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OF 281120Z OCTOBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND WASHINGTON



ARAB/ISRAEL: KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN INTENDS TO TAKE A FIRM LINE WITH ARAFAT ON 28 OCTOBER, HAVING OBTAINED SUPPORT FROM EGYPT AND IRAQ. THE KING IS HURT BY THE US ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION ON ARMS SALES, BUT GUARDED ABOUT THE PERES PROPOSALS. HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CONTACTS WITH SYRIA.

DETAIL

2. COUNSELLOR SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 27 OCTOBER. THE KING, WHO HAD SEEN PRESIDENT MUBARAK, UNDER SECRETARY RICHARD MURPHY AND PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THE PRECEDING WEEK AND WAS ABOUT TO SEE YASSER ARAFAT, GAVE THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF HIS CURRENT THINKING.

3. THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN APPALLED BY THE LARNACA KILLINGS, THE ISRAELI RAID ON TUNIS AND THE HIJACKING OF THE ACHILLE LAURO. AT HIS MEETING WITH ARAFAT ON 28 OCTOBER HE INTENDED TO TAKE A FIRM LINE. HE INTENDED TO SAY THAT THE 11 FEBRUARY AGREEMENT WAS AND REMAINED THE FOUNDATION STONE OF JORDANIAN POLICY, BUT THAT IF ARAFAT WISHED TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AS A NEGOTIATING PARTNER HE WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE SOLID ASSURANCES ON THE FOLLOWING TWO POINTS:

A. THAT HE COULD AND WOULD EXERCISE FIRM CONTROL OVER ALL MEMBERS OF THE PLO, AND THAT

B. ALL TERRORIST ACTS SUCH AS THE LARNACA KILLINGS AND THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING WOULD CEASE FORTHWITH.

WHEN ASKED WHAT HE WOULD DO IF ARAFAT EITHER REFUSED TO GIVE SUCH ASSURANCES, OR IF HE JUDGED THAT ARAFAT WAS INCAPABLE OF HONOURING THEM, THE KING SAID THAT HE WOULD PUBLICISE THE EXCHANGE AND LET THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE FORM THEIR OWN JUDGEMENT ABOUT THEIR LEADERSHIP. HE SAID THAT, IN ANY CASE, HE INTENDED IN HIS SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT ON 2 NOVEMBER TO MAKE NO REFERENCE AT ALL TO THE PLO AND HIS AUDIENCE COULD MAKE OF THAT WHAT THEY LIKED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED BACKING FOR HIS PROPOSED LINE WITH ARAFAT FROM THE PRESIDENTS OF EGYPT AND IRAQ.

THE PLO AND HIS AUDIENCE COULD MAKE OF THAT WHAT THEY LIKED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED BACKING FOR HIS PROPOSED LINE WITH ARAFAT FROM THE PRESIDENTS OF EGYPT AND IRAQ.

4. THE KING SAID THAT HIS MEETINGS WITH RICHARD MURPHY HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE. MURPHY HAD STRESSED THE HELPFUL ASPECTS OF PERES' SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE KING HAD AGREED THAT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SPEECH WERE INDEED POSITIVE. THE KING WOULD NOT BE FURTHER DRAWN ON PERES' PROPOSALS, ONLY REPEATING THAT WHILE MUCH WOULD DEPEND OF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT, THE FEBRUARY 11 AGREEMENT REMAINED THE BASIS OF JORDANIAN POLICY.

5. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT MURPHY'S VISIT HAD BEEN SPOILT BY THE US ADMINISTRATION'S VOLTE FACE THE FOLLOWING DAY ON ARMS FOR JORDAN. THE KING WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET THAT MURPHY HAD MADE NO MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT HAD THE COMMON COURTESY TO WARN HIM IN ADVANCE OF THE DECISION. ALL HE HAD RECEIVED WAS A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AFTER THE EVENT. THE KING SAID THAT THIS WAS THE END OF THE LINE AS FAR AS ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE US WERE CONCERNED. HE HAD PUT A GREAT DEAL OF PERSONAL EFFORT INTO TALKING TO SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN AND HE COULD NO LONGER AFFORD TO DAMAGE HIS CREDIBILITY IN THIS WAY. JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR ARMS SUPPLIES.

6. TURNING TO SYRIA THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN PRIME MINISTERS IN RIYADH. AFTER THE MEETING PRESIDENT ADA HAD TELEPHONED HIM AND THEY HAD HAD A FRINDLY AND POSITIVE CONVERSATION. AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS IN DAMASCUS HE HOPED PREPARATIONS WOULD BEGUN FOR A MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT ASAD. WHEN SPEDDING COMMENTED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE IN RJYADH APPEARED TO FAVOUR THE SYRIAN POSITION, THE KING AGREED BUT SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN REAL MOVEMENT ON THE SYRIAN SIDE, PARTICULARLY OVER THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WHICH THE SYRIAN POSITION WAS NOW MUCH CLOSER TO THE JORDANIAN. THE MEETING HAD ALSO SERVED TO CLEAR AWAY SOME SYRIAN MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WHAT THEY HAD SEEN AS CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS AND THE FEBRUARY 11 AGREEMENT. HE BELIEVED IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DRAW SYRIA INTO THE ARAB CONSENSUS.

7. FINALLY ON EGYPT KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR ON MUBARAK'S POSITION. MUBARAK, HE SAID, HAD MISSED A NUMBER OF OPPORTUNITIES OVER THE YEARS TO DEMONSTRATE HIS LEADERSHIP AND IN CONSEQUENCE THE INTERNAL DISTURBANCES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE AFFAIR WERE DOING DISPROPORTIONATE DAMAGE TO THE PRESIDENT'S STANDING. THE KING SAID THAT INSTABILITY IN EGYPT WAS VERY WORRYING TO JORDAN. ANY REPLACEMENT FOR MUBARAK, FROM RIGHT OR LEFT, WOULD BE A BLOW TO HOPES OF PEACE. JORDAN WAS THEREFORE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BOLSTER JORDANIAN/EGYPTIOAN RELATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO SHORE UP MUBARAK.

CCN: PARA 6 LINE SEVEN ...REG/ WOULD BE BEGUN FOR A ETC

RAFTERY

YYYY

ALHPAN 1182

NNNN

[This is what Peres said to you]

Personal



Room E.205

FCO

1. x. 85

My dear Charles,

You may like to see, and/or let the PM scan, Hussein's excellent & instructive UNGA speech of last Friday. One does learn from his expositions, so unusual these rhetorical days! See especially page 10, where he lists what he sees as the "relevant UN resolutions" on Palestine; & the excellent language on "prompt & direct" nego with Israel on p. 15.

In haste,
V. Spies.