

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T188 C185



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 October 1985

Your Majesty,

I wanted to let you know personally how deeply disappointed I was that the meeting between Sir Geoffrey Howe and the joint Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation which I announced at Aqaba had to be called off today.

We only learned at the very last moment that the two Palestinian representatives were not willing to associate themselves with the public statement already agreed with Zaid Rifai.

I attached great importance - as I know you did - to this meeting and the accompanying joint statement as a contribution we could make to your own tireless efforts for peace. I am all the more sad that despite the efforts of your own Ministers the refusal by the Palestinian representatives to accept a specific reference to Israel has produced this setback. I am very conscious that the outcome can only add further to the grievous burden you already carry.

/We concluded

SFW

CF file

Subject.

cc ops
master

LR

cc FCO
Sir P. Cradock

We concluded that it was essential to explain publicly the background to today's events. I realise the difficulties that this may cause on the Palestinian side. But I firmly believe that in pursuing the cause of peace the truth remains our strongest weapon. We shall only overcome the obstacles ahead if we confront them together in a spirit of frankness.

At this difficult time let me emphasise once again my own staunch support for your peace initiative. I am convinced that we were right to take the risks involved in inviting the delegation and that we must now go on searching for further ways of carrying things forward. We shall need to keep closely in touch on how to move forward in the weeks and months ahead.

*With admiration & respect
and warm regards,*

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal.

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence FLASH
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8 INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, EC POSTS, WASHINGTON,
9 UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister
An account of the
Jordanian meeting with
Sir G. Howe. CDD 14/11.

10
11
12 CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY JORDANIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
13 AND FOREIGN MINISTER

14 Summary

15 1. Jordanian disappointment at frankness of our press statement.
16 But understood our reasons and blamed problems on lack of
17 communication on Palestinian side. Anxious to know whether we
18 would reinstate the visit if they could achieve PLO agreement to
19 the original statement. I said we would need to reflect on that.
20 I underlined our continuing firm support for the King's
21 initiative. Jordanians have decided to cancel their visit to
22 Luxembourg.

23 Detail

24 2. I agreed to receive a courtesy call from the Jordanian Deputy
25 Prime Minister Majali and Foreign Minister Masri this morning in
26 place of the call by the joint delegation. The Jordanians were
27 given a copy of our press statement as they entered the room.
28 Their initial concern was to manage things so as to avoid damage
29 to the peace process and the image of the Palestinians concerned.

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MAIL
ADDITIONAL
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Catchword		I	
File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
	PRIVATE OFFICE	P F RICKETTS	233 4641
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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2 I made plain our great disappointment at these events. Like the
 3 Jordanians we had taken risks for peace. We were more than ever
 4 convinced that it was right to do so. The fact that the
 5 delegation's visit could not take place would be seen as a major
 6 setback to the King's initiative. This was of great concern to
 7 us because we continued to believe that the King's approach was
 8 the right one.

9 3. Masri said that he had spoken to the King in Scotland this
 10 morning. The King had asked that his personal thanks be passed on
 11 to the Prime Minister and me for what Britain had done. The King
 12 was deeply sorry at the turn events had taken. The Jordanians were
 13 clear that lack of communication on the Palestinian side was to
 14 blame. They had been making frantic efforts to contact Arafat
 15 and other PLO leaders. But Arafat had denied all knowledge of
 16 the proposed joint statement and the two Palestinians had
 17 decided that they could not accept it without endorsement from the
 18 PLO Executive Committee.

19 4. In answer to a question from Masri I made clear that there
 20 was no question of our accepting a call by the joint delegation
 21 without any agreed press statement.

22 5. Having read our own statement to the press, Masri commented
 23 that it was very strong and very honest. He did not dispute that
 24 it was an accurate account of the position, but he was concerned
 25 that it would destroy the credibility of Milhem and Khoury. In
 26 the negotiations last night on the joint press statement,
 27 agreement had been very close. The British and Jordanian
 28 representatives had been united in trying to press the
 29 Palestinians on the only outstanding point, a specific reference
 30 to Israel. Now in the light of our statement the chance of
 31 narrowing that remaining gap ^{might have been} ~~had~~ been lost.

