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FM WASHINGTON 1301327 MAR 85 TO MAMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 897 OF 12 MARCH

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HINFO HIMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVILY AMMAN PRIORITY ALGIERS TUNIS JEDDA JERUSALEM DAMASCUS UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: PRESHDENT MUBARAK'S WASHT TO WASHINGTON:

ARABAISRAEL

SUMMARY 1. MUBARAK URGED THE AMERICANS TO FIND A WAY TO OPEN A DIALOGUE MITH PALESTIMMIANS. US WILLIAMS TO TALK ONLY TO NON-PLO PALESTIMMIANS. BUT AGREEMENT THAT MOMENTUM MUST SOMEHOW BE MAINTAINED.

DETAIL

- 2. KIRBY (MURPHY'S DEPUTY FOR MIDDLE EAST NEGOTHATHONS) HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF MUBARAK'S DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ ON THE PEACE PROCESS. HE HAD NOT YET HAD A FULL ACCOUNT OF MUBARAK'S TALK WHITH PRESHDENT REAGAN, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT HIT HAD COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND.
- 3. MUBARAK HAD DESCRIBED AT LENGTH THE HISTORY OF THE JORDAN/PLO AGREEMENT, STRESSING THE EGYPTHAN CONTRIBUTION. HE HAD BEEN CRITHICAL OF GADDOUMI AND OTHER PALESTINIAN HARDLINERS WHO HAD REJECTED THE AGREEMENT WHTHOUT SEEIING A TEXT, AND OF ABU HYAD. HIS SO-CALLED IMMITHATINE HAD EVOLVED OUT OF A SERIES OF MEDIA INTERVIEWS IN WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED HIS THINKING, HIS AIM WAS DIRECT NEGOTIFICATIONS WITH THE PARTICUPATION OF MODERATE PLO MEMBERS. CHIRBY COMMENTED THAT MUBARAK APPEARED TO USE PALESTIMIANS AND PLO HINTERCHANGEABLY AND THAT HIT WAS NOT CLEAR PRECISELY WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS LAST PHRASE.)
- 4. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS TALKED REGULARLY TO THE PALESTIMIANS. HA ORDER NOT TO LEAVE THE FIELD OPEN FOR THE RUSSMANS, HIT WAS HIMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD BEGIN A SIMILAR DIALOGUE: THIS WOULD REDUCE THE BASK OF TERRORISM. (SOME 60 TO 70 PERCENT OF MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM WOULD CEASE INF THE US WERE SEEN TO BE WILLIAMS TO HELP), AND WOULD OBVINATE THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL

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5. MUBARAK SAIND THAT HE KNEW THE AMERICANS WERE CAUTHOUS, BUT URGED THEM TO FIRMD A WAY FORWARD. HE DAID NOT RECOMMEND ANY SPECIFIC ACTION. A DRAILOGUE COULD BE IMMUTHAYED HIM WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE; INT COULD BE SECRET OR NOT AS THE AMERICANS MISHED! BUT THE AMERICANS MUST DO SOMETHING TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. OTHERMAGE PALESTIMMAN FACTHOUS WOULD MOVE TOWARDS LIBYA WHICH WOULD BE COSTLY TO BOTH THE US AND EGYPT. OSAMA EL BAZ ADDED THAT ONE COULD NOT WANT FOR MORE MOVES FROM JORDAN OR THE PALESTIMMANS.

6. SHULTZ RECALLED THE FIRM US CONDITIONS FOR A DIALOGUE WHITH THE PLO, BUT ADDE THAT HE MINSELF HAD RECEIVED MAIN PALESTHMHAMS FROM THE OCCUPACE TERMINORIES WHITHOUT THE PLO LABLE. PERES HEEDED TO ESTABLISH MINS LEADERSMAP OVER LEBANON AND THE ECONOMY, ON WHICH HE HAD NOT YET DONE WHAT WAS REEDED, BEFORE HE COULD TACKLE THE OCCUPACE TERMINORIES. THE US RECOGNISED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT PROCESS, THOUGH THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT BOTH THE PROCESS MITSELF AND HITS CONTENT. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE MONETUM.

7. MUBARAK SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED WHITH KHAIG HUSSEIM WHICH HADDPENDEAT PALESTIMBHAINS MIGHT TAKE PART HIN A DIALOGUE, BUT HIT YOULD BE EASY TO COME UP WHITH SOME, KHAIC HUSSEIM WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE THOSE SELECTED, BUT HIT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO SEEK ARRATYS SHLENT ACQUIESCENCE, PALESTIMBHAN PARTICIPANTS HIN A DIALOGUE MINTH THE US WOULD BE THREATENED BY LIBBYANS AND RUSSIANS, NOT BY ARRATA.

8. SHULTZ ADDED THAT PERES WOULD MAVE TO BE CONSULTED TOO. KIRBY COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENDED TO SUGGEST AN INSRAELI VETO OVER PALESTIMBIAN PARTICUPANTS. SHULTZ HAD BEEN TRYBHING TO GET THE ECYPTIAMS TO FOCUS ON THE REAL DILEMPALY TO THE EXTENT THAT PALESTIMBIAN PARTICUPANTS HAD PLO BLESSING, HT WOULD BE MARDER FOR PERES TO ACQUIESCE, BUT HF THERE WEER IO EXPLICATE PLO BLESSING, PALESTIMBIANS WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO COME FORWARD.)

