



Prime Minister

The main need at Greenham
Common is for some 50 to 70
extra police officers - the Home
Secretary will doubtless comment.

A.F.C. $\frac{3}{3}$.

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PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

The Home Secretary copied to me his minute of 17th February about the policing of demonstrations outside military bases. I have also seen your Private Secretary's letter of 21st February and the comments from the Home Secretary's Private Secretary in his letter of 25th February.

2. I entirely share the concern about security at Greenham Common and about the need severely to reduce, if we cannot entirely eliminate, the incursions into the base. But, for reasons which I will explain, it is not the case that demonstrators would find it as easy to enter an operational cruise missile facility or any other sensitive defence installation.

3. Clearly a combination of defences is required beginning with patrolling outside the perimeter of the airfield and including perimeter fencing, a security force within, and the special defences of the cruise missile base itself. I can understand the Home Secretary's concern over the potential cost of perimeter patrols by the Police sufficient to guarantee that there would be no further incursions. Nevertheless deterrent patrolling is important. Given the nine mile length of the base perimeter, and its layout, I do wonder whether a presence of just over 20 Police officers on duty around the base is adequate? I understand that the Chief Constable's own assessment is that he would require somewhere between 50 and 70 officers on duty



if he were to patrol the vulnerable, southern, wooded area of the base effectively. This would seem the level of civil Police presence which should now be provided if incursions are to be effectively discouraged.

4. The perimeter fence surrounding our bases is normally made of chain link fencing and is not designed to keep out a determined intruder. There are a number of technical aids for improving security which are summarised in the attached note. These are expensive to install at a base as large as Greenham Common: for example, to install closed circuit television round the whole perimeter could cost £1-2 million depending on the type of camera used, and detector systems could cost £4-6 million. The major problem is that all such systems are susceptible to false alarms and are manpower expensive because they have to be constantly monitored.

5. We have already installed at Greenham Common a second fence of barbed-wire behind the existing chain link perimeter fence around the area of the cruise missile site itself to prevent protestors reaching the construction area. We are also looking at laying more barbed-wire round the base perimeter concentrating essentially on those areas which are most vulnerable, and at installing closed circuit television in selected areas which are currently difficult to patrol and observe. All this needs to be pressed forward quickly.

6. Finally there is the question of the protection of the most sensitive operational areas. Our policy is to concentrate the defences because this is more effective as well as being sensible on cost and manpower grounds. Thus nuclear weapon storage sites are stringently protected. The areas have double barbed-wire fences, intruder detector alarm systems, powerful lighting, observation towers, and other technical aids. Moreover, they are manned on a 24-hour basis by Servicemen capable of reacting immediately to any threat and backed up by reserve forces at a few minutes notice. This will be the position at the cruise missile site inside the airfield when the equipment is deployed to Greenham Common.



7. To sum up, technical aids can be of only limited use in an area as large as Greenham Common and they will not necessarily themselves prevent incursions - for example, CND could assemble large numbers of small groups and use diversionary tactics. We must make sure that the fencing is adequate. The other immediate need is for more effective policing. For my part I have already taken steps in this direction with the deployment of 40 additional RAF Policemen and Police dogs. I hope that the Home Secretary will feel able to encourage the Chief Constable to provide a larger civil Police effort.

8. There is also the question of arrangements to deal with possible demonstrations at Easter involving Greenham Common, Aldermaston, Burghfield and possibly Upper Heyford. Here, as the Home Secretary has reported, planning is well in hand and there is close co-operation between my staff and the other authorities concerned and lines of responsibility are being clarified.

9. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

WMA

Ministry of Defence

2nd March 1983

ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL SECURITY AIDS

1. Intruder Detector System (IDS) For Perimeter Fences. IDS are rarely hung on perimeter fences because of the high false alarm rate from wildlife, wind-blown objects etc. If used it is essential that the fenceline should also be under surveillance by guards or closed circuit television (CCTV) to identify the cause of the alarm quickly. A trained Response Force must also be made available to respond quickly to a security incident. The following systems are available.

a. Inertia Switches. Expensive and very vulnerable to false alarms unless used on internal fences. Cost £5,700 per 100m run. The rough cost of protecting Greenham Common would be about £6M.

b. Microwave. Various systems are available. Average cost £3,500 per 100m run. Rough cost about £4M.

c. Radiating Cable. Various systems available. Guidar (Canadian) shows promise but not yet granted a Home Office licence because it operates on a high frequency band. Plessy is well tried and tested. Can be above or an underground system. Average cost £75-£100 per m. Rough cost at Greenham Common about £5M.

All these systems have to be monitored.

2. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). Various systems available but once again not usually used on long perimeters. With low light CCTV it is usual to provide some security lighting. There are two options: One costs £10,000 per camera (includes installation, lighting and monitoring consol) and will cover a 400m run. The other costs £5,000 per camera but will only cover a 100m run. Rough cost about £2M.

3. Barbed Wire/Tape. Could be used to surround most of Greenham Common and is probably the best method of achieving quick results. However, various gaps would have to be left to permit traffic/pedestrians to enter. To be effective these gaps would have to be manned when in use. This would be very demanding in terms of manpower. The cost of a 3-coil fence with stakes etc would be £250,000 (includes kit and fixing).

Refence,
Feb 83, Polking
of Demo's at
Military Bases

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