Nets proved insufficient. At least 4 nets and a palletrolly were found to be needed to ensure speedy and efficient vertrep. Night vertrep frequently had to be undertaken and sometimes single pilot night vertrep. The conditions for night vertrep given in ATP 16A Art. 990 could not always be observed. (D/DNAW/2/74/119(436) dated 10 February 1981 refers).

10. The manning of Flight Deck areas at Action Stations requires careful consideration. It is thought inadvisable to have all of the flight deck crew and maintenance expertise concentrated in one area. Where aircraft operation allows the maintenance team should be split into two parties balanced by trade. One party should man the flight deck and hangar (supplemented by SMAC 233) and the remainder should be stationed in a back up area. From experience the principle of 'not putting all ones eggs in a single basket' applies. Finally, unserviceable aircraft should be de-fuelled before stowage in the hangar. This will greatly reduce the hazard from fire should the hangar be hit.

#### Aircraft Maintenance Procedures

1. The full wartime servicing schedules were never fully tested in this unit. The aircraft was maintained using the second schedule during the latter stages of CORPORATE; this appeared to raise no problems apart from building up a large number of Part 3 entries in the MOD Form 700.
2. The requirement for the aircraft to be at short notice deck alert (Chaff layer or anti-oxocet role) during daylight hours often inhibited execution of certain flexops; these were deferred and undertaken at the first convenient opportunity.
3. Night servicing during darken ship proved difficult and had to be carried out in dim red lighting. The hangar could not in any sense be made light-proof. (This must be an important consideration for future modification/construction).
4. Flexops requiring test transmissions can be completely inhibited by a restrictive comcon.
5. Second line avionic servicing facilities were vital to the continued operation of the Wessex 3 in ASW role. Continued unserviceability of Sonar and Doppler equipment exhausted spare black boxes very quickly.
6. Owing to the requirement to eject considerable quantities of Chaff/Hotel out of the aircraft PX 24 treatment was kept to a minimum to prevent contamination of the aircraft - this is detrimental to corrosion avoidance. (Proper chaff dispensing pipes/equipment is required).

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d. Main Rotor Blade erosion and leading edge damage

Rotor blades requiring replacing were changed at Ascension Island when the ship was south-bound. Thus all blades were in good condition at the start of the operation. Small sections of leading edge strip did subsequently become damaged and repair patches were applied. The life of repair patches was usually short thus maintenance of the blades became a continuing task. No erosion of leading edge metal was evident.

e. Aircraft equipment performance and reliability

In general throughout CORPORATE the Airframe and Engine maintained a high level of serviceability. Aircraft avionics accounted for almost all reliability problems. Sonar and Doppler and to a lesser extent Radar were bedevilled by unserviceability. The aircraft went U/S for task on 11 separate occasions and achieved 72% of assigned ASW tasking albeit subject to almost continuous box changing. (April/May assigned 109.00 ASW hours; achieved 77.55). Poor avionic performance probably resulted from a combination of equipment failure and environmental factors.

f. Environmental Problems

1. Wessex 3 aircraft leak badly thus rain in even moderate amounts penetrates the systems - we had some very heavy rain.

2. The requirement to leave the aircraft on deck for long periods (eg anti-exocet role) in inclement conditions contributed to the onset of much corrosion (particularly bad in tail area) and allowed dampness in the electrics which may have been a contributory factor in our avionic unserviceability. It must be accepted that in war aircraft can not always be put in the hanger when conditions are poor; particularly in a DLG with its cumbersome ranging procedure.

3. Chaff Hotel - during one chaff dispensing run approximately half a full skillet was accidentally dispersed within the aircraft. (Chaff type was of aluminiumised fibreglass). The contaminated aircraft was immediately landed and cleaned. Despite the use of a vacuum cleaner and dusting much of the contamination had 'stuck' to oily patches on the internal airframe; this proved impossible to dislodge. Excess contamination was 'neutralised' by wiping over difficult areas with a heavy concentration of PX 24. Apart from human health hazard, through inhalation, some of the Chaff was almost certainly drawn into electrical equipment and possibly through conduction in circuitry caused electronic problems. (Chaff dispensing system however simple is required).

g. Battle Damage Repair

1. The EDR Book produced was considered to be good and helpful by GLAMORGAN SMR.

2. The aircraft suffered no battle damage until its complete destruction by enemy action on 12 June 1982.

h. Logistic Support

Overall logistic support was good. Requests for stores from the UK were met in a very short period of time and delivered by airdrop. Much reliance was placed upon by both HERMES and INVINCIBLE in order to keep us serviceable. Turn round on unserviceable equipment from both ships was very good and much appreciated. Although stores at RN Air Stations are tested periodically for serviceability replacement items onboard are not; thus such equipment was fitted only to be later proven unserviceable after the aircraft had become airborne.

APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX AMETOC

1. Briefing volumes at the start of the Operation were Phillips School files and the Pilot. Cincfleetwooc's briefing docket arrived at the earliest opportunity. Metoc Signal traffic was spasmodic throughout the Operation, due no doubt to its precedence and the large number of groups and hence, air time, involved.
2. During the Ascension - Falklands transit the only information received was Synops. Forecasts for the Falklands were available from two sources but only after a great deal of "prodding"; Analysis was difficult with Synops only.
3. Too much information was provided "in area". Canals were only received every now, and again due, presumably, to having been vetted off to broadcast? In the early stages, no upper air information was available so PALMET "guesstimates" were necessary. Mufax reception was possible from Buenos Aires until it was censored off by the Argentinians (UK weather only was available on the Northwood frequency!)

## Conclusions:-

1. Shorter, more regular metoc info is needed en route and in area.
2. More equipment. (Balloons, oceanographic forecasting tapes for the ships computer, SATFAX, etc.?)
3. More background briefing material for all parts of the world.
4. The Met Officer was frequently made to feel inadequate and embarrassed by lack of available info!

ANNEX B TO  
GLANMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

AMMUNITION

1. Practice ammunition was exchanged with homeoons, 22 seacat missiles were embarked and virtually all magazines and ready use stowages were filled.
2. To reduce the likelihood of secondary damage from the initiation of immediate ready use helicopter ASW weapons it is proposed that there should be a protected RU storage for them in the vicinity of the hangar.
3. The absence of any replenishment for Seaslugs could have been embarrassing, even if Vertrep or a crane at a sheltered anchorage were the only methods of transfer. In the event there were no Seaslugs crates in the force, it was impossible to remove the non-operational missiles (1 Tele, 2 Drill, 1 Test) and flexibility in missile movement, all important for safety, was restricted.
4. Storage of extra food stocks in the large spare space in the Seacat Main Magazine was authorised on board and no hazardous items were stowed there. However, pumping out of the compartment, if flooded, could well have been hampered by disintegrated packaging. Mesh caged stowages should be provided for such additional stowage.
5. In the extreme weather conditions encountered, high winds caused splitting of Seacat missile sheaths, near the base and adjacent to the wing reinforced guards, permitting the ingress of moisture. Spare sheaths were used to replace those damaged and dessicants were changed but in some circumstances it was necessary to effect a complete drying out by placing the affected missiles in the RU magazine for several days. An S2022(EW) is being forwarded.
6. The shortage of Bin rockets was well known to all throughout Corporate. No ammunition resupply problems were encountered.

ANNEX C TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

## WEAPON ENGINEERING

### 1. Preparations

At the start of Corporate all equipments were at a high state of preparedness and there were no category E4 Opdefs. All preparations were therefore limited to cold/rough weather preps., which were completed without difficulty on passage to the IZ.

### 2. Personnel

It was well appreciated, before the conflict that the "one-off" maintenance should remain a "on-call" worker but after a few weeks of high equipment usage it became obvious that there was a requirement for experienced Senior Ratings to be available in every system day or night. Accordingly, extra Senior Ratings reverted to "on call" stakes to provide this coverage. Similarly, with two section officers working watch about as CNS2 Missile Director, it was found advisable to have one only of the four remaining WEO's on watch leaving time for the others to control weapon repair party activities. The net result was a considerable dilution of the original on-watch numbers, leaving more expertise from all deep specialisations for trouble shooting and repair at any time.

### 3. Equipment

With a very few exceptions, equipment availability proved to be very high indeed, despite amazingly high utilisation. CNS2, for example, remained on throughout the conflict and was subjected to 30 times its normal use; it was therefore necessary to reappraise the periodicity of certain planned maintenance items. In general, ARM improved with time as equipments were left on and appeared to 'settle'; 184 sonar proved particularly dependable.

4. PSLs were carried out regularly when requirements permitted. Pre-planned maintenance opportunities, during low-threat periods overnight, were often thwarted by changes in tasking. It was therefore necessary to carry out some maintenance on an 'ad hoc' basis during the relatively low-threat periods and as a result some less important planned maintenance was foregone.

5. Defects were varied in extent and occurrence but the 992 radar proved to be the most unreliable piece of equipment on board. Virtually no EHT spares are held for 992 and problems in this area eventually resulted in the non-availability of the set. A combination of poor weather conditions, operational notice and 5 hours of darkness, very often complicated equipment repair.

6. It was noticeable that several ships experienced problems when setting to work Hector and this was because they were not in receipt of the ASWE installation instructions. Assistance was given.

### 7. Weapon Repairs

No problems were encountered throughout Corporate or immediately following the action damage in particular. Shock effect in the Seaslug magazine caused two spray main connections to part and the subsequent severe flooding was handled well. In the long term repair of the action damage/ full use was made of a prepared list of all cables held on board.

MARINE ENGINEERING1. Hull

The heavy and almost continuous rough weather highlighted three hull weaknesses in particular.

a. The unpreserved parts of the upperdeck which quickly left great rust streaks on their adjacent areas. Typically, the areas behind mounting plates, behind and inside cable guards, and sittings which are probably painted on build but never again; these areas need careful attention particularly during half life repaints to prevent nugatory work on surrounding paint work thereafter.

b. Hull cracks in the known class weak area inevitably appeared.

c. It was evident in many older ships including GLAMORGAN that the weather removed large areas of grey top and undercoats exposing in all cases the original red lead priming coats. Whilst accepting that paint application methods, conditions are often to blame, it does appear that the bond between the priming and undercoat is weak and may merit research into an improve paint scheme for future use.

2. Main Propulsion

Proved remarkably reliable during the period particularly considering that by the beginning of the period under report, main steam had already been raised for a total of 53 days with only a 6 day break for SMP from 9 - 15 March. Both boilers reached 2100 steaming hours by 20 May and exceeded 3000 hours on 1 July. Nevertheless the boilers only had to be shut down for five periods all of under 24 hours to rectify essential steam leaks and guage glass defects. By the time of arrival in Portsmouth steam had been raised for a futher 120 days, continuously.

Boost drive at near full power was used on many occasions to proceed to and from NGS operations under the cover of darkness. This again proved most reliable and gave the watchkeepers great confidence in the whole propulsion plant.

The failure of the Port shaft after cooper roller bearing was inevitable. It was a known weakness which had been included on the postponed DED defect list. It was satisfactorily replaced by ships staff in extremely adverse sea condition within 48 hours.

3. Personnel

The defence watch organisation, which establish two seperate parties, a MBOCD patrol and reporting under HQ1 and maintenance team under the off-watch EOW proved most effective with the later carrying out continuous minor maintenance.

The performance of the first sea draft MEMs, following the exocet attack, was outstanding and their courage, good ship and system knowledge was a significant factor in saving the ship. But for operation forty one of them should have already been replaced; it was fortunate for the ship that they had not, and the sooner the MEMs first sea draft can be brought into line with those of other branches, the better.

4. The ME(L) department worked for ten very long days making safe hundreds of damaged electrical runs and effecting numerous temporary repairs following the action damage. This proved to be a feat of the highest professional standards and perseverance.

SUPPLY & SECRETARIAT

1. No major problems occurred within the Supply Department during Corporate and with the adjustments that were implemented, the support function could have continued for some months. Specific comments follow:-

2. Pay & Cash

Arrangements were made with Nelson to pay the ships company for May and June. The ship supplied revised drawing rates (by signal) after the pay rise and no major problems occurred. The £55,000 in cash onboard at the outset circulated within the ship and was adequate for all needs.

3. Catering

In common with others, shortages of fresh vegetables, yeast, eggs, breadmaking flour were felt from time to time - but were no more than temporary minor inconveniences. The GM balance increased by about £30 a day for two factors

- a. Increased allowances due to Zone D, Defence Watches and BR5 Art 2226
- b. Decreased consumption due to portion control and stock conservation measures.

The ships endurance was increased to the following limits:

- a. Dry - 80 days (using deep Seacat magazine as overflow storage).
- b. Frozen - 60 days
- c. Potatoes - 40 days (Using flats adjacent to the galley as overflow storage)

A further 14 days dry provisions were distributed about the ship for emergency use.

4. In defence watches, the wardroom galley was shut down, the officers eating aft in the SRDH. This worked well, enabling the cooks to work 24 hours about in two watches, and making it simpler to secure for action stations in an emergency. Action Messing was not required; meals were delayed when the ship was at 1Z until the threat reduced; the meal was then produced and eaten as soon as possible. Quarters action snacks were distributed during longer periods at action stations.

5. Cookery

Producing meals during two months of defence watches was straight forward; menus being adjusted as ingredients became available. The ships company (500) were fed from the Wardroom Galley entirely whilst temporary repairs to the damaged main galley were made. The resourcefulness of the chefs in providing varied menus despite this severe handicap and having lost four of their number was remarkable and a considerable achievement which underlines the very high quality of this sub branch.

6. NAAFI

Both the Canteen and GM suffered from a lack of resupply stocks. Non-service dry and frozen items were limited and the nutty famine in the Canteen was common to all ships; beer stocks, both keg and can were adequate.

7. Naval Stores8. Matconoff

Initially 52% availability was achieved during the Gibraltar - Ascension Southbound leg when GLAMORGAN was MATCONOFF. Delivery of available items became proportionately more difficult as the number of ships increased and they became spread out in AOA/TA/TE2/TRALA/SG areas. Notwithstanding, the system worked well.

9. UK Resupply

The CONDOR and colour code system seemed successful. Keeping trace of vital spares was always eased when depot package numbers were quoted with Airway Belt Numbers. It is essential these two numbers are always quoted on stores related signals, particularly the Airdrop manifests. Inevitably delays occurred in distributing airdropped items to ultimate destination and in some cases items dropped did not tally with those expected.

10. Routine Demands

Routine GNS demands on RFAs achieved a generally low availability; perhaps we were demanding the wrong items! Clothing - particularly cotton overalls and anti-flash was difficult to replace. GLAMORGAN was at a disadvantage having not been able to top up with GNS and clothing in the UK.

11. General Issues to Ships

When some new issue is made, eg ICABAs, Overalls, Extra Anti-Flash, Air Letter forms, they should be allocated and despatched as separate deliveries to each ship concerned. The CTG does not have the information or resources to start sharing them out. Only in the case of ICABA did this system work properly.

ANNEX F TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

NCD

1. The following points are raised consequent upon the damage control measures exercised on 12 June and as a result of experience gained throughout Operation Corporate.

a. Escape Hatches

1. Should be large enough for a man in fearnought and ICABA expansion to pass through easily.
2. Should be openable from both sides.
3. Should have a distinctive AEL very near them (green shaded?)

b. Hoses

Plastic female connections came apart or leaked very frequently. We believed they had all been landed inaw general signals/Phoenix pamphlets.

c. Main Broadcast

Floating battery power for the main broadcast amplifier should be considered.

d. Respirators

1. Their use and limitations in smoke should be taught. One life was saved quite miraculously. Include on respirator instructions.

e. ICABA

1. Outfits should be increased by 50% to cover likely non-availability of HP air.
2. To reduce the likelihood of compressor intake being smoke laden the compressors should draw suction from a variety of filtered upper deck points outside the citadel (which may well be smoke laden).
3. Icaba charging points should be closer to HP air reservoirs to improve likelihood that recharging will be possible after damage/smoke.
4. In many noisy areas, where the whistle was not likely to be heard, 2nd Equilisation method of use would have been ideal but was not likely known.
5. Two sets of Aquarius were placed under the compass platform as a war preparation. One was used in the hangar fire, but both would have proved very useful had there been a fire in the cabin flat. Application to all ships is don't forget the diving sets for firefighting. The shortage of BA was experienced in every ship that was hit.
6. Divers as firefighters. Because they are used to zero visibility and to working in a hostile environment, qualified divers were noticeably more mentally equipped to tackle fires. Consideration should be given to giving divers extra firefighting training so that your BA experts are also your fire experts.

f. Formica

1. All formica fitted should be backed.
2. All unbacked formica should be removed and replaced by backed or sandwiched material.

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h. Smoke

Long expanses of passage way should be broken up by screens or smoke doors.

i. 2 Gallon AFFF extinguisher stowages should be shock proof . ie fitted with closed handle hook or strap.

j. Exercises

NBCD in darkness is quite different. It is recommended that, in future, a proportion of ships exercises should be conducted at night and/or with nil lighting inboard.

k. Pumps

1. All ships should have some independently powered portable pumps for use inside the ship when electrical power has failed.
2. Starters for portable electrical pumps should be usable on all types of pumps. Connection points should be higher above deck level to keep clear of a flood, and also fitted more widely on 1 Deck.
3. The discharge on portable pumps should be angled in a different direction from the suction.
4. A fixed Rover G.T. pump suction pipe should be provided on the quarterdeck so that the pump can be rigged quickly to provide FM while the ship is underway.
5. High capacity bilge suction are required in the main machinery spaces. eg internal suction on Main Circs, STAs and FM pps.

l. DC Conditions

Subdivision, particularly in condition Z, should prevent the spread of damage laterally or fore and aft but should allow upwards venting. Wider use of '2 Clips Venting' (on the hinge side) might be useful.

m. Anti-Flash Gear

1. Larger stocks should be carried to allow for wear.
2. Laundering and reproofing on board should be made possible.
3. A visor or goggles should be considered, to cover the existing eye gap.
4. Anti-flash puttees to cover the shoe/overall gap may be worth considering.

n. AMD

1. Cotton material for No8s and overalls should be re-introduced.
2. Overalls should be made for issue over No8s as AMD.
3. Heavy 100% wool socks available to all.

o. Firefighting Training

1. Throughput at Horsea must be increased to allow ships to reduce backlog of uncompleted PJTs quickly.
2. Casualties. When exercising damage control a realistic casualty toll should be exercised. It is often necessary for improvised teams to tackle damage..

p. Communications in Damage Control. After damage, young Officers should be sent to the scene to find out first hand what is going on and what is needed, and then make a personnel report to the command. I

It is vital that the Command should know the exact situation. In GLANMORGAN upperdeck crews were reluctant to badger the Command for more assistance because, a) They believed the Command already knew the extent of the upper deck problem. b) The upperdeck crews were in total ignorance of the seriousness of the situation below.

G. Door Clips

Peacetime maintenance standards were inadequate. Little used clips are often too stiff or poorly fitting. During extended periods of condition Y or Z regular attention is needed to frequently used clips to ensure correct adjustment and take up wear.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - EXOCET INCIDENT 12 JUNE 1982EVENTTIME

- 112330 Ship at Action Stations. Closing F.I. for NGS.
- 120616 Completed NGS CO 150 Sp 26.
- 120625 Reverted to 1Y.
- 120630 Reverted to 2Y.
- 0635 First closing contact on radar 12NM.
- 0636 Port Sencat stood to. Underwheel to STBD AFG 180. 8NM assessed Exocet.
- 0636 $\frac{1}{2}$  Sencat fired at missile. Range 2000X. Overshot.
- 0637 Hit by missile. CO 150 Sp26 steam and gas boost. Hands to Action Stations. All fire PPS on. Firemain isolated at 84 and 128 stations. Lighting failure Portside Aft. L2 diesel stopped by blast down vent trunking. Fireball in GER 5L. Vent crash stopped. Port Sencat launcher dislodged from deck mounting. G6's still running. Reduced speed 12Knots. Ship apparently hit by missile Port Aft on Flight Deck by hangar.
- 0638 Helo fuel in APC explodes, throwing hangar doors overboard and Port Sencat launcher with three missiles into FD nets. First reports to HQ of fire in hangar, fire in Crews Galley 1M. Fire in gas turbineroom 5L.
- 0639 Ordered spraying of hangar, OIK - 20 generator compartment and ditching of Port petrol stowage. G6's shut down.
- 0640 Power failure M2 breaker room reported. Preparing to steam drench G.T.R. Search team in BA discover no fire. Dense smoke and splinter damage to GER air intakes. Steam drench preps aborted. Ceased putting AFFF down GER foam tubes.
- 0644 Hangar spray turned on. Unknown at time but main covered and providing very effective spray and cooling of deck.
- 0645 F Fighters entered galley area. No fire. Dense smoke and steam. Report of several casualties and bodies.
- 0646 Report from SQP of flooding in Seaslug main mag. 2L0 and Seaslug RU mag and transfer space, 2N0. Movement of missiles in main mag no longer possible. Depth of water 2'6" - caused by 2 joints in firemain splitting. Attempting to open drains.
- 0647 901 Director unservicable.
- 0648 Report from midships S.B. fire in hangar being fought from Port waist by 3 BA teams. Attempting to contain fire to hangar area and enter hangar to reach hangar offices where FD crew suspected trapped. Boundary cooling in OIK20 (fixed spray) generator space. Hangar fire also being fought by hose through open escape hatch into lower office.
- 0649 2 Seaslug fired to clear barrels.

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- 0650 Boundary cooling hangar roof. Danger from helicopter technicians and small arms ammunition still in a/c in hangar. Boundary cooling on all sides of fire.
- 0652 Firemain isolated in Seaslug mag 2L0. Depth of water 3'. Ordered portable pumps to 2M2.
- 0655 Report from Aft S.B. of free surface in 1M2 and crews galley. Firemain isolated Portside Aft section. 128 section. Pump rigged. Dwarf bulkhead in galley area. Water draining down through damaged deck into 2M2 breaker room.
- 0657 Speed 18 knots.
- 0700 HP air contaminated with smoke drawn in from 2L1 passage. Recharging of ICABA facility lost.
- 0704 List 5 1/2° Port.
- 0705 Report of free surface water in 2M2 passage. 3' deep. Water coming through holes in 2M2 breaker room deckhead. Water spread to 2P2 and 2L2 when doors opened. Pumps being rigged.
- 0708 Report of smoke and steam cleared from galley area. Several holes in deck. Mass of wreckage and at least two bodies. Pumping out 1M2 and allowing draining down into 2M2. Large quantities of water still coming down into galley through 10' x 5' hole in deckhead.
- 0709 Report of smoke in OIK 20 generator space. Aft bulkhead buckled at deckhead level. Allowing smoke and flames to enter. Space still being sprayed. Water draining into GTR 5L.
- 0715 Report from SQP. Drains open in main mag and transfer space. Draining down to GTR 5L and 6PZ Seaslug PP room respectively.
- 0718 List 7° to Port.
- 0720 Fire in hangar contained. Entry to hangar possible attempting to reach hangar office.
- 0722 Hangar spray turned off (no effect due to fractured main and melted pipework). Fire in Fwd end hangar.
- 0728 Commenced pumping out in 2P2 passage.
- 0730 Smoke in GWS 22TS 1L. Heat transmitted through deck. Cables smouldering and dense acrid smoke in whole compartment. No fire. Boundary cooling still taking place.
- 0732 List 8 1/2° to Port . E.
- 0735 GTR bilges topping up. Extra PP to GTR. Draining down from OIK generator space and Seaslug main mag. Eductors 75T/HR unable to cope.
- 0740 Hangar firemain isolated.
- 0758 P List 11° to Port. No 3 water ballast tank flooded. (75T). Pumping out 2M2 and 2L2 passageways. Water still draining down from hangar.
- 0800 3 x ICABA sets from YARMOUTH. (VERTREP).
- 0803 Men enter hangar. Dense white smoke.
- 0805 List reducing 8° 3 x ICABA sets from YARMOUTH (VERTREP)

- 0811 List reduced 5° Port.
- 0812 Fire reported in hangar upper office.
- 0822 SQP report flood down to 3" in main mag. Fire in hangar out. Regrouping. Fires still in hangar offices. Fresh water main burst. Hydraulics burst in hangar. Isolating hydraulics aft.
- 0826 Report of 8 bodies in upper office. Still fighting fire in office.
- 0831 2L2, 2M2, 2P2 passages pumped out list 4° Port. HP air restored. Charging panels operative.
- 0835 Fire out of control hangar office. 3° List Port.
- 0840 Possible fire in vent supply trunking to galley. List 1½°.
- 0845 Increased speed 21 Knots.
- 0846 Report of flood in 4M2 Seacat mag. Bilges topping up through inter-connecting drains to A/C drain tank 6N2.
- 0850 Report of water rising in 6PZ Seaslug pump room and 6PA1 pump bilges. Draining down from transfer space.
- 0851 1 person alive in hangar office. Trapped by legs. Given morphine. Fire still in upper office. Casualty in lower office.
- 0904 Fire reported in 901 Director. J.B. lobby. (Cables).
- 0905 Increased speed 23 Knots.
- 0910 Trapped man wearing respirator freed from hangar office.
- 0917 End of 'J' section condition Yankee. Holes punched in hangar roof deck. Fighting fire from above.
- 0940 Fire in galley exhaust trunking.
- 0950 Fires extinguished in trunking.
- 0957 6PA1 and 6P2 spaces pumped out.
- 1054 All fires reported out. Damping down in hangar and offices. Recovering bodies. Ceased boundary cooling.
- 1158 Sunrise.

ANNEX G TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

REPLENISHMENT AT SEA

1. HDS

a. Ships Internal Organisation.

1. Labelling must be ultra-clear, suggest special labels.
2. Ships must set up an organisation in which holds all outbound material and gets incoming material to the right person. Never were the present shortcomings more evident than when dealing with air drop stores.

b. Group Organisation.

A very tight organisation involving signalling items daily may appear superfluous: it is not. A subsequent battling order signal is also necessary. Mixing Vertrep and HDS does not work.

2. Vertrep

a. All ships should be issued with one palatrolley to clear loads quickly and move stores about the upper deck.

b. All ships should be issued with 4 cargo nets. Nets should be adjusted back to this figure after vertreps.

3. Airdrops

a. Helic lifting of loads after engagement of the hook by a Gemini is by far the most efficient method. Other methods should be fall backs.

b. Parachutes. Automatically(?) releasing parachutes were too unreliable. However, a manual release, with a trip hook operated by a lanyard or water drague would be useful. All parachutes should be expendable and slightly weighted to sink.

4. Despatch Vessels

These, as distinct from bulk supply ships, should be routed directly to and from destinations. They seemed to have too many stops, which would perhaps have been avoided by operating alternate routes ASI - TEZ - BG - ASI and ASI - BG - TEZ - ASI.

5. RAS

a. RAS(L)

1. Probe. Self tensioning winches did not seem to work well which led to wear/parting of the jackstay, and relegated this to a fair weather method.

2. QRC. Very reliable and preferred rough weather rig. APPLELEAF fitted with longer than standard ring which will not accept standard pelican hook.

**RESTRICTED**5. RAS(B)

1. Self-tensioning winches again unreliable.
2. Rigs in FORTs slow and unreliable. Load handling on deck seemed disorganised.
3. Old fashioned rig in REGENT/RESOURCE worked in the worst conditions experienced, when the limiting factor was moving loads on deck in heavy seaway.

## 6. General

1. RFA crews performed well.
2. RAS telephones. There were notoriously unreliable and it is believed that the wiring diagram used and marking of cables need to be standardised.

6. RAS(A)

At times there was concern owing to lack of stocks of 3" Rockets and 4.5" MK6 ammunition in the Task Group. Otherwise no problems but see Annex B.

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ANNEX H TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

## ADMINISTRATION & ORGANISATION

### 1. Defence Watches

The ship was in Defence Watches (4,4,4,6,6) for two months and this proved satisfactory. The timing of watch changes was adjusted as necessary when Action Stations interfered with meal times or changeovers. Some flexibility was also used when known periods at Action Stations would have affected the sleep of the two watches unevenly. The main difficulty was the tiredness which built up when long periods of Action Stations were superimposed on Defence Watches. Everyone was encouraged to sleep as much as possible and disturbance minimised. Evolutions such as major RAS(A) and (S) were carried out with only defence watch daywork personnel mostly in very poor weather.

### 2. Complement

The Complement borne proved adequate to the War Task. The reductions envisaged in recent amendments, when implemented, will cause difficulties notably for the ME department in Defence Watches.

In view of the commitments normally imposed upon a DLG, four LRO's(G) are essential. Operation Corporate was no exception, and GLAMORGAN was fortunate in having an acting LRO capable of fitting the billet left by ERS dilution. Having only 3 LRO's would have caused a serious loss in operational conditions, where a very high loading is unavoidable and a high standard expected.

### 3. Casualty Reporting

- a. If, in future, at war, CINCFLEET is to be only addressee in UK, QRS should be amended and show simplified war routine (not all paras of peace time required).
- b. Meaning of "missing, presumed killed" to be clarified.
- c. Requirement for SOB list to be distributed throughout ship, giving all information required by casualty reporting system, to be specified in QRS.

### 4. Tonedown

- a. Ship's fittings that cannot easily be painted out should take more account of tonedown (eg SCOT aerials).
- b. No other "austere measures" should be implemented till action is imminent.

### 5. War Orders

The ships War Orders were in general satisfactory. Actions required by the whole Ship's Company were publicised by temporary memoranda. Those together with some updating, based on recent experience, should be included in an amendment to the War Orders.

6. Lifesaving Equipments

- a. Scrambling nets should be standard fittings in all ships. (Not carried in DLG's).
- b. Once-only suits were inspected on issue and found, in many cases, to have leg-ties and neck openings secured; this dangerous practice at the manufacture/packing stage must be discontinued.
- c. RFA's should carry once only suits in peace time.

ANNEX J TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

## MORALE & AMENITIES

### 1. Morale

As stated in the Catering Report, the morale of the ships company remained very high for the majority of the period. There were no cases of indiscipline throughout Operation Corporate.

### 2. Religious Attitudes

The Chaplain reported a marked increase in Church attendance and the way in which he was received in his daily impanderings.

### 3. Families

I recognised very early in the Operation that the organisation for dissemination of information to families would be critical to their morale and, indirectly, the morale of the Ships Company. We therefore instituted a "wives grapevine" by distributing the numbers of most telephone subscribers onboard. This "dial a friend" concept snowballed with quite a slick countryside organisation!

Ship's news sheets were distributed by the wives and NPPS organisation to all families at least once per fortnight and these helped to fill in the inevitable mail gap.

### 4. Family News

A fortnightly service, in the blank modgram weeks, is essential.

### 5. MODMAIL

It should be made clear that shipgrams from families will never be possible in wartime. Communications facilities and routing should be arranged so that free modgrams can be sent from ships every 14 days. It should be possible to keep messages off WARE to avoid congestion.

### 6. MAIL

- a. In general, a good service considering the problems involved but:-
- b. Airdropping of mail should be given more priority.
- c. Handling of mail in ships must be improved. Returned outgoing bags should never happen.

### 7. Unofficial Chinese

They perform a very useful service and we should make it clear that MOD accepts war liability cover. GLAMORGAN Chinese remained loyal to the end but only with some "persuasion"!

### 8. Canteen Staff

The final outcome was satisfactory but the initial signals caused some confusion. The three Staff were 'frustrated' by the poor NAAFI stores situation (Annex B) but remained totally loyal throughout.

8. Films.

Understandably, film transfer took a low priority. The film library, established rather late in Hermes, would have been better in an RFA.

Financially, films drained the resources of the Welfare Fund out of proportion to the recreational value gained and the entertainment provided by films was below the usual weak standard. An early introduction of official video films for the Fleet would provide a swift panacea for many of the present logistic and morale shortcomings.

9. PR

a. Vetting, clearance and dispatch by individual ships of press copy should be allowed to CINCPLENT to speed the news on the way. We had some very frustrated Pressmen embarked!

b. There were some bad lapses in vetting eg any mention of UXBs, forecasting of troop movements.

c. Confusion on pension rights caused concern for a time.

d. Declarations of ship losses/casualties. It took some time to establish the best routine; fortunately in time for GLAMORGAN's real damage but not two weeks before when she had been erroneously reported damaged and returning prematurely to the UK. This involved a very large number of nugatory phone calls by our families organisation to dispel the rumour.

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ANNEX K TO  
GLAMORGAN'S 226  
OF 12 JULY 82

MEDICAL

The general health of the Ship's Company on the way South was good, and remained so throughout the period in defence watches. The number of cases seen daily in the sick bay actually dropped in spite of 24 hours a day service. The only conditions to show an increased incident were fungal foot infections and headaches. Personal hygiene was maintained to a high standard.

The planned preparations and war supplement stores were largely adequate and well thought out, the main modification we made being to speed closing up to action stations. However, considerable First Aid teaching to First Aid Parties and the ship's company in general was found to be necessary. This reflects the low priority that this subject normally receives in peacetime. Some members of First Aid Parties joined without receiving any instruction. All stocks that should have been collected each time from the sick bay were left at First Aid Posts. The midships First Aid Party moved from No 4 PO's Mess to the wardroom to distance it from the forward First Aid Party. The medical staff were dispersed from the sick bay except for the M.O.

In action the team worked well and produced a good overall standard. The quality of care might have been improved by concentrating all the serious casualties in one place but this proved impossible. Likewise, although the assistance provided later in the day by INVINCIBLE and HERMES was invaluable, two casualties might have benefitted from hospital treatment earlier than 6½ hours after being injured. The lessons learned on the day have partly been incorporated in a revision of NBOC standing orders. A separate report on the shrapnel effect of unbacked laminates has been forwarded.

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At Sea.

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6 July 1982

The Flag Officer Third Flotilla,  
Fort Southwick,  
Portsmouth,  
Hants.

HMS GLAMORGAN FLIGHT - ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

Reference: FOP3 I9F/IAG/KAG 28I627Z JUN 82 (Call for Report)

1. The Report required by the Reference is enclosed in the Annexes to this letter.
2. This report does not include information previously rendered in GLAMORGAN'S 201 dated 30 Jun 82 (Formex IOO) or GLAMORGAN'S 201 dated 3 July 82 (Aircraft Operating and Maintenance Procedures).