32 6. Masri asked for advice on how to handle their proposed visit
 33 to Luxembourg. They had already been thinking of cancelling it.
 34 Having now read our press statement he was even more inclined to

For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)


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1 <<<< *in order*
 2 do so, ~~so as~~ to preserve intact the possibility of mounting a
 3 joint delegation to Britain and the EC Presidency in the future.
 4 ~~The Secretary of State~~ agreed that in the circumstances
 5 cancellation seemed the right course. The Jordanians appeared to
 6 decide there and then that they would do so.
 7 7. Looking to the future, ~~the Secretary of State~~ underlined
 8 that we would make plain in public our admiration for all that
 9 the King was trying to do and our determination to go on working
 10 with him. Majali said that he was confident it would be possible
 11 to sort things out with the PLO and get their agreement to an
 12 acceptable statement. Masru pressed me on whether we would be
 13 prepared to receive a delegation if the same joint statement could
 14 be agreed in the future. I replied that I would need to talk this
 15 over with the Prime Minister. Today's events themselves created
 16 a new situation and any agreed statement would accordingly be
 17 looked at even more critically.
 18 8. In conclusion I said that I had spoken to the Prime Minister
 19 before the meeting. We were both very disappointed that these
 20 difficulties had arisen. I asked the Jordanians to pass on to the
 21 King our deep regret at the set back to the desperately difficult
 22 task he was engaged on, and our continuing support for him.
 23 Masri commented that the Jordanians were more than ever certain
 24 that the path they had mapped out was the right one. If they
 25 failed the resulting explosion in the region would only benefit
 26 the radicals.

27 *The Prime Minister will be sending the King a personal*
 28 HOWE *message in Scotland later today.*
 29
 30

/// 31 YYYYY
 // 32 MAIN
 / 33 MIDDLE EAST STANDARD
 34



TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

cc Press
Sir P.C.

STATEMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING WITH JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION: TO BE MADE BY THE MINISTER OF STATE, THE BARONESS YOUNG IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON TUESDAY 15 OCTOBER 1985.

1. At the end of her visit to Jordan, my right hon Friend, the Prime Minister, announced in Aqaba on 20 September her agreement that my right hon and learned Friend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, would receive in London a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. Our objective in issuing this invitation was to assist the search for peace in the Middle East and to demonstrate in a practical way our support for King Hussein's courageous initiative of 11 February in which he challenged the Palestinians to join him in a joint approach to peace negotiations with Israel. We intended to use the meeting to explain at a high level our strongly-held view that a peaceful settlement must be based on the fundamental and balanced principles of the right of Israel to exist in peace and security and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.
2. It was agreed that the delegation would be led by the Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Majali, and the Foreign Minister of Jordan, Mr Masri. The names of the two Palestinian delegates, Mr Milhem and Bishop Khoury, were put forward on the understanding that they personally

/supported

supported a peaceful settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions and were opposed to terrorism and violence. We received unambiguous assurances that the two Palestinians would make this clear publicly during their stay in London.

3. Last week our Ambassador at Amman negotiated with the Jordanian Prime Minister the text of a statement which it was agreed would be issued by the delegation after their talks with my right hon and learned Friend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. This stated that "the members of the joint delegation reiterated their personal support for a peaceful settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions, including Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council. They stated that in accordance with these resolutions a settlement should recognise the rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination within the context of a Jordanian/Palestinian confederation, as well as the right to secure existence of all states in the area, including Israel within its 1967 borders. They confirmed their opposition to all forms of terrorism and violence from whatever source".

4. The two Palestinians arrived in London on 12 October for a meeting with my right hon and learned Friend yesterday,

/14 October.

14 October. On the Afternoon of 13 October the two Palestinians said that they were not, after all, willing to associate themselves with this statement. We stressed to members of the delegation our fundamental requirement that they should confirm their personal commitment to a peaceful settlement which recognised Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised boundaries and their opposition to all forms of terrorism and violence. One of the Palestinian members of the delegation was unwilling to accept a specific reference to Israel's right to exist. We concluded that in these circumstances the meeting with the joint delegation could not take place.

5. We have kept in the closest touch with King Hussein and his government who I know share our disappointment at this setback. My right honourable and learned Friend had a useful talk with the Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister yesterday. He reaffirmed our firm support for King Hussein's initiative, which offers the best prospect of further progress.

6. The international community must be ready to encourage

/those

those who are working for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. We have shown that we are ready to do so. There can be no lasting settlement until all others are ready to do the same. We have made plain our deep disappointment that the opportunity offered by our invitation to the joint delegation has been missed.

