

MIDDLE EAST

PS
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 MR DEREK THOMAS
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR EGERTON
 HD/NINAD
 HD/HSD
 HD/UND
 HD/CONSULAR DEPT
 PUSD (2)
 NEWS DEPT
 RESIDENT CLERK

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE DIO



15.11.84

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130900Z FC0

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FM WASHINGTON 130132Z MAR 85
 TO IMMEDIATE FC0
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 897 OF 12 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN
 PRIORITY ALGIERS TUNIS JEDDA JERUSALEM DAMASCUS UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON;
 ARAB/ISRAEL
 SUMMARY

1. MUBARAK URGED THE AMERICANS TO FIND A WAY TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS. US WILLING TO TALK ONLY TO NON-PLO PALESTINIANS. BUT AGREEMENT THAT MOMENTUM MUST SOMEHOW BE MAINTAINED.

DETAIL

2. KIRBY (MURPHY'S DEPUTY FOR MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS) HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF MUBARAK'S DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ ON THE PEACE PROCESS. HE HAD NOT YET HAD A FULL ACCOUNT OF MUBARAK'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT HIT HAD COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND.

3. MUBARAK HAD DESCRIBED AT LENGTH THE HISTORY OF THE JORDAN/PLO AGREEMENT, STRESSING THE EGYPTIAN CONTRIBUTION. HE HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF QADDOUMI AND OTHER PALESTINIAN HARDLINERS WHO HAD REJECTED THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SEEING A TEXT, AND OF ABU HYAD. HIS SO-CALLED INITIATIVE HAD EVOLVED OUT OF A SERIES OF MEDIA INTERVIEWS IN WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED HIS THINKING. HIS AIM WAS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF MODERATE PLO MEMBERS. (KIRBY COMMENTED THAT MUBARAK APPEARED TO USE PALESTINIANS AND PLO INTERCHANGEABLY AND THAT HIT WAS NOT CLEAR PRECISELY WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS LAST PHRASE.)

4. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS TALKED REGULARLY TO THE PALESTINIANS. IN ORDER NOT TO LEAVE THE FIELD OPEN FOR THE RUSSIANS, HIT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD BEGIN A SIMILAR DIALOGUE; THIS WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF TERRORISM. (SOME 60 TO 70 PERCENT OF MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM WOULD CEASE IF THE US WERE SEEN TO BE WILLING TO HELP), AND WOULD OBTUATE THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL

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5. MUBARAK SAID THAT HE KNEW THE AMERICANS WERE CAUTIOUS, BUT URGED THEM TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HE DID NOT RECOMMEND ANY SPECIFIC ACTION. A DIALOGUE COULD BE INITIATED IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE; IT COULD BE SECRET OR NOT AS THE AMERICANS WISHED; BUT THE AMERICANS MUST DO SOMETHING TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. OTHERWISE PALESTINIAN FACTIONS WOULD MOVE TOWARDS LIBYA WHICH WOULD BE COSTLY TO BOTH THE US AND EGYPT. OSAMA EL BAZ ADDED THAT ONE COULD NOT WAIT FOR MORE MOVES FROM JORDAN OR THE PALESTINIANS.

6. SHULTZ RECALLED THE FIRM US CONDITIONS FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO, BUT ADDED THAT HE HIMSELF HAD RECEIVED MANY PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITHOUT THE PLO LABEL. PERES HAD TO ESTABLISH HIS LEADERSHIP OVER LEBANON AND THE ECONOMY, ON WHICH HE HAD NOT YET DONE WHAT WAS NEEDED, BEFORE HE COULD TACKLE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE US RECOGNISED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT PROCESS, THOUGH THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT BOTH THE PROCESS ITSELF AND ITS CONTENT. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM.

7. MUBARAK SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED WITH KING HUSSEIN WHICH INDEPENDENT PALESTINIANS MIGHT TAKE PART IN A DIALOGUE. BUT IT WOULD BE EASY TO COME UP WITH SOME. KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE THOSE SELECTED, BUT IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO SEEK ARAFAT'S SILENT ACQUIESCENCE. PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE US WOULD BE THREATENED BY LIBYANS AND RUSSIANS, NOT BY ARAFAT.

8. SHULTZ ADDED THAT PERES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED TOO. KIRBY COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENDED TO SUGGEST AN ISRAELI VETO OVER PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS. SHULTZ HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET THE EGYPTIANS TO FOCUS ON THE REAL DILEMMA: TO THE EXTENT THAT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS HAD PLO BLESSING, IT WOULD BE HARDER FOR PERES TO ACQUIESCE, BUT IF THERE WERE NO EXPLICIT PLO BLESSING, PALESTINIANS WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO COME FORWARD.)

9. ON JORDAN, MUBARAK CLAIMED THAT HE HAD PERSUADED KING HUSSEIN NOT TO GO TO MOSCOW, THOUGH SOME JORDANIAN PURCHASES OF SOVIET WEAPONS HAD BEEN INEVITABLE. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN PREPARED LAST YEAR TO TAKE ON CONGRESS OVER US ARMS SUPPLIES TO JORDAN. CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WOULD CHANGE IF JORDAN JOINED THE PEACE PROCESS. JORDAN'S SECURITY VIS-A-VIS SYRIA WAS AN IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM. IF KING HUSSEIN CAME FORWARD, THE US WOULD MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT OF SUPPORT. MUBARAK TOOK THE LINE THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT THE SYRIANS; IF THE TRAIN MOVED, THEY WOULD JUMP ON BOARD. HE ALSO SPOKE SCATHINGLY OF KING HASSAN, WHO HAD SENT HIM A MESSAGE TO SAY THAT HIS INITIATIVE SHOULD FIRST HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY AN ARAB SUMMIT, AND OF THE INACTIVITY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARIAT.

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11. OSAMA EL BAZ INTERJECTED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR POLITICAL MOVEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE TOO, NOT JUST ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE. ON TABA, EITHER AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATION WAS ESSENTIAL. MUBARAK ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE DOING WELL IN LEBANON; BUT THE RETURN OF THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR WOULD HAVE TO BE JUSTIFIED TO THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC.

12. KIRBY UNDERSTOOD THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MENTIONED TO MUBARAK THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY VISIT TO THE REGION BY MURPHY. MUBARAK HAD NOT REACTED, AND IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE FOLLOWING UP BEFORE HE LEFT WASHINGTON. KIRBY ADDED THAT THE DATES AND ITINERARY FOR MURPHY'S TRIP HAD YET TO BE AGREED.

WRIGHT

NNNN

TO MOSCOW

URS 1008

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131142Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 13 MARCH

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT WAS

RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 897 IF 12 MARCH

FOLLOWING FOR PS, PS/NO 10 (DUTY CLERK)

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