*Barrow*  
ME BARROW  
Captain Royal Navy.

Information:

The Flag Officer Naval Air Command  
Commander-in-Chief Fleet (For FAWO)  
Commanding Officer RNAS Portland  
Commanding Officer 737 Naval Air Squadron.

TITLE OF CO.#

Annexes:

- A. Operation Corporate - Chronology
- B. Operation Corporate - Narrative
- C. Flight Statistics.
- D. Flight Nominal List and Casualties.
- E. Flight Support, Tasking, Personnel and Training.
- F. Operational Rules and Employment.

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HEG GLAMORGAN FLIGHT - OPERATION CORPORATE CHRONOLOGY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLYING UNDERTAKEN</u>	<u>NOTWORTHY EVENTS</u>
<u>APRIL</u>		
2	VERTREP -14.00 hrs 50 LOADS 22 TXFERS	Diverted south for CORPORATE.
4	VERTREP 1.40 12 LOADS	Embarked 'Flag' from ANTRIM
5	OTHT 3.50 VERTREP 0.35 2 LOADS	
6	OTHT 2.55 SOOTAX 0.55	
7	VERTREP 2.25	
8	OTHT 1.30 HDS 0.40	
9	HDS 0.35	
10	OTHT 1.40 HDS 1.30	Consolidation in Ascension Island Area
12	NGS 2.15	
13	TRIAL 1.10 MAINTENANCE ASC 1.10	
14	CTF 1.40	
15	.....	Transferred 'Flag' to HERMES
16	GPMG/CHAFF 0.40	
18	.....	Ordered to proceed South to Falklands Area.
20	SONAR CTF/JUMPEX 1.20	
21	GPMG/RMR/CHAFF 1.55	
22	TRIAL/ASW 1.30	23... Tail rotor vibration problem
23	ASW/SAR 6.40 CTF 0.20	Transit South to Falklands
25	ASW 2.45	
26	ASW 2.50 SONAR CTF 0.50	24 ... No Flying A/C U/S vibration problems 26/27.... Sonar faults
27	SONAR CTF 1.00	
28	SONAR CTF/ASW/SS 3.15	
29	ASW 3.50 S/SCH 1.20	
30	TXFER 0.20	30... Continuing sonar problems.
<u>MAY</u>		
01	TRANSIT 0.30 ASW 2.40	Day NGS/Aircraft fired upon by Cannon/(Tigercat). Attack by Mirage on Ships. ALAC LYNX Hit.

DATE

FLYING UNDERTAKER

NOTEWORTHY EVENTS

MAY

02	AIRCRAFT TURN	0.05	
03	ASW/SAR SRCH	4.40	General Belgrano sunk
04	ASW	2.55	Sheffield Hit/later sunk
05	ASW	1.10	Ship patrol in TEZ
06	ASW	3.05	
07	ASW	0.55	A/C U/S Sonar/Port Lateral Jack.
09	CTF	0.15	8...A/C U/S Awaiting Jack.
11	ASW	0.35	9...WARRHAL Captured/later sunk. A/C U/S broken fuel pipe.
14	ASW	3.10	...Pebble Island Raid
	HDS	2.45	II U/S on task - sonar/Rotor TRU
15	ASW	2.55	12 U/S too rough for Groundrun.
16	ASW	0.55	13 A/C 'S' - satisfactory groundrun. ... Operation TORNADO (Deception)
17	RECCE/SCRN	2.10	... Aircraft fired at by Machine Guns
	ASW CHECK	0.20	north of Lively Id.
	ASW	3.05	
18	ASW	3.00	18 Some Sonar/FCS problems
19	ASW	1.00	19 FCS/Radar Problems (Jamming??)
20	ASW	2.45	
21	ASW	5.20	→ INVASION DAY ARDENT sunk ARGONAUT/ANTRIM Hit.
22	ASW	3.35	... collected Exocet reflector from
	HDS	0.35	Invincible. fitted on 22 May.
23	ASW	3.30	23...A/C U/S pm Doppler/Sonar.
	CTF/DECOY	0.50	ANTELOPE Bombed
24	ASW	3.35	... SIR LANCELOT/GALAHAD Hit
	SONAR CTF	1.00	Sonar marginal -strip failures.
25	ASW/HDS	3.35	COVENTRY/ATLANTIC CONVEYOR Hit.
26	ASW	1.20	...Sonar not 100% effective.
	HDS	2.10	
27	HDS	2.15	...spent day hunting for sonar spares!
28	ASW	4.15	
29	ASW	1.20	A/C U/S MRGB input seal. 31 May Flight Commander became 'TRALA MANAGER'
JUN			
10	CTF	0.35	3 - 8 Wessex 5 (Resource) embarked
	AIRDROP PU	2.00	TRALA HDS duties.
11	HDS	1.20	
12	.....		{ Ship hit by Exocet 0637Z Aircraft destroyed 6 Flight Killed, 2 injured.
14	Embarked TIDEPOOL WX5		
	severely damaged in storm.		.. Argentinians surrender.
16	.....		
18	In PORT SAN CARLOS Water all day.		
19	In Berkley Sound near Stanley		
21	Detached from CVBG en-route Ascension Island and home.		

April commenced with GLAMORGAN still participating in Exercise SPRINGTRAIN II and looking ahead to Passex with both French and Portuguese Forces.

On 2 April the ship was diverted south with other units towards Ascension Island for what was to be the start of OPERATION CORPORATE and the Falklands War. Those units ex-SPRINGTRAIN who were to return northbound to the UK were divested of all excess stores and ammunition in a huge RAS and helo vertrep programme. 400 participated in this task and was flown without stop for 14 hours in the cargo role.

The passage south to Ascension took from 2 to 11 April and the period was used to make material preparations and to practice likely future tactics. Particular emphasis was laid upon surface scouting and OTHF procedures with the aim of agreeing a common tactic that had good chance of being successful. At this stage a surface to surface engagement between exocet firers seemed a high possibility. Much practice at surface search and probe flying was undertaken. Commonly day probe/search sorties were flown very low level (15 to 20 ft) and night sorties in good conditions at 50 feet. Zoom climbs were carried out to operate intermittent radar and to obtain good communication. Such cautious tactics it was later decided were not required for normal search however it all added up to very good practice for both 'front' and 'back' seat crew members. Previous OTHF methods were quickly evaluated and discarded as being unlikely to provide necessary accuracy and Plan WHIPPET (based upon method C2) was evolved. Although not perfect this plan was enforced to provide a common search/OTHF method and then practiced assiduously. During this time our aircrafts polished yellow and blue livery was altered to uniform blue with no markings and war roundels.

On 4 April POF I and his staff embarked from ANTRIM; GLAMORGAN became the Flagship for a while and the Admirals cabin for'd was converted into 'the War Room'. GLAMORGAN Flight Commander was seconded to the Staff as Acting SAVO.

The southbound group crossed the equator on 9 April and arrived at Ascension Island on 11 April. On arrival Wessex 5 and Seaking Mk 4 aircraft (flown to ASC and re-assembled) carried out HDS; 400 was utilized for SOOTAX. Thence followed a period of consolidation in the sun until 14 April. During this period NGS procedures were exercised and 400 undertook probe and Radar type 909 evasion practice against HMS GLASGOW. The HWR2 radar warner had been fitted in the aircraft (VHF radio also retained) and much useful practice was achieved with this during the evasion trial. It proved almost impossible to break lock with the 909 once it had locked on either by use of violent manoeuvre, use of hand thrown chaff or flight at very low level. Detection and lock-on ranges varied but they were greater than positive visual identification ranges. On the positive side the trial runs were flown in very calm sea conditions and the 'enemy' were alert to our approach direction. This small trial emphasised the need for a 'self-defensive package' for our probe aircraft. Good value was had from this training period but as the future progress of the war was to show our preoccupation with surface warfare was not needed.

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on 13 April 400 was flown to Ascension Island. The all four rotor blades were exchanged for new ones; the trip provided our first close up view of this volcanic pinnacle, of Wideawake airstrip and for some a welcome stretch of legs ashore. On 14 April the ship detached to rendezvous with the HERMES group proceeding south from the UK. On arrival HERMES presented a remarkable sight, loaded to the gunwales, here lay the key to success or failure of the whole operation! On 15 April POF I transferred his flag from GLAMORGAN to HERMES and thereby gained an enhanced staff with which to conduct operations over the coming weeks.

Our remaining time in the vicinity of Ascension Island involved the fitting of the GPMG mounting to our aircraft and subsequent air test firing; in addition practice Chaff hotel drops were undertaken and evaluated on the ships radar. Shore helicopters flew extremely heavy vertrep programmes to replenish the force and this continued until the order to move south towards the Falklands was given on 16 April.

At this point it was decided that 400 would be returned to the ASW role and by 20 April re-installation of the sonar equipment had been completed. Some ASW screening sorties were flown from 23 April however the sonar equipment never again functioned as reliably as before it was removed. In particular power supply and transmitter faults continued throughout CORPORATE; these were only allayed by continual changing of black boxes, by support from the carriers and by the continued hard work of Flight (R) ratings. At the end of the month 400 was flown to HERMES for second-line attention in order to attempt to cure the sonar faults.

During the night of 23 April at the end of an ASW sortie a red mini-flare was sighted. Its bearing was crossed with another from a ship and a rough position gained. The weather was appalling with driving rain and very low visibility however 400 came on top a ditched helicopter. Owing to a very low fuel state it was not possible to remain at the scene of SAR and on completion of fixing the position for HMS BRILLIANT 400 returned to GLAMORGAN. It transpired that the aircraft was a Seaking Mk 4 - the pilot was rescued but the poor crewman lost - the first British casualty of the Falklands Campaign.

Early on 1 May the Force entered the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) and the War proper commenced. Following early morning attacks by both Vulcan and SHAR on Stanley Airfield GLAMORGAN ARROW and ALACRITY detached to bombard Stanley Airfield from the south. Thus commenced the first and last daylight NGS of the war. The three ships came under attack from 5 Mirage aircraft; a rather frightening introduction which resulted in a lucky escape by all three ships. Two bombs exploded close by the stern of GLAMORGAN and ARROW received some cannon holes through the funnel. 400 was airborne throughout the action conducting an ASW sweep within 3 miles of the shore; the Mirage were spotted at very low level closing coincident with a fierce cannon barrage from the shore. A missile (believed TIGERCAT) was also fired at the helicopter and violent evasive manoeuvre taken however it splashed a couple of hundred yards short to the complete relief of the aircrew! One of the LYX from the type 21's was damaged during this action whilst attempting to establish an airspot position from the area of Kidney Island to the north. Day NGS seemed too dangerous without complete air superiority and henceforward runs to the Gunline were always conducted under the cover of darkness and without air threat.

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Prior to the NGS action on 1 May GLAMORGAN embarked and operated a Wessex 5 in addition to its own Wessex 3. Operation of two Wessex appeared quite feasible in the short term. The Wessex 5 in a Gunship role (2 x GPRG/ASI2/SSII) was perceived to be required to protect the airspotter in the LYNX and the ASW Wessex from the unwelcome attention of armed enemy helicopters or gun armed small craft. Neither threat however materialised. In the early morning of 2 May the three ships again returned to the area south of Stanley and this time conducted a protracted bombardment without incident. Both Wessex were flown from GLAMORGAN however a previously overlooked deck handling problem nearly caused acute embarrassment. The Wessex 5 was landed first with the intention of moving the aircraft into the ships waist prior to recovery of the Wessex 3 after its ASW sortie. Unfortunately the Wessex 5 with weapons platforms fitted will not fit into a DLG waist and much time consuming deck handing was required to clear the deck before the Wessex 3, now very short of fuel, could be recovered. An unexpected problem made worse by the fact that the ship's HIFR gear had been removed and sent elsewhere!

The events of the remainder of May and of June, the defeats, the victories are now history. Beginning with the sinking of the General Belgrano on 3 May and ending with the surrender of Argentinian forces at Port Stanley on 16 June. This narrative will be confined to those events surrounding GLAMORGAN and the Flight and will not cover detail of the whole operation.

Throughout May, excepting periods for which the ship was detached on other operations, 400 was employed in the ASW screen surrounding the CVEG. The screen comprised a number of standing sectors encompassing the force and was usually occupied by four 'Dippers'. 400 suffered a number of 'mechanical' problems during this time however once again sonar defects caused the utmost frustration and required continual work to allow the aircraft to play its part. Weapons were initially carried by the helicopter however the extra weight proved to unduly restrict time on task and it was decided not to carry them. A consort would be controlled to attack as required. The waters to the east of the Falkland Islands provided no lack of 'submarine' contacts; whales abounded and often their response was identical with that of a submarine. Many weapons were dropped at the beginning of the war on just such targets however as time progressed weapons were dropped with more caution. In conclusion the waters were very dangerous for our ships and ideal hunting ground for submarines. It was probably our good fortune that the Argentinians neither had many submarines nor wished to use them aggressively. In just this sort of situation there is an absolute requirement for the provision and use of Depth Charges and Anti-Submarine Mortars. Classification was difficult and was usually resolved by using a bomb.

On 14 May GLAMORGAN was detached to the north of the Falklands and in conjunction with heliborne forces was involved in the Pebble Island action. 400 was unserviceable with a broken fuel pipe and was not flown. A stiff shore bombardment under the direction of a shore spotter was

undertaken and this combined with rapid action by troops (SAS ?) ashore concluded in the destruction of eleven Argentinian aircraft for no British casualties. As usual on completion of a bombardment action the ship retired to the east at high speed in order to be out of Argentinian aircover by dawn.

From 16 to 21 May GLAMORGAN amongst others was involved in Operation TORNADO; a deception plan designed to convince the Argentinians that the British landing would take place to the south and south west of Stanley. The plan called for continual suppressive fire and reconnaissance in these areas and was conducted every night until the Amphibious landing had taken place at San Carlos. 400 was usually used to provide ASW cover for the ship during the bombardment although the constraints of operating a helicopter from a ship very close inshore were marked. During one sortie to the East Cove area SW from Stanley it was planned to fly 400 overland and carry out a 4.5" flare drop to add some authenticity to our recce. All went well until the aircraft crossed the coast when it came under fire from two machine guns situated on a headland. Luckily no damage was received and the aircraft recovered safely onboard( with flares). It is of interest that during the month GLAMORGAN fired 5 Seaslug missiles in surface to surface mode as part of the shore bombardment!(results not known however this demonstration of fire power was a great morale booster for all on board). The success of the nightly visits and continual bombardment may not be known however if their result was to keep more Argentinian troops stationed in Stanley then they will have been a success. The Argentinians often responded to naval bombardment by returning fire with their 105 and 155mm howitzers sited onshore around the airfield and Stanley common. Such fire usually proved totally ineffective however their accuracy improved with time and several shells fell uncomfortably close to the ship. Looking back and in view of later events the increasing effectiveness of our NGS may well have prompted the enemy to go to the costly and difficult effort of setting up a shore Exocet battery.

Further Gunline operations were carried from 26 to 30 May on completion of which GLAMORGAN was detached to the TRALA (Tug, Repair and Logistics Area) 60 - 100 miles east of the main battle group. Rectification work on many of the ship systems was commenced and the ship inherited the task of 'Trala Manager' (de facto CTU Trala and Guardship). On 29 May 400 suffered unintentional damage to the Main rotor gearbox input housing seal. This caused a permanent oil leak from the main gearbox and rendered the aircraft unserviceable. A spares demand from the UK was satisfied in time to test fly the aircraft on 10 June however the gearbox leak could not be cured and it was decided to limit flying the aircraft to emergencies and vital operational tasks only.

GLAMORGAN's period in the TRALA lasted from 31 May until 11 June. This provided some rest for the ship after continual nightly visits to the Gunline. The Flight Commander, left without an aircraft, was seconded to the operational task of 'managing' the TRALA. On 3 June a Wessex 5 from BFA RESOURCE was embarked to provide HDS support for Trala ships (STUFF). The Wessex worked extremely well and additionally provided some further flight time for the GLAMORGAN pilots and aircrewman. The Wessex was withdrawn on 9 June when RESOURCE left the TRALA and was temporarily replaced by AMBUSCADE's LYNX.

During the evenings of 9/10 June the ship was employed in the recovery of air drop stores from the sea. These were delivered by parachute from Hercules aircraft flying from Ascension Island. (Average flight time for these aircraft was 25 hrs). In addition to crated stores personnel were also delivered in like manner into the sea and recovered by helicopter. Stores needed to be lifted from the sea quickly in order to prevent them becoming waterlogged and therefore even heavier. Geminis contacted the stores, disconnected parachutes, and then hooked on the helicopter 30 ft strop. The recovery task would have been quite impossible without the use of a helicopter and on 10 June, without the use of the LYNX, there was no option but to fly GLAMORGAN's Wessex. Maximum Flight time of 1 Hr imposed.

During the evening of 11 June the ship handed over TRALA manager duties to TIDEPOOL and detached to join YARMOUTH and AVENGER to once again conduct bombardment from the area to the south of Stanley. Fire support was to be given to our troops on the ground in the area of Two Sisters and Mount William. The ship remained at Action stations all night and with the other ships answered any calls for fire from the shore. Our troops were engaged in the final stages of gaining control of the high ground around Stanley prior to making the final assault.

At 0600 on 12 June the ship retired from the Gunline to the south and prepared to rejoin the CVEG. From accounts rendered later the nights NGS had been highly effective. Regrettably at 0637 the ship was hit by a missile, now known to have been an Exocet fired from a shore battery in the vicinity of Sapper Hill. The missile was seen in flight and the ship manoeuvred into a full starboard turn in order to point stern to threat. One Seacat missile was fired towards and narrowly missed the missile which struck the ships deck just outside the Hangar area. The Missile exploded outside the hangar doors penetrated the deck above the main Galley then carried through the hangar doors into the hangar. The hangar doors and Seacat mounting were subsequently blown over the side and an intense fire erupted inside the hangar. Sadly all but two of the people in the hangar area at the time were killed. From the flight casualties were six dead and two injured and from the ship a further six dead and thirteen injured. The fire was fought for over three hours as the ship made way back to the CVEG. Valuable assistance was rendered by YARMOUTH and her Flight who delivered extra BA sets for the ships use. Later Seakings were operated and landed onboard to evacuate the wounded. The dead were buried after a moving service in the evening. GLAMORGAN's Wessex 3 (400) and affectionately known as 'Willie' was completely destroyed. Remnants of the

aircraft were ditched over the side.

13 June saw the ship alongside the MV STENA SEASPREAD (Repair Ship) in the TRALA. FMC came onboard to carry out first aid repairs and GLAMORGAN reassumed TRALA Manager.

HDS Support in the TRALA was now provided by a Wessex 5 aircraft deployed in RFA TIDEPOOL. This aircraft was used to pick up a further Airdrop of stores on 15 June. Weather for the drop was poor and deteriorated to Gale force 9 on completion. Conditions were unsuitable for the return of the borrowed Wessex to TIDEPOOL and, with no rotor brake and no tip socks and only four nylon lashings it had to be secured to the deck. Extra rope lashings were passed in order to attempt to restrain the blades and rotor-head. The subsequent storm did its worst and left the aircraft the next day with two broken main rotor blades, a damaged rotor head and a collapsed mainwheel tyre. Luckily no airframe damage had been sustained. The Wessex 5 crew were subsequently transferred to SS ATLANTIC Causeway to pick up a replacement aircraft for TIDEPOOL.

The weather remained too rough at sea to contemplate further repair work. The land battle having now been finally won the decision was made for GLAMORGAN and STENA SEASPREAD to proceed to complete repairs in SAN CARLOS WATER. (Previously of 'Bomb Alley' fame). Repairs were completed and then on completion of a short visit to Port William near Stanley on 20 June and after saluting FOPI's flag on 21 June the ship turned for home. Our transit north was conducted in the company of HMS PLYMOUTH. Ascension Island reached on 29 June and Portsmouth on 10 July after 116 days away from the UK and 104 days continuously at sea.

During the War GLAMORGAN fired 1450 rounds of 4.5", 7 Seaslugs and 1 Seacat.

1. Total Hours Flown During CORPORATE ..... 143.45
2. Crew average daily flying rate ... 2.50 Hrs (Day 106.20  
Nite 37.25)
3. Aircraft was flown on 51 out of a possible 72 days.

4. Breakdown of tasking and hours flown

a. ASW	-	78.25	-	35 sorties
b. Search/OTHF	-	13.25	-	9 sorties
c. Vertrep	-	20.40		
d. HDS	-	14.15		
e. Maintenance/CTF	-	9.30		
f. NGS Spot	-	2.15		
g. Trials/Misc.	-	5.15		

143.45

5. Serviceability for ASW Task

Actually tasked - 108.00 hrs (An extra 13 hours were tasked  
Achieved - 78.25 hrs during periods when ship detached  
% Serviceability- 72.6% and are not counted)  
Shortfall - 27.4%  
(35.35 hrs)

6. Weapons - NIL Weapons were expended during the Operation.  
2 Attacks with DC Mk II Controlled - target  
assessed as NONSUB.

OPERATION CORPORATE - HMS GLAMORGAN FLIGHT  
NOMINAL LIST AND LIST OF CASUALTIES

FLT CDR	LT CDR	GC	HUNT	CO16410W	
PI	LT	GT	STEPHENSON	C022964J	
P2	S/LT	MR	de WINTON	C026774S	
SMR	ACAEMN(M)	D	LEE	DO72303T	- KILLED
LI	AEMN(L)	JT	KELLY	DO51437D	- WOUNDED
RI	AEA(R)I	IL	TATE	DI27995U	- SLIGHT INJURIES
MI	AEA(M)2	KI	McCALLUM	DI21589B	- KILLED
ACMN	POACMN	CP	VICKERS	DO83308A	- KILLED
L2	POAEM(L)	NJ	ADCOCK	DO76946L	- KILLED
R2	POAEM(R)	MR	MORRIS	DO65402T	
M2	LAEM(M)	P	OKOPSKI	DI71265Y	
R3	AEM(R)I	BP	HINGE	DI46866M	- KILLED
L3	AEM(L)I	K	RYLEY	DI55517M	
M3	AEM(M)I	IJ	MACLEOD	DI74778R	
M4	AEM(M)I	M	HENDERSON	DI75642S	- KILLED

All Flight Casualties occurred when an Argentinian EXOCET missile hit the hangar area of HMS GLAMORGAN on the early morning of 12 June 1982. Those killed were buried at sea.

OPERATION CORPORATE - HMS GLAMORGAN FLIGHT  
SUPPORT, TASKING, PERSONNEL AND TRAININGI. COMPLEMENT AND PERSONNEL

a. GLAMORGAN's Flight Deck was manned in a Defence Watch system for 24 hours a day. This was undertaken over a considerable period and required the full support of SMAC 233 ratings. The ship possessed 8 such Ratings and all 8 ratings were required. The possession of 3 FDO's allowed for a sensible watch system and for the Officers concerned to carry out their subsidiary duties. (METO/SEC/DSO). The conditions of Deck operation during a war require fully trained support personnel - there is no time to train locally any such personnel. The Flight Defence Watch, in addition to normal deck/aircraft duties, also provide a Firefighting attack party in the after part of the ship. The manning of the Flight deck area at Action Stations is considered in GLAMORGAN'S 20/ of 3 July 1982.

b. Fatigue - Owing to an effective Defence Watch system and non-continuous action state fatigue was never a great problem. Only the senior maintenance members, particularly of the (R) trade, suffered fatigue when required to work out of watch to repair/service the aircraft. This has to be accepted.

c. Morale - Good morale was maintained. Natural fluctuations obviously took place. Some people notably came to the fore and gave encouragement to those whose spirits and determination were not quite as high.

2. TRAINING

a. General aircrew training proved to be satisfactory; clearly some flying operations required in war can not be safely practiced in peace. The best that can be achieved is to continue to demand the highest aircrew training standards and never be tempted to lower them.

b. Maintenance was often carried out in difficult conditions and the training given seemed well able to meet the task.

c. Ship Helicopter Controllers- It is for consideration that Rating controllers require greater experience than that provided by the present course. Bearing in mind that the controller operates at an Officer interface in a high pressure Operations Room environment then, the quality and character of the man is equally important as his ability for pure radar control. This must be borne in mind when recommending a man for course. It is felt that HC's should be volunteers and that they should be given recognition for their status and for the extra responsibility they hold. We demand high standards of Aircrew- we must demand high standards of controllers.

Many HC's seem unable to modify their control technique when dealing with Radar fitted helicopters. Full 'Wasp type' procedure for such helicopters is not required. R/T discipline was poor and control sometimes too verbose in a tactical war setting.

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GLAUBORGAN experience indicates that more emphasis needs to be given to General ATC procedures, airspace reservation implications and the general interpretation of Air Charts.

3. AIRCRAFT TASKING

This was sound however the requirement to carry warshot weapons did not allow for very effective time on task on the screen. The endurance of the aircraft was too poor and it was finally decided to fly for maximum 'ping' time and not to carry weapons. A consort was to be used in the event of contact being gained.

4. EQUIPMENT

a. The HWR2 Radar warner was fitted to the aircraft (VHF radio also retained by repositioning). This equipment proved most useful as a pure warner and the aircrew felt much safer for having it.

b. The Rank NVA was absolutely invaluable as a nighttime SAFETY AID. In conditions of darken ship and minimum deck lighting the non-flying pilot using the NVA could con the flying pilot clear of ships and onto the correct approach. When proceeding to and from the ASW screen with all units fully darkened the NVA was used as an anti-collision aid.

c. GPMG Mounting- The Flight Commander required this to be permanently fitted, even in the ASW role, unfortunately the mounting spigot assembly is incompatible with the standard window. The window fitting was still required for light proofing and environmental purposes. A new window blank, compatible with the mounting was manufactured from plywood and ships fittings. This window could be removed internally into the aircraft in flight and thus allow the rapid mounting of the machine gun. The window was also capable of jettison in an emergency.

d. The Exocet Reflector - a model of ingenuity, was manufactured onboard Invincible from sheet aluminium. It was strengthened and fitted to the aircraft starboard carrier by local modification using ship materials. A sturdy job was achieved and the aircraft carefully test flown. It was very difficult to hold the required station relative to the protected unit the aircraft flight path had to carefully take into account; the WIND and chaff Delta patterns! In one short trial the reflector completely saturated a type 904 radar rendering it incapable of giving target indication. A cumbersome piece of kit known locally as 'the biscuit tin' maximum airspeed when fitted was around 50 kts.

e. Safety Equipment - All aircrew carried 4 extra water ration packs in Immersion Suit pockets. Strobe Lights (not an item included in the lifepreservers carried) were issued and attached to immersion coveralls.

HMS GLAMORGAN FLIGHT - OPERATIONAL RULES AND EMPLOYMENTI. Night Operations

- a. Night operations in conditions of very reduced Flight Deck lighting (ASW threat) proved difficult to begin with until experience was gained. Similarly night approaches to a fully darkened ship (flight deck lights only in the final stages) caused some problems of orientation even with the assistance of radar and NVA.
- b. Under conditions of radar silence and fully darkened operations by night, helicopter transits to and from the ASW Screen could be positively dangerous, particularly at normal transit heights. Collision possibilities between helicopters and helicopters and ship masts were to the forefront. The use of the NVA was sometimes of help but not always. In these circumstances GOOD, FIRM PROCEDURAL CONTROL and higher transit heights are required. It is suggested that a low level modified version of the QUADRANTAL RULES could be employed to ensure separation of helicopters within a large force.

2. Helicopter Control Rules and Procedures

- a. Points contained in Ib also apply to this section.
- b. The frequent requirement for I-Band silence (ESM restriction) precluded full controlled operations.
- c. In general the Rules appear satisfactory apart from the points mentioned. It is not possible to legislate for every case and operationally the rules do have to be broken particularly with respect to the grade of controller on the radar. With care this may be minimised.
- d. OPERATION CORPORATE provided for everyone the experience of multi-helicopter operation within a very large force and the co-ordination of helo and fixed wing ops. This required very sharp eyes and good communications between controllers. It was a fact that sometimes the amount of helo control information being passed threatened to take over the tactical circuit (ASW A). Also HDS tasks were often allowed to be conducted on tactical circuits rendering the circuit virtually unusable. Better planning and BREVITY when using radio circuits are indicated here.
- e. Helicopter Identification and Safe Lane procedures are never practiced often enough or realistically enough in peace. To a properly equipped enemy the Helo transponder is a giveaway.

3. HDS and Vertrep

- a. This is an enormous task in war and a vital task. It demands a highly efficient and structured organisation. During CORPORATE HDS was often untimely, stores were lost and the organisation did not always appear top line. The co-ordination of MATCONOFF demands, Store and passenger

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transfer inputs, delivery order and timing would appear to need a dedicated Force Helicopter Delivery Controller and associated team. The overall Air Co-ordinator and GLOGO are far too busy to be able to manage the complexity of the stores/HDS task. The HDS controller needs to work separately from but in concert with the Air Co-ordinator. Next, stores delivered to the inner labyrinths of a large ship like HERMES are often lost or delayed owing to the sheer volume of 'Stuff' carried by those ships. The use of Postbox ships seemed to work quite efficiently. Overall a study of the HDS/Vertrep task needs to be undertaken and a structured Force Organisation evolved. Many aspects of former amphibious operations organisation could well be adopted. Finally spontaneous serials injected by ships always ruin any battling order.

b. Wherever possible, provided it does not preclude the aircrafts primary role, in wartime aircraft should keep their Cargo Hook permanently fitted.

c. A larger number of Air Cargo Nets and Palletrollys need to be spread around the Fleet to ensure more timely and efficient Vertrep. Present allocations appear too small.

**4. SPARE DECKS**

a. Ship/Aircraft operating capabilities are well covered in HOSTAC and BR 766A. Emergency landing capability for various Helo types is however not given. It is for example possible for a Seaking to land on a Type 2I in extremis. A Ship/Helicopter Landing Feasibility Guide is enclosed as an example and it is felt that this information should be properly produced and included in BR 766A.

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## SHIP/HELICOPTER LANDING FEASIBILITY GUIDE

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SHIP TYPE	HELICOPTER TYPE	WASP	LYNX	WESSEX	SEAKING
LPD		YES	YES	YES	YES
"O" CLASS		YES	YES	YES	YES
TIDE		YES	YES	YES	YES
ROVER		YES	YES	YES	YES
REGENT		YES	YES	YES	YES
ENGADINE		YES	YES	YES	YES
NESS		YES	YES	YES	YES
PORT		YES	YES	YES	YES
ENDURANCE		YES	YES	YES	D
SIR		YES	YES	YES	D
DLG		YES	YES	YES	D
21		YES	YES	D	D
22		YES	YES	D	D
42		YES	YES	D	D
LEANDER II (EXOCET)		YES	YES	D	D
LEANDER I & III		YES	D	VD	VD
ROTHESAY		YES	D	VD	VD
HECATE		YES	D	E	E
82		YES	D	X	X

## DECODE :

- YES.....NORMAL LANDING POSSIBLE  
 X .....NO LANDING POSSIBLE  
 D .....LANDING POSSIBLE UP TO SEA STATE 3/4  
 VD .....LANDING VERY HAZARDOUS EVEN IN SEA STATE 0  
 E .....LANDING MATHEMATICALLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACCIDENT ALMOST CERTAIN EVEN IN SEA STATE 0

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HMS GLAMORGAN

At Sea

3 July 1982

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The Flag Officer Third Flotilla,  
Fort Southwick,  
Portsmouth,  
Hants.

OPERATION CORPORATE - AIRCRAFT OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES.

Reference: FOF3 I9F/HEH 25I232Z JUN 1982 (Call for Report). (IA)

A. Aircraft Operations General

1. To meet operational and tactical requirements flying and maintenance procedures needed much flexibility and sometimes did not meet normal, acceptable peacetime standards. In this instance care and commonsense had to replace book procedures. An understanding of safety rules allied to normal training standards provided a good base from which to modify procedure however the value of good pilot experience can not be understated.
2. Only those points confined to non-tactical aspects of aircraft operation are covered in this report. Tactical aspects are covered elsewhere.

B. Flight Deck operations in HMS GLAMORGAN

1. In preparation for heavy weather moves a steel hawser was rigged through flight deck ringbolts. This allowed for a check lashing to be instantly applied with no fumbling. The hawser was not used for normal lashing of the aircraft however it proved a good additional safety feature.
2. Ship movement in roll and pitch was sometimes outside proscribed limits. Take-offs and landings had to be negotiated with care and when the ship was at its most stable point. Slick work by the flight deck team was most important.
3. Although not allowed in the SHOL off centre-line landings had to be accepted at times.
4. Sea King helicopters were landed on 45° cross-deck nose to port. These operations usually involved large passenger transfers and, in the final instance, casualty evacuation. Landings were easily undertaken and proved safe enough in calm conditions with small deck movement but would be more hazardous with a sea running. Refuelling of Seakings is quite possible from a DLG deck.
5. On occasion two Wessex were operated from GLAMORGAN (WX3 and a WX5). This proved feasible for a short period; needed little back up and gave the ship enhanced operational capability. The following points are applicable:

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- a. One aircraft has to remain on deck despite inclement weather. (Corrosion factor).
  - b. Deck shuffles can only be accomplished by launching one of the aircraft.
  - c. In the absence of a spare deck HIFR equipment is required for the Wessex 3. (Safety consideration).
  - d. A Wessex 5 with weapons platform fitted can only be manoeuvred into the waists with difficulty and then only by going tail first.
  - e. Slick deck operations are essential.
6. Deck operations under darken ship conditions required great care. The use of minimum lighting for movement and shielded torches for maintenance meant that supervisory checks had to be absolutely scrupulous in execution.
  7. The two large Fairleads/Fire hydrants and Stop/Go lights positioned at the centre of each side of the Flight Deck are badly placed. They inhibit unusual deck operations in an emergency and in the event of a large flight deck fire the hydrants would be unusable. ✓
  8. The requirement to keep fully-prepped ready-use torpedoes and depth charges in the flight deck area when under threat from cannon and machine-gun firing aircraft poses a particular hazard to both flight deck crew and ship. (A DC Mk II exploded on board HMS PLYMOUTH). Consideration should be given to providing an Armoured stowage or Barrier in flight deck areas. ✓
  9. Vertrep Operations - A ship allocation of 2 Cargo Nets proved insufficient. At least 4 nets and a palletrolly were found to be needed to ensure speedy and efficient vertrep. Night vertrep frequently had to be undertaken and sometimes single pilot night vertrep. The conditions for night vertrep given in ATP I6A Art. 990 could not always be observed. (D/DNAW/2/74/II9(436) dated 10 February 1981 refers). ✓
  10. The manning of Flight Deck areas at Action Stations requires careful consideration. It is thought inadvisable to have all of the flight deck crew and maintenance expertise concentrated in one area. Where aircraft operation allows the maintenance team should be split into two parties balanced by trade. One party should man the flight deck and hangar (supplemented by SMAC 233) and the remainder should be stationed in a back up area. From experience the principle of 'not putting all ones eggs in a single basket' applies. Finally, unserviceable aircraft should be de-fuelled before stowage in the hangar. This will greatly reduce the hazard from fire should the hangar be hit. ✓

#### C. Aircraft Maintenance Procedures

- I. The full wartime servicing schedules were never fully tested in this unit. The aircraft was maintained using the second schedule during the latter stages of CORPORATE; this appeared to raise no problems apart from building up a large number of Part 3 entries in the MOD Form 700.