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING

1 Allegation that HMG cancelled meeting

We made clear that the meeting could not take place under the circumstances I have described. We now need to pause for reflection.

2 Setback in progress towards peace?

Of course. Great disappointment also. But must not allow it to be fatal setback. Urgent need for peaceful settlement remains. Recent violent incidents only underline urgency.

3 Failure for HMG

No. Worthwhile attempt. No doubt that if end to terrible conflict in Middle East to be found, need to encourage those seeking peaceful solutions. Need to take risks. No apologies. Still wish to help advance peace process. Regret others not also prepared to take risks.

4 Caving in to US pressure?

No. Mr Shultz told my Rt Hon ^{Learned Friend} and when he saw him that he welcomed the initiative. No question of succumbing to pressure. Last minute change on Palestinian side.

5 Why Palestinians reneged?

Not for me to say. But believe demonstrates pressures on moderates.

6 Which Palestinians?

(If pressed) Mohamed Milhem.

7 UK Changed Ground Rules?

No. Delegation came on clear understanding that they would unequivocally and publicly state their commitment to a peaceful settlement and their opposition to terrorism and violence. This means acceptance of SCRs 242 and 338 and of

Israel's right to exist.

8 Britain duped/assurances

- Negotiated assurances with Jordanian Prime Minister.
- Statement cleared with Jordanian Prime Minister and Bishop Khouri.
- Jordanian Prime Minister assured us that Mr Milhem would agree statement.

9 Renewed contacts?

Keep in close touch with King Hussein. Jordanians as disappointed as we by this last minute change. No plans for renewed contacts with Palestinians. Depends on them - clear statements indispensable.

10 Luxembourg Meeting

Understand that Jordanians have postponed the meeting.

11 Conditions attached to visit to France, Italy and Holy See

A matter for the governments concerned. (If pressed) Not aware of any conditions attached.

12 Arms Sales to Arab countries. Like other Western countries, have never disqualified ourselves from selling arms to moderate Arab States.

- Must not force them to turn to Soviet Union as only supplier.
- Saudi Arabia and Jordan bastions of stability and moderation, with legitimate self-defence needs, facing external threats.

13 Israel: arms embargo. Imposed in direct response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Policy kept under review. Israel's withdrawal not completed.

14 Change in British policy towards PLO?

- No change in Government's attitude. Do not recognise PLO's claim to be sole legitimate representative of Palestinians. Do not propose to give PLO any official status.
- Recognition does not come into it: recognise states only.
- We maintain regular working contact at official level with PLO. But Ministerial contacts will remain difficult so long as PLO ambiguous about terrorism and Israel's right to exist. This incident underlines problems.

TERRORISM

15 Meeting rewards violence?

On contrary, acts of violence reinforce need to encourage forces of moderation. Regret that they are not prepared to be as explicit in public as we would wish.

16 PLO supports armed struggle and terrorism?

Not all Palestinians support terrorism/armed struggle. PLO a set of initials embracing wide cross-section of opinion, apparently enjoying support of most Palestinians in occupied territories.

17 Delegation visit inconsistent with British policy towards IRA?

No parallel. IRA proscribed but Sinn Fein takes part in Northern Ireland elections, polls only 10% of vote. Palestinians not enfranchised, though PLO apparently has widespread support.

18 Khoury had terrorist connection?

Denied allegations of complicity in terrorism at the time and has done so again recently. Never prosecuted by Israeli authorities although they are now claiming that he admitted awareness of

transporting for others a package containing explosives. This was apparently later used in a bombing attack. Concentrate on present. Of course past record important, but present commitment even more vital.

19 But commitment in Palestinian Charter to destroy Israel?

Need to look to future, discard out-dated texts.

ACHILLE LAURO

20 US/Egyptian relations over Achille Lauro Hijack

Regret disagreements between good friends. Hope any misunderstanding will soon be cleared up. No reason to doubt Mubarak's version of events. Egyptians had difficult hand to play. Grateful to them for bringing the hijack to an end without further loss of life. Have said so personally to Egyptian Foreign Minister.

21 Italian actions

Matter for Italian authorities in light of all evidence available to them. Regret disagreement between Italy and US. Understand US anger at death of citizen.

22 PLO Complicity

Not in a position to make a conclusive judgement at this stage.

23 International Conference

Fully understand Hussein's need for international framework for negotiations. International Conference fine in principle. But not convinced it is productive approach while two sides so far apart.

