

ADVANCE COPIES

15

MIDDLE EAST

PS

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR FERGUSSON

MR EGERTON

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

IMMEDIATE

PUSD (2)

NEWS DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEL AVIV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 015

OF 131330Z JANUARY 86

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, RIYADH

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, ROME

ARAB/ISRAEL: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I ASKED MY US COLLEAGUE ABOUT THE LATEST US POSITION ON 13 JANUARY. HE GAVE ME SOME NUANCES ADDITIONAL TO THE BASIC U S CONDITIONS SUMMARISED IN (WASHINGTON TELNO 75).
2. PICKERING SAID THEY WERE WORKING ON A NUMBER OF IDEAS WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO THE KING WITHOUT GOING OUTSIDE U S REQUIREMENTS. FOR INSTANCE, THE CONFERENCE MIGHT HAVE A SECRETARY-GENERAL WHO MIGHT RECEIVE REPORTS FROM THE WORKING GROUPS AND CIRCULATE THEM TO CONFERENCE MEMBERS. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY WAS THAT THE CONFERENCE MIGHT MEET QUARTERLY TO RECEIVE REPORTS BUT NOT TO COMMENT ON THEM. PICKERING SAID THE ESSENTIAL POINT WAS TO STICK TO THE BASIC CONCEPT OF DIRECT TALKS WITHOUT THIRD PARTY VETOES ON ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED BILATERALLY, SEMICOLON AND WITHOUT INSTITUTIONALISING THE CONFERENCE AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE ON ONE OF THE PARTIES. THESE WERE U S REQUIREMENTS AND HE THOUGHT (AND I AGREE) ESSENTIAL FOR ISRAEL TOO.
3. THERE WAS ALSO AN IDEA INSPIRED BY CLUVERIUS THAT THE U S SHOULD ENUNCIATE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH IT WOULD JUDGE TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS. THIS HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF DEALING WITH SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN PROCEDURES AND MIGHT THEREFORE BE MORE HELPFUL TO THE KING. BUT IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE TO HANDLE VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL (AND I DARE SAY IN ARAB COUNTRIES TOO) AND THE KING WOULD BE WELL AWARE THAT ANY PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN BY THE ADMINISTRATION COULD BE OVERTURNED BY THE CONGRESS.