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- 2. The requirement for the aircraft to be at short notice deck alert (Chaff layer or anti-exocet role) during daylight hours often inhibited execution of certain flexops; these were deferred and undertaken at the first convenient opportunity. ✓
- 3. Night servicing during darken ship proved difficult and had to be carried out in dim red lighting. The hangar could not in any sense be made light-proof. (This must be an important consideration for future modification/construction). ✓
- 4. Flexops requiring test transmissions can be completely inhibited by a restrictive emcon.
- 5. Second line avionic servicing facilities were vital to the continued operation of the Wessex 3 in the ASW role. Continued unserviceability of Sonar and Doppler equipment exhausted spare black boxes very quickly. ✓
- 6. Owing to the requirement to eject considerable quantities of Chaff Hotel out of the aircraft PX 24 treatment was kept to a minimum to prevent contamination of the aircraft - this is detrimental to corrosion avoidance. (Proper chaff dispensing pipes/equipment is required).

D. Main Rotor Blade erosion and leading edge damage.

I. Rotor blades requiring replacing were changed at Ascension Island when the ship was south-bound. Thus all blades were in good condition at the start of the operation. Small sections of leading edge strip did subsequently become damaged and repair patches were applied. The life of repair patches was usually short thus maintenance of the blades became a continuing task. No erosion of leading edge metal was evident.

E. Aircraft equipment performance and reliability

I. In general throughout CORPORATE the Airframe and Engine maintained a high level of serviceability. Aircraft avionics accounted for almost all reliability problems. Sonar and Doppler and to a lesser extent Radar were bedevilled by unserviceability. The aircraft went U/S for task on 11 separate occasions and achieved 72% of assigned ASW tasking albeit subject to almost continuous box changing. (April/May assigned 108.00 ASW hours; achieved 77.55). Poor avionic performance probably resulted from a combination of equipment failure and environmental factors.

F. Environmental Problems.

- I. Wessex 3 aircraft leak badly thus rain in even moderate amounts penetrates the systems - we had some very heavy rain.
- 2. The requirement to leave the aircraft on deck for long periods (eg anti-exocet role) in inclement conditions contributed to the onset of much corrosion (particularly bad in tail area) and allowed dampness in the electrics which may have been a contributory factor in our avionic unserviceability. It must be accepted that in war aircraft can not always be put in the hangar when conditions are poor; particularly in a DLG with

its cumbersome ranging procedure.

3. Chaff Hotel - during one chaff dispensing run approximately half a full skillet was accidentally dispersed within the aircraft. (Chaff type was of aluminiumised fibreglass). The contaminated aircraft was immediately landed and cleaned. Despite the use of a vacuum cleaner and dusting much of the contamination had 'stuck' to oily patches on the internal airframe; this proved impossible to dislodge. Excess contamination was 'neutralised' by wiping over difficult areas with a heavy concentration of PX 24. Apart from the human health hazard through inhalation, some of the Chaff was almost certainly drawn into electrical equipment and possibly through conduction in circuitry caused electronic problems. (Chaff dispensing system however simple is required).

G. Battle Damage Repair

- 1. The BDR Book produced was considered to be good and helpful by GLAMORGAN SMR.
- 2. The aircraft suffered no battle damage until its complete destruction by enemy action on 12 July 1982.

H. Logistic Support.

*June?*

I. Overall logistic support was good. Requests for stores from the UK were met in a very short period of time and delivered by airdrop. Much reliance was placed upon the second line servicing and workshop facilities provided by both HERMES and INVINCIBLE in order to keep us serviceable. Turn round on unserviceable equipment from both ships was very good and much appreciated. Although stores at RN Air Stations are tested periodically for serviceability replacement items onboard are not, thus such equipment was fitted only to be later proven unserviceable after the aircraft had become airborne.



*Barrow*  
 M. E. BARROW  
 Captain Royal Navy  
 Commanding Officer

Information:

The Flag Officer Naval Air Command  
The Commanding Officer 737 Naval Air Squadron.

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HMS BRISTOL  
BFPO Ships

225/5

Office of the Commander in Chief Fleet  
Eastbury Park  
Northwood  
Middlesex

18 October 1982

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

1. I have the honour to report the proceedings of Her Majesty's ship BRISTOL, under my Command, from 27 November 1981 to 19 October 1982. A period which covers an extended DED in Portsmouth and the ship's deployment to and from active service in the South Atlantic.

DOCKING AND ESSENTIAL DEFECT PERIOD

2. Following ten days of preparations, BRISTOL started an extended DED on 7 December 1981. Although termed a DED the period in Dockyard hands was more akin to a mini-refit as it had indeed replaced the scheduled refit.
3. The agreed DED package contained a formidable workload and the procedures and timetable in FEO's were not totally appropriate to this particular occasion. At the start of the DED I proposed a formalised 4 month Docking and Essential Work (DEW) package to combine the essential elements of DED and refit timetables. Although this concept was not formally adopted it provided a good working base for this particular period.
4. Throughout the DED the ship's staff was extremely well supported by Flag Officer Portsmouth's and the General Manager's staff. Docking and undocking dates were met, and a 'Terminal Date Walkround' by the General Manager was completed as planned on 15 March, with surprisingly few outstanding items.
5. A number of factors assisted BRISTOL completing the very large work package in the time available.
- The ship's company lived onboard throughout the Period, thereby keeping the ship alive and making the most of working hours available to ship's staff.
  - The adoption of a policy of, where possible, repairing machinery onboard rather than transferring items to shops ashore.
  - Adoption of a rolling programme of overhaul, whereby for example ship's staff worked on services overnight, while contractors undertook major refurbishment of items such as Sewage Treatment Plant.
6. The start of Operation CORPORATE coincided with BRISTOL's Completion Date walkround by the Chief Staff Officer (Engineering) to Flag Officer Portsmouth, Captain J C JUDGE, Royal Navy.
7. Although BRISTOL was not initially earmarked for Operation CORPORATE it became my aim for BRISTOL to achieve full operational readiness in the shortest possible time. In the event an original programme of Safety Drills, SAT's, defect rectification and COST had to be reduced from 10 weeks to 4 weeks in order to be ready to sail from UK on 10 May.
8. The ship sailed for Sea Acceptance Trials on 15 April. With full assistance

from all authorities involved these trials were completed in the Portsmouth and Portland areas by 20 April. I would like to record my appreciation of the Fleet Requirements and Air Direction Unit who were able to provide all the many tracking sorties, always on time and often at very short notice. Without the units unstinting co-operation SAT's would not have been completed on schedule.

9. The Defect Rectification Period 21 - 25 April was also used to reprogramme the ship's ADAWS computer to accept 5-tier symbology, so that the ship would use the same programme as other ships of the TASK FORCE. The completing of Additions and Alterations, which extended the flight deck over the redundant mortar well, proved a most significant and invaluable improvement during operations in the South Atlantic, enabling BRISTOL to provide a deck for LYNX and on occasion SEA KING Helicopters. The ship was also stored and ammunitioned in preparation for COST and Operation CORPORATE.

10. On 22 April FO Portsmouth (Rear Admiral A S TIPPETT) made an informal walkround of the ship in place of a full Operational and Departmental Material Assessment. He assessed that the ship was ready for COST. It is an indication of the co-operation and hard work by all during the 4 month DED that the ship was able to sail for COST 11 days after the start of SAT's.

#### CONTINUATION OPERATIONAL SEA TRAINING

11. A ten day COST had been planned, starting with the Staff Sea Check on 26 April. However, a defect on the main feed pump reduced the ship's time at Portland to 5 days. In that period the ship was able to complete the successful firings of 2 Sea Dart missiles. This period of COST has been reported separately by Flag Officer Sea Training.

12. While the main feed pump was being repaired the ship embarked war stocks of ammunition and stores. Special dispensation was given to stow rounds of 4.5 inch ammunition in the mortar projectile room. This effectively doubles the amount of that ammunition carried. The ship was ready to sail for the South Atlantic on 10 May.

#### PASSAGE TO SOUTH ATLANTIC

13. BRISTOL (CTU 317.8.1.1) was to lead the first group of ships to reinforce the South Atlantic Task Force. I sailed from Portsmouth in company with RFA OLNA (Captain J A BAILEY Royal Fleet Auxiliary) to rendezvous off Plymouth that evening with HM Ships AVENGER (Captain H M WHITE Royal Navy), PENELOPE (Commander P V RICKARD Royal Navy), MINERVA (Commander S H G JOHNSTON Royal Navy) and ACTIVE (Commander P C B CANTER Royal Navy). HMS ANDROMEDA (Captain J L WEATHERALL Royal Navy) joined the group in the South Western Approaches on 11 May. HMS CARDIFF (Captain M G T HARRIS Royal Navy) was to join off Madeira on 14 May.

14. A passage Work-up Team under the direction of Commander J R BRIGSTOCKE Royal Navy (CST to FOST) was embarked in ships in order to further assist in ships' training and work-up to War readiness. Most of the ships in the group had, like BRISTOL, very little opportunity for Operational Sea Training prior to deploying. The presence of the Work-up Team contributed significantly to the usefulness of exercises conducted during the passage South to Ascension.

15. In order to gain maximum air defence practice, the Group delayed 24 hours in the South Western Approaches to conduct Air Defence Exercises with FRU Aircraft, RAF Buccaneers and French Super Etendards. The ADEX with the French was excellent value and the realism of the attacks, coming only 1 week after the loss of HMS SHEFFIELD, added a particularly keen edge to the exercises.

16. By 12 May a requirement to arrive off the Falkland Islands earlier than planned resulted in an increase in SOA to OLANA's maximum sustainable speed. In good weather conditions the Task Unit forced south and arrived off Ascension Island 50 hours ahead of schedule.

17. The Task Unit spend 8 hours at anchor off Ascension Island, embarking a vast amount of stores. The ships of the Task Unit were the first to anchor off the Ascension Island that could take large quantities of vital stores, ammunition and mail. Loading continued through the afternoon and evening and the Task Unit sailed at 182300Z.

#### PASSAGE ASCENSION - TEZ

18. With the Falkland Landings, and probable further losses of ships imminent, I was ordered to bring the Task Unit south at best speed. 3 Tankers were station on the route, so I was not tied to OLANA's speed. The Task Unit was thus able to maintain an SOA of 25 knots between replenishments. The first units of the Task Units entered the TEZ on 25 May, 7 days after leaving Ascension. The 3 Leander Class Frigates ANDROMEDA, MINERVA and PENELOPE had spent most of the passage near maximum boiler power; it is to their credit that they were able to sustain that power over such a long period.

#### SEADART ENGAGEMENT 22 MAY

19. At 1209Z on 22 May 31°43S 31°17W the ship was called to Action Stations on an EW detection of Boeing 707 radar. Rules of engagement allowed me to destroy this target if the required criteria were met. At 230 miles the EW bearing correlated with a 965 radar contact closing from the south west. 909 Fire Control Radar locked on at 36 miles, but at this stage there was no positive proof of identification. When the contact was at 35 miles six fast moving contacts appeared on 992 radar to the West South West at 26 miles, closing the force. This gave the immediate impression that the 707 was providing Tactical Direction to Attack Aircraft. Alarm procedure engagement was initiated and one salvo of Sea Dart was fired with the lead contacts at 18 miles. As quickly as the contacts appeared they disappeared and the missiles were destroyed 8 seconds after predicted intercept. Just prior to the Sea Dart firing the positive aircraft contact made a sharp alteration to the west and started to skirt the force maintaining a range of 35 miles, indicating that some form of ESM equipment had been fitted to the aircraft and the capabilities of Seadart were appreciated. The 707 flew North for a while (about 100 NM) then turned back and approached the Task Unit from the north east. This was the positive proof I required, and I despatched CARDIFF under silence to make ground fast 15 miles to the north east in an attempt to lure the 707 into Seadart range. This ploy was partly successful and CARDIFF fired a salvo of Seadart, but at extreme range, and one missile was seen to pass very close to the contact. The Argentinian 707 continued its south easterly track and no proof of damage was available.

#### 26 MAY - 19 JUNE

20. a. From 26 May to 19 June, excepting one short break, BRISTOL's main employment was AAW and EW picket some 20 miles west of the CVBG and 2 miles east of Port Stanley. The ship quickly adapted itself to this singular 'routine' of the war - a very high weapons and personnel alert state during daylight hours; advantage of a much reduced air threat during the long (14 hour) nights and low SOA which gave opportunity for rectification and first line maintenance to be conducted on the picket line. An attitude of 'Make Do and Mend' pervaded during

the period which ensured full availability of sensors, machinery and general equipment whenever required. Additionally, with BRISTOL's future role in mind, as Flagship to Flag Officer Third Flotilla, it was appreciated that future opportunities for lengthy maintenance periods would not be possible. This policy of maintenance during low threat/opportunity basis continued through July and August and resulted in no dedicated maintenance period being required by the ship during the 4½ months of deployment.

- b. As standby Flagship I was able, through extensive monitoring of broadcasts and voice circuits, to maintain a fully up-to-date Force Ops Room and a complete tactical picture of the progress of the campaign. I had embarked 2 additional AWOs before leaving UK, and I thus had a unique Flag picture outside the Flagship.
- c. From 28-30 May BRISTOL was detached to the east of the CVBG to co-ordinate the movements of merchant ships in the Tug, Repair and Lie-up Area (TRALA). My main task was to ensure that the ships scattered over a large area of the TRALA were brought forward in good time ready to be escorted into San Carlos.
- d. The MV ATLANTIC CAUSEWAY, newly arrived in the TRALA took on a doubly important role, following the sinking of her sister ship. She was accorded full protection and I was able to brief her Master and SNC prior to the vessel's passage to San Carlos.
- e. I was relieved in the TRALA on 30 May by HMS GLAMORGAN (Captain M E BARROW DS Royal Navy).

#### 19 JUNE - 1 JULY

21. a. On 19 June I was detached by CTG 317.8 to proceed north to intercept the MV STENA INSPECTOR in approximate position 23°S 20°W on 25 June. There I was to embark Flag Officer Third Flotilla, Rear Admiral REFFELL, and rejoin the CVBG by 1 July. The passage was uneventful, but included a very successful astern Replenishment from MV BRITISH TAMAR, in ideal conditions. As far as I can assess this was the first astern Replenishment that BRISTOL has conducted since commissioning.
- b. I rendezvoused as planned with HMS INVINCIBLE and MV STENA INSPECTOR on 25 June and FOF3 and staff transferred to BRISTOL. I hoisted the Flag of FOF3 at 251400Z and BRISTOL started the 2,500 mile return passage to the TEEZ, rejoining CTG 317.8 at 011000Z July. There followed a 36-hour period of FOF1/FOF3 discussions and handover, and BRISTOL assumed the role as Flagship to CTG 317.8.

#### 2 JULY - 28 AUGUST

22. a. Throughout this period BRISTOL served as Flagship to CTG 317.8. Excepting 3 short visits to San Carlos Water and Port William/Stanley, the ship remained with the CVS Group operating to the east of the Falkland Islands, on the edge of the newly introduced 150 mile Falkland Island Protection Zone (FIPZ). From 6-8 July BRISTOL anchored in San Carlos Water to act as a base for CTG 317.8 while he made initial contact with the Forces ashore. It was a chance for the Ship's Company having heard so much about the Amphibious Operating Area to go ashore and see for themselves where the landings took place. During this period I was able to attend the Memorial Service to the two Type 21 Frigates lost in the Campaign.

b. From 17-19 July, 8-9 August and 20-21 August BRISTOL anchored in Port William while CTG 317.8 attended conferences and tours ashore, and hosted return calls onboard. These visits were also particularly valuable as they gave the opportunity to make contact with the Masters and officers of the Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT), while these merchant ships were being unloaded in Port William. BRISTOL paid a final visit to Port William on 24 August in company with INVINCIBLE.

c. While supporting the CVS group BRISTOL participated fully in all planned weapon training and operational. The exercising of organic air support and periodic dedicated SSN support for ASW training ensured that the standards of operators and weapon systems readiness were not allowed to fall from those maintained during the Campaign. Frequent patrols to the West Falklands in support of overt CVS operations in the western FIPZ served not only to show British Forces resolve to the Argentines but also brought home to the ship's company that a threat still existed from Argentinian Forces.

d. The workload of the Operations Department and in particular the Communications Division, increased enormously during the period as Flagship. Here the experience gained as FOF3 Flagship in OCEAN SAFARI 1982 was to stand the Organisation in good stead, and the Operations Room and MCO quickly absorbed the Flagship commitments. To accommodate the extra personnel, over and above normal Flagship requirements, many spaces were converted to take bunks (eg the Pay Office). Everybody had a proper bunk and although crowded conditions were adequate.

e. On 27 August HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, in company with HMS BATTLEAXE and HMS AMAZON joined the Task Group. That day and the following was spent in detailed staff handovers. On 28 August opportunity was taken to photograph all ships of the Task Group in formation around INVINCIBLE and ILLUSTRIOUS. On completion CTG 317.8 transferred to ILLUSTRIOUS.

f. A detailed analysis of weapon and machinery availability, with other lessons learnt, has been forwarded under a separate report in response to a questionnaire from the Operational Evaluation Group on 7 Sept 82.

#### HOMEWARD PASSAGE 28 AUG - 17 SEP

23. a. At 282000Z INVINCIBLE was ordered to take Tactical control of BRITSOL and detach for passage to UK. BRITSOL was the last CORPORATE warship to leave the TEZ who had been involved in hostilities. The passage home was delightfully uneventful. The ship reverted from state 2 to state 3 on 30 August for the first time since 11 May. On 31 August RFA OLNA joined and remained in company until Portsmouth. Warmer weather brought colour to some very pallid faces that had seen little of the light of day during the previous  $4\frac{1}{2}$  months. An overnight stop at Ascension (6/7 Sept) enables advance leave parties to disembark and stores and mail to be embarked. The second leg of the homeward trip passed quickly and without incident, and after a brief period anchored off Lizard Point on 16 Sept where I embarked 13 members of West Country Press and Television, the ship anchored at Spithead (in thick fog) at 0600 17 September. I had the honour to welcome onboard Admiral Sir Henry LEACH, the First Sea Lord, who breakfasted with me and my Heads of Departments, before being taken on a tour of the ship.

b. The entry into Portsmouth in company with INVINCIBLE was a wonderful, exhilarating and memorable experience. Any fears that my sailors had been forgotten so long after events of the South Atlantic had ceased to be news were well laid to rest and we were able to enjoy the very best of homecomings. I would like to record my appreciation of the work of Flag Officer Portsmouth's Staff who, faced with all manner of large and small problems in organising the ship's homecoming, controlled events perfectly on the day adding immeasurably to the enjoyment and happiness of those who had come to welcome us.

c. A five week Assisted Maintenance Period started on 5 October, and the ship is due to sail for operational Sea Training on 8 November. On 19 Oct I hand over command of HMS BRISTOL to Captain M J F RAWLINSON Royal Navy after a fascinating and eventful 20 months in command.

THOUGHTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE SHIP

24. The morale of the Ship's Company has remained very high throughout the summer. The extremely hard work put in by all to prepare the ship quickly, but properly, for Operation CORPORATE produced the momentum which was sustained throughout the ship during its time in the South Atlantic. As with others protecting the Battle Group there was at times some frustration at not being able to do more - NGS or convoy protection - but the singleness of purpose remained. As the 'modus operandi' changed from a clear war footing to uneasy peace with peacetime activities I was concerned that some ratings may look over their shoulders at the returning units and wonder why it was not for them. This never happened; the Ship's Company understood our role and the subsequent enthusiasm applied to serving the Flag was remarkable. The high state of morale onboard was undoubtedly underpinned by the excellent work done at home for BRISTOL wives and families. This period in the life of the ship re-inforced all the faith one has had in the young sailor - they responded magnificently - having had to cope with the tensions of hostilities and the long periods of uneventful readiness which fell to BRISTOL.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

A GROSE  
Captain Royal Navy  
Commanding Officer

Information:

The Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Ministry of Defence (Naval Historical Branch).

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226/1

HMS ENDURANCE  
BFPO ShipsThe Commander in Chief Fleet  
Northwood  
Middlesex

24 May 82

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit the report of proceedings of Her Majesty's Ship ENDURANCE for the period from 5 December 1981 to 19 March 1982 covering the Antarctic Deployment.
2. Following an eventful passage, the ship arrived on station in the Falkland Islands on Friday 4 December and was immediately faced with the disembarkation of the detached survey party to Berkeley Sound on the eastern side of the East Island. This sound is a deep, sheltered stretch of water some ten miles in length which could form a convenient harbour for vessels and rigs involved in any future oil prospecting in the area. It was last surveyed in 1834 by HMS BEAGLE and so a modern survey of the area is being undertaken as part of the continuing process of up-dating the charts of the Falkland Islands. The detached survey party consisted of two officers and ten men together with the survey boat James Caird, it remained deployed from 4 December through to the 25 February (with some rotation of personnel) when they were re-embarked to be redeployed South in the Antarctic. The party under the command of Lieutenant R BALL lived in the old school house during their long detachment in Berkeley Sound and established an excellent liaison with the local inhabitants.
3. Having dis-embarked the boat camp the following day the ship sailed round to Stanley, firing a 17 gun salute to His Excellency the Governor of the Falkland Islands on entering harbour. The next few days were spent off-loading a large quantity of stores which had been brought out for the Islands and the Royal Marine Garrison (Naval Party 8901), and also re-newing old friendships. Tuesday 8th December is celebrated as a National holiday commemorating the defeat of the German Battle Squadron of Admiral Graf von Spee by Admiral Sturdee on 8th December 1914. The occasion is marked by a parade and a thanks giving service. ENDURANCE provided both a Royal Marine's and Ship's Company guard as well as a colour party.
4. The following day ENDURANCE sailed from Stanley for the three day passage to South Georgia, having embarked Mr Rex Hunt, the Governor, his wife, a BBC TV film crew and sixteen members of the Joint Services Expedition to South Georgia. The passage was made almost entirely in thick fog, stopping twice on passage, once either side of the Antarctic convergence zone for plankton samples for the Marine Biological Association from Plymouth. Then in the early hours of Saturday 12 December the snow covered mountains of South Georgia appeared out of the fog glowing yellow in the rays of the morning sun. Dis-embarkation of the Joint Services Expedition and their vast quantity of stores was started by helicopter but flying conditions in Royal Bay in the vicinity of their main base were proving very difficult as the westerly wind was being funneled between two mountain ranges at the head of the bay, and then being further accelerated as it slid down the Ross Glacier, to produce 50 knot winds inside the bay while a few miles outside the wind was barely rippling the sea. The weather prevented anchoring off the beach as intended and dis-embarkation

had to progress with the ship underway. During the disembarkation one helo sortie was made to St Andrew's Bay with the Governor and his wife. Unfortunately in the process of landing in the very turbulent wind conditions the helicopter got out of control and crashed, ending up on its side with extensive damage to the main rotor and tail sections. Fortunately the occupants suffered only slight bruises. Disembarkation of the J.S.E. equipment continued using the remaining helicopter and in the evening the ship steamed round to St Andrews Bay to recover the Governor and his wife and the helicopter crew who had been cared for by an Anglia TV film crew, the Honourable Lucinda Buxton and Anne Price, who were camped in St Andrews Bay filming the king penguin colony.

5. Disembarkment of equipment and personnel was continued the following day using boats as well as the remaining helicopter. The ship then returned to St Andrews Bay to recover the main salvageable bits from the wrecked helicopter, but the operation had to be terminated in the afternoon due to thick fog. On 15th December the ship moved round to Grytviken for the Governor to visit the main B.A.S. base, continuing west over night to be in position the following morning to carry out the S.I. and H.I. vertical photography tasks at Bird Island. Although some runs were carried out, the weather deteriorated steadily and strong winds and poor visibility frustrated any further attempts. As the forecast was even worse the ship returned to Leith to allow the Governor to visit the old whaling stations and to examine the contracted scrap metal which was to be removed by the Argentines. On the 19th another attempt was made to salvage the final items from the crashed helicopter and ditch the carcass. But again this had to be abandoned due to the fog. The following day a further attempt was made to undertake the vertical photography outstanding but again efforts were frustrated by the weather. It was however possible to get the Governor in to visit the B.A.S. out station at Bird Island and to deliver their mail. After this, the time available in South Georgia ran out and it was time to turn west and make our way to the Falkland Islands for the Christmas break. Good progress was made on the passage back and the ship anchored in Stanley on the evening of 22nd December. Christmas in Stanley was warm and mild in contrast to the Arctic conditions being suffered in England and the ship's company enjoyed a pleasant two day break. The standard Christmas fayre and activities were held on board and hospitality was also extended to the ship by the local inhabitants.

#### First Work Period Summary

6. This work period was hampered by continual bad weather and the aerial work was limited by the loss of one helicopter. However the Governor of the Falkland Islands was able to undertake an extensive tour of South Georgia, his first visit to the largest and most important island in the Falkland Island Dependencies. The Joint Services Expedition and their stores were successfully landed in conditions which were far from ideal. Some wildlife and intelligence photography was conducted but high level photography was impossible in the prevailing conditions. The BBC TV team who were shooting scenes for a series on Shackleton managed to achieve their planned sequences and were actually grateful for some bad weather shots. Unfortunately the planned visit to Signy Base had to be cancelled due to lack of time. Just as ENDURANCE was arriving back in the Falklands on 23rd December it was learnt that the Argentine Naval Icebreaker ALMIRANTE IRIZAR had arrived at the South Georgia Port of LEITH with Mr DAVIDOFF the scrap dealer embarked. Apparently Mr DAVIDOFF was to compile an inventory of the scrap together with photographs so that he could decide on future transport operations.

7. This in itself would have had minimal importance as DAVIDOFF had entered into a contract with Salvasons. However, as he had failed to undergo the normal immigration procedures, had not informed Grytviken and furthermore had arrived in a Naval Vessel without Diplomatic Clearance, I represented these facts in the strongest terms to HE the Governor.
8. This visit was all the more sinister as the IRIZAR had remained 'covert' throughout her passage to South Georgia, and as I had called on her Captain some 3 weeks before in BUENOS AIRES, where he openly gave me his ship's programme. He should have been in the Weddell Sea at that time not South Georgia!
9. I concluded that the Argentine Navy had entered into a most convenient 'Deal' with DAVIDOFF the scrap dealer so that British resolve over the Sovereignty of South Georgia could be tested. It had been my stated opinion for some months that Argentina would try to do a 'Southern Thule' in South Georgia and DAVIDOFF provided the ideal opportunity.
10. Mr HUNT (HMGFI) agreed with this theory, but unfortunately the Embassy in BUENOS AIRES played it down in the interests of maintaining good relations with the Argentines and the IRA IRIZAR got away 'Scott Free'. (I signalled these conclusions to CINCLEBY and the Ministry of Defence).

#### The Second Work Period

11. The Christmas break was of short duration (2 days) for there was the requirement to proceed to MONTEVIDEO and collect a new helicopter which was being flown out from England in an RAF C130 Hercules transport aircraft and was to arrive in MONTEVIDEO on Tuesday 29 December. So at 0630 on Boxing Day - an uncivilised hour - the ship got underway and headed North. The voyage was uneventful and the ship arrived in MONTEVIDEO in the afternoon of 29 December at the same time as the aircraft was landing. The following day was spent assembling the new helicopter and then on New Years eve following a successful test flight the new helicopter was embarked and the ship sailed for the Antarctic. Hopes of a failed test flight to allow New Years eve in harbour were dashed. but the ship itself was obviously reluctant to go for it suffered a major fuel injector failure on leaving harbour and we had to anchor just outside to effect repair. The RAF Hercules which also took off that afternoon obviously had similar misgivings for the aircraft suffered an engine failure on take off and had to return to MONTEVIDEO for repairs. But whereas the ship was underway again in a couple of hours the Hercules had to wait for a new engine to be flown out from the UK in another Hercules and the RAF had another 2 weeks in MONTEVIDEO. We could have forgiven them their luck if only they had had the forethought to take our homegoing mail out of their aircraft and put it on a commercial aircraft going on to UK.

12. The ship sailed directly from MONTEVIDEO South to the Antarctic Peninsula, collecting and delivering mail by helicopter on passing the Falklands. A team from the Scott Polar Research Institute led by Dr Vernon Squire and including Miss Monica Christensen from last year's party had joined the ship in MONTEVIDEO and the first task on arrival in Bransfield Strait (at the entrance to the Weddell Sea) was the location of a suitable large tabular iceberg for an S.P.R.I. experiment. Almost as if by Royal command on the morning in question a large tabular iceberg appeared to order and the entire day was devoted to the experiment. The 3 scientists and a party of six assistants from the ship's company were flown on to the centre of

this iceberg which was roughly of diamond shape with sides some three quarters of a mile long and standing 140 feet above sea level (and extending approximately 500 feet below the surface) The ship carried out the external measurements and launched a wave rider buoy to record the sea and swell while the S.P.R.I. scientists set up their instruments in and on the berg to record a whole spectrum of parameters, in particular the stress and strain inside the iceberg. Radio echo sounder runs were flown over the iceberg to establish its underwater profile.

13. These S.P.R.I. experiments are part of a sponsored worldwide study into the feasibility for using these massive antarctic icebergs both as a source of fresh water and as an energy source (a heat pump in reverse) and the experiments are a continuation of work carried out from ENDURANCE last year.

14. Overnight the ship continued south towards James Ross Island and during the afternoon while crossing the northern end of the Erebus and Terror Gulf encountered the first pack ice of the season. This slowed progress but there were sufficient leads to continue down to the Prince Gustav channel as far as the western end of Vega Island. Here the pack was consolidated into fast ice and further progress was halted. However the ship was now within helicopter range of the base camp at Brandy Cove and so the B.A.S. geologists were collected by helo while the ship lay parked alongside the fast ice. A ladder was put over the side and members of the ship's company enjoyed a short period stretching their legs on the ice. The golfers had to give up as they were losing too many balls.

15. Having embarked the geologists the ship then proceeded through Herbert sound to find the channel clear of fast ice was able to make the first recorded passage between Vega Island and James Ross Island and establish that a clear navigable passage existed between the Islands. The following four days were spent in the James Ross area. The helicopters were used to ferry the geologists to a whole host of isolated outposts for rock sampling which would otherwise have taken months of gruelling footwork to achieve. While this was going on the Surveyors conducted an open survey to the east of James Ross Island and covered a very worthwhile hitherto unexplored area. I visited Marambio Argentine Airforce Base and while there arrangements were made for myself and a large team from the ship to visit Hope Bay Argentine Base by Chinook helicopters on the following day. The Argentine Airforce at Marambio and the Argentine Army at Hope Bay could not have been more helpful or more hospitable, I contacted the Commanding Officer of the Airforce Base when he consistently referred to the area as the 'Argentine Antarctic', but otherwise relations were extremely cordial. The only point of note was the presence of Mrs PERLA BAUSCO at Hope Bay, who made some excuse when I invited him onboard and he subsequently lied to me when talking on the Radio about the movements of Mrs IRLAW. He referred to her making passage through the ice to the Bulgrin Base, when she was heading for Southern Thule! Perhaps they were all embarrassed about the South Georgia incident.

16. By Tuesday 12th January, all B.A.S. geology work had been completed and the ship left the James Ross area and proceeded eastward out of the Erebus and Terror Gulf to the northern end of the Bransfield Strait for another S.P.R.I. iceberg experiment. A suitable large tabular iceberg was not quite so easy to find on this occasion, and the search was hampered by patches of thick fog. However by midday a suitable iceberg was tracked down and flying operations commenced. Work throughout the day was severely disrupted by bad visibility and it was not until 2300 in conditions of almost complete darkness that the last man was recovered from the iceberg, the experiment successfully concluded the satellite transmitting station established and the ship continued North.

17. The following day was spent in the vicinity of King George Island and in the morning I and a small team visited Arctowski, the Polish Base, Presidente Frei the Chilean Base with its new extension called Tiente March. The poor Poles were in a pathetic state due to lack of support from home, but were coping manfully with help from everyone except the Soviets. The Chilean Base was a modern well disciplined Air Force transit base, operating C130 and the Russian Base was dirty, the people were scruffy and only the KGB men (who had arrived 2 days before) had a spark of life.

18. The ship anchored in Bahie Flides overnight and held a buffet supper party onboard for members of the various bases which had been visited. In addition to the normal British mixture of nationalities there were present, Russians, Poles, Chileans a Uruguayan and our Norwegian S.P.R.I. young lady - a truly international party and a unique feature of the co-operation which exists in the Antarctic. Much fuss was made of the Poles particularly in front of the Russians, but the whole event was an example of good international co-operation.

