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FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 141500Z F C O

TELNO 17

OF 141000Z JANUARY 86

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, WASHINGTON,  
INFO PRIORITY JERUSALEM, RIYADH (FOR PS TO SECRETARY OF STATE)  
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT.

WASHINGTON TELNO 75: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. I ASKED THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER TODAY WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE KING LAST SPOKE TO ME (MY TELNO 6).
2. RIFAI, WHO LEAVES FOR LONDON ON 15 JANUARY TO JOIN THE TALKS AT NO 10 ON 16 JANUARY, SAID THAT CLUVERIUS IS CONTINUING HIS SHUTTLE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND HAD BEEN HERE A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO. JORDAN HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE FIRST THREE OF THE FOUR STIPULATIONS IN SHULTZ'S LETTER TO THE KING (WASHINGTON TUR) BUT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH, STILL BELIEVED IT NECESSARY THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD HAVE A CONTINUING ROLE WHEN WORKING GROUPS HAD BEEN CONSTITUTED AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO HELP RESOLVE DIFFICULTIES IN THESE GROUPS. RIFAI THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE EASY ENOUGH FOR ALL CONCERNED TO ACCEPT A "CONTINUING ROLE" WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED FOR IN A NUMBER OF WAYS E.G. REGULAR REPORTS BY THE GROUPS TO THE CONFERENCE. NOR SHOULD PEOPLE JIB AT THE FUNCTION OF RESOLVING DIFFICULTIES. THERE WAS IN ANY CASE NO WAY IN WHICH THE CONFERENCE COULD IMPOSE ITS WILL ON SOVEREIGN STATES WHICH WAS THE MAIN WORRY OF THE US AND ISRAEL.
3. JORDAN WAS NOW WAITING FOR PERES' RESPONSE TO THESE JORDANIAN VIEWS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. PERES HAD ASKED FOR ANOTHER WEEK AND HAD TOLD CLUVERIUS THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RESPOND EARLIER OWING TO PREOCCUPATION WITH TABA. HE HAD ALSO SAID THROUGH CLUVERIUS, THAT WHETHER JORDAN CONTINUED TO DEAL WITH ARAFAT OR NOT HE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THE NAMES OF THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO WOULD ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SO THAT HE COULD NOT BE ACCUSED BY HIS OPPONENTS OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE P.L.O.

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4. RIFAI SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER NEWS FROM ARAFAT. I SAID THAT HIS EARLIER REMARKS TO ME (MY TELNO 10) HAD SUGGESTED THAT JORDAN WAS SHAPING UP FOR A SHOWDOWN WITH ARAFAT. RIFAI CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS THE KING'S DISPOSITION BUT HE HIMSELF WAS NOT SURE THAT THAT WOULD BE WISE. JORDAN REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT 'A PLO' MUST BE REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE. IF ARAFAT COULD NOT PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FIND PLO REPRESENTATIVES WHO COULD. THE SYRIANS ARGUED FOR EITHER A UNIFIED PLO WITHOUT ARAFAT OR RELAGATING THE PLO TO THE SIDELINES. BUT NEITHER WAS EASY FOR JORDAN. JORDAN TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE 11 FEBRUARY AGREEMENT STOOD, THAT IT WAS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO, NOT ARAFAT, AND THAT THE PLO WAS A FLEXIBLE TERM.

5. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NO ISSUES APART FROM THE PEACE PROCESS THAT THE JORDANIAN SIDE WOULD RAISE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PLO HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD REVIVE THE IDEA OF A JOINT DELEGATION VISITING LONDON BUT THE KING HAD REFUSED TO.

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MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR EGERTON  
MR O'NEILL  
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MR LONG

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ARAB/ISRAEL

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FM AMMAN

TO DESKRY 141500Z FCO

TELNO 019

OF 141500Z JANUARY 86

AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH (FOR PS TO SOFS)

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

*ms*

YOUR TELNO 63 TO WASHINGTON: ARAB/ISRAEL: US VIEWS

1. SINCE SENDING MY TELNO 17, I HAVE SEEN YOUR TUR CONTAINING THE TEXT OF MR SHULTZ'S MESSAGE TO YOU.
2. IN MY VIEW THE US APPROACH DOES NOT SHOW ANYTHING LIKE SUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING OF JORDAN'S DIFFICULTIES. THE AMERICANS ARE CLEARLY STILL WORKING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH IS NO MORE THAN A FIG-LEAF. THEY ENVISAGE JORDAN NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL IN A WORKING GROUP WHICH HAS NO REAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONFERENCE PROPER. AND THEY PROBABLY HOPE THAT JORDAN WILL DO THIS ACCOMPANIED BY UNREPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS. THIS IS THE SPECTRE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS REGARDED HERE AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF JORDAN. IN ANY CASE KING HUSSEIN HAS ALMOST CERTAINLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TOO FAR TO PRESIDENT ASAD TO BE ABLE TO AGREE TO SUCH A FORMULA NOW. NOR, WITH HIS PRESSING NEED FOR CONTINUED ARAB FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN 1986, IS HE LIKELY TO PREJUDICE PROSPECTS OF THAT BY AGREEING TO A NEGOTIATING STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD BE WIDELY CONDEMNED IN THE ARAB WORLD.
3. IN MY VIEW, IF AT THE FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH THE KING WE SIMPLY BACK THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THESE ISSUES HE WILL REGARD US AS SHOWING INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY TELNO 17, HE IS AT PRESENT AWAITING MR PERES'S VIEWS ON THESE POINTS. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TRY TO DISCOVER FROM HIM ON 16 JANUARY WHETHER AND HOW PERES HAS REPLIED. BUT PERES PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE DONE BY THEN. IN THAT CASE I BELIEVE THAT, INSTEAD OF MERELY SUPPORTING AN INSENSITIVE AMERICAN POSITION, WE SHOULD EXPLORE THE GROUND FOR COMPROMISE.

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