24 US Seizure of Liner Hijackers

Our position on terrorism is well known. There must be no concessions to terrorists and those responsible for acts of terrorism must be brought to face justice. HMG naturally welcomes this when it occurs.

25 Were we informed in advance of the US action?

No.

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RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1985

Dear Charles,

Message from the Prime Minister to King Hussein

/ As we agreed on the telephone, I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister might wish to send to King Hussein about today's events.

The passage in square brackets is included in the light of the evident disappointment of the Jordanian Ministers who called on Sir Geoffrey this morning at the frank terms of our statement. Sir Geoffrey thought that the Prime Minister might want to explain briefly to the King why we had concluded it was necessary to put out this statement. The passage does however have a somewhat defensive ring and could be omitted without losing anything essential.

We understand that the King returns to London from Scotland in the course of tomorrow. We would be happy to arrange the delivery of a letter as soon as possible tomorrow.

Yr
wv.
P F Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

LOZAMP

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:

King Hussein of Jordan

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I wanted to let you know personally how deeply disappointed I was that the meeting between Sir Geoffrey Howe and the joint Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation which I announced at Aqaba had to be called off today.

We only learned at the very last moment that the two Palestinian representatives were not willing to associate themselves with the public statement already agreed with Zaid Rifai.

I attached great importance, - as I know you did - to this meeting and the accompanying joint statement as a contribution we could make to your own tireless efforts for peace. I am all the more sad that despite the efforts of your own Ministers the refusal by the Palestinian representatives to accept a specific reference to Israel has produced this setback. I am very conscious that the outcome can only add further to the grievous burden you already carry.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

We concluded that it was essential to explain publicly the background to today's events. I realise the difficulties that this may cause on the Palestinian side. But I firmly believe that in pursuing the cause of peace the truth remains our strongest weapon. We

/shall

shall only overcome the obstacles ahead if we confront them together in a spirit of frankness.?

At this difficult time let me emphasise once again my own staunch support for your peace initiative. I am convinced that we were right to take the risks involved in inviting the delegation and that we must now go on searching for further ways of carrying things forward. We shall need to keep closely in touch on how to move forward in the weeks and months ahead.

aa.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

JOINT DELEGATION.

By no means all
this morning press
was bad. See
attached.

mf

N. L. W

15.10.

Appointment & missed

THE CANCELLATION of yesterday's controversial meeting between Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, and two members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation's executive committee has come as only half a surprise. In the present climate of hostility in the Middle East, heated to boiling point by the successive murder of three Israelis by Palestinian terrorists in Cyprus, the retaliatory raid by the Israelis on the PLO headquarters outside Tunis and the spectacular hijacking of the Italian ship Achille Lauro, talks on a Middle East peace settlement would have appeared badly timed to say the least.

Given the circumstances, the official explanation for the cancellation of the meeting must be considered as telling only part of the story. When Mrs Thatcher, the Prime Minister, announced the visit of a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation to London during her visit to Jordan in September, she made it clear that the Palestinian members had been accepted only on certain conditions.

Those conditions were that Bishop Elia Khouri and Mr Mohammed Milhem, both of them considered to be Palestinian moderates, personally supported a peaceful settlement of the Arab/Israeli dispute on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Equally important were their opposition to terrorism and violence and what Sir Geoffrey Howe has described as "the unambiguous assurances" that the two Palestinian delegates would make clear publicly their position during their stay in London.

Declaration

The text of the public declaration that Bishop Khouri and Mr Milhem were going to make after seeing the Foreign Secretary was meticulously drafted in negotiations between British and Jordanian officials, who were also acting on behalf of the PLO. As late as the middle of last week, if British officials are to be believed, the Jordanians informed the British Government that the wording which had been worked out was acceptable to both themselves and the PLO delegates.

There are several possible reasons why the whole carefully constructed scenario has failed to materialise and why, at the last moment, the Palestinian members of the joint delegation refused to accept the agreed text.

The British side could have

made last-minute changes which proved unpalatable to the PLO, though this is strenuously denied by the Foreign Office. The Jordanians, who acted as go-betweens, could have misunderstood the PLO's position and signalled its agreement to London when it still had reservations. The most likely explanation, however, is that the Palestinian delegates simply changed their minds about making such a significant declaration in public at a time when the PLO is reported to be reviewing its whole strategy.