19. The following day an attempt was made to visit the Chilean Base of Arturo Prat on Greenwich Island but thick fog descended during the flight in and the visit had to be abandoned. That afternoon the ship called at Reception Island, an atoll formed by the crater of a dormant volcano, with a small passage sufficient to allow the ship passage into the lagoon to anchor off the old B.A.S. base abandoned after a major eruption in 1967.

Summary of the Second Work Period

20. This was a most successful period helped by good weather and very much freeze conditions in the James Ross area than in previous years. The B.A.S. geologists were extremely pleased with the work they accomplished and the S.P.R.I. achieved two most successful major iceberg experiments. Some useful hydrographic and magnetic work was done by the ships team and almost all the bases in the northern part of the Antarctic Peninsula were visited. In this context the Uruguayan officer borne on board for Antarctic experience was most invaluable as an interpreter for all the Spanish speaking bases and a request was made for him to remain for the third work period. Shortly after the start of the period the First Lieutenant developed appendicitis, however it was 'confined' by the use of drugs, and the Navigating Officer, assisted by the Charge Surveyor took over the Executive Officer's duties. The First Lieutenant was eventually flown back to the UK for an operation and is not expected to return until the middle of May.

21. The ship arrived back in Stanley on Sunday 17 January to a welcome pile of mail, an opportunity to play Soccer and Rugby and a limited run ashore. During a short three day stay I carried out the annual inspection of NP 8901. The result of this inspection has been reported separately. During this short visit to Stanley I paid my usual call on HEGFI and outlined the points noted during the previous work period, particularly the International effort being devoted to Geological work in the Peninsula, the attitude of the Argentines, Soviets Poles etc. Also the amount of military resources being pumped into the Peninsula area by Chile and Argentina and the Air and Sea lift capacity offered by both these countries. British facilities compared with the Argentines are vastly inferior and the Chilean Air facilities are most impressive. If Britain is to reap some of the economical benefits from this part of Antarctica the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of Energy and the MOD have to re-think our whole policy for the South Atlantic and not leave our devoted scientists with the most archaic methods of transport and communication.

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also at Stanley during this visit was the Defence Attache from Buenos Aires, a great friend of ENDURANCE. However I was disappointed at his lack of, and indeed since he mentioned it, the lack of knowledge at his Embassy over Argentine aspirations in the Antarctic. I lent him most of the ships video tapes so that he could improve their 'Education'.

### Tierra Del Fuego

22. The next period in the ship's programme had been partly allocated to guardship duties in the vicinity of Cape Horn to cover the Whitebread Pound the World Yacht Race organised by the Royal Naval Sailing Association, and partly as an opportunity to visit the Beagle Channel area and 'low key visit to Chile'. On the way down to Cape Horn from Stanley the opportunity was taken to visit Fox Bay settlement on West Falkland. These remote settlements are almost entirely isolated from the rest of the world and the visit of ENDURANCE in its Falkland Island guardship role is a major occasion. Members of the ship's company went ashore to watch the sheep shearing and afterwards most of the settlement appeared on board for a tour of the ship and refreshments in various messes. It is unfortunate that more of these settlement visits cannot be fitted in to the ship's programme.

23. Thursday 21st January saw the ship pounding into heavy seas through the Estrecho de la Maire and on towards the notorious Cape Horn. The bigger boats who were leading in the race had already passed but two of the smaller entrants were passed during the day. Thumping into the head seas and high wind meant slow progress and it was late that night before ENDURANCE succeeded in rounding the 'Horn'. Initially on a rescue mission to assist the British yacht 'Bubblegum', but the Chileans had the matter in hand, the ship entered the Beagle Channel into calmer waters and better weather for the passage up the channel and a three day informal visit to Ushuaia on the Argentine side of the channel. The ship arrived off the town, the most southerly town in Argentina, at 1330 and fired a 21 gun salute which was answered from the Argentine Naval Barracks. However the wind, which had been light and variable during the passage up the channel had by now increased to a steady 10 knots from the northeast and with no tugs the pilot and I agreed to anchor off. The official cocktail party was held that evening, guests sheltering by boat, not an ideal arrangement in the choppy conditions, but by the end of the party the wind speed was down to 5 knots again and I managed to creep alongside.

24. The reception by the Argentine Navy to the visit was surprisingly cold (separate signal). Only one of their officers attended the cocktail party as a private guest and they would not play football against the ship, or even allow use of their ground for a match against the local civilian side. Considering how cordial the Naval reception had been on previous visits to Argentine ports, even as recent as the visit to Puerto Belgrano two months previously, this cold reception was a disappointment. It was put down to the fact that the ship was due to go on to Punta Arenas in Chile and in the Argentine eyes Ushuaia was in the war zone in their conflict with Chile over the Beagle Channel. However Mr Tom Goodall, the Honorary British Consul made the ship most welcome and some members of the ship's company managed to see some of the very spectacular hinterland of Tierra del Fuego. Not only is Ushuaia the Naval headquarters for the Argentine War Zone in their dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel, but it is also the control centre for the 'Malvinas' and Antarctic Zones. ENDURANCE was clearly the 'Enemy' in this territory.

25. During the November '81 visit to Bahía Blanca, Captain Zavatiequi had been one of my guests at a lunch party and at that time made various kind promises about our forthcoming visit to Ushuaia as he was due to be promoted to Rear Admiral and to become 'Flag Officer Ushuaia'. In the event he was not at Ushuaia at all during our visit and it transpired that he had been 'called away' to Buenos Aires.

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Later his Chief of Staff Russo admitted to me (during the Mar del Plata visit) that he had 'orders' not to fraternise with the British and it would be more convenient if the Admiral was 'absent' from the Port.

25. As ENDURANCE left Ushuaia one of the more influential Buenos Aires papers announced plans to invade the Falklands, not an unusual occurrence but this together with the cold reception was the subject of a separate signalled report.

26. From Ushuaia ENDURANCE sailed west up the Beagle Channel, exchanging the Argentine pilot for a Chilean Naval Officer who was to act as pilot for the long transit up the western section of the Beagle Channel and then on through Canals O'Brien, Balleneros, Cockburn, Magdalena and eventually the Straits of Magellan to Punta Arenas. This was to be the first visit of a British warship to a Chilean port for many years and was very much a visit to test the Diplomatic water. The Naval pilot, a Lieutenant Commander Paul de Broque proved extremely efficient, spoke excellent English and was open and friendly. We were most fortunate in the weather for the passage through this most fascinating part of the world and the canals of Tierra del Fuego were reminiscent of the fjords of Norway. The towering mountains and occasional glaciers with its distinctive birch forests gives its own aura and brings to life the sketches of Darwin's explorations of the area. The ship anchored for the night in a small cove at the southern end of Canal Ballenero where two small local fishing boats were also at anchor. These came to inspect the ship and shouted exchange of greetings which eventually developed into a highly profitable exchange of goods, 150 large spider crabs for some frozen pork!

27. The following day the ship continued up Canal Ballenero and the Cockburn Channel and eventually arrived off Punta Arenas at 1900 and firing yet another 21 gun salute, berthed alongside the main jetty. The reception at the hands of the Chilean Navy was overwhelming and quite the opposite from the 'cold' atmosphere at Ushuaia. For a low key visit there was a full social programme of official calls and social events and everywhere we were received with genuine warmth and a desire for greater contact between the two navies. The ship's marine detachment spent a day ashore training with the Chilean Marines and came away impressed with both the motivation and the state of training within the Chilean Marine Corps. It was a friendly and most enjoyable visit, particularly in my case as I was able to renew a friendship with Commander Adolfo Cruz who had been my next door neighbor in Newcastle some years ago. He is now Commanding the Chilean Polar ship BRUCO PARDO, named after the captain of the Chilean tug YELCHO who rescued the crew from Shackleton's ENDURANCE.

28. The ship sailed on Saturday 30 January after an influential visit and proceeded east through the Straits of Magellan and out into the South Atlantic. We called briefly into Berkley Sound in the Falklands to change round personnel on the detached survey party and then continued north to arrive at Mar del Plata, Argentina on Thursday 4 February for the two week self-maintenance period and 'half term break'. The ship is well known in Mar del Plata having spent its SMP here every year for the last four years. There was the normal programme of calls and entertainment with the usual friendly reception for the ship from the Argentine Naval Officials and the local British community. The Ambassador, Mr Anthony Williams was present in Mar del Plata for the visit, as were all the yachts from the Whitebread Round the world Yacht Race which were berthed in the basin just ahead of the ship. Rear Admiral Charles Williams and the other officials from the R.N.S.A. Committee were also present in port. As usual the British community provided hospitality for the ship's officers, and this time for the first time four officers wives flew out from the U.K. for the visit under the terms of

Accommodation for the officers and wives was arranged at the Argentine Naval Hotel through the good offices of the Base Commander.

30. Excellent relations were maintained with the Submarine Base and the S.M.P. provided a welcome break for the ship's company as well as an opportunity to get through the routine maintenance schedules. Assistance with repainting was provided by the same Argentine contractor as the previous year, and an excellent service was provided. Good friends were established among the crews of the Round the World Yachts, and several repair jobs were done on board for the British entries. The Ambassador gave a cocktail party on board ENDURANCE for the Round the World Yacht crews and the race organisers including the South Africans! In contrast to 1981 the Argentine prices had fallen in value markedly against the pound and so prices ashore in Mar del Plata were reasonable. The ship's company could therefore afford a run ashore and several took the opportunity to travel to the more distant parts of Argentina.

31. The ship sailed from Mar del Plata on Monday 22 February having embarked a DPR(N) film crew headed by Mr Tippey and under the charge of Commander F. W. Ponsonby MA to DPR(N) who had been tasked to produce a Naval documentary film on the ship's activities in Antarctica. After a short three day passage the ship called to fuel and reembarc the detached survey party and the survey boat. In addition Lord and Lady Buxton joined the ship and remained as guests for the third work period.

#### The Third Work Period

32. The passage from the Falkland Islands south across Drake Passage was inevitably rough which was a good introduction to our passengers of the typical weather in this part of the world. However steady progress was maintained and the ship arrived off the entrance to Johnstone Passage at dawn on Monday 1st March for entry to Rothera. A busy day was spent landing the detached survey party and both ship's boats and setting up and calibrating the marks and trippers for the survey. In the evening the ship left Rothera and continued back up north to continue its other tasks leaving all the surveyors ashore to progress the work off Rothera. Tuesday evening was spent at Paradise B.A.S. base delivering the mail and stores and entertaining the personnel on board. The following day it was intended to start the major task of putting in the food and fuel dumps on to Brabant Island in preparation for the 1983 Joint Services Expedition. However the weather was most unfavourable being a mixture of high winds and thick fog. Several attempts were made to fly in and find suitable positions but flying conditions were hazardous and all attempts had to be abandoned. The ship proceeded to Paradise Harbour for the night to visit the Argentinian Base of Admiral Brown. This is a small but rather attractive base with a mixed scientific and naval crew. In the prevailing appalling weather finding an anchor berth where the water was shallow enough to anchor proved difficult and we eventually anchored in an uncharted section of the bay two cables from the base of a glacier in 100 meters of water. The Base personnel were entertained to supper on board that evening and the following day I visited the base accompanied by Lord Buxton. The ship then returned to Brabant Is. and for a second attempt at putting in the dumps. Although the visibility was much better, there was still excessive turbulence. The island is extremely rugged, rising some 8,000ft and either sheer rock face or heavily crevassed glaciers. Several attempts were made to establish landing sites but all had to be abandoned as unsafe. Eventually I decided that the task was not possible and that the best alternative was to land all the stores on the neighbouring Myers Island. The ship went round to Arthur Harbour and anchored off Palmer Station, the American Base on the island. Visits were exchanged with the base and the Base Commander kindly agreed to accept and store all the J.S.E. equipment.

During the following day whilst the stores were being offloaded by helicopter the U.S. coast guard icebreaker GLACIER arrived in the bay to collect stores from Palmer. As GLACIER's helicopters were unserviceable we were able to repay the favour by flying all the American stores from Palmer on to GLACIER's flightdeck. I visited their ship and had the Captain to lunch. I was unimpressed with the general state of the ship and the morale on board appeared to be low. It seemed strange to find so many female members of the crew carrying out menial tasks on board. Both ships sailed from Palmer that afternoon. ENDURANCE turned South and proceeded via the impressive and very scenic Le Maire Channel, (locally nicknamed 'Kodak Gap' from its photographic value) to return to Rothera.

33. In view of the excellent ice conditions this season it was decided to attempt to reach Rothera by the much shorter route passing inside of Adelaide Island. So on the morning of Saturday 6th March the ship entered Martha Strait and proceeded down towards Hennesse Bay. Some pack ice was encountered which gradually got thicker and heavier. However steady progress was maintained and as it was a beautiful sunny day the film crew were delighted with the opportunity to film the ship working in the ice. Eventually a good clear lead was found inside Hennesse Bay and a helo recee was flown to investigate the narrows. Unfortunately the helicopter reported back that the narrows were completely blocked by thick fast ice and that passage through was impossible. So course had to be reversed and the pack ice renegotiated to return back through Martha Strait to take the outside route. This took the ship through some unsurveyed areas during which the old cry, "Breakers ahead" was heard and we had to go hard to starboard to avoid an uncharted shoal - such are the excitements of navigating in the uncharted waters of the Antarctic.

34. There followed a concentrated period of ship survey work in the approaches to Rothera to provide a new route in to the base inside of Jenny Island. The ship covered the deep water while the survey boat coped with the more hazardous sections round the islands and shoals where the R.R.S. BRUNSFIELD had grounded in 1980. The weather remained favourable generally and excellent progress was made. However by Wednesday 10 March the time available had run out and the attached survey party had to return on board and the buses recovered. As the ship started northwards the weather broke and the wind built up to force nine from the west. To avoid the heavy seas we took the inner route via the Pendelton Strait and the Le Maire Channel to the Gerlache Strait. This time in the Le Maire Channel conditions were far from photographic, with low cloudy driving snow and winds were gusting up to 80 knots in the narrows. However conditions eased overnight and the following day I was able to visit Captain Arturo Prat, the Chilean Base on Greenwich Island on passing and later the same day paid another visit to the main Chilean Base of Presidente Frei on King George Island. Lord and Lady Buxton were able to accompany me on both visits. These visits completed time was getting short in the Antarctic Peninsula and course was set northeast for South Georgia.

35. Good speed was made with the assistance of the Weddell Sea current and Monday 15 May saw the ship once again off South Georgia in a mass of icebergs. During the forenoon the personnel of the Joint Services Expedition and all their equipment were re-embarked from Moltke Harbour, the men looking wild dirty but fit after their three months in the field. Then in the afternoon the ship went on round to St Andrews Bay where the flight were able to complete the salvage and disposal of the carcass of the Wasp which had crashed on landing during the first work period in December. In addition Lord and Lady Buxton were able to go ashore and call on their daughter Lady Buxton who together with her assistant Miss Anne Price had been at St Andrews Bay filming the King Penguin colony since November. The ship spent the night at anchor off the bay going round to Grytviken the following morning to visit the B.A.S. base and deliver and collect mail and stores.

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We sailed from South Georgia that evening and after another rough passage returned to the Falklands on Friday 19 March to end the Third Work Period.

#### Summary

36. The third work period was blighted by almost continual bad weather. In spite of all this major objectives were achieved. The main aim of establishing a fully surveyed channel into Rothera to the west of Jenny Island was achieved although due to defects with the boat trisponder and the poor weather not as much of the boat work was achieved as had been hoped for. The stores for the Joint Services Expedition to Brabant Island were not actually landed in their preferred locations but the expedition leader, Commander Chris Furse was more than satisfied with their eventual positions. The DPR(N) film crew were well pleased with the material they gathered although they had many frustrating periods due to bad weather. Most of the British and foreign bases in the Antarctic have now been visited with the exception of those on the South Orkneys, and finally Lord and Lady Buxton very much appreciated their visit and the Navy can be assured of even greater support in the House of Lords for its continued presence in the Antarctic and South Atlantic.

37. Having returned to the Falkland Islands the flight were disembarked, and the surveyors and the Royal marine detachment landed prior to the ship's planned passage up to Montevideo to embark the new NP8901. However events were moving in the South Atlantic which were about to shatter the peace and normality of the ENDURANCE annual routine. The story of these events is told in the next report.

#### Comment

38. It is both irritating and easy to be wise after the event and although the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia may have taken whitchhall and much of the world by surprise, the accumulation and rising crescendo of bellicose remarks should have given ample warning to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office particularly our Embassy in Buenos Aires, that the Junta were up to no good.

39. From a personal point of view, I spent a most frustrating Summer in 1981, trying desperately to impress upon a variety of authorities that the Antarctic is likely to become an important focal point area for world politics and international industrial development. If the Japanese and Communists can devote much time, effort and money towards this area not to mention the United States who this year are spending some £40 million compared with \$6 million from Great Britain, then we ignore this area at our immense disadvantage if not at our peril. My 'Warning Pipe' have been sounded and it can only be hoped that it is not too late to secure our rightful advantage in an area which has been largely pioneered by British Adventurers British Scientists and the Royal Navy, and where the oil reserves are currently stated to be approximately one third of those in Saudi Arabia.

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N J BARKER  
 Captain Royal Navy  
 Commanding Officer

Annexes:


1. Ships Flight
2. Supply and Secretariat
3. Marine Engineering
4. Weapons Engineering

Locations:

The Hydrographer of the Navy  
 Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Director of Research Naval Historical Branch

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The Commander in Chief Fleet  
Northwood  
Middlesex



Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit my report of proceedings for Her Majesty's Ship ENDURANCE for the period 19th March to 14 April 1982.
2. In my previous report of proceedings dated 24th May I mentioned my concern and some of the warnings given about the Argentine attitude towards the Falklands and the Dependencies. (Signals to MODUK NAVY 251955Z JAN 82 and 011245Z FEB 82). Against a background of economic depression and a worsening labour situation, it was becoming clear that GALTIERI was going to make some morale boosting gesture towards his people and the 'Malvinas' could provide the required emotional diversion. The increasing crescendo of bellicose remarks together with the firm intent to test British resolve over the sovereignty of South Georgia should have been sufficient evidence to alert the FCO and particularly the British Embassy in Buenos Aires that on this occasion the Argentines actually meant what they were publishing in their papers. Indeed the combination of Mr DAVIDOFF the scrap man and the Argentine Navy was in itself a suspicious intrigue and a remarkably convenient partnership for both the aspirations of the Argentine Government and also Mr DAVIDOFF. The build up had gone on against very mild Foreign Office opposition for several months. Argentine Naval ships had remained covert for each of their sorties to South Georgia and following the arrival of the BUEN SUCESO with the scrap men, the Captain was congratulated by his authorities for a most successful 'Operation'.
3. It was during the evening of 19th March that the message was received from BAS in South Georgia reporting the presence of the BUEN SUCESO at Leith. An Argentine flag had been hoisted, shot heard, and military men had been seen ashore. The message was passed to the Governor and I spoke with the base commander at Grytviken late that night for confirmation. At 0630 the following morning the Governor came onboard to discuss the situation with me, to speak personally with the base commander, to issue instructions and to send a sitrep to the FCO, MODUK and Naval Authorities. Later that day and following the final match of the Stanley Shield, (which was won by ENDURANCE) there was a buffet supper party given by the Manager of Cable and Wireless, Mr Ian Stewart and his wife, for the ship's officers and local officials including HEGFI and it was during this party that a message was received from the ship giving ENDURANCE orders to sail to South Georgia. Since all the necessary people, including the OIC NP 8901 were already at the supper party, a war council was convened in the kitchen; plans were made to re-embark the Flight, the ship's RM Detachment and to beef it up to platoon strength with the addition of nine Marines from NP 8901. The Surveyors were to remain in Stanley and continue their work with the survey launch James Caird.
4. On the 21st March the BUEN SUCESO was still berthed at Leith and it

was clear that the Argentines did not intend to comply with the Governor's instructions to proceed to Grytviken and complete the proper immigration formalities. Plans were therefore made to remove both the ship and the men on the ground from South Georgia. However, early on the 22nd March BUEN SUCESO sailed leaving behind an estimated number of 50 men, some of whom were considered to be Marines, and plans were modified to concentrate on the peaceful removal of the Argentine shore parties. Shortly before ENDURANCE arrived off Grytviken orders were received not to take any action against the Argentines but to remain unobtrusive, unprovocative and thereby observe and report all Argentine activities. This was a disappointment, not entirely because we were prepared for a scrap, but also because I had assessed that the Argentines were determined to demonstrate their Sovereignty over South Georgia, with similar intentions to those when they 'innocently' slipped into Southern Thule some 5 years earlier. The situation was going to be difficult to defuse and whatever happened the Argentines were going to make political capital, to claim British provocation and make escalatory gestures. In the event of course the Argentines were ~~made~~ to lock the aggressors and world opinion reacted accordingly.

5. The 'eyeball to eyeball' situation that followed was tense and particularly uncomfortable for the scientists at South Georgia and for ENDURANCE. I was well aware of the Argentine naval 'build up' and of the discussions that were taking place in the Diplomatic world, but was very concerned at the way that many of those involved in the discussions were underestimating the impending danger and also the determination of the Argentines. I asked to try to defuse the situation locally as I know (and did like) Captain Trombeta, my opposite number in the Antarctic area, but the situation was beginning to get out of hand and anyway Trombeta was getting bolder by the day and making a much better job of his relative velocity at sea in endeavouring to head me off when we were patrolling in close proximity. He did not succeed but we both knew that he was soon to have support from frigates and destroyers.

6. On one occasion I was in my private OP watching ARA BAHIA PARAISO disgorging the contents of his ship to the scrap men and Marines at Leith when I was spotted by his Alouette helicopter. Three of us waited to have some unpleasant explosive on us but perhaps this was the start of an incredible story of a cat (ENDURANCE) with nine or more lives throughout the South Georgia campaign (at least so far).

7. As the Argentine naval build up continued and the British Antarctic Scientists became more nervous it was very much the task of ENDURANCE to placate them, for even if the ship did not bristle with guns at least ~~we~~ ~~were~~ there to manage the situation and to evacuate the scientists if the Argentine threats came to fruition. My concern at this stage was to know what Argentine surface forces or sub-surface forces were heading for South Georgia or the Falklands and how they were likely to be deployed. Indeed I asked the Embassy at BA for information, and after a considerable lapse of time received a quote from the CLARIN and PRENSA (2 leading papers) stating that the Argentines were carrying out naval exercises! This did little to instil confidence in our diplomatic resources, but perhaps, I concluded, that the FCO was not going to take a strong line over the Falklands or South Georgia. If so, it was clear that ENDURANCE was to be the Sacrificial Lamb.

8. As the days wore on diplomatic exchanges continued, while the Argentines paid lip service to overtures made by Britain and the United Nations. Their Naval preparations were almost completed and an invasion of both the Falklands and South Georgia was imminent. Then suddenly on the evening of Wednesday 31st March ENDURANCE was sailed from South Georgia leaving the Royal Marine Detachment behind in defence of the scientists. The logic of this move was not clear, as the Falklands were to be invaded on the 2nd April, a fact which

was widely known, and it takes ENDURANCE approximately 3 days passage (and more in a force 40 gale which prevailed at the time) to reach Port Stanley. I could only assume that senior politician had said 'what on earth is our only ship doing in South Georgia, she ought to be in the Falklands', but perhaps I would not be writing this report if the ship had been allowed to stay and fight it out at Grytviken!

9. The odds of one Ice Patrol Ship armed with AS12 missiles and, by now, without most of her small arms (RM Detachment) against the might of the Argentine Fleet was daunting, but my aim was to go for the Argentine Fleet Oiler the Punta MEDANOS which was reported to be in the vicinity of Beauchene Island. I felt that if I could knock out the oiler, the threat posed by the very thirsty old ex-American destroyers would be reduced considerably but there was little ENDURANCE could do at sea halfway between the Falklands and South Georgia, in a force 40 gale. I decided that it was better to get back to South Georgia before it was too late, to support the Royal Marine Detachment to evacuate the scientists and to attack at least the Bahia Paraiso and if possible one or both of the corvettes. On 1st April the ship was ordered back to South Georgia, and at best speed I made for the SE end of the island. I did this in the light of a report that 2 corvettes, 2 destroyers, a submarine and a tanker were heading for South Georgia and I assumed that they would make their approach from the North. Furthermore by using the cover of the icebergs to the South and the coastline which I know well, I could possibly escape detection before arriving back in the vicinity of Grytviken.

10. At the same time I endeavoured to keep in touch with both Port Stanley and Grytviken on HF issuing instructions to my Detachment and BAS by either 'guarded' English or a very cumbersome 'Slide Code'. On April 2 at 0500, I lost contact with Port Stanley and expected to lose contact with South Georgia soon afterward. Throughout this, one of the most humiliating days in our history, World News Bulletins referred to Argentine proclamations of a great naval victory. Against whom? ENDURANCE I suppose who by this time was making best speed down wind towards South Georgia. I resolved to make their victory less easy if it was humanly possible, with a virtually unarmed ship and a bit of local knowledge. Later ENDURANCE was reported by the Argentines to have been sunk.

11. In the evening of the 2nd of April the Bahia Paraiso called the Grytviken base and informed them that the Falklands had surrendered and advised Grytviken to take similar action. My OCRM had clear instructions not to comply and eventually Bahia Paraiso said that the base was to 'stand-by for an important message at 8 o'clock in the morning'.

12. The 3rd of April started in earnest when I continued my original instructions to my OCRM at Grytviken. I reiterated instructions to defend the base, repeated the R.O.E. but told him not to continue fighting if lives were to be lost unnecessarily. It must be seen that Argentina took South Georgia by force. At approx 1115 (local), the Bahia Paraiso called the base and the base commander managed to delay his reply, and asked B.P. to listen on HF so that I could monitor the conversation and also consult DNOT and ACNS(O) on continued use of force if I could ever get within range to launch my Wasps with AS12 missiles.

13. Having been told that the R.O.E. did not allow an AS12 attack unless provoked, I carefully considered the definition of provocation particularly as the war being attacked were HMS ENDURANCE RM Detachment and returned to the HF voice net to try to delay the Argentine assault. I finally instructed my OCRM to defend in accordance with previous orders and shortly afterwards the line went dead and the battle was on. At 1515 I was at extreme range to launch a Wasp without arms to recon the area. The instructions to the Wasp were to 'shut down' on a ridge so that I could close with the ship leaving the aircraft



just enough fuel to return. The Wasp (Lt Cdr Ellerbeck) returned at 1700 reporting that the battle was over; one corvette was damaged, at least one knowledge which ship had imprisoned the RM Detachment. With the greatest regret, I concluded that a night AS12 attack, on a ship which could have my own troop embarked, launched from a mountain top, when by that stage I could hardly prove provocation would be disobedience of orders and a risk against our troops which I could not take. I was resigned to having more of my own ships company taken prisoner, for my surveyors had been taken prisoner at Stanley on the previous day after some spirited resistance, now the Detachment had also been taken prisoner after a gallant action. It was later learnt that my Detachment had damaged the corvette GUERICO and shot down two helicopters which, by any standard, was a magnificent achievement from such a small force.

14. I have also since learnt that the Argentines were well aware that ENDURANCE was in the area and could inflict some damage upon them. I, on the other hand, was still under the impression that there were two Exocet fitted corvettes in the area with the possible addition of two ex-American destroyers and a submarine. My intention was to locate these forces and to get to within range to attack if and when the rules of engagement allowed. My aim was not only to get within AS12 striking range but also to do so without being detected, then instructions followed ordering me to remain undetected, not to attack but to provide a much intelligence as possible.


15. The Ship's Company responded to this challenge with all that is best in our Service, enthusiasm, courage, dedication and with not a little apprehension that our red painted ship provided the enemy with a very slow and obvious target for the Exocet fitted corvettes. I was forced to play a game of cat and mouse for the next two days, using the bergs, the bays, coves and rocks often in partially charted, sometimes uncharted waters to remain camouflaged from the enemy. In addition to providing intelligence I endeavoured to placate the remaining British people on South Georgia ensuring them of our protection such as it was. Perhaps the most unpleasant aspect of this period was the realization that if we were forced to abandon ship after damage the life expectancies in those freezing waters was about 10 - 20 minutes with little or no hope of rescue by another ship. However with this and the other dangers faced at that time it did not diminish the courage and determination shown by my officers and men, they were first class. With very limited assets our will to win thorough and achieve those objectives was paramount and I feel that I can justifiably report that in our own way we succeeded.

16. On 5th April ENDURANCE left South Georgia to R/V with the Task Force after 17 days in the zone of conflict. There were mixed feelings of relief on the one hand and of leaving our friends in South Georgia on the other, whatever the case I hoped we could return and retrieve the situation, and on the 6th April a signal was received instructing the ship to join ANTRIM in a special group dedicated towards the re-capture of South Georgia. We were delighted and we all hoped that the Argentines would not be let off the hook this time.

17. After an uneventful passage where I managed to keep in touch with South Georgia through one or more of the indirect means, I joined ANTRIM and FLYMOUTH on the 14th April. Voluntarily both these ships companies cheered ENDURANCE as we approached, it was one of the most touching days of my life. We were not heroes, but we had emerged alive and ready to do battle again.

18. In a previous report I mentioned that it was irritating to be wise after the event and therefore I will not labour the lack of awareness shown by the FCO over both the Argentine character and Argentine aspirations in the South Atlantic. 'Know your enemy' has seldom been more aptly demonstrated. For ENDURANCE this period has been one of excitement, fear and I believe achievement to some degree. It has certainly been one which has demonstrated to the world how Britain and indeed Maritime Forces can react when the chips are down.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant



N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Information:

The Hydrographer of the Navy  
The Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Division.

226/1

HMS ENDURANCE  
BFPO ShipsThe Commander in Chief Fleet  
Northwood  
Middlesex

4 July 1982

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit my report of proceedings for Her Majesty's Ship ENDURANCE for the period 14 April to 2 May 1982. The report encompasses the re-occupation of South Georgia by British Forces (Operation PARQUET).
2. ENDURANCE joined ANTRIM, TIDESPRING and PLYMOUTH at 0900 on 13 April. This was our first encounter with part of the Task Force and their spontaneous gesture of giving three cheers as they passed ENDURANCE was much appreciated after our rather lonely war. Later that day my survey party was re-embarked from ANTRIM where they had been fully employed compiling photographic panoramas of South Georgia from a wide variety of intelligence photographs for the land forces. I was delighted to see the party back and to hear at first hand their contribution to the defence of Stanley. I also learnt that following the final surrender of ground forces at Stanley, the second in command of the party (Lieutenant C TODHUNTER Royal Navy) acted with great coolness and initiative and was able to recover vital survey records from Government House by remaining in plain clothes and posing as a reporter. This enabled him to move relatively freely while the remainder of the party and the Royal Marines were under guard. 144
3. During the afternoon of the 13th the ship was involved with a RAS(L) of both Dieso and Avcat. The evolution was conducted in near perfect conditions astern of TIDESPRING at about 4-6 knots. As this was a 'first' for ENDURANCE a jury RAS reception rig had to be improvised. On completion of the RAS the small Task Group started off on the six day passage, and in our case return to, South Georgia.
4. Throughout the run south ENDURANCE remained guide for the formation, and my maximum speed of 12-13 knots must have tried the patience of the other units. The passage was conducted covertly with a most restrictive Emission policy and with the use of formation ROMEO during RORSAT passes. The latter evolution led to a number of close quarters situations when darkened in poor visibility and without radar. Consequently, later in the passage ENDURANCE was nominated as radar guard ship during periods of poor visibility, with navigation lights being used during the closing phase of the manoeuvre. Another feature of the passage was the apparent continual need for the military personnel embarked in all ships to be regularly transferred for discussions, briefings and meetings. This particularly applied to the SAS units who required all members of their teams to be present at all stages of planning. This led to an almost continuous programme of helo transfers during daylight which was time consuming, generally wasteful of helo flying hours and largely unproductive (according to my SAS men). In hind-sight it would have been better if all planning cadres for each sub-unit could have been accommodated in the same ship. During the passage I and my officers made considerable efforts to brief both ships and military teams on the terrain and conditions in South Georgia, but unfortunately it soon became apparent that, even at this early stage, some military elements (notably SAS) were unwilling to respond to such advice and felt that the terrain of South Georgia was similar to Northern Norway. The covert passage ended at first light on 21 April when all ships were in a position to insert reconnaissance parties.

... at Round Bay ... was done a covert Vesp mission was flown to ... British ... at St Andrews Bay. The aim of this mission was ... to land one of my ship's company with the party at St ... to monitor the ... to ensure that no news of the return ... 'Red Flag' was ... the visit ... to ... to ... to provide the military planners with excellent ... the ... buildings at King Edward Point. The landing ... to be ... in two phases. Initially twelve SAS were to ... on the night of the 21 April. ... the ... and ... the ... to be ready to ... the ... of the ... and ... to ... the ... the weather ...

These pages, inserted among those of Captain Barker's letter of 4 July 1982, are from the copy sent to HMS ANTRIM. (Captain B G Young RN was CTG 317.9 for Operation PARAQUET.) They show Captain Young's own comments in red ink, in the margin.

Naval Historical Branch  
MOD

9 November 1984



5. ENDURANCE, with PLYMOUTH in support, was tasked with inserting elements of 2 SBS at Hound Bay but before this was done a covert Wasp mission was flown to the British Antarctic Survey base at St Andrews Bay. The aim of this mission was two-fold; firstly I wished to land one of my ship's company with the party at St Andrews Bay, ostensibly to provide a measure of protection and to monitor the regular radio conversation between BAS bases (to ensure that no news of the return of the 'Red Plum' was broadcast). Secondly the visit enabled me to embark Mr Peter STARK of BAS who was able to provide the military planners with excellent intelligence on the layout of the BAS buildings at King Edward Point. The landing of recce troops was to be conducted in two phases. Initially twelve SBS were to be landed at the head of Hound Bay by Wasp and Gemini on the night of the 21 April. This group would then advance over and secure the Sorling Valley to be ready to receive two gemini to be helo dropped at the extreme south east corner of Cumberland Bay East. Regrettably, like many plans in South Georgia, the weather intervened.

