

Defence  
Feb 83



✓ CC RJ  
of BI

Prime Minister

MO 11/2/2

To note.

A.J.C. 12/5

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: RAF UPPER HEYFORD

I have been reviewing our planning for two CND demonstrations expected to take place at RAF Upper Heyford during the next three weeks. RAF Upper Heyford is a major USAF operational base - one of the most important in Europe - with a force of some 70 F111 nuclear capable aircraft and appropriate nuclear weapon storage. CND's intentions are:

a. A Christian CND march from Bicester to Upper Heyford on Saturday 21st May, when they will hold a service outside the base, followed by a vigil overnight and a service the following morning. There may be another service and vigil on Monday 23rd May. The organisers hope to attract about 2,000 supporters for this event, which the civil police expect to be orderly and law abiding. The Thames Valley Police will control events outside the base, with their strength ranging from 40 to 100 over the period. We have made arrangements for similar numbers of Ministry of Defence Police, supplemented if necessary by RAF Police, to be present within the perimeter to deal with any intrusions.

b. Of much greater significance in terms of operational threat is CND's planned blockade of the base from 31st May to 3rd June. For these four working days they hope to maintain a constant presence of 1,000 demonstrators, in shifts, outside the base throughout the period. Their aim is to halt or impede base operations. This poses a direct challenge to our



ability to maintain operational readiness at an important base, and there must be a risk of deliberate intrusions into the base of similar sites by fringe groups which attach themselves to the demonstration; possibly on a troublesome scale.

2. Now that the Election has been called, it is possible that CND may change their plans and tactics. And currently the Thames Valley Police doubt whether CND can assemble the numbers they hope for from 31st May to 3rd June. But I have no doubt that we must plan on the basis that the blockade will go ahead, and at least on the scale currently envisaged by the civil police: I have directed that our planning must be sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to deal if necessary with much larger numbers if intelligence (which has so far been good) nearer the time suggests that may be the case.

3. A particularly difficult problem affecting security arrangements at Upper Heyford, as we discussed before Easter, is the public road which bisects the base. The map at Annex A shows the position. To the north of the public road lie the nuclear weapons storage area, other ammunition depots, and operational aircraft including those armed aircraft held on quick reaction alert in hardened aircraft shelters. To the south lie the accommodation and recreational facilities. The northern area is almost wholly fenced off but the southern area is not fenced along the main road. Access to the operational part of the base is effectively confined to the gates opening off the public road and during any 24 hour period some 3,000 US personnel must move on and off the base. It is of cardinal importance to keep this road clear, both to maintain access for the personnel needed to support operations, and to prevent the demonstration getting so out of hand as to make large scale incursions possible. On the basis that the numbers of CND demonstrators are unlikely to reach 1,000 at any time, the current assessment, the Thames Valley Police have expressed confidence in



their ability to keep this road open and to control events, deploying up to 600 Police Officers.

4. We have already strengthened the physical defences of the northern area of the base, by laying an additional 5 miles of barbed wire inside the existing perimeter fence. Further improvements on these lines are planned before 31st May, but wire cannot offer a totally guaranteed defence. Internal security at Upper Heyford, as at other operational USAF bases, is an American responsibility and the USAF Commander is responsible to his own authorities for the security of his nuclear weapons and the aircraft which carry them. This authority rests in the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (Command 9363 of Jan 1955). For this purpose the local commander has a force of 470 armed US Service Police. But in these special circumstances, and to minimise the risk of any confrontation between demonstrators and armed US personnel, we have agreed with the American authorities that the US security force will confine its operations to the protection of the nuclear areas shown to the north of the runway at Annex A. The UK will provide an outer cordon, which we currently plan to comprise 160 MOD Police by day (120 by night) with 5 dog teams (3 by night) and 100 RAF Police with 19 dog teams. If later intelligence suggests it may be necessary, this force will be supplemented by appropriate and if necessary large numbers of unarmed UK service personnel. I have directed that the UK force must be sufficient in number to deal swiftly with any intruders and prevent them from impeding operations or penetrating to sensitive areas. It would clearly be intolerable if CND were able to claim that they had seriously affected operations at RAF Upper Heyford, or if our security arrangements could be claimed to have been ineffective. Unlike Greenham Common, which was still a base under construction, we must plan to maintain normal military activities including flying operations. We must also prevent demonstrators interfering with American and local British people who will be going about their daily business in the accommodation and recreational areas.