Their willingness to talk peace in the aftermath of the stunning Israeli air attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunis and the capture of the Italian cruise ship's Palestinian hijackers must have been seriously eroded. Even before the latest events, Bishop Khouri and Mr Milhem were threatened with assassination by Palestinian extremist groups and it was probably more than their lives were worth to go ahead with their visit to London and accept publicly the existence of the state of Israel.

For Mrs Thatcher and her Foreign Secretary, who had shown considerable courage in inviting the Palestinian delegates to London in the face of strong criticism from the U.S., Israel and the British Jewish community, the breakdown of the meeting must come as both a disappointment and relief.

Relief, because Mrs Thatcher was understandably loth to see the British Government associating with members of an organisation responsible for abhorrent terrorist attacks in the weeks and days before the scheduled meeting. Disappointment, because her initiative could have marked the beginning of a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process, if it had gone well. As it is, it will not be easy to set up another meeting of the same kind, particularly if the PLO now decides to adopt an even more intransigent and violent stance.

In the end, however, all sides in the Middle East conflict will be forced to accept what is already obvious to most people in the world—that no political advantage is to be gained by a continuation of terrorism.

The events of the last week have certainly brought home to the western democracies the need to step up international action against terrorism. But they have also underlined the urgency for the U.S. and, possibly the Soviet Union, to play an imaginative and dynamic role in pushing the combatants to the negotiating table.

Another entry for the high-tech race

By Kenneth Gooding
Motor Industry Correspondent

SUDDENLY, the world's most successful motor companies seem to be driven by a single thought: to accelerate as rapidly as possible into electronics, aerospace and other high-technology businesses.

Daimler-Benz's bid for control of AEG—a cash-poor company with a rich store of advanced technology—echoes strongly the actions of General Motors, which has this year spent nearly \$8bn on high-technology acquisitions. Just as GM is seeking to protect its future as the world's biggest motor manufacturer, Daimler-Benz is primarily concerned to defend its position as the world's leading truck maker and a producer of up-market, high quality cars.

There is also a bonus for such adventurousness: by diversifying, these companies are spreading their interests out of vehicle production—where, for the time being, growth has slowed to a snail's pace—to areas with immense growth potential. Both GM and Daimler-Benz know that their chances of growth through increased market share in the motor industry are limited.

"Electronics as an industry is still at the model T stage," says Mr Roger Smith, GM's chairman. He intends to use the expertise of the companies he has acquired to turn GM into a "paperless" organisation. Customers will be able to order a car, components for it will be called up and assembled at a computer-controlled factory and the finished vehicle sent off to its final destination without any invoices changing hands.

Daimler-Benz has already shown it is determined to stay in the forefront of the use of electronics in its vehicles—particularly in its highly-profitable cars. The German company has no intention of allowing the Japanese to move up into its part of the market unchallenged.

Before the offer for AEG, the most important move by Daimler-Benz was the acquisition earlier this year of Dornier, the West German aerospace company—a move which was quickly followed

had the same thing in mind to gain access to new markets and technologies which have been too expensive to develop for cars and trucks alone.

Daimler-Benz's purchase of the 50 per cent shareholdings did not already own in which makes large engines, was not in the category.

It already had access to MTU's technology and manoeuvre seems to have defensive. The price paid for the MTU stake, unofficially estimated at DM 500m, provided a welcome cash injection for MAN, Daimler-Benz's partner in the venture and second-largest West German heavy truck producer.

The timing of the deal enabled MAN to resist the blishments of General Motors which was more than a little interested in buying a shareholding in MAN from its parent, GHV engineering group.

So Daimler-Benz's apparent benevolent gesture towards competitor was in reality lightened self-interest. By helping MAN along the recovery road, Daimler-Benz prevented the entrance of an unwelcome intruder to its domestic market—a market it has so far successfully guarded against foreign competition.

MAN accounts for about 10 per cent of West German truck market, a useful starting point for any one of Daimler-Benz's competitors wanting to erode the group's dominant position and market share well over 50 per cent.

This strength in Western Europe's largest truck market enabled Daimler-Benz to emerge as the world's largest producer of heavy trucks (over six tonnes gross) by the end of the 1970s.

Its heavy truck assembly plant at Woerth, near Karlsruhe—Europe's biggest with 10,600 employees—can produce well over 100,000 vehicles a year enough to satisfy demand in both Germany and the UK.