6. The initial insertion of six Marines was carried out in appalling conditions with the Wasp (Lt Cdr ELLERBECK) making three trips in violent turbulence and driving snow. The fourth lift returned on board in whiteout conditions and I had to cancel any further flying. However the remainder of the party and their kit were inserted later that night by gemini, once again in dreadful conditions. The intention had been to weigh and be clear of land by dawn, but fate intervened and my windlass motor burned out and I was forced to slip my starboard anchor and proceed to sea immediately. In view of the weather, sea state and the need to effect repairs to my windlass I moved down the coast to the relatively sheltered waters of Gold Harbour and removed the armature whilst PLYMOUTH maintained a patrol out to seaward. It was also later that day that I received the not surprising news of the SAS mountain troop who were in trouble in an untenable position on Fortuna Glacier. They went there against all advice resulting in the subsequent crash of two Wessex 5 helicopters in whiteout conditions. It is most regrettable that the SAS chose to ignore advice from me, my officers and experienced mountain and Arctic warfare Royal Marines in attempting this foolhardy landing which so nearly led to considerable and unnecessary loss of life. Life in South Georgia is much harder than Norway, and some were beginning to agree!

7. By the evening of 22 April the weather at Hound Bay had moderated sufficiently to fly in geminis to the SBS forward positions without undue difficulty and following this final stage of the insertion I had every expectation that the recce would proceed as planned and consequently cleared the coast to seaward as ordered by the CTG. There then followed one of the more frustrating periods of the operation, I needed sheltered waters to repair the windlass and to exercise the ship in the mass gemini drills that would be needed for the assault on Grytviken, where the plan was to use ENDURANCE as an LSL. Unfortunately we spent fruitless hours at sea almost hove to on high seas 30 miles to the north east of South Georgia awaiting the return of ANTRIM from the rescue of an SAS gemini adrift off Stromness Bay. It was during the afternoon of 23 April that two enemy contacts were made which radically changed the character of the operation. First the force was detected by an Argentine Hercules reconnaissance aircraft which closed to within eight nautical miles of PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING. It may have been a coincidence but this detection followed a statement on the BBC World Service that elements of the Task Force could be close to South Georgia. The second enemy contact of the day came when HF communications were intercepted by ENDURANCE and identified by PLYMOUTH. My initial assessment was that the transmissions originated from a sub-marine and that the signal strength indicated that it was within 100 nm. He was later proved totally correct in this assessment, and his conviction probably saved at least one loss at the hands of the submarine.

8. The threat to the force was dramatically increased and the aim of the CTG was to protect the troop carrying RFA whilst awaiting the arrival of HMS BRILLIANT as

Bay East. Regrettably, like many plans in South Georgia

6. The initial insertion of six Marines was carried out with the Wasp (Lt Cdr ELLERBECK) making three trips in violent turbulence and driving snow. The fourth lift returned on board in whiteout conditions and I had to cancel any further flying. However the remainder of the party and their kit were inserted later that night by gemini, once again in dreadful conditions. The intention had been to weigh and be clear of land by dawn, but fate intervened and my windlass motor burned out and I was forced to slip my starboard anchor and proceed to sea immediately. In view of the weather, sea state and the need to effect repairs to my windlass I moved down the coast to the relatively sheltered waters of Gold Harbour and removed the armature whilst PLYMOUTH maintained a patrol out to seaward. It was also later that day that I received the not surprising news of the SAS mountain troop who were in trouble in an untenable position on Fortuna Glacier. They went there against all advice resulting in the subsequent crash of two Wessex 5 helicopters in whiteout conditions. It is most regrettable that the SAS chose to ignore advice from me, my officers and experienced mountain and Arctic warfare Royal Marines in attempting this foolhardy landing which so nearly led to considerable and unnecessary loss of life. Life in South Georgia is much harder than Norway, and some were beginning to agree!

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*True that  
unnecessary  
and unnecessary  
loss of life was  
in great  
degree!*









13. This was not an enviable situation as I was well by the ship underwater and how, with a super-imposed need every bit of animal cunning to survive as well as inserting my troops. I did not have any depth charges rely on a possible periscope radar detection which was small pieces of ice debris.

14. However the paramount aim was to re-capture South that the risks to the ship had to be accepted in the I also convinced that I could take the South Georgia mentioned earlier and the quicker I could get my troops the better.

15. Before dawn on the 25 April we made the fourth of the operation up the, by now, very familiar coast of instructions to have a Wasp at alert 8 with AS 12 by ed to launch the Wasp for surface search in the vic shortly after launch, ANTRIM's Wessex reported a sub had attacked with a depth charge. On rounding Barff the submarine and attacked with two AS 12 in success second aircraft with two more AS 12. In the mele th fired 7 missiles of which 5 were assessed as hits on t On the final attacks the aircraft came under fire from tank missile, but the attacks were pressed home and ir was reported to be alongside at King Edward Point list

16. Having neutralised the sub-surface threat the immediate briefing was called onboard ANTRIM which was OIC 2 SBS and an assault was planned during which ENI Firstly one Wasp was tasked with flying in the Naval over to Dartmouth Point, and secondly to launch 2 SBS Bore Valley using BRILLIANT's Lynx. The first missi Commander and Senior Observer who, having seen the Argentine Forces, were delighted to see the process reverse in the British Land Force Commander to accept the later flew out both casualties of the operation, one! Regrettably ENDURANCE's second task was never carried ed troops were most frustrated at being left out of the surrender of Grytviken, I felt that time and daylight was detached under PLYMOUTH's command to secure the s Leith. Both ships arrived at dusk in Husvik Bay and the base commander later identified as Captain ASTIZ that the civilian scrap men employed by Mr DAVIDOV wou Marines under his command would fight. However after on Channel 16 VHF a surrender of all personnel was AG ordered to leave at once and walk round to Stromness taken prisoner by the SAS detachment dis-embarked from ASTIZ and his men were ordered to remain in Leith until out behind a white flag to be taken prisoner by combin before dawn. This plan was duly carried out and ASTI PLYMOUTH where a simple surrender ceremony was conducted.

17. Later ASTIZ told me that he was trying to persuade hell pitch at Leith where he would blow up myself and surrendered! Certainly he had dug a large hole underneath the 'H', another miraculous escape but the experienced 'killer'. 'It was the only way I could get you', he said.

to need every bit of animal cunning to survive as well as achieve my own aim of re-inserting my troops. I did not have any depth charges (I now have) and could only rely on a possible periscope radar detection which was all the more complicated by small pieces of ice debris.

14. However the paramount aim was to re-capture South Georgia and I concluded that the risks to the ship had to be accepted in the presence of that aim and I was also convinced that I could take the South Georgia garrison by executing the plan mentioned earlier and the quicker I could get my troops back in their fighting posture the better.

15. Before dawn on the 25 April we made the fourth covert passage in this part of the operations up the, by now, very familiar coast of South Georgia to Hound Bay with instructions to have a Wasp at alert 8 with AS 12 by daylight. At 0910 I was ordered to launch the Wasp for surface search in the vicinity of Cumberland Bay, but shortly after launch, ANTRIM's Wessex reported a submarine on the surface which he had attacked with a depth charge. On rounding Barff Point my Wasp also sighted the submarine and attacked with two AS 12 in succession. Meanwhile I scrambled by second aircraft with two more AS 12. In the melee that followed ENDURANCE aircraft fired 7 missiles of which 5 were assessed as hits on the casing or conning tower. On the final attacks the aircraft came under fire from automatic weapons and an anti-tank missile, but the attacks were pressed home and in the final stages the submarine was reported to be alongside at King Edward Point listing and issuing smoke.

16. Having neutralised the sub-surface threat the initiative was regained, an immediate briefing was called onboard ANTRIM which was attended by my Ops Officer and OIC 2 SBS and an assault was planned during which ENDURANCE's role was twofold. Firstly one Wasp was tasked with flying in the Naval Gunfire Support Forward Observer to Dartmouth Point, and secondly to launch 2 SBS and elements of SAS into Bore Valley using BRILLIANT's Lynx. The first mission was executed by my Flight Commander and Senior Observer who, having seen the capture of Grytviken by the Argentine Forces, were delighted to see the process reversed. Subsequently my Wasps flew in the British Land Force Commander to accept the surrender of Grytviken and later flew out both casualties of the operation, one to ANTRIM and one to ENDURANCE. Regrettably ENDURANCE's second task was never carried out and once again my embarked troops were most frustrated at being left out of the action. Following the surrender of Grytviken, I felt that time and daylight were being wasted until I was detached under PLYMOUTH's command to secure the surrender of the garrison at Leith. Both ships arrived at dusk in Husvik Bay and I started negotiations with the base commander later identified as Captain ASTIZ. Initially his position was that the civilian scrap men employed by Mr DAVIDOV would surrender but that the Marines under his command would fight. However after I had spoken to him further on Channel 16 VHF a surrender of all personnel was agreed. The civilians were ordered to leave at once and walk round to Stromness where they would be met and taken prisoner by the SAS detachment dis-embarked from ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH. ASTIZ and his men were ordered to remain in Leith until first light and then walk out behind a white flag to be taken prisoner by combined SAS and SBS troops landed before dawn. This plan was duly carried out and ASTIZ was brought onboard PLYMOUTH where a simple surrender ceremony was conducted.

17. Later ASTIZ told me that he was trying to persuade me to land on the football pitch at Leith where he would blow up myself and the helicopter even after he had surrendered! Certainly he had dug a large hole underneath the 'H', another miraculous escape but this time at the hands of a very experienced 'killer'. 'It was the only way I could get you', he said.

18. In the aftermath of the invasion there were many tasks and problems to be faced. The first two areas that required immediate attention were the custody of

*My ship!*

*Any extraction in action! Furthermore was was only that sure in the film!*

*Wrong - it was our ship!*

*InSBSAS! It would have been with us was quite sure of Grytviken!*

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(P. 17)

task I had onboard an ~~onboard~~ spare seaman watch keeper. In the days following AS tried out a full reconnaissance of all buildings and a took an underwater search of the jetty area with the following two weeks over 1100 kilos of PE and TNT, so located and counter mined by the ship's divers, other conditions. In addition ammunition, detonators and profusion and also counter mined except for 7.62 ammu for use by the ship's company and M Company for small were found but it is believed that most were either d fiord or buried.

20. It was also during this period that the Captai questioning (he had actually been onboard not long b del Plata!) and he revealed that his aim had been tw and to land his trdop of Special Forces at Grytviken the vicinity of the South Georgia coast on the 23 an detected a merchant ship off the coast and this was recee. ASTIZ had also informed the submarine of EN Friday 23 April they were not aware of any other shi the attack on Sunday 25th. This account very much ment of ships. The ANTRIM group had moved some 30 was the only British surface vessel remaining in the learnt much later that SANTA FE had an 'attack solu though my second hand report stated that the CO thoi the records it could have only been ENDURANCE and t tubes at Grytviken. Another miraculous escape.

21. Amongst this activity, I conducted a Board of an Argentine Senior Rating POW onboard the SANTA FE King Edward Point to Grytviken. The findings of t arately but it is sufficient to say that it was a n was a result of inexperience and poor briefing.

22. By Thursday 29 April Operation PARAQUET forces take up their new roles. PLYMOUTH had departed w

the prisoners and the making safe of all the mines, explosives and booby traps in Leith. The first decision concerning the prisoners from Leith was that the Argentine Marines should be separated from the civilian scrap merchants. Consequently I embarked ASTIZ and his men and the two senior managers of the scrap merchants, whilst PLYMOUTH took on the scrap labourers. Onboard ENDURANCE I regarded the two groups as requiring totally different levels of custody and supervision. ASTIZ and his troops were thoroughly searched by my SAS embarked force and then confined under armed guard in the hold. Later, when PLYMOUTH and the SAS departed for the Falklands, all the scrap men were embarked in ENDURANCE and members of the ship's ad hoc landing party took over duties. The civilian managers I confined in the guest cabin until they dis-embarked into TIDESPRING later in the week. As the civilians were regarded primarily as detainees the two leaders were permitted to gather up their men's kit under supervision which then accompanied them to TIDESPRING. It was with some satisfaction that we had this party embarked as they were the catalyst for the whole conflict and had caused ENDURANCE much anxiety in the early stages.

19. The explosives at Leith had initially been made safe by ASTIZ under close supervision of SBS officers. All approaches to the whaling station had been heavily mined mainly with command detonated fragmentation devices made up from plastic explosive or TNT blocks, rocks and scrap iron. It was most fortunate that for this task I had onboard a MCDO (Lt O'CONNELL) who had been loaned from ILLUSTRIOUS as a spare seaman watch keeper. In the days following ASTIZ departure Lt O'CONNELL carried out a full reconnaissance of all buildings and approaches to Leith, and later took an underwater search of the jetty area with the ship's diving team. Over the following two weeks over 1100 kilos of PE and TNT, some in dangerous condition, were located and counter mined by the ship's divers, often diving in the most appalling conditions. In addition ammunition, detonators and hand grenades were found in profusion and also counter mined except for 7.62 ammunition which was confiscated for use by the ship's company and M Company for small arms training. Some weapons were found but it is believed that most were either ditched in the deep water of the fiord or buried.

20. It was also during this period that the Captain of SANTA FE was embarked for questioning (he had actually been onboard not long before when the ship was at Mar del Plata!) and he revealed that his aim had been two-fold; to sink enemy ships and to land his troops of Special Forces at Grytviken. He had been operating in the vicinity of the South Georgia coast on the 23 and 24 April and on Saturday had detected a merchant ship off the coast and this was later confirmed by the air recee. ASTIZ had also informed the submarine of ENDURANCE's presence, but since Friday 23 April they were not aware of any other ships in the immediate area until the attack on Sunday 25th. This account very much coincides with the actual movement of ships. The ANTRIM group had moved some 300 miles to the ENE and ENDURANCE was the only British surface vessel remaining in the vicinity of South Georgia. I learnt much later that SANTA FE had an 'attack solution' on the 'merchant ship' although my second hand report stated that the CO thought it was a 'tanker'. From the records it could have only been ENDURANCE and the torpedoes are still in the tubes at Grytviken. Another miraculous escape.

21. Amongst this activity, I conducted a Board of Inquiry into the shooting of an Argentine Senior Rating POW onboard the SANTA FE during a shift of berth from King Edward Point to Grytviken. The findings of this Inquiry are reported separately but it is sufficient to say that it was a most unfortunate incident and was a result of inexperience and poor briefing.

22. By Thursday 29 April Operation PARAQUET forces were starting to disperse and take up their new roles. PLYMOUTH had departed with all the Special Forces for the Falklands, M Company were settling into Grytviken and King Edward Point and starting to prepare their Observation Posts and defences. TIDESPRING was coping

*As a witness  
on the Bell!*

*Wrong  
I do not  
believe this!  
It was ~~incorrect~~.*

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the Falklands, M Company were settling into Grytviken starting to prepare their Observation Posts and defend manfully with the problems posed by 180 prisoners. the force ENDURANCE was given the pleasant task, but ically and flying conditions), of visiting all the BA upants. Since the defeat of the Argentine Forces we bases on their regular HF net, and so on 30 April and uncharted west coast of the island to retrieve the oc at Schleiper Bay and Bird Island and brought onboard botanists, glaciologists, biologists and two ducks. ble Miss Lucinda BUXTON and Miss Annie PRICE from th All the BAS personnel were later transferred for 24 hc to recover the personal and scientific equipment or v Argentines crude attempts at looting and destruction. in ANTRIM who sailed on 2 May to escort TIDESPRING ar Ascension Island.

*Please is not an  
"Hemmings" as  
the description of a  
like Pex!*

23. ENDURANCE was again happy to be alive, happy to end and run the place as a forward operating base for the

manfully with the problems posed by 180 prisoners. Before the final break up of the force ENDURANCE was given the pleasant task, but at times difficult (geograph- ically and flying conditions), of visiting all the BAS bases to evacuate the occupants. Since the defeat of the Argentine Forces we had been in touch with the bases on their regular HF net, and so on 30 April and 1 May I went round to the uncharted west coast of the island to retrieve the occupants of the Summer Bases at Schleiper Bay and Bird Island and brough onboard a collection of very relieved botanists, glaciologists, biologists and two ducks. We also embarked the Honourable Miss Lucinda BUXTON and Miss Annie PRICE from their exile in St Andrews Bay. All the BAS personnel were later transferred for 24 hours to Grytviken to attempt to recover the personal and scientific equipment or whatever remained after the Argentines crude attempts at looting and destruction. Finally all were embarked in ANTRIM who sailed on 2 May to escort TIDESPRING and her prisoners towards Ascension Island.

23. ENDURANCE was again happy to be alive, happy to take charge of South Georgia and run the place as a forward operating base for the final push into the Falklands.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Information:

The Hydrographer of the Navy  
The Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Division  
The Commanding Officer HMS ANTRIM

From: Captain Nicholas Barker, Royal Navy

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HMS ENDURANCE  
RFPO Ships

The Commander in Chief Fleet  
Eastbury Park  
Northwood  
Middlesex

21 July 1982

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit my report of proceedings for Her Majesty's Ship ENDURANCE during Operation Corporate for the period 3 May to 17 June 1982. *disputed  
naval?  
37*
2. Following the successful re-occupation of South Georgia during Operation PARAGUET, ships that had taken part rapidly dispersed leaving ENDURANCE as South Georgia Guardship, then shortly afterwards as Commander Task Group 317.9. I assessed my tasks as threefold. Not in any order of priority but firstly to provide technical, communications and help support for M Company 42 Commando RM who had taken up residence at King Edward Point as South Georgia garrison. This remained a continuous task through the following months, although slightly relieved by the arrival later in May of the first Packet Ship. She had ferried down much needed personnel and kit to provide domestic, communications and vehicle transport. These supporting elements were apparently necessary to convert a 'fighting unit' (ie a Company) into a garrison capable of its own administration and support services. Secondly there was the task of clearing up both Grytviken and Leith after their occupation by Argentine Forces. Grytviken was lightly mined and largely left to the garrison, while I concentrated the ship's assets on Leith. The problem was twofold; in the first place a large number of detonators, explosives and ammunition had to be found and either made safe or countermined. Secondly I resolved to clean up some of the squalor which was left behind and make the buildings habitable again. The final task was to prepare for the maintenance, repair and stores consolidation of Task Force ships in South Georgia. This involved the survey of anchorages and jetties and reconnaissance ashore to assess the facilities available. This preliminary work was of great value and importance, and later enabled the successful consolidation of four RFA, the cross decking of 5 Infantry Brigade and the supply of vital repair materials to STENA SEASREAD. It was also of great interest to me personally as I had long been the advocate of South Georgia being used for the peaceful exploitation of Antarctica rather than the logistic support of a South Atlantic war!
3. The first week was spent in and about the anchorages off Stromness Bay working on the clearance of Leith. At the same time a survey was started in the vicinity of the jetty at Stromness with a view to securing ships alongside for repair of maintenance. Both tasks progressed well despite very low temperatures and winds gusting up to 70 knots. ENDURANCE dragged anchor three times during the week, each time recovering a mass of cordage, wire and chain which had to be cut away whilst lying drifting in the most sheltered water available and eventually I was forced to remain at slow speed at sea until weather moderated. It was during this week with much valuable work being done that the Argentine CVFP previously being used by the Scrap Merchants was restored to working order by My Weapons Engineering Officer (Lieutenant D HUTCHINGS); a task which required great patience and engineering skill.

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In later weeks this bright orange craft became a familiar and most useful asset in the South Georgia anchorages. The end of the week saw the start of the build up of the South Georgia fleet with the arrival of three ships. The Tug SALVAGEMAN entered Cumberland Bay early on Saturday morning completely unexpected, due to her communications difficulties. This caused a 'Stand To' by the garrison who were understandably concerned to see an unidentified vessel entering their bay. RMA S TYPHOON arrived 24 hours later and assumed duties of South Georgia tug whilst SALVAGEMAN was despatched to the TEZ. This decision was, I believe, unfortunate as TYPHOON with her single screw was clearly better suited to ocean work whereas SALVAGEMAN later proved a most versatile and manoeuvrable vessel well fitted to the varied tasks in South Georgia. To end the week RFA BLUE ROVER arrived on Sunday with a most welcome delivery of mail.

4. During this period the ship's diving team lead by Lieutenant D O'CONNELL Royal Navy were carrying out their search and demolition tasks around Leith. During the three weeks that followed the re-occupation they found, collected and countermined well over 1100 kilos of TNT and plastic explosive, much of it in a dangerous state. In addition quantities of rockets, mortar bombs and other ammunition were found and either used by our own forces for training or countermined. The majority of the material was found on land, but an underwater search was also carried out in the vicinity of the main jetty at Leith. This task was undertaken in freezing Antarctic water amongst thick kelp in zero visibility. Under these conditions the team found and brought to the surface a quantity of arms, explosives and ammunition together with kit bags containing personal items and some radio equipment of considerable intelligence value. In doing so some divers exceeded 600 minutes diving time in three weeks. It was a task carried out in the best traditions of the Service requiring stamina, skill and fortitude of the highest order.

5. The following week started with the first of many threat warnings that were to recur throughout the campaign. In this case CTF 317 had assessed that the Argentine submarine SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO had sailed some 7 days before and could be en route to South Georgia. With no ASW search capability there was little that could be done to protect the high value units with ships, but I resolved once again to use geography and the environment to give as much protection as possible. Consequently at first light a visual reconnaissance was flown by ENDURANCE's Wasp, and then ENDURANCE in company with BLUE ROVER made a covert passage close inshore from Grytviken to Stromness Harbour. Of all the South Georgia anchorages Stromness is the best protected to seaward and this was the first of several occasions that I used this feature to advantage. Later in the week after a successful fueling from BLUE ROVER, ENDURANCE carried out a sketch survey of Gold Harbour for use as a possible consolidation anchorage. Unlike Stromness the anchorage is open to seaward, but I hoped that a measure of ASW protection would be provided by the presence of icebergs rather than by the terrain. On return we undertook the final embarkation of Argentine stores from Leith. The stock of tinned foods and rather cheap wine were shared amongst the ships in the Group and the garrison and with those that arrived later and were much appreciated by all. At the end of the week to our general relief SANTIAGO was located near Belgrano and we were able to relax slightly. But the high spot of the week was the arrival of MV STENA SEASPREAD who took up a hover station in Stromness Bay with the intention of setting up fleet maintenance facilities in relatively calm waters with a reduced air, surface and sub-surface threat.

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6. The arrival of SEASPREAD with an FMG embarked was a great boost to the many projects in hand at South Georgia. Her manoeuvrability, craneage and best technical expertise were used fully for three days to prepare Stromness to receive ships for repair and maintenance. During the period a full technical reconnaissance was carried out of all three disused whaling stations off Stromness Bay to establish and catalogue the facilities and raw materials available. On Wednesday, however, work ceased as SEASPREAD was ordered to sail for the TEZ. I was disappointed by this decision as both SEASPREAD and I considered that the repair work could best be carried out in sheltered water well away from the main Argentine threat rather than at sea in the TEZ in what I expected to be bad sea conditions. As part of the process of setting up a maintenance base at Stromness the reconnaissance troop from M Company accompanied by the Commander Land Forces (Major SHERIDAN) carried out a reconnaissance and an appreciation of the military forces needed to defend the anchorages. This work was carried out in conjunction with my own assessment of the air and seaborne threat. The joint conclusions reached were that in order to secure South Georgia against the known Argentine threats an additional company group would be needed on the ground in Stromness, and a measure of air defence supplied either by ground based SAM or a point defence fitted escort. A defensive minefield was also proposed to add to the ASW protection of the consolidation anchorages.

7. The final task during the week was the preliminary attempt to salvage the Argentine submarine SANTA FE which had been crippled by depth charge and AS12 attacks and disabled by BRILLIANT's diving team by blowing off the rubber. She was now sunk alongside the jetty at Grytviken with only the fin above water. Initially pumping by TYPHOON assisted by ENDURANCE's diving team was partially successful but after four days the only salvage pump available became defective and the project was abandoned for the time being. The final event of the week was the arrival of MV SAXONIA, the first merchant vessel to be sent to South Georgia to consolidate RFA from the Falkland Islands Task Groups.

8. The week starting 24 May once again heralded an intelligence report. This time there were indications that the submarine SALTA was midway between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. I assessed that she would be tasked in the antisubmarine role, and that consolidation shipping in South Georgia was the specific target. Consequently SAXONIA and BLUE ROVER were sailed to lie in the icebergs to the east of the island, and at the same time M Company established an OP on Tonsberg Point to visually cover the approaches to the anchorages. ENDURANCE planned to deploy to Gold Harbour Bay from where I could fly a concentrated programme of visual probes using fuel dumps established earlier at St Andrews bay, Grytviken, and Leith. Fortunately after 24 hours of intensive preparations, intelligence sources assessed that the initial SALTA report to be incorrect and that she was in fact at Belgrano. Almost simultaneously it was learned that the cross decking of 5 Infantry Brigade would be taking place in South Georgia at the end of the week, and preparations were made accordingly. Before that main event, however, the first Packet ship (CS IRIS) arrived with stores and mail for all units as well as having my Marine Detachment embarked. I was most pleased to see them again and congratulate them personally on their spirited defence of South Georgia. During IRIS's short stay a signal was received from STENA SEASPREAD to say that she was short of ship repair materials and so IRIS was despatched to Stromness where after considerable effort by a party from ENDURANCE, led by my Marine Engineering Officer (Lieutenant W STEPHENS), quantities of steel plate were embarked. Simultaneously the Argentine LCVP was used to raid Leith and was able to embark single iron and cutting gas in excess of STENA SEASPREAD's demands which was then loaded into IRIS before she sailed. STENA SEASPREAD later reported that

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these materials had been used extensively in the repair of GLASGOW and other bomb damaged ships. By the middle of the week the South Georgia group had been further augmented by the arrival of the five CORDELLA class minesweepers of Task Unit 317.0.3. The group were to wait in South Georgia until their services were needed in the Falklands, and in the weeks to come this small group of rust streaked trawlers proved to be an invaluable asset.

9. On Thursday afternoon Cumberland Bay began to fill. CANBERRA and NORLAND arrived at 1500 followed at 2030 by QE 2. A meeting was immediately convened onboard QE 2 where a blunt discussion took place on the timescale for the cross deck operation. The military view was that the move should start the following morning whereas my instructions and indications were to expedite the move in order for the Brigade to reach the Falklands at the earliest opportunity and to reduce the time that a large concentration of valuable, attractive and vulnerable ships were concentrated in the waters of Cumberland Bay. Fortunately my arguments were backed by the forceful voice of the SNO CANBERRA who, like me, believed speed was of the essence, and the naval arguments won the day. The transfer started that night. For the next 72 hours 5 Brigade and at least 250 tons of stores were transferred using helicopters, minesweepers, TYPHOON, LEEDS CASTLE (who was passing through at the time), ships, boats and the familiar LGVP! Initially transfers were just from QE 2 to NORLAND and CANBERRA, but later in the week EFA STROMNESS arrived to embark stores and ammunition from QE 2 and from another new arrival, the ammunition ship LYCAON. Throughout the transfer the cheerful and dedicated hard work by the minesweepers of TG 317, 0.3 was the key to the success of the operation. They manoeuvred their single screw vessels in marginal conditions alongside liners and stores ships whilst loaded to the limits of stability before moving to offload to their allocated ship. TYPHOON as well played a significant part as, due to the low side door in NORLAND, no stores could be disembarked from the trawlers into her, and so single handed TYPHOON transferred the 1/7 Gurkha Rifles with their kit and stores from QE 2 to NORLAND.

10. As ships were emptied or filled, they departed. CANBERRA left early on the morning of Saturday 29 and QE 2 followed the same evening. It was, however, during the 29th that an alarming incident occurred when the BRITISH WYE was bombed by a HERCULES aircraft. Until then I had assessed that apart from carrier based aircraft the only land based air threat to South Georgia was posed by Canberras operating at the limit of their endurance, in very hostile climate armed with only two bombs apiece. With the advent of the armed Hercules the threat was changed and this added to my desire to clear QE 2 from the area at the earliest opportunity. This desire was heightened by the unconfirmed report of an aircraft sighted high over Cumberland Bay on the afternoon of the 29th. This could have been the returning 'BRITISH WYE' aircraft or a separate reconnaissance mission, but in either case I assessed that due to its height it would be photo rather than visual reconnaissance. The final transfer from QE 2 into the sweepers took place in a 10 foot swell in Cumberland Bay where only skillful seamanship by all the parties involved prevented an accident, or injury. Finally QE 2 slipped out of the bay at 1900 to take a dog leg to the east before a fast run to Ascencion. During the transfer I had been privileged to meet the survivors from COVENTRY, ANTELOPE and ARDEENT when they transferred from CANBERRA to QE 2, and it was a humbling experience to hear their stories of the loss of their ships. The stores transfer however went on, with STROMNESS moving around to the more sheltered waters at Leith to load ammunition and stores from both QE 2 and LYCAON once again packhorses by the trawlers. The transfer finally completed at 1430 Sunday 30 May when STROMNESS sailed for the Falklands.

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11. Following the attack on BRITISH WYE and the possible overflight of South Georgia by recon aircraft, my assessment of the air threat at this stage was that the Argentine could well mount a similar attack in our direction. Therefore, on Sunday and Monday all units stood to in AA all day with the limited close range weapons available and I deployed Wasps up threat primarily as visual lookouts but also armed with AS 12 to put as much flack in the path of an incoming Hercules as possible. Ships that were not involved in transfers were sent east to lie up hidden amongst the chaff (bergs) until the threat reduced. This group now included RFA RESOURCE who had arrived during the QE 2 transfer to consolidate from SAXONIA. Later I was delighted when an Argentine reconnaissance aircraft reported that there were no enemy ships at South Georgia. He had looked only at Grytviken and failed to search Husvik and Stromness Bays. At least that ruse had been successful.
12. The week that followed was one of frustration, high winds and seamanship. The consolidation of RESOURCE took place mainly in the harbour at Husvik where I considered the holding ground was best, and where there was a certain amount of room for large ships to manoeuvre. Unfortunately all attempts by SAXONIA to berth alongside RESOURCE failed mainly due to poor manoeuvrability and the lack of a powerful manoeuvrable tug. As a result both ships anchored and consolidation was progressed once again by TU 317.0.3. These little ships were also pressed into service as water carriers when fresh water stocks in LYCAON ran dangerously low. It was during this week that the South Georgia weather played its ace; on no less than four occasions winds gusting off the glaciers at up to 70 knots caused all ships to drag despite, in some cases, 13 shackles of cable out. Fine seamanship and ship handling by both SAXONIA and RESOURCE averted disaster on each occasion as they fought their way clear of the narrow confines of Husvik Harbour. Eventually after a week of patience and hard work by all parties, RESOURCE was stored and she sailed for the TEZ on Saturday 5 June. Also on Saturday, 3 of the 5 minesweepers sailed for the TEZ to be available for their primary task of minesweeping in and around the islands. I was sorry to see them go.
13. To counter some of the frustration caused by the weather the week did see an improvement in our ability to counter the Argentine threat by the arrival on Tuesday morning of HMS ANTRIM. For the duration of her stay she was tasked to remain at sea during daylight hours 5-10 miles to seaward of the anchorage in use. An event emission policy was ordered as I assessed that a slow and heavy aircraft such as a Hercules would stay well clear of a known AAW ship. The final event of the week which was to greatly improve the position of consolidation ships was the arrival on Sunday of the ocean tugs SALVAGEMAN and YORKSHIREMAN, who were to be of great value throughout their time in South Georgia.
14. The two tugs had an early opportunity to prove their worth when STROMNESS returned to Cumberland Bay on the morning of Monday 7 June. This time she had come from the TEZ for stores consolidation and by midday SAXONIA had been moved alongside by the tugs and storing could progress apace. This development did not allow the two remaining minesweepers a respite, as they were again required as water carriers for the newly arrived tanker PEARLEAF, and once again for LYCAON. Such a start to this consolidation was of course too good to last! The weather broke on Tuesday when storm force winds caused SAXONIA/STROMNESS combined to drag across Cumberland Bay despite the efforts of the tugs in attendance. Luckily the gale was short lived and storing was recommended on Wednesday morning. The early part of the week also saw other arrivals and departures. LYCAON sailed on Tuesday morning with her explosive cargo to be offloaded in the Falkland Islands. She had only been partially

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offloaded in South Georgia at the time of the QE 2 transfer, but had withstood violent winds and blizzards and by good seamanship had remained in the Stromness anchorage when the rest of us were forced out to sea. The arrival on Tuesday evening of the North Sea oil vessel WIMPEY SEAHORSE saw a ship with a vast deck cargo of buoys, mooring chain and shackles. Her task was to lay buoys in the South Georgia anchorages to assist future consolidation and maintenance operations.

15. The alongside consolidation of STROMNESS was again broken off on Thursday by strong winds and a swell running into the bay and so the storing was completed once again by NORTHELLA and FARNELLA. But late on Thursday STROMNESS sailed fully stored to be relieved by RFA REGENT who arrived on Friday morning. Fortunately this final RFA to be stored in South Georgia had the required effect on the weather and her storing from both SAXONIA and GEESPORT was completed by Monday 14 June. This fortunately was the day that the Argentines in Port Stanley surrendered. As a result no further consolidation operations took place in South Georgia and the forces began to disperse. HMS FARNELLA and NORTHELLA departed to join the remainder of their Task Unit to sweep mines in the approaches to Stanley, and GEESPORT also sailed to the west with her much needed cargo of fresh fruit and vegetables. ENDURANCE with M Company embarked set off to the east in the next chapter of the Odyssey on Operation Keyhole and the recapture of Southern Thule.