5. Our plans are flexible. We will keep them under review in case additional reinforcements may be necessary before the event. I have already approved reinforcements on the scale mentioned above, and that Service helicopters be available to move them if necessary. I have also directed that signs in adequate numbers be prepared in time for 21st May which will warn of the presence of armed guards. Currently there are no such signs, but since we can no longer guarantee the behaviour of the demonstrators, or that all of them are well-intentioned, this is a prudent and necessary step. I do not however propose as yet to volunteer any public statement about the presence of armed guards, and the notices themselves would be within the base perimeter. To advertise the importance of the base, and its security, might be taken as a challenge; but equally we cannot and must not seek to minimise either aspect.

6. There will continue to be the closest possible consultation between the MOD, the Home Office, the USAF and the Thames Valley Police. This worked admirably over Greenham Common.


7. I have not in this minute mentioned the more directly political and presentational aspects of these events should they occur. They are very important, but I shall deal with them separately.

8. I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, the Paymaster General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Murphy [Private Secretary]  
Draft approved by Mr Herelme and signed in his absence.*

Ministry of Defence  
12th May 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



HIGH SECURITY AREAS SHOWN IN RED.

PERIMETER FENCE SHOWN IN GREEN

MAGNETIC NORTH IS 06°30' WEST OF TRUE NORTH (JAN 1980)  
 ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE IS 00°11'6" EASTERLY.  
 Magnetic variation based on information supplied by THE INSTITUTE  
 OF GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES, GEOPHYSICALS UNIT, EDINBURGH.  
 Airfield Elevation 133.6 m (438.3 Feet) Contour Interval 3 Metres

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	INITIAL
4	26 JAN 83	ANNUAL UPDATE	G.S.H.
3	30 SEP 82	ANNUAL UPDATE	G.S.C.
2	10 MAY 82	PERIMETER FENCE ADDED TT END	G.P.G.
1	30 SEP 81	ANNUAL UPDATE	G.P.G.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING DCE/P&R - WASHINGTON D.C.

U.S. FORCES EUROPE  
 MASTER PLAN  
 UPPER HEYFORD AIR FORCE BASE  
 OXFORDSHIRE, ENGLAND.

SCALE 1:5000 DATE FEB 1980 TAB NO. C-1

FOR TRUE TO SCALE COPIES, PHOTOGRAPHIC ENLARGEMENTS AND REDUCTIONS OF THIS DRAWING APPLY TO:  
 CENTRAL SURVEY BRANCH DCE/PSA


Based upon the Ordnance Survey map with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Crown Copyright reserved.

O.S. Sheet No's  
 SP 4827 4927  
 SP 4828 4926 5026 5126 5226  
 SP 4829 4925 5025 5125 5225

NOTES:  
 This drawing has been produced from the original 1:2500 compilation Sheet No's S 704-706/79 and S 708/75, which was based upon Ordnance Survey 1:2500 A.R.I. Sheets dated April 1975 and revised by Fairley Survey Ltd Nov 1979.  
 LEVEL DATUM LIVERPOOL  
 CONTOUR V.I. 3metres

R.A.F. UPPER HEYFORD

RECORD OF SITE PLAN




SHEET DIAGRAM  
 This drawing has been produced from a photographic reduction of the original 1:2500 compilation, Sheet Nos S 415-418/80.

SHEET 1 OF 1  
 See also drawings No's 1:2500 S 415-418/80 1:5000 Reduction S 419/80 1:10000 Reduction S 420/80  
 DATE FEB 1980

Compiled by DCE/PSA SURVEY JOB NO 26208 SCALE 1:5000  
 ENGINEERING SURVEYS LTD DRAWN CENTRAL SURVEY DCE/PSA  
 on behalf of Central Survey DCE/PSA CHECKED  
 S 419/80  
 for DCE/PSA CENTRAL SURVEY DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

112 MAY 1983



CONFIDENTIAL



cc HO  
FCO  
P60  
CO

RL

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

BF

13 May 1983

Policing of demonstrations: RAF Upper Heyford

The Prime Minister was grateful for Mr. Heseltine's minute of 12 May, the contents of which she has noted.

I should be grateful if you and Tony Rawsthorne could keep this office closely informed of developments, in particular during CND's planned blockade of the Upper Heyford base from 31 May to 3 June.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Alex Galloway (Paymaster General's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

W