The economies of scale at Woerth also made it possible for Daimler-Benz to match the worst efforts of its competitors in the European truck price war which flared in the

THE STAR SAYS

Risk we had to take

ONLY the most blind and bigoted can take much comfort from the last minute cancellation of talks between Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

While no decent human being can for one second condone terrorist outrages like the Achille Lauro affair, words and not warfare hold out the only real hope of long term peace in the Middle East.

There was—and still could be—a unique role for Britain to play as the "honest broker."

That was why Mrs. Thatcher risked and took on the wrath of the Americans, the Israelis and others by inviting the PLO men to London.

It was an act of statesmanship. Because in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict neither side is blameless.

Underlining the real worth of the Thatcher initiative was her determination to visit Israel next year to balance her tour of Arab nations last month.

Too much mystery and coded Foreign Office jargon surrounds yesterday's eleventh-hour cancellation.

Too many questions remain unanswered about undoubted pressure put on London from Washington and Tel Aviv.

A full explanation is essential. Otherwise this whole sorry affair might look a bit like a cop-out.

A turn off!

THE Government is planning to allow TV cameras into the House of Commons for a short

Sinclair trike facing end of the road

By PETER WELBURN

ELECTRIC trike inventor Sir Clive Sinclair called in the receivers yesterday.


Sales of the C5 three-wheeler never took off. And now Sir Clive's company, which is separate from his other electronics operation, owes £700,000.

A Sinclair spokesman said: "In view of the company's position and in order to ensure the future of the electric vehicle venture and its research activities Sir Clive has been advised to appoint receivers."

The electronic whizz-kid sank £7 million of his personal fortune into the project, hoping to sell 100 000 trikes a year.

And he still plans the eventual launch of two and four-seat versions with a bigger range and higher speed.

ST
W
CO



October 15 1985

Not our fault

THE cancellation of the talks between the Foreign Secretary and the two leading members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation has gladdened the Israelis and many Americans.

It has handed the PLO another propaganda defeat, and dashed for the foreseeable future any hopes Britain might have had of advancing the Jordanian-PLO initiative for Middle East peace.

Labour MPs and some Tory ones are looking for scapegoats. They are criticising Mrs Thatcher for impulsiveness and the Foreign Office for its obdurate Arabism. In the perspective of what—just—might have been achieved, this is a short-sighted response.

It is unjust to talk about Britain's "diplomatic humiliation" and blame the Prime Minister and Sir Geoffrey Howe. Mrs Thatcher acceded to these talks—under pressure, perhaps, from King Hussein whom she sees as a man of honour and staunchly pro-British—in the belief that if the PLO delegates could be made to agree to the initial declaration (backing non-violence and the integrity of Israel's 1967 boundaries) it would be a major step forward.

In retrospect, of course, this belief seems ingenuous. There has been an escalation of terrorism and violence, with the murder by Palestinians of three Israelis in Cyprus, Israel's retaliatory raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis and the hijacking of the Achille Lauro.

Add to these the strong diplomatic pressure from Washington and Jerusalem to call off the talks, and it will be evident why the Government feels relief as well as disappointment that the Palestinian delegates backed away from the declaration they had agreed to make.

But these same acts of terrorism show how necessary it is to promote genuine peace initiatives in the Middle East. Britain, with its long history of involvement in the area, should not be seen as having no role to play.

Haringey

NOW you see him; now you don't. Last week's Bernie Grant we rightly described as a gutter-demagogue, gloating over the Tottenham riots, exulting that the police had been given a good hiding and wondering if Pc Blakelock might not have been

The trouble wi

BRI

Getting black

—it's no good

I HAPPEN to believe that the way to prevent urban riots is to decide decisively to improve the conditions of the black community.

This is one problem we could solve, did we but possess the breadth of mind to be generous. I hope that we do, but I confess this is a large subject with many complexities.

But one important part of it is simple. Out of 125,000 policemen in Britain, only 700 are black. These are disgraceful and dangerous figures and they must be changed forthwith.

Never mind if anybody is to blame, choosing scapegoats does not resolve the difficulty. Everybody surely, agrees action must be taken and what is required is imagination rather than recrimination.

We must discard the idea that we can sit back, be tolerant, and await black applications for the police—or for that matter the civil

Speal

I SAW little wrong with Mrs Thatcher's performance at the Tory Conference. She seemed to be brimful of vim and remains the most commanding personality in British politics.

I am much less sure about the Thatcherite vision of the future. It has become so vague, limp and pale, that I doubt if it enthuses anybody except uncritical party activists.