16. Conclusion: During the period of this report ENDURANCE was employed exclusively in and about South Georgia. During all operations the weather and environment played a crucial role. The weather remained a constant source of speculation and at times irritation especially as winds up to 70 knots frequently sprung up in less than an hour only to drop to a gentle breeze after six hours or so. At the latter end of the period blizzard conditions added to the problems. Conversely, on occasions the weather and environment were used to our advantage, I was most grateful for the fog and low cloud that shrouded the first 24 hours of the QE 2 transfer, and I was equally pleased to use the presence of icebergs amongst which to hide the high value units during periods of air and sub-surface threat. The importance of manoeuvrable ships and tugs was also much appreciated during the operation as well as the need for safe, secure anchorages (preferably with buoys already laid) for this type of operation. Overall the triple aims of support of the garrison, the clearance of Leith and Grytviken and most important the transfer of stores and personnel were achieved in a spirit of maximum co-operation despite the military threats and the elements.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

**CONFIDENTIAL****HMS ENDURANCE  
BFPO Ships**

226/1

The Commander in Chief Fleet  
Eastbury Park  
Northwood  
Middlesex



18 July 1982

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit the report of OPERATION KEYHOLE, the repossession of Southern Thule, which was carried out under my command between 14 June and 24 June 1982.

Background

2. Southern Thule is the southernmost island in the South Sandwich group, a chain of islands of volcanic origin stretching in an arc some 180 miles long down as far as 59 deg 30 mins south. They were first sighted by James COOK from HMS RESOLUTION on 30 January 1775, who named them after the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord SANDWICH. Subsequently they were visited by a host of explorers, and were used as a base for whaling operations in the early twentieth century. However, due to the extremely hostile nature of the terrain and climate they were never permanently settled. However in 1976, without any request or notification, the Argentines established a base on Southern Thule at the site of the old British Antarctic Survey observation station. The existence of this station was not discovered until HMS ENDURANCE made a routine visit around the islands for hydrographic purposes in 1977. Notes of protest were sent from the Foreign Office to the Argentine Government but these were ignored. Due to the policy not to aggravate relations between the two countries no measures were taken to eject the Argentines and the existence of the base was to all intents and purposes ignored by the British Government. HMS ENDURANCE carried out scientific work in the South Sandwich Islands during 1981, but I was given strict instructions not to land on Southern Thule or have any contact with the Argentines less the gestures be interpreted by an International court as a sign of acceptance of the Argentine claim. However, the opportunity was taken while ENDURANCE was in the area to monitor the activity there and carry out some covert reconnaissance. At that time it was assessed there were 42 Naval people at the base.

3. After hostilities between Britain and Argentina broke out over the Falkland Islands in April I proposed a small expedition to remove the Argentines from the base at Southern Thule, and on 14 June as Stanley was being retaken by British Troops I was sent the warning order for OPERATION KEYHOLE. Copies of the important signals sent during this operation are at Annex B.

Preparation

4. The composition and numbers of Argentine forces on Southern Thule were unknown. The intelligence estimate put the number at a possible one hundred and ten, but basing on our own assessment and reconnaissance of the base the previous year I put the number between 40 to 50. There was a hangar on the base so it was possible that there were helicopters there. The area was also within range of HERCULES aircraft either from the mainland or the Antarctic base at MARAMBIO. However, the main opposition in this operation was likely to be the weather. The pack ice would normally be advanced to cover the southern islands in the group by the end of June. This year, because of the good summer satellite imagery, indicated that the pack was still some thirty miles south of Southern Thule. But the pack ice was advancing and isolated areas of pack ice could well be found to the north of the ice edge. Temperatures were expected to be about minus ten degrees celsius and this combined with strong winds and poor visibility would produce a daunting task.

essential that this operation was concluded with the least possible delay so that it could be seen as being part of the overall operation. I was therefore instructed to issue an ultimatum to the Southern Thule base on HF and try to get the occupants to agree to surrender merely by the threat of force without recourse to the more time consuming deployment of forces from the TEZ. So at 2040 on 15 June my CTF contacted MARAMBIO, the main Argentine base, and passed the following message:

'The Falklands and South Georgia are now in British hands. To avoid further bloodshed you are to give up possession of base CORBETA URUGUAY. All complement will be embarked in the British ship HMS ENDURANCE and will be repatriated to Argentina. Otherwise we will bomb and take Thule by overwhelming force.'

In due course at 2138Z the following reply was received from Thule:

'You are navigating in Argentine waters and the station CORBETA URUGUAY is carrying out scientific work.'

As the reply did not commit the garrison to surrender it was decided to press ahead with a forceable evacuation. The wording of the reply indicated that they thought ENDURANCE was already in the area - in fact we were still firmly off South Georgia.

#### The Plan

6. Initially I had agreed that ENDURANCE could undertake this task, assisted by the tug SALVAGEMAN, and using two troops from M Company 42 Commando, who were already at South Georgia, providing that I was supplied with some Blowpipes and operators to give an element of air defence. However, it was decided that HMS YARMOUTH and RFA OLMEDA would be sailed from the Task Force to provide the requisite 'overwhelming force' if necessary. So the order for OPERATION KEYHOLE was issued by CTF 317 and a meeting was held on board ENDURANCE to plan the whole operation.

7. In order to expedite the task it was decided that ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN would sail before YARMOUTH and OLMEDA arrived from the TEZ. ENDURANCE would embark the Recce Troop from M Company and also, providing the trials were successful, embark the Messex V from REGENT to improve the troop lift capability and allow the Recce Troop to be inserted in one lift. The balance of Marines from M Company and the Blowpipe missiles would follow later. This arrangement had the advantage of getting the Recce Party ashore and giving them one day of observation before the arrival of the main force. It also allowed ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN (ice strengthened) to reconnoitre the sea area around the island for ice and recommend the best way in for the other two less well equipped ships. Weather and ice were going to be critical factors in this operation and arrangements were made by CTF 317 for the RAF to fly a C130 mission down to Southern Thule to establish the sea and ice conditions in the area, establish the northern limit of the pack ice and also carry out a fleet-  
ing recce of the base itself.

8. So at 1500Z on Tuesday 17 June, just two days after the receipt of the warning order, ENDURANCE, with 22 Marines from M Company embarked and one large Messex occupying one half of the hangar, sailed from South Georgia for the South Sandwich Islands with the tug SALVAGEMAN in station astern.

9. The weather remained kind and a good speed of 11½ knots was maintained. Isolated icebergs were encountered but there were no signs of the pack. On Friday 18 June an AA rapid open fire exercise was carried out on passage with the ship's 20 mm Cerlikons augmented by the automatic small arms fire of the ship's 24 detachment and the embarked forces. It produced an impressive display of firepower. In the meantime YARMOUTH and OLMEDA carried out RAS(S) and (L) at South Georgia and having embarked 81 Marines from M Company, at 1900Z sailed from South Georgia for Southern Thule. Unfortunately the C130 recce flight was cancelled, apparently due to a forecast of bad weather over the target area and so no advance intelligence was received.

#### The Operation

10. ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN arrived in the vicinity of Southern Thule in the early

morning of Saturday 19 June. The weather was heavily overcast, the wind blowing from the west at 20 to 25 knots and there were persistent snow showers which drastically reduced visibility. In addition the still air temperature was minus 11 degrees; which with the strong wind gave a chill factor of some minus 45 degrees. With the sunrise at 1050Z and sunset at 1650Z the hours of daylight were very limited. However, fortunately there was no pack ice to be seen in the immediate vicinity and the scattering of icebergs provided convenient cover from the possible attack by Argentine aircraft. The ships therefore laid up five miles to the northwest of Thule in the close vicinity of a convenient large tabular iceberg. Then shortly after sunrise a Wasp reconnaissance was flown to investigate the chosen IS for the Recce Troop. Flying conditions were marginal to say the least, but I decided to go ahead and insert the Recce Troop on the ice cap above the base but a little further to the east than originally intended because of the crevassing on the ice (see map at Annex C). The Recce Troop was flown in by Wessex at 1130 with the Wasp armed with AS12 missiles riding shotgun. Weather conditions remained grim but the landing was successfully carried out with great credit to all involved particularly the aircrew. Unfortunately it was learnt from listening to the radio reports from the base that the Recce Troop insertion had been detected, I decided to press ahead and leave the Recce Troop in position. To counter the loss of surprise I decided to fly an overt recce of the base area and also to carry out further Wessex flights to simulate numerous further troop landings to confuse the Argentines and keep their heads down. The Recce revealed no obvious fixed defences, and the only activity was the frantic burning of classified material.

11. The plan for operations on the following day was to demand surrender by radio but if this was not forthcoming to put in a gradually escalating demonstration of firepower using NGS from YARMOUTH and missiles from the helicopters on an isolated rock just off the base. If this did not convince the Argentines to surrender then the buildings themselves would be attacked and the full force of Marines landed from CIMEDA. But, in accordance with instructions, 'minimum force' was the order of the day.

12. Overnight ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN remained in the vicinity of the convenient iceberg while YARMOUTH and CIMEDA closed from the northwest and reached the rendezvous at 0400Z. Unfortunately the weather was too bad for transfer of orders and maps so these had to wait until the first light for transfer by Wasp together with the transfer of the Blowpipe missile and crew to ENDURANCE. Radio contact was maintained with Recce Troop overnight which had moved forward in atrocious weather conditions to an OP above the base and had dug themselves in on the ice. This was a feat of outstanding physical stamina.

13. The following morning the OP reported no activity at the base and no sign of any defensive positions. I attempted to call the base on the radio to demand the surrender but was unable to raise any reply. So H Hour was set for 1330Z and the ships moved to their assault stations. However as minimum force was a firmly stated criterion I decided to take ENDURANCE right up to within half a mile of the base within range of my 20mm guns to provoke a reaction and some response on the radio before ordering the start of the bombardment. As ENDURANCE closed the base the Recce Troop reported that a party of Argentines had come out of the main building and were walking towards them waving a white flag. I immediately cancelled the NGS which was due to start in six minutes time. CIMEDA was ordered to land one troop of M Company along with ENDURANCE RM Detachment to take over the base and I flew ashore by Wasp to accept the Argentine surrender of the base. It was all over without a single shot being fired.

#### Tidying Up

14. The Argentine garrison turned out to be one Teniente de Corbeta of base command and a crew of nine servicemen and one civilian technician, many fewer than had been expected. The base was searched for arms and explosives and any items of intelligence value. Little was found until the last day as the garrison had plenty of warning of the impending evacuation and all the cryptographic materi-

all end scientific records had been destroyed in the preceding three days. A quantity of plastic explosive was found and a large number of detonators. These were disposed of. Some small arms ammunition was found in the base and a large quantity of weapons, radio equipment was finally spotted in the sea by one of the helicopters. The radios and the scientific equipment had been systematically destroyed and the whole base was in a chaotic state. The prisoners and M Company were withdrawn to OIMEDA by helicopter. ENDURANCE had anchored in FERGUSON BAY just to the south of the base and at 1800 a small surrender ceremony was held on board witnessed by the Commanding Officers of all the ships and the Oic of M Company.

15. The following day ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN remained in FERGUSON BAY to secure and tidy up the base. YARMOUTH and OLMEDA sailed for South Georgia, taking with them the prisoners and M Company less the Recce Troop which, together with the Blowpipe detachment, remained in ENDURANCE.

16. From informal questioning of the base commander it was learnt that his party were landed in December 1981 by the IRIZAR after her clandestine visit to South Georgia. He said that the base was mainly a statement of Argentine sovereignty over the South Sandwich Islands and also part of the South Atlantic communications and meteorology chain. He said that the arms and ammunition had been dumped, and the radios and scientific equipment destroyed on instructions from Buenos Aires. He claimed that two million dollars worth of equipment had either been destroyed or ditched. The base was to be increased and half the hangar, which was constructed last year, was to be converted to give more accommodation and logistic support. He confirmed that the BAHIA PARAISO had sailed from Thule to support the South Georgia invasion which gives credence to the view that this was a premeditated move, also it can be assumed that some of the Thule base complement were landed at South Georgia. The base commander, who was very young and spoke reasonable English, was very upset by his capture and particularly anxious over the BBC reports that there had been no opposition. He considered that although specially selected at a very early age for his current position his future prospects were very dim.

17. ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN remained at Southern Thule in extreme weather conditions securing the base until 1700 on Tuesday 22 June. No evidence of any scientific work other than meteorology could be found. The base was cleared up as best as possible in the time available and any documentation of a possible intelligence value was recovered on board. Food stocks were either ditched or retained on board for use. Apart from the mess and some broken windows the buildings were of good design and in a reasonable state of repair. The base was left secured and with the Union Jack still flying.

18. ENDURANCE with SALVAGEMAN in company proceeded up the South Sandwich chain overnight and in the morning did a quick circuit of Zavodovski Island to view the volcano and to confuse any Argentine air attack before heading back for South Georgia. The weather on the way back was surprisingly good, a pleasant change from the high winds, driving snow and sub-zero temperatures of the previous three days. This allowed a fast passage speed and both ships anchored in Cumberland Bay at 1430 on Tuesday 24 June, exactly one week after setting out on the operation. ENDURANCE resumed the duties of GNO South Georgia from HMS ANTRIM and returned to more mundane work.

#### Summary

19. This was a highly successful mission conducted in severe Antarctic winter weather. Fortunately we were just in time and the pack ice did not present the hazard which had been feared, and the small Argentine garrison chose not to offer any resistance. However great the credit must go to the Recce Troop of M Company who spent a gruelling 24 hours in the most severe of weather. In addition the aircrew flew helicopters in conditions far beyond their normal limits. As the aircrew flew helicopters in conditions far beyond their normal limits. As the events turned out the use of force was not necessary. However had circumstances been different it is considered that the appropriate firepower was immediately available and the determination was there to see it through. The 'unofficial' pre-

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presence of the Argentines on this useful piece of British soil has been a source of frustration for several years. They have been removed hopefully for good. This iceclad rock together with the other Sandwich Islands could become important when the exploitation of Antarctica starts in a few years time.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

*N J Barker*

N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Annexes:

- A. Timescale of events
- B. Key signals (FOF 3 only)
- C. Map of Southern Thule

Information:

The Hydrographer of the Navy  
The Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Division

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ANNEX A TO HMS  
ENDURANCE's 226/1  
dated 18 July 1982

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

(All times ZULU)

- 15 June 82                   Warning order received  
2040 Message demanding surrender passed to Southern Thule.
- 16 June                    Operation order for OPERATION KEYHOLE received.  
P.M. Meeting on board ENDURANCE
- 17 June                    YARMOUTH and OLMEDA depart TEZ  
M Company Recce Troop and REGENT Wessex V embark in ENDURANCE  
1400 ENDURANCE sails South Georgia, SALVAGEMAN in company.
- 18 June                    YARMOUTH and OLMEDA arrive South Georgia.  
RAS(S) and (L). Embark 81 Marines from M Company.
- 19 June                    0800 ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN arrive Southern Thule  
1300 Recce Troop inserted.
- 20 June                    0400 YARMOUTH and OLMEDA arrive Southern Thule  
1200 ENDURANCE starts to close Argentine base  
1224 Argentine garrison surrendered  
1300 M Company landed  
1800 Surrender ceremony in ENDURANCE
- 21 June                    All day ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN at anchor in FERGUSON BAY  
1400 YARMOUTH and OLMEDA sail for South Georgia thence TEZ
- 22 June                    All day ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN in FERGUSON BAY  
1700 Sail for South Georgia
- 23 June                    On passage
- 24 June                    1430 ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN return to Grytviken

226/1

HMS ENDURANCE  
BFPO Ships

The Commander Task Force 317  
Eastbury Park  
Northwood  
Middlesex

5 August 82

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit the report of proceedings of Her Majesty's Ship ENDURANCE as Commander Task Group 317.9 and subsequently Commander Task Unit 317.8.7 between 24th June and 6th August 1982. This covers the final period in South Georgia, a visit to the Falkland Islands and the passage to Ascension.
2. ENDURANCE returned from the successful repossession of Southern Thule on Thursday 24th June with Ocean Tug SALVAGEMAN in company and took back the duties of Senior Naval Officer South Georgia from HMS ANTRIM. Present in South Georgia on return were the following units;
  - a. HMS ANTRIM air defence unit.
  - b. MV SCOTTISH EAGLE station tanker.
  - c. RFA REGENT station stores ship.
  - d. WIMPEY SEAHORSE laying moorings.
  - e. Tug YORKSHIREMAN assisting berthing and transporting stores/personnel.
  - f. MV BRITISH ENTERPRISE III despatch vessel (temporary visitor).
  - g. M Coy Gp 42 Cdo Royal Marines Garrison.
3. BRITISH ENTERPRISE III had just arrived as the despatch service and as well as bringing a welcome delivery of mail also returned my First Lieutenant who had been away in the United Kingdom for the last five months with appendicitis. Having refuelled from SCOTTISH EAGLE, ENDURANCE went alongside the small jetty at King Edward Point, largely to allow the engineers an opportunity for some self maintenance but also allowing the best access to the Argentine submarine SANTE FE which was to occupy much of our attention for the next few weeks.

#### The Salvage of the Sante Fe

4. The SANTE FE had been badly damaged during the recapture of South Georgia and been placed alongside the jetty by the old whaling station at Grytviiken. Here it had been disabled and subsequently sunk. The submarine was lying with just its fin above the water and heeling over some fifteen degrees to port. In this position it was not only obstructing the most valuable alongside berth on the island but, as it was still fully loaded with torpedoes, it was also a distinct hazard to the nearby BAS base where M Coy were living. An initial attempt to refloat the submarine was made by

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ENDURANCE divers and RMAS TYPHOON in May, but this was abandoned when the pumps failed. However, on return from Southern Thule I decided to put a major effort into moving the submarine using the SALVAGEMAN and ENDURANCE divers with the task firmly supervised by two ex-submarine officers, my H Charge Lt Cdr Ives and my Supply Officer Lt Cdr AINSLIE. These two officers, with the diving team and the men from SALVAGEMAN put in an enormous effort over the following three weeks in freezing Antarctic conditions inside a stinking oily hulk.

Their labours eventually resulted in a successful salvage of the submarine and she was beached by the Hestesletten, south of King Edward Cove, and out of harms way, yet in a position where she could be recovered if needs be. The full story of the salvage of the SANTE FE in a detailed report is given in my letter dated 17 July 82.

#### Moorings

5. As the Falkland Islands had been recaptured, the requirement for moorings at South Georgia had been queried, but instructions were received to go ahead with the moorings as planned, since separate moorings were being supplied for the Falklands. So WIMPEY SEAHORSE under the direction of Mr Roger FERRY the MBSO forged ahead with this work starting with a four legged first class buoy in Stromness Harbour. Conditions were far from ideal; strong winds, driving snow and sub zero temperatures made working on deck extremely difficult and the very deep water of Stromness put an extra strain on equipment and men. Unfortunately an anchor shackle parted in the final stages of the 1st class lay and the mooring had to await diving assistance before it could be completed. However, good progress was made with the second class mooring which was completed off Leith and finally a third class mooring was laid inside King Edward Cove for the use of the guard ship or for future visits of B.A.S. vessels to Grytviken.

#### The Garrison

6. M Coy of 42 Cdo under the command of Captain C J NUNN Royal Marines had taken over after the recapture of Grytviken on the 3rd April and been installed in the B.A.S. base as the garrison ever since. They had been somewhat envious of the exploits of the other companies of the Commando who were seeing further action in the Falkland Islands particularly after the capitulation of Stanley when it was learnt that 42 Cdo were to be repatriated. On return from the Operation at Southern Thule vigorous efforts were made by M Coy Gp to return to the United Kingdom in company with the rest of their Commando, which caused a plethora of signals to and from the various authorities as attempts were made to organise a relief garrison and the necessary transport of personnel and baggage. However, eventually arrangements were made for detachment of Scots Guards, some 55 strong, to relieve the Royal Marines and in due course HMS AMBUSCADE arrived with the advance party on the 7th July. On the following day NORDIC FERRY arrived with the main party and to collect the out going Royal Marine Garrison.

M Company had never been particularly happy with their task at South Georgia largely because they missed the initial action, but they did well throughout and I was delighted to be given the opportunity to take them on the Southern Thule Operation where the Recce Troop under Sgt NAPIER, put up a fine performance in terrible weather conditions.

7. During this final period in South Georgia, winter arrived in no uncertain terms. There were frequent heavy falls of snow and the temperatures dropped and stayed well below freezing. The track between King Edward Point and Grytviken became impassable and movement outside the base area required snow shoes or skis. However the gale force winds which had so plagued the consolidation phase during the autumn mostly died away to be replaced by occasional blizzards and some glorious sunny days. Furthermore with the easing of the enemy threats the ship's company was able to take some time off ashore. Expeds were organised to the managers house at Husvik which was being renovated as a weekend house for future use. Many of the ship's company tried their hands or rather their legs at skiing while others took out the tobogans. Indeed the slopes behind Grytviken resembled St Moritz!

In addition the old cinema at the Whaling station, though in rather a dilapidated condition, was converted into an indoor football court.

8. During the early days in South Georgia I had set up a Development Committee to study and undertake certain projects to improve facilities in the island. Of these, some, (like the moorings and salvage) were completed before we left; some, like the exped facilities were progressed, while others like the long term improvements to the jetties were progressed but not far enough. At the time of writing no firm plans have been made for future garrisons at South Georgia or for the levels of forces in the South Atlantic. However, if, as it appears likely, there is to be an increase in the defence effort in the area then thought should be given to the best use that can be made of the facilities in South Georgia. The island offers a refreshing alternative to the Falkland Islands both for the troops and the ships. There are excellent exped opportunities as well as suitable areas for live firing and army training ashore. It is an area of outstanding natural beauty and in the past has always been a stopping place for the specialist cruise ships which can visit the Antarctic. It has also been used extensively in the past by the Eastern Block fishing vessels as a base and watering port. With the expanding interest in the development of resources in the Southern Ocean the island would benefit, from the maintenance of a strong British presence and an improvement to the facilities. A suitable arrangement between the British Antarctic Survey and the Ministry of Defence is needed to make the best use of the situation. When possible it is recommended that Grytviken be garrisoned by Royal Engineers so that the jetties can be properly repaired and a survey can be undertaken to select the best position for a C130 Air Strip.

The Run Down in South Georgia

9. With the recapture of the Falkland Islands it was inevitable that the importance of South Georgia as a consolidation area and forward operating base would diminish and so it was therefore not surprising that the size of Task Group 317.9 gradually declined. HMS ANTRIM sailed on the 26th June to rendezvous with the carrier group before proceeding home. RFA REGENT sailed on 26th June for the Falklands, followed on 10th July by the SCOTTISH EAGLE. So I was left with the two tugs SALVAGEMAN and the YORKSHIREMAN and the WIMPEY SEAHORSE still busy laying moorings when on the 10th July the Task Group was reorganised as Task Unit 317.8.7.

10. However, our own days in South Georgia were numbered. Encouraging progress was being made on the SANTE FE salvage and the repair ship STENA INSPECTOR had been nominated to take over the duties of South Georgia guardship. The STENA INSPECTOR arrived in the afternoon of the 12th July and the handover started. The team were taken round the various anchorages and whaling stations while the Clearance Diving team assisted WIDEY SEAHORSE to complete the first class mooring in Stromness. On Tuesday 13th the despatch vessel G.S. IRIS arrived not only with another very welcome large delivery of mail but also with an extra salvage pump which we hoped would finally enable the SANTE FE to be refloated and moved.

11. And so eventually at midday on Friday 16th July, the handover having been completed and the SANTE FE having been safely parked, ENDURANCE with SALVAGERMAN and YORKSHIREMAN in station astern sailed from South Georgia with the back drop of the huge mountains glistening white in the winter sunshine. It had been almost exactly four months since the ship had originally arrived at South Georgia in response to the illegal landing of the scrapmen the event which sparked off the whole confrontation.

#### The Falkland Islands

12. The passage across to the Falkland Islands was inevitably rough and the RAS(S) scheduled with RFA REGENT had to be cancelled. Unfortunately due to poor visibility the ship's company were unable to catch more than a glimpse of the carrier task group when it passed a few miles to the south. Then on Monday 19th July ENDURANCE returned to Stanley, our erstwhile home in the Southern Ocean. The familiar landscape was somewhat crowded, Supply ships for the task force crammed the outer harbour and occupied all the berths in Port Stanley itself. The harbour was busy with boats, while overhead the air was full with the clatter of helicopters. Ashore the streets were full of army vehicles and teemed with men in the varying uniforms this was all a far cry from the peace and quiet of former times. Never-the-less the ship was given a most heartwarming reception. Mr Rex HUNT, the newly styled Civil Commissioner gave a party for the officers and senior rates at Government House and we received the most humbling and sincere congratulations from the many friends from Stanley who were present, I felt they were the people who deserved the congratulations. During the visit I called on Rear Admiral D R REPELL (CTG 317.8) in HMS BRISTOL, and Major General THORN Commander Land Forces.

13. Having embarked the survey launch 'James Caird' and left behind the commandeered Argentine launch 'James Turd', ENDURANCE sailed from Stanley on Wednesday morning with Mr Rex HUNT, the Civil Commissioner embarked to visit some of the outlying settlements. The first call was at Fitzroy, the scene not a few weeks previously of the disastrous attacks on SIR TRISTRAM showing no visible signs of the recent conflict. The few local people who were in the two settlements were invited on board for lunch and it was interesting to listen to their stories of the war. Having delivered some badly needed diesel fuel, the ship then steamed overnight round south of the island and the following day visited Fox Bay in West Falkland. The ship had previously visited here in January on the way down to Cape Horn and so this was another opportunity to visit old friends. People from both East and West Fox Bay settlements and the Major from the small garrison were invited onboard for a large buffet lunch, some in the Wardroom others in the Senior Rates Mess. Again it was interesting to hear the stories of the war from the local people. They had not suffered unduly under the Argentines but were very relieved to be liberated. They spoke extremely highly of the Gurkha troops who have been billeted with them after the recapture and had been very sorry to see them go.

14. Overnight the ship steamed back to Stanley and the following day fuelled from the resident tanker. Then having landed Mr Rex HUNT with resounding farewell cheers from the ships company. ENDURANCE finally sailed from Stanley in procedure Alfa with guard paraded and a colourful display of fireworks.

15. The passage to Ascension was uneventful and the ship arrived on the morning of the 4th August to await the arrival of HMS HECATE to hand over the duties of Falkland Island Dependencies Guardship.

#### Summary

In my previous reports of proceedings, I have endeavoured to stress the importance of Antarctica and the exploitation of minerals and fish as major resources for the future. For it is in that context, which I believe the Falkland Island Dependencies assume importance as forward operating bases for the oil and fishing industries. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are indisputably British for whatever historical claims Argentina may put forward over the Falklands the same cannot be applied to the dependencies. Of course Argentina believes in a spurious longitudinal claim to a sector of the Antarctic and therefore the ownership of the South Georgia and the South Sandwich assume a corresponding importance. Although emotion runs high in Argentina over the ownership of the 'Malvinas' any emotion over the other islands only seems to occur because they are described as 'Dependencies'.

I have mentioned that the Soviets and East Germans have used South Georgia as a safe haven during the summer months in past years. It is not known what our future policy will be in allowing this to continue but you will be aware that the Soviets are 'fishing' throughout the South West Atlantic/Antarctic area and I've no doubt will be keeping a very sharp eye on any mineral exploitation.

Geologically and climatically South Georgia is completely different from the Falklands, South Georgia of course being part of the Scotia Arc, running from Tierra del Fuego, round through South Georgia, South Sandwich, South Orkneys and the Antarctic Peninsula. Oil has been found in fairly large quantities in the north of Tierra del Fuego. Geologists operating from ENDURANCE this season had some 'Promising Finds' in the Antarctic Peninsula area, so who knows what the future holds for the other islands. They are surely worth defending. That the Argentines are still making bellicose noises is, I believe, utterly in keeping with both their arrogant character and their 'education' over the ownership of these islands. I have always felt that the Junta find it very convenient to maintain a running confrontation somewhere, be it a border dispute with Paraguay, Chile, the Beagle Channel problem or the Falklands, anything to distract the people from the root cause of their distasteful and inefficient administration, giving of course a role for their armed forces, from which they can 'breed' the members of a future Junta - A vicious circle indeed.

These comments are not made in a self opinionated way, far from it, they are the culminating thoughts from a very keen studentship of the entire area in most of it's aspects. Many theories have been proposed for 'the way ahead' and it can only be hoped that the fences will be mended. There is much that is good in the South American Countries, though it may not always be apparent and if nothing else this tragic war has served to concentrate some minds on the plight of the Falkland Islanders in addition to the economic potential of the whole area.

- 21 June AN Refuelled alongside SOUTHERN BAY.  
1700 Secured alongside King Edward Point.
- 22 June Retard clocks to '01 time (+3).  
HMS ANTRIM departed.
- 27 June Church Service ashore. Recreational Leave. N J BARKER  
Captain Royal Navy  
Commanding Officer
- 28 June to Self maintenance week. Salvage work.
- 1 July Church Service ashore. Recreational Leave.

## ANNEX:

0900 HMS SPURWIND arrived with advance party relief garrison.  
1500 HURWANCE slipped from King Edward Point, anchored in

## A. Diary of events 24th June to 4th August 1982

1 July 0800 HMS HURWANCE arrived with 2nd HMS Devon Group.  
1630 HMS HURWANCE departed with 2nd HMS Devon Group.

## Information:

0900 HURWANCE proceeded alongside King Edward Point.  
The Hydrographer of the Navy ashore. Recreational Leave.

The Flag Officer Third Flotilla.

Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Division

- 11 July 0800 HURWANCE and HMS THORNTON proceeded to Thurston.  
1930 HURWANCE returned to Cumberland Bay.
- 14 July HURWANCE survey ashore to beaching area.
- 15 July SANTA FE reflected and beached at Eagle Station.
- 16 July 1100 HURWANCE, SALWORTHY and THORNTON called from South Georgia.
- 18 July 1700 R/V with 6th Tank Group. HAD(S) cancelled due to weather.
- 19 July 0900 arrived Port Stanley. Captain calls on Civil Commissioner.
- 20 July 0800 JTB (2075) and Commodore Lord James Falkland Islands.  
0900 Sailed from Stanley. Mr Gen HAD Civil Commissioner embarked.  
1150 Arrived Fitzroy. Settlement visit.  
1600 Sailed Fitzroy.
- 22 July 0900 Arrived Fox Bay. Settlement visit.  
1630 Sailed Fox Bay.
- 23 July 0830 Secured alongside G A VALER. Refuelled.  
1100 Ashore. Civil Commissioner disembarked.  
1600 Sailed from Stanley in protection Alpha.  
2130 Transfer with HURWANCE GARDIA.
- 4 August 0900 Arrived Ascension Island.

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ANNEX A to HMS ENDURANCE's  
226/1 dated 5th August 1982

DIARY OF EVENTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
24 June	1430 ENDURANCE and SALVAGEMAN returned and anchored at Grytviken. First Lieutenant rejoins.
25 June	AM Refilled alongside SCOTTISH EAGLE. 1500 Secure alongside King Edward Point.
26 June	Retard clocks to '0' time (+2). HMS ANTRIM departed.
27 June	Church Service ashore. Recreational leave.
28 June to 3 July	Self Maintenance week. Salvage work on SANTE FE all week.
4 July	Church Service ashore. Recreational leave.
7 July	0900 HMS AMBUSCADE arrived with advance party relief garrison. 1500 ENDURANCE slipped from King Edward Point, anchored in Cumberland Bay.
8 July	0800 MV NORDIC FERRY arrived with 2nd BTN Scotts Guards. 1630 MV NORDIC FERRY sailed with M COY 42 Cdo RM.
9 July	0900 ENDURANCE proceeded alongside King Edward Point.
11 July	Church Service ashore. Recreational leave.
12 July	1500 STENA INSPECTOR arrived at Grytviken.
13 July	AM ENDURANCE and STENA INSPECTOR proceed to Stromness. 1930 ENDURANCE returned to Cumberland Bay.
14 July	ENDURANCE survey submarine beaching area.
15 July	SANTE FE refloated and beached at Hestesletten.
16 July	1100 ENDURANCE, SALVAGEMAN and YORKSHIREMAN sailed from South Georgia.
18 July	1200 R/V with carrier Task Group. RAS(S) cancelled due to weather.
19 July	0900 arrived Port Stanley. Captain calls on Civil Commissioner. CTG 317.8 (POF3) and Commander Land Forces Falkland Islands.
21 July	0900 Sailed from Stanley. Mr Rex HUNT Civil Commissioner embarked. 1130 Arrived Fitzroy. Settlement visit. 1600 Sailed Fitzroy.
22 July	0900 Arrived Fox Bay. Settlement visit. 1630 Sailed Fox Bay.
23 July	0830 Secure alongside G A WALTER. Refuel 1100 Anchor Port Stanley. Civil Commissioner disembarked. 1600 Sailed from Stanley in procedure Alpha. 2330 Transfer with DUMBARTON CASTLE.
4 August	0900 Arrived Ascension Island.

Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Portsmouth  
Hants

31 July 1982

ENDURANCE FLIGHT - OPERATION CORPORATE REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

References:

- CICFLEET's 19F/19N/1AG/JAG/KAG 111040Z Jun 82 (OEG OP ANALYSIS)
- POF 3's 19F/HEH 25 1232Z Jun 82 (MAINTENANCE REPORTS)
- POF 3's 19F/1AG/KAG 281627Z Jun 82 (ADMIN ROP)

The report required at Reference C is forwarded with great pleasure following an exciting and prolonged period of Operations, where the ENDURANCE Flight put up a most efficient performance in, for the most part, atrocious weather conditions.

F.O.F.3.  
231/317/4  
11 AUG 1982  
PORT SOUTHWICK  
FAREHAM, HANTS.