9, ON JORDAN, MUBARAK CLAMMED THAT HE HAD PERSUADED MING MUSSEIN NOT TO GO TO MOSCOW, THOUGH SOME JORDANIAN PURCHASES OF SOWRET WEAPONS HAD BEEN IMMENTABLE, SHULTZ SAMO THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN PREPÄRED LAST YEAR TO TAKE ON CONGRESS OVER US ARMS SUPPLIES TO JORDAN. CONGRESSIONAL ATTI-TUDES WOULD CHANGE HE JORDAN JOHNED THE PRACE PROCESS, JORDAN'S SECURITY WIS-A-WIS STRIAM WAS AN IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM, IF KINC HUSSEIN CAME FORWARD, THE US WOULD MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT OF SUPPORT HUBARAK TOOK THE LINE THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO WORTY ABOUT THE SYMIAMSE HE THE TRAIN MOVED, THEY WOULD JUMP ON BOARD, HE ALSO SPORE SCATHMAGED OF KINC HASSAN, WHO HAD SENT MIN A MESSAGE TO SAY THAT MIS IMMINIATIVE SHOULD FIRST MAVE BEEN APPROVED BY AN ARAB SUMMIT, AND OF THE MINACTIFWHTY OF THE ARB

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11. OSAMA EL BAZ HMYENJECTED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR POLINTICAL MOVEMENT ON THE PALESTMANIAN MESUE TOO, NOT JUST ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE. ON TABA, EMTHER AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENT TO ARBATEATHON WAS ESSENTIAL. MUBARAK ADDED THAT THE MSRAELINS WERE DOING WELL HALL ESAMON; BUT THE RETURN OF THE ECYPTIAN MHSASSADOR WOULD HAVE TO BE JUSTIAMENTED TO THE ECYPTHAN PUBLIC.

12. KAPBY UNDERSTOOD THAT PRESIDENT REAGN HAD MENTHONED TO MUBARAK THE PROSIDELAITY OF AN EARLY WIGHT TO THE REGION BY MURPHY. MUBARAK HAD MOT REACTED, AND HIT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE FOLLOWING UP BEFORE HE LEFT WASHMAGTON. KHIRPY ADDED THAT THE DATES AND HITHERARY FOR MURPHY'S TRIPP HAD YET TO BE AGREED,

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MOSCOW TRS 1008 CONFIDENTIAL FM FCO 131142Z MAR 85 TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 13 MARCH FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 897 IF 12 MARCH FOLLOWING FOR PS. PS/NO 10 (DUTY CLERK) INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN PRIORITY ALGIERS TUNIS JEDDA JERUSALEM DAMASCUS UKMIS NEW YORK MIPT: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARAB/ISRAEL SUMMARY MUBARAK URGED THE AMERICANS TO FIND A WAY TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS. US WILLING TO TALK ONLY TO NON-PLO PALESTINIANS. BUT AGREEMENT THAT MOMENTUM MUST SOMEHOW BE MAINTAINED. DETAIL 2. KIRBY (MURPHY'S DEPUTY FOR MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS) HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF MUBARAK'S DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ ON THE PEACE PROCESS. HE HAD NOT YET HAD A FULL ACCOUNT OF MUBARAK'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT IT HAD COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND. MOBARAK HAD DESCRIBED AT LENGTH THE HISTORY OF THE JORDAN/PLO AGREEMENT, STRESSING THE EGYPTIAN CONTRIBUTION. HE HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF QADDOUM! AND OTHER PALESTINIAN HARDLINERS WHO HAD REJECTED THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SEEING A TEXT, AND OF ABU LYAD. HIS SO-CALLED INITIATIVE HAD EVOLVED OUT OF A SERIES OF MEDIA INTERVIEWS IN WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED HIS THINKING. HIS AIM WAS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF MODERATE PLO MEMBERS. (KIRBY COMMENTED THAT MUBARAK APPEARED TO USE PALESTINIANS AND PLO INTERCHANGEABLY AND THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR PRECISELY WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS LAST PHRASE.) 4. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS TALJED REGULARLY TO THE PALESTINIANS. IN ORDER NOT TO LEAVE THE FIELD OPEN FOR THE RUSSIANS, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD BEGIN A SIMILAR DIALOGUE: THIS WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF TERRORISM. (SOME 60 TO 70 PERCENT OF MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM WOULD CEASE IF THE US WERE SEEN TO BE WILLING TO HELP), AND WOULD OBVIATE THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. NEITHER THE JORDANIANS NOR THE PALESTINIANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: IT WOULD JUST BE THEATRE AND WAS NOT A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION. A JORDAN/PALESTINIAN/ISRAELI MEETING, WITH US HELP, WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. 5. MUBARAK SAID THAT HE KNEW THE AMERICANS WERE CAUTIOUS, BUT URGED THEM TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HE DID NOT RECOMMEND ANY SPECIFIC ACTION. A DIALOGUE COULD BE INITIATED IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE: IT COULD BE SECRET OR NOT AS THE AMERICANS WISHED: BUT THE AMERICANS MUST DO SOMETHING TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. OTHERWISE PALESTINIAN FACTIONS WOULD MOVE TOWARDS LIBYA WHICH WOULD BE COSTLY TO BOTH THE US AND EGYPT. OSAMA EL BAZ ADDED THAT ONE COULD NOT WAIT FOR MORE MOVES FROM JORDAN OR THE PALESTINIANS. 6. SHULTZ RECALLED THE FIRM US CONDITIONS FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO, BUT ADDED THAT HE HIMSELF HAD RECEIVED MANY PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITHOUT THE PLO LABLE. PERES NEEDED TO ESTABLISH HIS LEADERSHIP OVER LEBANON AND THE ECONOMY, ON WHICH HE HAD NOT YET DONE WHAT WAS NEEDED, BEFORE HE COULD TACKLE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE US RECOGNISED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT PROCESS, THOUGH THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT BOTH THE PROCESS ITSELF AND ITS CONTENT. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM.

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