This need not be so. Though Thatcherism arouses more cold hatred and savage abuse than anything seen in Britain since Oliver Cromwell, it does have one thing going for it. It is closer to the wishes of the majority of voters than anything else on offer.

The trouble with Mrs Thatcher and the Thatcherites is that they have forgotten who their friends are. They live surrounded by civil service mandarins and Tory nabobs, who mean well, but who have never understood why Thatcherism is exciting.

These chaps find both the hatred and enthusiasm rather puzzling. Nothing in their background equips them to understand what all the fuss is about. They are more accustomed to traditional Toryism, which is emollient and stupefyingly dull.

Thatcherism is not like that. It is a divisive doctrine because Thatcherites believe it is vital to the future of Britain that they should rescue the deserving from the choking and impoverishing embrace of the undeserving.

They do not take the undeserving to be the sick, the old, or the weak. Their targets are the idle, the indifferent, the inconsequential and the ill-disposed. That is a formidable list of enemies for a start.

Terror Footnotes

In the wake of America's interception of an Egyptian airplane carrying PLO terrorists, a few footnotes are in order. Prime Minister Thatcher's decision to call off a meeting between her government and two members of the PLO's executive committee, Bishop Eliya Khoury and Mohammed Milhem, is welcome. Critics, including this newspaper, had scored Mrs. Thatcher for agreeing to any such meeting, noting that it contradicted her tough talk about terrorists like the IRA. Israel produced a 1969 interview with Bishop Khoury in which he admitted smuggling explosives that killed two Jews in a Jerusalem supermarket; Jerusalem also provided a newspaper interview with Mr. Milhem wherein the former mayor of Halhoul had called for continued warfare against Israel. But the decision to cancel the meeting apparently came when the two refused to issue a promised public statement recognizing Israel's right to exist and renouncing the use of violence. After the meeting's cancellation, the pundits promptly started in about the blow to Mrs. Thatcher's prestige. On the contrary, her reversal will enhance her reputation as a realist.

Iraq's foreign minister in Washington late last year was supposedly that war-plagued government of President Saddam Hussein was ending its support for international terrorism. Mr. Abbas's flight strikes us as a good occasion to test Iraq's sincerity, demanding that Baghdad alert its neighbors the document is to be lifted and its holder arrested at the border crossing.

In another spot, two nations promote that cooperation against terrorism possible despite differences. On Monday, Dominic McGlinchey, once most wanted man in Britain and Ireland, was extradited to the Irish republic to face terrorist charges and being acquitted of murder in Northern Ireland. Mr. McGlinchey is wanted by the Irish republic for the attempted murder of a policeman and for illegal possession of firearms. The thin note is that the confessed member of the radically violent Irish National Liberation Army was originally captured in the south, then extradited to Northern Ireland to face a murder charge, a symbol of the cross-border commitment to prosecute terrorism.

Italian Prime Minister Craxi's decision to release the man the U.S. believes masterminded the Achille Lauro hijacking, Mohammed Abbas, was something different. On Saturday, Mr. Abbas flew to Yugoslavia. He reportedly left Belgrade yesterday for an undisclosed destination. A point to note is that the man President Reagan vows to track down and try is traveling on an Iraqi diplomatic passport. It's not clear from news reports we've seen just when and how Mr. Abbas obtained that passport. But we do recall that when the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations with Iraq last November, the rationale was to bring Iraq into the moderate camp. The reason American officials received

The spirit of realism may even be catching on in the U.N., where yesterday a move to have the General Assembly invite Yasser Arafat to the 40th anniversary commemoration was dropped. After intensive consultations with the six nonaligned states supporting the move, the General Assembly president, Jaime de Pinies of Spain, announced that they would not pass their resolution to seat the PLO chief. As the Irish on both sides of the border understand, as Mrs. Thatcher has now demonstrated, as Iraq is pressed to prove, as the U.N. is to know better than anyone—the important thing is not who takes action against terrorists but that action is taken.

Pepper ... and Salt

Winged Victory

In tropical traveling,
One fact is certain:
The mosquito's inside
Your mosquito curtain.

—Robert Gordon


Expanding Menu Market
TV dinners used to grace
My hurried evening table;
Now tell me what
I need to buy

For videos and cable.

—Ralph Shaffer

Torn Curtain

"I dream of making a million in show business, just



the use of 'Tap' data (page one) on being called a

Santa Ana, Costa Rica
P.S.: She and let me wrong: It should

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