*N J Barker*

N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Closure:

HMS ENDURANCE Flight - Operation Corporate Report of Proceedings

Information:

- Commander in Chief Fleet (for Fleet Air Warfare Officer)
- Flag Officer Naval Air Command
- Captain HMS OSPREY

OPERATION CORPORATE-REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

CHRONOLOGY

- MARCH
- 19 Flight disembark to Green Patch, East Falkland. Report received onboard that ARA BUEN SUCESO landed military and civilian personnel in Leith, South Georgia.
  - 21 Flight re-embark in Berkeley Sound. ENDURANCE sails for South Georgia.
  - 24-31 Observation Post insertion and relief flying.
  - 25 O.P. overflown by Argentine Alouette 3.
  - 31 Royal Marine detachment disembark to Grytviken. ENDURANCE sails for Falkland Islands.
- APRIL
- 01 ENDURANCE ordered back to South Georgia.
  - 02 Falklands invaded by Argentina.
  - 03 Grytviken captured by Argentine forces.
  - 03-05 Evasion of Argentine threat.
  - 05 ENDURANCE sails north to rendezvous with rest of Task Force.
  - 14 ENDURANCE joins TG 317.9 en route for South Georgia.
  - 21 2 SBS inserted Hound Bay. Two Wessex 5 lost at Fortuna Glacier.
  - 23 TG detected by Argentine C 130. Hostile submarine detected in area.
  - 24 2 SBS recovered. ENDURANCE detected by Argentine 707.
  - 25 434 and 435 attack and hit ARA SANTE FE with four AS12 missiles. Grytviken surrenders to TG 317.9.
  - 26 Leith surrenders to TG 317.9. South Georgia recaptured.
- MAY
- 01 SAS personnel recovered from Schlieper Bay and Bird Island.
  - 10 Area search in submarine threat.
  - 16-19 Engineers from STENA SEASPREAD evaluate whaling stations.
  - 18 Action Wasp for submarine sighting verification.
  - 30/31 Wasp air defence battery.
- JUNE
- 01 Vertrep AS12, SS11 missiles and Mk 11 depth charges.
  - 14 Argentine forces surrender in Falklands.
  - 17 ENDURANCE sails for Operation Keyhole (Southern Thule). Practice SS11 firing.
  - 19 Fly reconnaissance and troop insertion.
  - 20 Argentine base surrenders.
  - 21 Vertrep HES YARMOUTH and RFA OLMEDA.
  - 24 ENDURANCE returns to South Georgia.

## 5. NARRATIVE

1. HBS ENDURANCE Flight's involvement in Operation Corporate began unsuspectingly on 19 March, when the ship returned to Port Stanley from the depths of the Antarctic peninsula, having first called at South Georgia to recover the Joint Services Expedition, left there in December. Having completed a five hour disembarkation to Green Patch, eighteen miles away on Berkeley Sound, the Flight settled down to a period of survey support flying and aerial photography, while ENDURANCE carried out roulement of NP 8901 Royal Marines.
2. This illusion was shattered at 0600 Sunday 21 March, when an order was given to re-embark as soon as possible, as ENDURANCE had been directed to sail to South Georgia. The Argentine warship BUEN SUCESO had landed civilian and military personnel, ostensibly as scrap metal workers, at the whaling station of Leith. Endurance had been given the task of ensuring either their legalization, or their eviction, and accordingly the Flight flew back on board with utmost despatch, leaving behind equipment non-essential to the operation, in the care of the settlement.
3. The rough passage was spent installing the sights in both aircraft, fitting the missile booms, and preparing armament.
4. However, the plans for a quick solution were quashed by politicians and the Flight spent the next week inserting, and re-supplying observation posts, first at Jason Harbour, and lastly on Grass Island in Stromness Bay. This was done covertly at all times, maximum advantage being made of the Wasps manoeuvrability and the rugged terrain. The exception came on the 25th when the Commanding Officer, Flight Commander and Senior Observer were overflown by an Alouette 3, while watching the ARA BAHIA PARAISO discharge stores for the men ashore, from nearby high ground. However this compromise seemed to have no repercussions, other than the aircraft being camouflaged overnight.
5. The next period of active involvement for the Flight began on April 3rd, when an armed recce was flown at maximum range. The aim was to report the situation at Grytviken, where the ships RM detachment, who had been put ashore on March 31st, had been defending the base. Their action had been most praiseworthy, having holed the corvette GUERRICO, shot down two helicopters, and caused much dismay to the Argentine troops coming ashore. They had achieved the aim of causing South Georgia to be taken by force, before surrendering, in order to save further loss of Argentine lives. It was depressing to watch the Argentines moving into Grytviken with their two ships lying not a mile away-ideal AS12 targets.
6. The recce having remained covert, the ship then had to evade the possible sub-surface, surface, and air threat, each of which had been reported by diverse but credible means. Further covert reccees were flown, to keep the command appraised of the situation, and also to enable reports to be made to UK.
7. On the 5th, the ship was ordered north to rendezvous with elements of the rapidly formed Task Force. The ship duly met and joined with HMS ANPRIM and PLYMOUTH, and RFA TIDESPRING to form TG 317.9, with ANPRIM in command. The passages north and south were employed to give sight training and GPMG practice for back seat crew, to provide HDS and SOOTAX, and to brief Special Force elements on the climate and terrain of South Georgia.
8. Returning to the familiar island coastline on April 21st, the Flight Commander and Senior Observer launched in 434 to put a man ashore at St. Andrews Bay, a hut occupied by two film makers, who might otherwise, without his guidance, have given away the ships presence over their HF radio link.
9. Driving snow began to envelop the ship as it approached Hound Bay, and the aircraft launched again to commence landing SBS troops at the head of the bay. The increasing wind brought occasionally violent turbulence, such as this island only seems capable of, and the snow made contact with the coastline a pre-requisite.

10. Three further trips were flown at low level, now in darkness without practical radar guidance, and after twice losing contact with the shore it, white out, even with the aid of a night vision aid, flying had to be abandoned, to avoid the increasing odds on an accident. Twelve troops were landed that night by Wasp and Gemini, and they moved forward to secure the Sorling Valley.
11. That same day, in similar conditions, two Wessex 5 aircraft from RFA TIDESPRING crashed on Fortuna Glacier.
12. After further recess on April 22nd, the evenings calmer weather enabled us to fly Gemini to the SBS installed by the Nordenskjold Glacier, in Cumberland Bay East.
13. The force was detected by an Argentine C 130 on the 23rd, at the same time as interceptions informed of the presence of an enemy submarine within 100 miles.
14. Both aircraft were launched on the morning of the 24th, one to search for the SBS, who were returning from an abortive attempt to cross the Bay, and were late for their rendezvous, the other flew northwards along the coastline, attempting to use the terrain to remain covert, and to search for enemy movements, and for the submarine. The latter was causing no little anxiety to the ships company as all our escorts had moved themselves over 300 nautical miles to the North.
15. The Flight Commander and Senior Observer displayed hitherto unrealised mountaineering skills in reaching an OP by Barff Point, which enabled 'no-contacts' report to be returned on board. Later, the SBS, having been located, were recovered to ENDURANCE, their mission unfortunately having failed because of the brash ice in Cumberland Bay.
16. On the same day, ENDURANCE was detected by an Argentine 707, remaining out of small arms range, and later reports were received from Bird Island of two warships and low flying fast jets in that area. Armed strike recesses were flown over 60 nautical miles to the north west, to verify these reports. Nothing was seen in deteriorating weather, and the aircraft returned with minimum fuel.
17. The Flight had operated an alert crew system since returning to the island, and by daylight one crew was brought to Alert 8 with 434 on deck armed with two AS 12 missiles. Through a tense and expectant atmosphere on board came the order 'Action Wasp' at 0910 on April 25th. 434 launched for a surface search, but almost immediately ANTRIM's Wessex 3 reported sighting and attacking an enemy submarine on the surface with Mk 11 depth charges.
18. 434 (Flight Commander and Senior Observer) sighted the boat approximately two miles north west of Barff Point, and immediately attacked from a search height of 1000 ft, at a range of four miles. After one misfire and reselection, a hit was achieved on the coming tower, damaging pumps and sensors. The Royal Navy Historical Unit has reported that this was the first firing of a warshot missile in action by the Royal Navy. The second missile was not as successful, falling thirty yards short.
19. Returning from a reload, air activity had increased with BRILLIANT's two Lynx aircraft overflying the contact at 1000', and HMS PLYMOUTH's Wasp approaching low level unannounced from the north. 434 smartly assumed No 1 position in the pattern and fired at 100ft, from a range of three miles. The first missile was a rogue, the second a hit which passed through the glass-fibre fin and exploded on contact with the sea. PLYMOUTH's Wasp then attacked, their only missile falling just yards short. 434 departed the action as the two Lynx aircraft closed Grytviken and the submarine on a strafing run.

20. Meanwhile, 435 (Senior Pilot and Leading Aircrewman) had been launched, armed with two AS12 missiles. On instructions from 434, they crossed overland into Cumberland Bay and, sighting the submarine turning into King Edward Point, attacked with both missiles, the first falling just short and the second striking the conning tower, again without exploding. Their attack had been pressed bravely home through machine gun fire and anti tank missiles fired by Argentine troops ashore.

21. 434 again reloaded on board, and launched again to carry on the attack, passing 435 en route, who warned of the fire from the troops ashore. 435 attacked from 200', on top Dartmouth Point, at a range of 3 miles. Two misfires proved a missile hang-up, and the opposite missile was selected and fired at considerably closer range. Again concentrated small arms fire and anti-tank missiles were encountered, but a reduction in speed avoided these, and a last successful hit on the conning tower was scored, destroying pumps, and most aerials and periscopes directly or through shrapnel. This last attack also accounted for the only casualty of the engagement, an Argentine crew member who had been manning a gun, and who subsequently lost a leg. After these last hits, with the SANTA FE damaged and smoking alongside, the attack was called off.

22. The Flight's next task was to carry a Naval Gunfire spotting officer from HMS ANTRIM to a suitable location. 434 tried several areas but eventually Dartmouth Point was selected for its freedom from cloud, and its commanding view of the target, King Edward Point. In fact all fire was directed across the cove at Brown Mountain and surrounds. Troops were airlifted to the Hestelletten, and began making their way round, neutralising suspected OP's en route. At approximately 1700, the crew of 434 first spotted a white flag near the Argentine positions, and minutes later, a surrender was broadcast by the enemy.

23. 434 launched from the Point with Captain Browne, the gunfire director, and picking up Major Sheridan RM, Commander Land Forces, flew him to King Edward Point to accept the Argentine surrender. After several other flights to bring in senior officers, 434 flew the wounded Argentine to HMS ANTRIM for a leg amputation, and also carried the only British casualty, an SAS medic with a sprained ankle, to ENDURANCE for treatment.

24. The next day, Leith surrendered, and ENDURANCE Flight changed its image from attack to HDS. Many PoW and troop transfers were flown by the end of the month, when the rest of TG 317.9 sailed for the Falklands or Ascension Island.

25. As previously stated, the Flight's main task now was very much in support of ENDURANCE's role as QEM South Georgia. A plan was drawn up for sorties in support of 'M' Company Royal Marines, now installed in Grytviken. Almost daily flights occurred to replace or resupply their OP's, to ferry personnel to aid the garrison, and to reconnoitre likely paths of approach for a counter attack by the enemy.

26. However, before this task started, the Flight evacuated BAS personnel, and two ducks, from bases at Schlieper Bay and Bird Island. All of these, as well as the two girls from St. Andrews Bay, were returned to UK via Ascension Island.

27. Good weather afforded the opportunity to locate the crashed Wessex aircraft on Fortuna Glacier and valuable serviceable equipment was salvaged. This was later given to RFA RESOURCE Flight.

28. The pattern continued throughout the period, being interrupted by reported submarine and C130 bomber threats, which provoked different responses from the Flight. To counter the first, Mk 11 depth charges had been embarked, and surface searches were flown, without contacts, for icebergs and rocks had deceived inexperienced lookouts. Each report was, however treated with due respect, as a non-sub contact report is vital, and most welcome. To counter the second threat, most of the maintainers armed themselves with SLR's and GPMG's, while the aircrew could only

- 1000 AS-2, and keep a cold, lonely vigil on a headland. The plan, admittedly desperate, but better than no plan at all, was to distract the attention of the pilots on their final run in. Fortunately, the theory was not tested.
29. Earleir in the month, members of NP 2010 from STENA SEASPREAD had been flown between the whaling stations in their search for metal, which when found, was later utilised to repair battle-damaged warships in the TEZ.
30. Their mother ship was only one of the multitude of varied decks upon which. ENDURANCE Flight alighted during our sojourn in South Georgia. Whether it was the working area of a small tug, flight deck height 3ft, or the swimming pool deck of SS CANBERRA, flight deck height 82ft, no challenge was refused.
31. The pattern of June was very similar, with HDS the main priority. However, with the signing of the surrender by the Argentine forces in the Falklands, orders were given to ENDURANCE to recapture the island of Southern Thule, at the southern end of the South Sandwich Islands chain, some 600 nautical miles south east of South Georgia.
32. To provide a rapid troop lift capability, the use of a Wessex 5 was considered. WW from RFA REGENT Flight landed on and shut down, to carry out hangar and deck trials. By careful deck handling, the folded aircraft fitted smartly into one side of the hangar, the other side holding the two Wasps. Ranging and spreading were achieved equally successfully, and with Lt Cdr CJ BLIGHT's experience for landings, it was decided the experiment was worthwhile.
33. Before sailing, SS11 missiles had been embarked, and a practice firing was carried out successfully to prove the system.
34. On arrival at Southern Thule on June 19, one Wasp was launched to recce for possible landing sites for the Royal Marine advance recce troop. One slightly less tenuous than the others was identified, and at 1130 the Wessex carried the recce troop ashore, with an armed Wasp flying close. Regrettably, the insertion was detected, purely by chance, by an Argentine who had walked from the base, and several other trips were flown to simulate a greater force being landed on the ground. An overt recce was also flown which detected no fixed defences.
35. With daylight less than six hours long, and temperatures with chill factor around  $-40^{\circ}\text{C}$ , further action was halted until the next day. RFA OLMEDA and HMS YARMOOUTH joined overnight, and at first light, a Blowpipe team was transferred to ENDURANCE.
36. With a plan for escalating aggression against the Argentines if no response to calls for a surrender were forthcoming, ENDURANCE closed the base to provoke a reaction. This was duly seen by the Recce Troop, who had doggedly moved forward overnight, when the Argentines came out from the buildings, waving a white flag. The Commanding Officer was then flown ashore to accept their surrender, not a shot having been fired.
37. The remaining flying revolved around troop and POW movements, and removal of stores from the base, all of which took until the 22nd, with ENDURANCE acting as HCU throughout the operation.
38. Finally, then, ENDURANCE sailed for South Georgia with the Union Flag flying on Southern Thule, and we returned to Grytviken on Thursday June 24th, only a week after we had sailed, and a very successful three months after our return from Port Stanley.

The remainder of our time in South Georgia saw the flying programme being increasingly hampered by the hardening of the Antarctic winter. Thankfully the flight deck remained useable through liberal coats of Consin and Kilfrost, but snow clearance required shovel and snow plough tactics which proved to be a good E.A. 19 July saw us fly into Green Patch, Falkland Islands, to recover what was left of our equipment taken ashore four months earlier - to the day.

## PARTIAL. 21 JANUARY 1968

1. TOTAL AIRCRAFT HOURS  
 XS 529 (435).....84.55  
 XS 527 (434).....78.20

## 2. TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS

	PC	SOBS	NOBS	SP	LACMN
DAY	80.50	36.45	41.25	69.50	63.20
NIGHT	6.35	3.00	3.25	3.55	2.55
TOTAL	87.25	39.45	44.50	73.25	66.15

NOTE: Each Observer acts as helicopter controller when not flying.

## 3. WEAPON FIGURES

## WARSHOT:

SOBS: 5-AS 12 (3 hits, 1 miss, 1 rogue)  
 LACMN: 2-AS 12 (1 hit, 1 miss)

## PRACTICE:

NOBS: 1-SS 11  
 ALL : GPWG firing (approx 300 rounds each)

## 4. NOMINAL LIST

1. ELLERBROCK JA LT CDR Flight Commander  
 WELLS DW LT SOBS  
 FINDING TS LT Senior Pilot  
 BUCKLAND RJF S/LT NOBS

WILLIAMS K CAEM(M)  
 KINGROTT JG AEM(M) 1  
 UDEY MR AEM(L) 1  
 CORDERY R POEM(R)

SHARPE M IAEM(M)  
 BIBBY JG LAEM(L)  
 HENDERSON AA LA(SE)  
 MADDIN R LACMN  
 THOMPSON G AEM(M)  
 WOOD D AEM(M)  
 BARNES C AEM(L)

## 2. CASUALTIES

NIL

E. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

1. Development, Qualification and Training.

None of these tasks provided any difficulties, as the work required involved little that was new. The only exception, the preparation of SS11 missiles, had not been practised, but was quickly learned.

2. Own Support

As the Flight is used to maintaining the aircraft for months on end without Squadron supervision, no problems were experienced.

3. Parent Ship Support (including STUFT)

The ships company were eager to solve any problems relating to the ships main armament, and support was excellent.

4. UK Support

High priority demands were quickly satisfied. The cancellation of all outstanding low priority demands however, appeared an uneconomical complication, as simply freezing all demands below O9, until completion of the operation, would have saved the additional work of reordering.

5. Clearances, Modifications, and New Equipment.

1. The Steady Scope binocular appeared to have no advantage over the BEZU Sight.
2. During SBS insertion at night, the Night Vision-Aid was hand held by SOBS and a commentary given whilst closing the coast at low-level.

6. Tasking/Fatigue/Morale.

The flying task was never excessive during the period. Flight deck operations in Antarctic conditions, while not new to the Flight, are always tiring, and require greater vigilance. However, everyone coped well with the situation. The aircrew, who were often required to shut down for long periods ashore, or in the mountains, were often troubled by the cold, but proper precautions ensured no danger as a result.

Morale ran the full range from elation during our periods of action, to the occasional depths during interminable days of support flying. In general, however, the Flight as one reacted creditably throughout an experience that was novel to all.

7. Welfare

ENDURANCE's plight was unique in being the only British presence for so long in the area of conflict. As well as being largely defenceless, the inability to communicate with families after the necessary ban on Immarat calls, to deny radio reports and to reassure, was worrying on both sides. However, the continuation of the Family Gram system did alleviate everyone's concern.

F. WEAPONS RELEASED.

IT WELLS

AS 12 No.1-Range 3.5-4 Nm:Height 1000':Target-Cuppy class submarine on surface, slow moving, beam aspect. Hit on conning tower, exploded.

No.2 Range 3-2.5 Nm:Height 1000':Target as above:Miss-thirty yards at 6 O'clock

No.3 Range 3 Nm:Height 100':Target as above:Quarter view:Rogue, left horizontal.

No.4 Range 2-2.5 Nm:Height 100':Target as above, beam aspect.Hit on conning tower, no explosion.

No. 5 Range 3Nm; Height 800'; Target alongside, beam aspect; Hang-up after two resolutions. Jettisoned later on order from command.

No. 6 Range 2Nm; Height 150'; Target as above. Hit on conning tower, large explosion.

NOTE: Faults later attributed to faulty TMOK box.

#### LACON NADIN

AS 12 No. 1 Range 4Nm; Height 400'; Target-Guppy class submarine on surface, slow moving, quarter aspect. Miss, fifty yards, seven o'clock.

No. 2 Range 3Nm; Height 400'; Target as above. Hit on conning tower, no explosion.

#### S/MT BUCKLAND

SS11 No. 1 Range 1.5-2Nm; Height 200'; Target-small rock cluster. (Practice missile) Miss, thirty yards, eight o'clock.

### 6. OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT.

#### AS 12 Missile

1. AS 12 missile aimers are trained to fire and control missiles as part of a DDTAC, i.e. from 400' and 60kts, and are passed a range from target, from which can be calculated a time in flight of the weapon. However, when operating inshore, or when away from radar control, these precise parameters are not necessarily practicable. Time in flight is unknown without precise ranging, although if possible, plotting target position and intended firing position can yield a range, but the limitations of this method are only too obvious.

2. Without this information, to attempt the trajectory an aimer is trained to achieve would be imprudent. The missile must be held on target for as long as is considered reasonable, bearing in mind the aircraft's flight profile. Here again, the DDTAC idea is high suicidal when counter fire is expected. Therefore, a lower altitude is essential, with the limiting consequences that has on missile control.

3. Obviously, compromises are necessary when mounting an attack in this manner, and indeed, it would appear that the days of the AS 12 missile are numbered in the Royal Navy. However, while reliance is still placed on it, perhaps on reflection of the above mentioned considerations in the training schedule, or night training sorties, practical missile firings, would be of benefit to aircrew who might well be faced with situations outside the training manuals compass.

4. On more than one occasion, ENDURANCE's lack of defensive armament prompted use of the aircraft in most unhelpful ways. Bearing in mind reports that Argentine A1 and Mirage pilots would swerve about, or even ditch weapons when the flash of a point defence missile was observed, it was decided to employ the AS12 missile in this way. At times when C130 bombing raids were reported as probable, if not imminent, an aircraft was sent to shut them on a preliminary, with a field of fire over the most likely approach path. The intention, albeit rather desperate, was to divert and distract the attacking pilots concentration, and hopefully his aim, by loosing a missile during his run in. No real anti-aircraft capability was contemplated. As stated in Section B, the theory was not exercised.

#### Ex 11 Depth Charge

5. HMS ENDURANCE has no allowance for these weapons, but experience prompted their acquisition from RFA REGENT at the first opportunity. ENDURANCE, not being sonar fitted, would leave the aircraft a visual attack option only, against which the odds might be considered high. However, nobody expected the first AS12 missile target to be a submarine, and it is considered that provision of depth charges would give ENDURANCE more flexibility of response in a similar situation. The opinion is reinforced by the greater destructive force of the depth charge against such a target.

#### 11. PEACETIME RULES VERSUS OPERATION REALITY.

1. Perhaps the greatest digression from peacetime rules was the embarkation and operation of RFA REGENT's Wessex 5, already explained in Section B. The deck and hangar trials were successfully conducted on calm seas, and it was appreciated on all sides that this was the only way it could be operated, night deck landings being similarly inadvisable.
2. However, the greater endurance and payload of the Wessex 5, compared to the Wasp, showed its value in sheltered waters at Southern Thule, and enabled a more efficient delivery and recovery effort as a result.
3. Similarly, cross-decking with Lynx aircraft posed no problems at all, and their power and manoeuvrability showed to their advantage on several occasions. Lynxes from RFA FORT AUSTIN and HMS BRILLIANT shut down on ENDURANCE's deck, without limiting ship manoeuvres.
4. The inaccessibility of the ships magazine forced a supply of ready use weapons to be maintained within the hangar. Even stowage in the waists was prohibited by the weather and low temperatures.
5. Indeed, on occasions when Special Forces troops were embarked, the hangar became a treasure trove of weapons and projectiles, there being no other place for them in a ship of this design. The Flight, however, coped admirably with this intrusion on their working space.
6. Experience having shown the practice to be an acceptable risk, whenever an air threat was reported, many of the Flight were armed with SLRs and GPMGs. They have all been instructed in their use at HMS OSPREY's range, and would no doubt have given a good account of themselves, had they been required. The value of such a concentrated fire was shyly demonstrated at San Carlos Water and elsewhere, and is not to be underestimated.

2 AUGUST 1982.

Plar Officer  
 Plar Pilot  
 Plar Southwick  
 Plar Fareham  
 Plar Hunts

Reference;

1. FOP3 EEH251232ZJUN82. AIRCRAFT OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES DURING OPERATION CORPORATE.

2. HMS ENDURANCE Flights involvement in OPERATION CORPORATE was such that with very few exceptions, normal operating procedures were employed throughout the period. Observations made during the operations are listed below.

3. WEAPONS AND WEAPON SYSTEMS. No unforeseen problems were encountered other than the stowage of the weapons themselves. Throughout the period it was necessary to stow considerable quantities of weapons in the hangar in order to ensure a rapid reaction to any threat. In view of the inevitability of this situation in wartime it would seem that more thought should be given to this in peacetime. The normal peacetime attitude of inspection teams from FOST and FOP3 of 'it should never be done' means that no thought is given to the problem until the action starts. Some means of locking together a stack of G12 boxes into a rigid mass whilst ensuring a quick release facility, without the use of masses of rope would have proved very useful.

4. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES. Wartime servicing was not required as the periods of action were of short duration. Normal servicing was carried out throughout with no unforeseen problems. The procedures detailed in the wartime servicing instructions made good sense in that they reduced the workload of the maintainers and improved aircraft availability. Paragraph 4 however seems to ignore the fact that in a situation of actual threat the aircraft will fly if they are at all flyable.

5. MAIN ROTOR BLADE EROSION. Although the aircraft were required to operate in more severe conditions than normal no problems were encountered in this field. The WASP main rotor blades are particularly suitable for operations in cold conditions.

6. AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY. The only new problem encountered was the freezing up of the moisture in the rescue hoists. It was found that when aircraft had been cold soaked for even quite short periods the rescue hoists frequently became frozen. This problem may well have been aggravated by the poor heating facilities in ENDURANCE'S hangar. The method employed to cure the defect was simply to allow the hoist to thaw out naturally in flight and carry out a hoist run out check on completion.

7. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. The conditions met during OPERATION CORPORATE were similar to those normally encountered during antarctic operations though the aircraft were required on occasions to operate in conditions which would normally preclude flying operations. The simple precautions of being properly clothed and storing the aircraft whenever possible avoid any real difficulties. The MONSIEUR/UREA flight deck anti-icing system is quite effective against simple ice but is of little use in heavy snow. The only effective answer in these conditions is to scrape the deck regularly to prevent heavy build ups.

BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIRS. No damage of any sort was sustained by ENDURANCE aircraft. The battle damage repair manual provided, although not used, did provide good food for thought.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT. In the initial stages of CORPORATE it was found that the satisfaction of demands took a considerable amount of time due mainly to the limited number of ships passing our way. This situation rapidly improved such that the supply situation was far better than that normally experienced in this part of the world.

CONCLUSION. The part played by ENDURANCE Flight in OPERATION CORPORATE involved very few new experiences in the field of aircraft maintenance. New operating procedures were required and the environmental conditions encountered were only marginally more severe than normal. The extending of the deployment caused no great stores supply or aircraft maintenance problems though it inevitably required the extension of annual maintenance rest flights etc.



CAEMN(M) K WILLIAMS.  
SMR ENDURANCE FLIGHT.

*K Williams*

SECRET

149819 X

250/1

The Commander in Chief Fleet  
Eastbury Park  
Northwood  
Middlesex

17 Sep 82

REPORT ON THE ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE ARGENTINE SUBMARINE SANTA FE

1. The purpose of this letter is to try to resolve the conflicting and confused reports which led up to the attack and sinking of the Argentine submarine SANTA FE. It contains at Annex A a detailed account of the attack as seen from ENDURANCE and at Annex B a damage report written on completion of the salvage operations. During the three week salvage operations the diving team, working around the clock, came to know the submarine intimately both inside and out. They are therefore best qualified to comment on the damage.

2. Subsequent to Annex B Lieutenant C Sherman, the Diving Officer of HMS BRILLIANT, at the time of the recapture of South Georgia revealed the following:

The submarine was moved under her own battery power from the BAS jetty to the whaling station. The vessel had a list to port and problems with stability were encountered during the move. When the vessel berthed at the whaling station the list increased and the stem began to submerge. This was apparently attributable to damaged after ballast tank(s). No internal leaks were apparent and the pressure hull appeared intact. A charge consisting of 4 x 14oz TNT blocks and 8lbs of plastic explosive was planted on the centre portion of the rudder to immobilise the vessel. In addition two small demolition charges were placed on the periscopes and radar. The hatches and doors throughout the vessel were opened to vent any gasses and smoke.

3. Following this account and enclosed Annexes it is submitted that the vessel was fundamentally seaworthy and able to dive even after the depth charge and AS 12 attacks. But it is considered that there would have been so much turbulence in the vicinity of the fin following AS 12 damage, that the submarine would have become an easy kill for the Frigate BRILLIANT had she ventured out of the harbour.



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*N J Barber*  
N J BARBER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Annexes:

- A. Flight Report of Proceedings dated 30 Jul 82
- B. Diving Report of underwater damage to SANTA FE dated 19 Aug 82

226/2

HMS ENDURANCE  
RFPO Ships

The Flag Officer Third Flotilla  
Fort Southwick  
Fareham  
Hants


31 July 1982

HMS ENDURANCE FLIGHT - OPERATION CORPORATE REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

References:

- A. . CICFLEET's 19F/19N/1AG/JAG/KAG 111040Z Jun 82 (OEG OP ANALYSIS)
- B. . FOF 3's 19F/HEH 25 1232Z Jun 82 (MAINTENANCE REPORTS)
- C. . FOF 3's 19F/1AG/KAG 281627Z Jun 82 (ADMIN ROP)

1. The report required at Reference C is forwarded with great pleasure following an exacting and prolonged period of Operations, where the ENDURANCE Flight put up a most efficient performance in, for the most part, atrocious weather conditions.



N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Enclosure:

1. HMS ENDURANCE Flight - Operation Corporate Report of Proceedings

Information:

The Commander in Chief Fleet (for Fleet Air Warfare Officer)  
The Flag Officer Naval Air Command  
The Captain HMS OSPREY

OPERATION CORPORATE-REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

A. CHRONOLOGY

MARCH

- 19 Flight disembark to Green Patch, East Falkland.  
Report received onboard that ARA EGEN SUCESO landed military and civilian personnel in Leith, South Georgia.  
21 Flight re-embark in Berkeley Sound. ENDURANCE sails for South Georgia.  
24-31 Observation Post insertion and relief flying.  
25 O.P. overflowed by Argentine Alouette 3.  
31 Royal Marine detachment disembark to Grytviken.  
ENDURANCE sails for Falkland Islands.

APRIL

- 01 ENDURANCE ordered back to South Georgia.  
02 Falklands invaded by Argentina.  
03 Grytviken captured by Argentine forces.  
03-05 Evasion of Argentine threat.  
05 ENDURANCE sails north to rendezvous with rest of Task Force.  
14 ENDURANCE joins TG 317.9 en route for South Georgia.  
21 2 SES inserted Hound Bay. Two Wesssex 5 lost at Fortuna Glacier.  
23 TG detected by Argentine C 130. Hostile submarine detected in area.  
24 2 SBS recovered. ENDURANCE detected by Argentine 707.  
25 434 and 435 attack and hit ARA SANTE FE with four AS12 missiles. Grytviken surrenders to TG 317.9.  
26 Leith surrenders to TG 317.9. South Georgia recaptured.

MAY

- 01 BAS personnel recovered from Schlieper Bay and Bird Island.  
10 Area search in submarine threat.  
16-19 Engineers from STEMA SEASPREAD evaluate whaling stations.  
18 Action Wasp for submarine sighting verification.  
30/31 Wasp air defence battery.

JUNE

- 01 Vertrep AS12, SS11 missiles and Mk 11 depth charges.  
14 Argentine forces surrender in Falklands.  
17 ENDURANCE sails for Operation Keyhole (Southern Thule).  
Practice SS11 firing.  
19 Fly reconnaissance and troop insertion.  
20 Argentine base surrenders.  
21 Vertrep HMS YARMOUTH and RFA OLMEDA.  
24 ENDURANCE returns to South Georgia.

1. HMS ENDURANCE Flight's involvement in Operation Corporate began unsuspectingly on 19 March, when the ship returned to Port Stanley from the depths of the Antarctic peninsula, having first called at South Georgia to recover the Joint Services Expedition, left there in December. Having completed a five hour disembarkation to Green Patch, eighteen miles away on Berkeley Sound, the Flight settled down to a period of survey support flying and aerial photography, while ENDURANCE carried out roulement of NP 8901 Royal Marines.
2. This illusion was shattered at 0600 Sunday 21 March, when an order was given to re-embark as soon as possible, as ENDURANCE had been directed to sail to South Georgia. The Argentine warship BUEN SUCESO had landed civilian and military personnel, ostensibly as scrap metal workers, at the whaling station of Leith. Endurance had been given the task of ensuring either their legalization, or their eviction, and accordingly the Flight flew back on board with utmost despatch, leaving behind equipment non-essential to the operation, in the care of the settlement.
3. The rough passage was spent installing the sights in both aircraft, fitting the missile booms, and preparing armament.
4. However, the plans for a quick solution were quashed by politicians and the Flight spent the next week inserting, and re-supplying observation posts, first at Jason Harbour, and lastly on Grass Island in Stromness Bay. This was done covertly at all times, maximum advantage being made of the Wasps manoeuvrability and the rugged terrain. The exception came on the 25th when the Commanding Officer, Flight Commander and Senior Observer were overflown by an Alouette 3, while watching the ARA BAHIA PARAIISO discharge stores for the men ashore, from nearby high ground. However this compromise seemed to have no repercussions, other than the aircraft being camouflaged overnight.
5. The next period of active involvement for the Flight began on April 3rd, when an armed reconce was flown at maximum range. The aim was to report the situation at Grytviken, where the ships RM detachment, who had been put ashore on March 31st, had been defending the base. Their action had been most praiseworthy, having holed the corvette GUERRICO, shot down two helicopters, and caused much dismay to the Argentine troops coming ashore. They had achieved the aim of causing South Georgia to be taken by force, before surrendering, in order to save further loss of Argentine lives. It was depressing to watch the Argentines moving into Grytviken with their two ships lying not a mile away-ideal AS12 targets.
6. The reconce having remained covert, the ship then had to evade the possible sub-surface, surface, and air threat, each of which had been reported by diverse but credible means. Further covert reconces were flown, to keep the command appraised of the situation, and also to enable reports to be made to UK.
7. On the 5th, the ship was ordered north to rendezvous with elements of the rapidly formed Task Force. The ship duly met and joined with HMS ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH, and RFA TIDESPRING to form TG 317.9, with ANTRIM in command. The passages north and south were employed to give sight training and GPS practice for back seat crew, to provide HES and SOOTAX, and to brief Special Force elements on the climate and terrain of South Georgia.
8. Returning to the familiar island coastline on April 21st, the Flight Commander and Senior Observer launched in 434 to put a man ashore at St. Andrews Bay, a hut occupied by two film makers, who might otherwise, without his guidance, have given away the ships presence over their HF radio link.
9. Driving snow began to envelop the ship as it approached Hound Bay, and the aircraft launched again to commence landing SBS troops at the head of the bay. The increasing wind brought occasionally violent turbulence, such as this island only seems capable of, and the snow made contact with the coastline a prerequisite.

10. Three further trips were flown at low level, now in darkness without practical radar guidance, and after twice losing contact with the shore in white out, even with the aid of a night vision aid, flying had to be abandoned, to avoid the increasing odds on an accident. Twelve troops were landed that night by Wasp and Gemini, and they moved forward to secure the Sorling Valley.
11. That same day, in similar conditions, two Wessex 5 aircraft from RFA TIDESPRING crashed on Fortuna Glacier.
12. After further recess on April 22nd, the evenings calmer weather enabled us to fly Gemini to the SES installed by the Nordenskjold Glacier, in Cumberland Bay East.
13. The force was detected by an Argentine C 130 on the 23rd, at the same time as interceptions informed of the presence of an enemy submarine within 100 miles.
14. Both aircraft were launched on the morning of the 24th, one to search for the SES, who were returning from an abortive attempt to cross the Bay, and were late for their rendezvous, the other flew northwards along the coastline, attempting to use the terrain to remain covert, and to search for enemy movements, and for the submarine. The latter was causing no little anxiety to the ships company as all our escorts had moved themselves over 300 nautical miles to the North.
15. The Flight Commander and Senior Observer displayed hitherto unrealised mountaineering skills in reaching an OP by Barff Point, which enabled a no-contacts report to be returned on board. Later, the SES, having been located, were recovered to ENDURANCE, their mission unfortunately having failed because of the brash ice in Cumberland Bay.
16. On the same day, ENDURANCE was detected by an Argentine 707, remaining out of small arms range, and later reports were received from Bird Island of two warships and low flying fast jets in that area. Armed strike recess were flown over 60 nautical miles to the north west, to verify these reports. Nothing was seen in deteriorating weather, and the aircraft returned with minimum fuel.
17. The Flight had operated an alert crew system since returning to the island, and by daylight one crew was brought to Alert 6 with 434 on deck armed with two AS 12 missiles. Through a tense and expectant atmosphere on board came the order 'Action Wasp' at 0910 on April 25th. 434 launched for a surface search, but almost immediately ANERIX's Wessex 3 reported sighting and attacking an enemy submarine on the surface with Mk 11 depth charges.
18. 434 (Flight Commander and Senior Observer) sighted the boat approximately two miles north west of Barff Point, and immediately attacked from a search height of 1000 ft, at a range of four miles. After one misfire and reaclection, a hit was achieved on the conning tower, damaging pumps and sensors. The Royal Navy Historical Unit has reported that this was the first firing of a warshot missile in action by the Royal Navy. The second missile was not as successful, falling thirty yards short.
19. Returning from a reload, air activity had increased with BRILLIANT's two Lynx aircraft overflying the contact at 1000', and HMS PLYMOUTH's Wasp approaching low level unannounced from the north. 434 smartly assumed No 1 position in the pattern and fired at 100ft, from a range of three miles. The first missile was a rogue, the second a hit which passed through the glass-fibre fin and exploded on contact with the sea. PLYMOUTH's Wasp then attacked, their only missile falling just yards short. 434 departed the action as the two Lynx aircraft closed Grytviken and the submarine on a strafing run.

20. Meanwhile, 435 (Senior Pilot and Leading Aircrewman) had been launched, armed with two AS12 missiles. On instructions from 434, they crossed overland into Cumberland Bay and, sighting the submarine turning into King Edward Point, attacked with both missiles, the first falling just short and the second striking the conning tower, again without exploding. Their attack had been pressed bravely home through machine gun fire and anti tank missiles fired by Argentine troops ashore.

21. 434 again reloaded on board, and launched again to carry on the attack, passing 435 en route, who warned of the fire from the troops ashore. 435 attacked from 200', on top Dartmouth Point, at a range of 3 miles. Two misfires proved a missile hang-up, and the opposite missile was selected and fired at considerably closer range. Again concentrated small arms fire and anti-tank missiles were encountered, but a reduction in speed avoided these, and a last successful hit on the conning tower was scored, destroying pumps, and most aerials and periscopes directly or through shrapnel. This last attack also accounted for the only casualty of the engagement, an Argentine crew member who had been manning a gun, and who subsequently lost a leg. After these last hits, with the SANTA FE damaged and smoking alongside, the attack was called off.

22. The Flight's next task was to carry a Naval Gunfire spotting officer from HMS ANTRIM to a suitable location. 434 tried several areas but eventually Dartmouth Point was selected for its freedom from cloud, and its commanding view of the target, King Edward Point. In fact all fire was directed across the cove at Brown Mountain and surrounds. Troops were airlifted to the Hestelstetten, and began making their way round, neutralising suspected OP's en route. At approximately 1700, the crew of 434 first spotted a white flag near the Argentine positions, and minutes later, a surrender was broadcast by the enemy.

23. 434 launched from the Point with Captain Browne, the gunfire director, and picking up Major Sheridan RM, Commander Land Force, flew him to King Edward Point to accept the Argentine surrender. After several other flights to bring in senior officers, 434 flew the wounded Argentine to HMS ANTRIM for a leg amputation, and also carried the only British casualty, an SAS medic with a sprained ankle, to ENDURANCE for treatment.

24. The next day, Leith surrendered, and ENDURANCE Flight changed its image from attack to HDS. Many PoW and troop transfers were flown by the end of the month, when the rest of TG 317.9 sailed for the Falklands or Ascension Island.

25. As previously stated, the Flight's main task now was very much in support of ENDURANCE's role as CHM South Georgia. A plan was drawn up for sorties in support of 'M' Company Royal Marines, now installed in Grytviken. Almost daily flights occurred to replace or resupply their OP's, to ferry personnel to aid the garrison, and to reconnoitre likely paths of approach for a counter attack by the enemy.

26. However, before this task started, the Flight evacuated SAS personnel, and two ducks, from bases at Schlieper Bay and Bird Island. All of these, as well as the two girls from St. Andrews Bay, were returned to UK via Ascension Island.

27. Good weather afforded the opportunity to locate the crashed Wessex aircraft on Fortuna Glacier and valuable serviceable equipment was salvaged. This was later given to RFA RESOURCE Flight.

28. The pattern continued throughout the period, being interrupted by reported submarine and C130 bomber threats, which provoked different responses from the Flight. To counter the first, Mk 11 depth charges had been embarked, and surface searches were flown, without contacts, for icebergs and rocks had deceived inexperienced lookouts. Each report was, however treated with due respect, as a non-sub contact report is vital, and most welcome. To counter the second threat, most of the maintainers armed themselves with SLR's and CPWC's, while the aircrew could only

deperate, but better than no plan at all, was to distract the attention of the pilots on their final run in. Fortunately, the theory was not tested.

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29. Earlier in the month, members of NP 2010 from STENA SEASPREAD had been flown between the whaling stations in their search for metal, which when found, was later utilised to repair battle-damaged warships in the TEZ.

30. Their mother ship was only one of the multitude of varied decks upon which ENDURANCE Flight alighted during our sojourn in South Georgia. Whether it was the working area of a small tug, flight deck height 3ft, or the swimming pool deck of SS CANBERRA, flight deck height 82ft, no challenge was refused.

31. The pattern of June was very similar, with HDS the main priority. However, with the signing of the surrender by the Argentine forces in the Falklands, orders were given to ENDURANCE to recapture the island of Southern Thule, at the southern end of the South Sandwich Islands chain, some 600 nautical miles south east of South Georgia.

32. To provide a rapid troop lift capability, the use of a Wessex 5 was considered. WW from RFA REDENT Flight landed on and shut down, to carry out hangar and deck trials. By careful deck handling, the folded aircraft fitted smartly into one side of the hangar, the other side holding the two Wasps. Ranging and spreading were achieved equally successfully, and with Lt Cdr CJ BLIGHT's experience for landings, it was decided the experiment was worthwhile.

33. Before sailing, SS11 missiles had been embarked, and a practice firing was carried out successfully to prove the system.

34. On arrival at Southern Thule on June 19, one Wasp was launched to reconce for possible landing sites for the Royal Marine advance reconce troop. One slightly less tenuous than the others was identified, and at 1130 the Wessex carried the reconce troop ashore, with an armed Wasp flying close. Regrettably, the insertion was detected, purely by chance, by an Argentine who had walked from the base, and several other trips were flown to simulate a greater force being landed on the ground. An overt reconce was also flown which detected no fixed defences.

35. With daylight less than six hours long, and temperatures with chill factor around -40°C, further action was halted until the next day. RFA OLMEDA and HMS YARMOUTH joined overnight, and at first light, a Blowpipe team was transferred to ENDURANCE.

36. With a plan for escalating aggression against the Argentines if no response to calls for a surrender were forthcoming, ENDURANCE closed the base to provoke a reaction. This was duly seen by the Reconce Troop, who had doggedly moved forward overnight, when the Argentines came out from the buildings, waving a white flag. The Commanding Officer was then flown ashore to accept their surrender, not a shot having been fired.

37. The remaining flying revolved around troop and POW movements, and removal of stores from the base, all of which took until the 22nd, with ENDURANCE acting as HCU throughout the operation.

38. Finally, then, ENDURANCE sailed for South Georgia with the Union Flag flying on Southern Thule, and we returned to Grytviken on Thursday June 24th, only a week after we had sailed, and a very successful three months after our return from Port Stanley.

39. The remainder of our time in South Georgia saw the flying programme being increasingly hampered by the hardening of the Antarctic winter. Thankfully the flight deck remained useable through liberal coats of Consin and Kilfrost, but snow clearance required shovel and snow plough tactics which proved to be a good EMA. 19 July saw us fly into Green Patch, Falkland Islands, to recover what was left of our equipment taken ashore four months earlier - to the day.

C. STATISTICS

PERIOD. 21 MARCH-25 JUNE

1. TOTAL AIRCRAFT HOURS  
 XS 539 (435).....84.55  
 XS 527 (434).....76.20
2. TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS

	FC	SOBS	NOBS	SP	LACMN
DAY	80.50	36.45	41.25	69.50	63.20
NIGHT	6.35	3.00	3.25	3.55	2.55
TOTAL	87.25	39.45	44.50	73.25	66.15

NOTE: Each Observer acts as helicopter controller when not flying.

## 3. WEAPON FIGURES

WARSHOT:

SOBS: 5-AS 12 (3 hits, 1 miss, 1 rogue)  
 LACMN: 2-AS 12 (1 hit, 1 miss)

PRACTICE:

NOBS: 1-SS 11  
 ALL: CPMG firing (approx 300 rounds each)

D. NOMINAL LIST

1. ELLERBECK JA	LT CDR Flight Commander
WELLS DW	LT SOBS
FINDING TS	LT Senior Pilot
BUCKLAND RJP	S/LT NOBS
WILLIAMS K	CAEM(M)
KINGSHOTT JG	AEAM(M) 1
UDEN NR	AEA(L) 1
CORDERY R	POAM(R)
SHARPE M	LAEM(M)
BIBBY JG	LAEM(L)
HENDERSON AA	LA(SE)
NADIN R	LACMN
THOMPSON G	AEM(M)
WOOD D	AEM(M)
BARNES C	AEM(L)

## 2. CASUALTIES

NIL

## E. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

### 1. Complement, Qualification and training.

None of these headings provided any difficulties, as the work required involved little that was new. The only exception, the preparation of SS11 missiles, had not been practised, but was quickly learned.

### 2. Own Support

As the Flight is used to maintaining the aircraft, for months on end without Squadron supervision, no problems were experienced.

### 3. Parent Ship Support (including STUFT)

The ships company were eager to solve any problems relating to the ships main armament, and support was excellent.

### 4. UK Support

High priority demands were quickly satisfied. The cancellation of all outstanding priority demands however, appeared an uneconomical complication, as simply freezing all demands below O9, until completion of the operation, would have saved the additional work of redemanding.

### 5. Clearances, Modifications, and New Equipment.

1. The Steady Scope binocular appeared to have no advantage over the BEZU Sight.
2. During SBS insertion at night, the Night Vision Aid was hand held by SOBS and a commentary given whilst closing the coast, at low-level.

### 6. Tasking/Fatigue/Morale.

The flying task was never excessive during the period. Flight deck operations in Antarctic conditions, while not new to the Flight, are always tiring, and require greater vigilance. However, everyone coped well with the situation. The aircraft, who were often required to shut down for long periods ashore, or in the mountains, were often troubled by the cold, but proper precautions ensured no danger as a result.

Morale ran the full range from elation during our periods of action, to the occasional depths during interminable days of support flying. In general, however, the Flight as one reacted creditably throughout an experience that was novel to all.

### 7. Welfare

ENDURANCE's plight was unique in being the only British presence for so long in the area of conflict. As well as being largely defenceless, the inability to communicate with families after the necessary ban on Inmarsat calls, to deny radio reports and to reassure, was worrying on both sides. However, the continuation of the Family Gram system did alleviate everyone's concern.

## F. WEAPONS RELEASED.

### LT WELLS

AS 12 No.1-Range 3.5-4 Nm:Height 1000':Target-Cuppy class submarine on surface, slow moving, beam aspect. Hit on conning tower, exploded.

No.2 Range 3-2.5 Nm:Height 1000':Target as above:Miss-thirty yards at 6 O'clock

No.3 Range 3 Nm:Height 100':Target as above:Quarter view:Rogue, left horizon

No.4 Range 2-2.5 Nm:Height 100':Target as above, beam aspect, Hit on conning tower, no explosion.

No. 6 Range 2Nms:Height 150':Target as above. Hit on conning tower. Large explosion.

NOTE: Faults later attributed to faulty T10K box.

LACEN NADIN

AS 12 No. 1 Range 4Nms:Height 400':Target-Cuppy class submarine on surface, slow moving, quarter aspect. Miss, fifty yards, seven o'clock.

No. 2 Range 3Nms:Height 400':Target as above. Hit on conning tower, no explosion.

S/IT BUCKLAND

SS11 No. 1 Range 1.5-2Nms:Height 200':Target-small rock cluster. (Practice missile) Miss, thirty yards, eight o'clock.

G. OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT.

AS 12 Missile

1. AS 12 missile aimers are trained to fire and control missiles as part of a DIDTAC, i. e. from 400' and 60kts, and are passed a range from target, from which can be calculated a time in flight of the weapon. However, when operating inshore, or when away from radar control, these precise parameters are not necessarily practicable. Time in flight is unknown, without precise ranging, although if possible, plotting target position and intended firing position can yield a range, but the limitations of this method are only too obvious.

2. Without this information, to attempt the trajectory an aimer is trained to achieve would be imprudent. The missile must be held on target for as long as is considered reasonable, bearing in mind the aircraft's flight profile. Here again, the DIDTAC idea is high suicidal when counter fire is expected. Therefore, a lower altitude is essential, with the limiting consequences that has on missile control.

3. Obviously, compromises are necessary when mounting an attack in this manner, and indeed, it would appear that the days of the AS 12 missile are numbered in the Royal Navy. However, while reliance is still placed on it, perhaps on reflection of the above mentioned considerations in the training schedule, of night training sorties, practical missile firings, would be of benefit to aircrew who might well be faced with situations outside the training manuals compass.

4. On more than one occasion, ENDURANCE's lack of defensive armament prompted use of the aircraft in most unlikely ways. Bearing in mind reports that Argentine AA and Mirage pilots would swerve about, or even ditch weapons when the flash of a point defence missile was observed, it was decided to employ the AS12 missile in this way. At times when C130 bombing raids were reported as probable, if not imminent, an aircraft was sent to shut down on a promontary, with a field of fire over the most likely approach path. The intention, albeit rather desperate, was to divert and distract the attacking pilots concentration, and hopefully his aim, by losing a missile during his run in. No real anti-aircraft capability was contemplated. As stated in Section B, the theory was not exercised.

Mk 11 Depth Charge

5. HMS ENDURANCE has no allowance for these weapons, but experience prompted their acquisition from RFA REGENT at the first opportunity. ENDURANCE, not being sonar fitted, would leave the aircraft a visual attack option only, against which the odds might be considered high. However, nobody expected the first AS12 missile target to be a submarine, and it is considered that provision of depth charges would give ENDURANCE more flexibility of response in a similar situation. The opinion is reinforced by the greater destructive force of the depth charge against such a target.

H. PEACETIME RULES VERSUS OPERATION REALITY.

1. Perhaps the greatest digression from peacetime rules was the embarkation, and operation of RFA REGENT's Wessex 5, already explained in Section B. The deck and hangar trials were successfully conducted on calm seas, and it was appreciated on all sides that this was the only way it could be operated, night deck landings being similarly inadvisable.
2. However, the greater endurance and payload of the Wessex 5, compared to the Wasp, showed its value in sheltered waters at Southern Thule, and enabled a more efficient delivery and recovery effort as a result.
3. Similarly, cross-decking with Lynx aircraft posed no problems at all, and their power and manoeuvrability showed to their advantage on several occasions. Lynxes from RFA FORT AUSTIN and HMS BRILLIANT shut down on ENDURANCE's deck, without limiting ship manoeuvres.
4. The inaccessibility of the ships magazine forced a supply of ready use weapons to be maintained within the hangar. Even storage in the waists was prohibited by the weather and low temperatures.
5. Indeed, on occasions when Special Forces troops were embarked, the hangar became a treasure trove of weapons and projectiles, there being no other place for them in a ship of this design. The Flight, however, coped admirably with this intrusion on their working space.
6. Experience having shown the practice to be an acceptable risk, whenever an air threat was reported, many of the Flight were armed with SLRs and CPKCs. They have all been instructed in their use at HMS OSPREY's range, and would no doubt have given a good account of themselves, had they been required. The value of such a concentrated fire was ably demonstrated at San Carlos Water and elsewhere, and is not to be underestimated.

HMS ENDURANCE

19 August 1982

REPORT OF UNDERWATER DAMAGE TO SUBMARINE SANTA FE

Diving operations were carried out in May and June 1982 to assess the damage to, and ascertain the reason for, the SANTA FE sinking with a view to salvage.

The diving operations established the following:

1. Extensive damage to the after end of the casing in the vicinity of the rudder pintals.
2. The rudder blown off its upper pintal and lying on the bottom to port.
3. Stern glands packed intact and undamaged.
4. Extensive shrapnel/bullet holes in the casing around the fin.
5. Damage to the casing forward and to port of the fin caused by an explosion which had also torn off part of the guardrail around the fin.
6. No apparent damage to either the port or starboard ballast tanks.
7. All upper deck hatches had been left open and all torpedo loading hatches were secured.

The subsequent pumping out operations revealed the following internal damage/leaks supporting the facts established by the diving team:-

- a. Manoeuvring Room: Fractured pipe port side forward and just off centre line.
- b. Manoeuvring Room: Fractured pipe port side aft.
- c. Aft Torpedo Room: Hatch leaking.
- d. Aft Torpedo Room: No 7 Stern torpedo tube leaking.

Damage to the after end of the submarine's casing and rudder was attributable to an explosion initiated by HMS BRILLIANT's ship's diving team and designed to immobilise the vessel. It was also almost certainly the cause of the leak through No 7 stern torpedo tube.

The two leaks in the manoeuvring room were on a salt water services cooling line. These leaks were insufficient to incapacitate the vessel or affect its diving capability. They were unlikely to have been caused by an explosion as light bulbs, gauges and other delicate fittings in the manoeuvring room and adjacent compartments were intact. It is more likely that these were caused by storm damage.

The sinking of the SANTA FE was as a result of a combination of events. The damage by HMS BRILLIANT's divers and the storm damage in the manoeuvring room caused the stern of the vessel to sink. When the sea level rose to the aft torpedo hatch the after end of the submarine flooded and caused the vessel to sink faster by the stern until it came to rest on the bottom. As all inter-

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nal water tight doors and access hatches to the casing had been left open the flooding was not contained and all buoyancy lost.

*D. W. O'Connell*

D C W O'CONNELL  
Lieutenant, Royal Navy  
Diving Officer

*N. J. Barker*

N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer



OEG

CONFIDENTIAL  
COVERING SECRET

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HMS ENDURANCE  
at sea


130/1

Commander in Chief Fleet  
WOOD  
Halesen

17 July 1982

REPORT ON THE SALVAGE OF SUBMARINE ARA SAIBE FE

1. Having personally monitored and indeed for the most part witnessed this long and difficult salvage operation, I must pay great tribute to those who laboured under extreme weather conditions outside the Submarine and also to those who worked in dangerous and incredibly unpleasant conditions within the Submarine.
2. The whole operation was conducted in the best of humour, spirit and above all cool, calculated common sense. There were no 'Experts' until the last day, perhaps just as well, but the previous submarine experience and the leadership provided by Lieutenant Commander IVES and Lieutenant Commander AINSLIE was of the highest order. This, together with the enthusiasm of the Diving Team and almost all crew members from the SALVAGEAN, provided the momentum to carry the job through to a most satisfactory conclusion.
3. Everyone concerned was 'willing' that Submarine to the surface and this bunch of amateurs succeeded where in my view many others would have faltered.
4. The enclosed Report describes the operation and the contents of the Submarine. The vessel is now beached in a position where further salvage could take place if it is ever considered necessary. For ENDURANCE it was the culminating incident in what has been a most extraordinary War.



*Nigel Barker*  
N J BARKER  
Captain  
Commanding Officer

Enclosure:

1. Report of Salvage of Submarine SAIBE FE dated 16 July 1982

Information: Flag Officer Submarines  
Flag Officer Third Flotilla

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HMS ENDURANCE

250/1

at Sea

REPORT ON THE SALVAGE OF SUBMARINE ARA SANTE FE

1. Background. The Argentine submarine ARA SANTE FE was attacked and damaged by AS12 missiles and the blast from depth charges on 25 April 1982 off GRITVIKEN, South Georgia. Following the retaking of South Georgia she was moved under her own power to GRITVIKEN Jetty. A Diving Team from HMS BRILLIANT disabled her by blowing the rudder off the pintals. The submarine subsequently sank alongside the jetty before any salvage assets could reach South Georgia. The tug TYPHOON and HMS ENDURANCE's ships diving team later attempted to salvage the submarine, but this was halted due to pump failure. The submarine was left on the sea bottom, with just the fin showing and at an angle of 15 degrees list to port.
2. Salvage Operation. The present salvage operation commenced on 28 June when HMS ENDURANCE returned from South Thule, and was conducted by the units and personnel at Annex A. The aim of the operation was to raise the submarine and make her sufficiently stable for her to be removed from the jetty where she was blocking an otherwise very useful berth as well as presenting a hazard to the local Whaling Station and BAS Base. The subsequent disposal of the submarine was to be at the discretion of the Ministry of Defence and any useful publications removed were to be despatched for intelligence purposes.
3. Initial attempts to pump out the submarine through the upper conning tower hatch were thwarted by the water level being below the lip of the hatch only at low water, and by the lack of any plans of the submarine. A concrete, wood and sandbag cofferdam was constructed around the hatch, and, after some days of rebuilding and strengthening, it finally held and allowed pumping to recommence. Two Flyght submersible pumps with 50 tons/hour capacities were used. Pumping continued until access was gained to the lower Control Room, where it was discovered that the door to the after end of the submarine was shut, and a major leak was present in the Auxiliary Machinery Space (AMS) under the WT Office. The HP air panel in the Control Room appeared to have been totally discharged and there was no evidence of any air in the Bottle Groups. All surfaces were extremely slippery due to the list to port and the mixture of diesel, hydraulic oil, battery acid, sanitary tank contents and sea water. One pump was put on the AMS to contain the leak which appeared to be from a vent trunking, and the other was slowly moved forward over a period of two days until, after opening the bulkhead door, access was gained to the forward Torpedo Compartment. Details of torpedoes, mines, explosives, detonators and publications found in both the forward and aft Torpedo Compartments are at Annex B.
4. Throughout the pumping operation, the diving team had continued, during bitter weather conditions, to pierce the Main Ballast Tanks (MBTs) from the outside by means of a Cox's gun, with a view to using the tugs air to blow them. However, this met with only limited success, resulting in 2 MBTs being blown using this method (No.2 & No.4). The difficulties resulted from an average of 1 in 4 misfires of the explosive bolts,

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caused by malfunction or maloperation by inexperienced operators, and lack of information on the thickness of the tanks and their location. This problem was largely overcome by blowing the MBTs from the HP air panel in the lower Control Room (by sawing the pipes in half!) and using tug's air (100 psi) to blow 2, 3, 4 and 5 MBTs. Together with the pumping this resulted in some movement of the bow section from the bottom. Ship's air was also used to put a High Salvage Blow on aft of the fin, with all low Salvage points aft open. The bulkhead door to the Galley/Accommodation Space was then breached by removing the sight glass in the door, which produced a bore of water into the Control Room. This eventually resulted in the stopping of the leak in the AMS vent trunking, confirming suspicions that the bulkhead vent trunking from aft had not been shut down, causing a free flow between compartments. When it was confirmed that the pumps were coping with this ingress, the bulkhead door was prised open with crowbars, causing a full-bore flood into the Control Room. The pumps also coped with this after a short time. Access was now possible as far aft as the bulkhead door to the Motor (Manoeuvring) Room, which was shut. The water level was chest high and again leaks from trunkings were evident in the After Engine Room. These were isolated. Progress was set back by pump failures overnight, causing the forward end to be flooded up again. One pump was restarted but the second pump was burnt out. When access to the After Engine Room was again possible, and after a period of 12 hours with an LP blow on the High Salvage Point to the Motor Room, the bulkhead door was gradually cracked open using the by now familiar 'crowbar and brown trousers method', and access gained right through to the aftermost compartment.

5. There then followed a period of attempting to pump a submarine dry using one submersible pump, which was only just winning against leaks in the Motor Room and the After Torpedo Compartment. Various other pumps were used (diesels, electric spates, SALVAGEMAN's monitor fire pump, and a small barrel pump), but they could not cope with the 38 feet plus height out through the fin. Finally, HP air was discovered in the submarine's LP system, and by cross connecting to the blow panel it was possible to blow MBTs using approximately 120 psi submarine LP air. The bow and Safety tanks were also blown and the submarine's forward casing rose 3-4 feet out of the water. Divers confirmed that the bows were 6 feet off the bottom, reducing to aground just aft of the fin. With the forward casing clear of the waterline, a diesel spate pump was floated on a gemini and a hose passed through the forward Escape Tower. This enabled the lower levels forward to be mopped up and resulted in the bow rising another two feet. The arrival of the much awaited two submersible pumps from the Falklands (one arrived U/s) enabled the pumping aft to progress much more rapidly, and by pm 14th July it was assessed that with less than one compartment full of water remaining inside the submarine, and with MBTs blown, the submarine should rise. A final blow round was ordered when number 6 starboard MBT valve was found shut, and opened. Dramatically the submarine rose to the surface at 1840z with a list of about 25 degrees to port. She appeared to stabilise, was definitely buoyant and was in tow-worthy state hull-wise. Pumping a leak stopping continued overnight to improve stability and only one leak in the Motor Room could not be stopped because it was inaccessible.

6. On 15 July a Clearance Diving Team from STENA INSPECTOR (i/c FCPO Green) inspected the forward and after Torpedo Compartments and assessed that the presence of TNT explosives which were rapidly drying out and therefore becoming unstable, detonators and the difficult conditions aft,

all combined to make the submarine a possible 'Time-Bomb'. He recommended that action be taken early to dispose of the submarine. Following a meeting and consultation with Higher Authority, it was decided to beach the submarine in position  $54^{\circ} 17.58S$   $036^{\circ} 29.3W$  off the Hessesletten. This was achieved by the SALVAGEMAN and the YORKSHIREMAN, and the submarine was placed hard aground on a gently shelving beach, and with a list of 25 degrees to port with the conning tower hatch and all bulkhead doors open. Pumping in the Motor Room and MBT blowing had continued during the tow. Numbers 3, 4 & 5 starboard MBTs were partially flooded prior to the tow to improve the list. All lines were cut to the submarine just prior to beaching. It was assessed as too dangerous to recover the two submersible pumps from aft.

7. After a period of 24 hours the submarine's list had reduced to 15 degrees to port and the after end of the casing had settled just below the water line. It is considered that the water level inside the submarine will reach sill level in the Accommodation Space and that the explosives in the after compartment will remain well covered.

8. The whole salvage operation was achieved with an excellent spirit of cooperation with the Master and crew of the SALVAGEMAN, and later with the much appreciated injection of expertise and advice from Lt Cdr PHILIPS and the RFO from the STENA INSPECTOR, and Lt BAYNEPHANION from the STENA SEASPREAD. All played their part in achieving a highly satisfactory and somewhat unusual task.

D C W O'CONNELL  
Lietenant Royal Navy  
Diving Officer

A A AINSLIE  
Lietenant Commander Royal Navy  
Supply Officer

D M IVES  
Lietenant Commander Royal Navy  
Charge Surveyor

16 July 1982

Annexes:

- A. List of Personnel and Units
- B. Armaments and Explosives.

Enclosures:

1. Notebook translation
2. Plans of Submarine
3. Signals
4. Photographs.

ANNEX A TO HMS ENDURANCE'S REPORT250/1 DATED 16 JULY 1982.LIST OF PERSONNEL AND UNITS.

1. HMS ENDURANCE: Lieutenant Commander D M Ives, Royal Navy  
 Lieutenant Commander A A Ainslie, Royal Navy  
 Lieutenant D C W O'Connell, Royal Navy  
 AB J W Ferguson D181860Y  
 AB M S Leach D166068N  
 Mne R K White PO38389Y  
 Mne S J Parsons PO3440X
  
2. MT SALVAGEMAN and MT YORKSHIREMAN.

ATTN: R. G. H. S. DURANCE'S  
 REPORT 250/1 DATED 13 JULY 1952

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE FOUND IN ARA SANTA FE

1. The explosive ordnance found during the salvage of the SANTA FE is listed below by compartments. Two types of torpedo were found. One type has been positively identified by manuals and publications as the US MK 37 homing torpedo. The other type identified by a photograph (copy enclosed) is believed to be a US MK 15 torpedo. Neither torpedo appears in ABCDP's. Dimensions and identifying features on the possible MK 15 are as follows:

Colour	Black
Length overall	21' 9"
Head Section	4' 1"
Flask Section	9' 9"
Afterbody & Tail	6' 11"
Warhead	1100 lbs HMX
Diameter	21"
Propellers	2 x 4 bladed

The head section is joined to the flask section by 48 recessed nuts. The nose has a built in lifting eye which is flush with the ogive shape of the head section. A brass plate 9" x 15" is situated on the underside of the head section allowing access to the pistol mechanism. The flask section has a wide lug on the upperside of the body. There are a number of access holes in the aftermost part of the flask section. A 2" diameter hole on the lower port side of the torpedo provides access to a pipe. A 4" x 2" hole on the centre port side provides access to 2 pipes. Above this access hole are 3 recesses. The flask section is joined to the afterbody by 48 recessed nuts. The afterbody has a spring loaded lever situated on the upperside. Two ovoid shaped access plates are situated on the forward port side of the afterbody. The foremost of these two plates lies at 90° to the top of the torpedo. The other plate is situated below and to the right of the first plate. Both plates are secured by 3 nuts.

2. Explosives found in FWD Torpedo Compartment

4 x MK 37 homing torpedoes lie on racks on the port side. Each torpedo contains a warhead of 325 lbs HMX.

1 x MK 15 torpedo lies on the false deck on the port side.

4 x MK 15 torp does lie on the rack on the STD side and 1 x MK 15 lies below the false deck on the STD side. All 6 MK 15 torpedoes have 1100 lbs HMX warheads. It is believed that the 4 MK 15 torpedoes lying in the racks have pistols inserted and the 2 under the deck plates are free of pistols.

This deduction is made because the access to the pistol mechanisms on the 4 torpedoes in the racks lie on the underside of the torpedo. This means that to fit pistols these torpedoes would have to be turned through 90°, the plate removed, pistols inserted, plate replaced and torpedo turned back. The 2 MK 15 in the bilges lie on their sides allowing easy access to the pistol access plate.

All torpedoes in the FWD Torpedo Compartment have locking straps on their propellers.

There are 6 torpedo tubes forward and all are believed to be loaded. Information in the OOD's File suggests that tubes 4 and 5 contain MK 37's and the remaining tubes are believed to contain MK 15's.

A small number of pyrotechnics were also found in this compartment.

3. Lower Control Room

A box of small arms ammunition lies on the deck in the Lower Control Room.

4. After Torpedo Compartment

4 MK 15 torpedoes lie in the racks aft. These are also warshots and are believed to have pistols inserted. All have locking strips on their propellers. The after torpedo tubes are believed to be loaded and tube 7 is believed to contain a MK 37 torpedo. Tube 8 is believed to contain a Mine as a brass tally was in personnel that a Mine is in the tube was found on the door of the tube. Tube 7 is damaged and has a slow leak. Damage is believed to have been caused by an explosion initiated by HMS BRILLIANT's divers whilst immobilising the Submarine.

In addition to the torpedoes the after Torpedo Compartment contains a large quantity of pyrotechnics, small arms ammunition, TNT, primers and detonators. A number of boxes have broken loose spilling primers, TNT and detonators onto the deck. The submersible pump in the After Torpedo Compartment was found to have TNT and primers stuck in its strainers. As this ordnance has been submersed in oil and water it is considered unsafe.

Appendix:

1. Copy of photograph of MK 13 & MK 15 torpedoes.


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16 November 1982

Ministry of Defence (Naval Historical Branch)  
Ministry of Defence (Defence Secretariat Division 5)OPERATION CORPORATE - REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Reference: MODUK Navy's LAJ/19F/Z6R 231340Z July 82

1. HMS ENDURANCE satisfactorily completed her Assisted Maintenance Period, post her deployment on Operation Corporate, on 22 October 1982.
2. There were no other events of significance.



*A J B Laybourne*

A J B LAYBOURNE  
Captain  
for Rear Admiral

Copies to: Commander in Chief Naval Home Command  
Commander in Chief Fleet  
Chief of Fleet Support

CT





