

SUBJECT

cc Master
Ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 20 A/86

CONFIDENTIAL

12402 - 1

OCMIAN 2402
CONFIDENTIAL
OO AMMAN
OO TEAVI
OO DAMAS
OO CAIRO
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
022130Z FEB
GRS 589

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 031400Z WASHINGTON
TELNO 173
OF 022130Z FEBRUARY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.
BEGINS AS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM ON THE PEACE PROCESS MAY BE AT A CRITICAL STAGE, I THOUGHT I WOULD SEND YOU MY PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS FOLLOWING MY RECENT TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND PRIME MINISTER PERES.

IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT, WITH THE TIRELESS HELP OF YOUR PEOPLE, SO MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT WEEKS IN DEVISING A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND MR. PERES. AGREEMENT WILL REQUIRE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS BY BOTH. I KNOW THAT THEY LOOK TO YOU FOR CONTINUING SUPPORT IN RESOLVING THE REMAINING ISSUES INCLUDING THE KEY QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING CLEAR-CUT DECISIONS

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OUT OF ARAFAT AND THE PLO.

SHIMON PERES IMPRESSED ME WITH THE SINCERITY OF HIS COMMITMENT TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. HE KNOWS THAT IF THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN SOON ANOTHER CHANCE MAY NOT OCCUR FOR A LONG TIME. WHILE HE WAS IN LONDON HE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO STATE IN PUBLIC FOR THE FIRST TIME HIS READINESS TO ACCEPT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN ADDITION TO, THOUGH NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. HE CLEARLY SEES ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO CARRY HIS COALITION PARTNERS WITH HIM ON THIS. BUT HIS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IS LIMITED. I ASSURED HIM THAT BRITAIN WOULD BE READY TO HELP IF THERE WAS ANY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WE WERE ASKED TO PLAY BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED. HE MENTIONED BUT DID NOT PURSUE THE IDEA OF A PRELIMINARY MEETING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN UNDER UNITED KINGDOM CHAIRMANSHIP. I HAVE NOT MENTIONED THIS TO THE KING.

I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY CONCERN ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION. HE REGARDS IT AS IMPORTANT FOR THE STABILITY OF HIS KINGDOM TO SECURE PLO ENDORSEMENT FOR HIS APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS. HIS CHANCES OF OBTAINING CONCESSIONS FROM ARAFAT WOULD BE INCREASED IF HE COULD POINT TO APPROPRIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS BY THE UNITED STATES AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE, PERHAPS THROUGH A CLEAR RESTATEMENT OF YOUR PROPOSALS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982. IT WOULD BE IN NONE OF OUR INTERESTS IF KING HUSSEIN WERE TO WRITE OFF THE 11 FEBRUARY AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO.

FRANKLY, I FOUND KING HUSSEIN IN A MOOD OF DISILLUSIONMENT TOWARDS THE US. HE BADLY FEELS IN NEED OF REASSURANCE OF YOUR SUPPORT BECAUSE OF WHAT HE SEES AS YOUR FAILURE TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE EQUIPMENT WHICH HE REGARDS AS VITAL FOR JORDAN'S DEFENCE.

MR PERES EXPRESSED TO ME HIS DEEP SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. I HAVE SUGGESTED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT ANYTHING WHICH HE CAN DO TO ALLAY MR PERES' CONCERNS ABOUT SYRIA WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE RESERVATIONS, WHICH I FULLY SHARE, ABOUT GIVING THE SOVIET UNION A WIDER ROLE. BUT I WONDER WHETHER

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THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO EXPLORE DIRECTLY HOW FAR THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE READY TO WORK POSITIVELY IN A CONFERENCE.

MY READING OF THE CABLE TRAFFIC IS THAT WE ARE AT THE CRITICAL POINT FOR THE CHANCES OF AN AGREEMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ISRAEL AND JORDAN. IT IS NOT REASSURING THAT SO MUCH DEPENDS ON ARAFAT, WHO HAS SHOWN HIMSELF SUCH A WEAK VESSEL. BUT SO FAR AS YOUR ADMINISTRATION CAN TIP THE BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF AGREEMENT, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO GO THE FINAL YARD.

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MIDDLE EAST
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NEWS D
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DEFENCE D

PS
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSON
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
SIR D MIERS
MR O'NEILL
MR RATFORD
MR LONG

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL

-3-
CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

PRESIDENT CLERK :

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

I enclose a telegram for despatch to Washington. This is a revised text of Mr. Culshaw's telegram, a copy of which I believe you are holding. I should be grateful if you could read this text to Mr. Culshaw before despatch of the telegram.

SMMA

pp (CHARLES POWELL)

2 February 1986

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	ZCZC CONFIDENTIAL FM FCO TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TELNO OF INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS ARAB/ISRAEL 1. Please pass the following message to President Reagan from the Prime Minister. BEGINS As efforts to maintain momentum on the peace process may be at a critical stage, I thought I would send you my personal impressions following my recent talks with King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres. It is encouraging that, with the tireless help of your people, so much progress has been made in recent weeks in devising a framework for negotiations acceptable to both King Hussein and Mr. Perez ^{PERES} . Agreement will require very difficult decisions by both. I know that they look to you for continuing support in resolving the remaining issues including the key question of Palestinian participation. I also understand the difficulty of getting clear-cut decisions out of Arafat and the PLO.	
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	Catchword: Shimon
File number Dept NENAD	Drafted by (Block capitals) C D POWELL
Authorised for Initials Date/time despatch by:	
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

		Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 10%;"> <p>1 <<<<</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10</p> <p>11</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14</p> <p>15</p> <p>16</p> <p>17</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p> <p>26</p> <p>27</p> <p>28</p> <p>29</p> <p>30</p> <p>31</p> <p>32</p> <p>33</p> <p>34</p> </div> <div style="width: 80%;"> <p><<<<</p> <p>PERES</p> <p>Shimon Peres impressed me with the sincerity of his</p> <p>commitment to get negotiations started. He knows that if</p> <p>this does not happen soon another chance may not occur for</p> <p>a long time. While he was in London he took the opportunity</p> <p>to state in public for the first time his readiness to accept</p> <p>an international conference in addition to, though not as</p> <p>a substitute for, direct negotiations. He clearly sees advantage</p> <p>in trying to carry his coalition partners with him on this.</p> <p>But his room for manoeuvre is limited. I assured him that</p> <p>Britain would be ready to help if there was any constructive</p> <p>role we were asked to play by the parties concerned. He</p> <p>mentioned but did not pursue the idea of a preliminary meeting</p> <p>between Israel and Jordan under United Kingdom chairmanship.</p> <p>I have not mentioned this to the King.</p> <p>I know that you share my concern about King Hussein's</p> <p>position. He regards it as important for the stability of</p> <p>his kingdom to secure PLO endorsement for his approach to</p> <p>negotiations. His chances of obtaining concessions from Arafat</p> <p>would be increased if he could point to appropriate acknowledge-</p> <p>ment of Palestinian rights by the United States at this critical</p> <p>stage, perhaps through a clear restatement of your proposals</p> <p>of 1 September 1982. It would be in none of our interests</p> <p>if King Hussein were to write off the 11 February agreement</p> <p>with the PLO.</p> <p>Frankly, I found King Hussein in a mood of disillusion-</p> <p>ment towards the US. He badly feels in need of reassurance</p> <p>of your support because of what he sees as your failure to</p> <p>persuade Congress to provide him with the equipment which</p> <p>he regards as vital for Jordan's defence.</p> <p>Mr Peres expressed to me his deep scepticism about</p> <p>the attitude of Syria and the Soviet Union. I have suggested</p> <p>to King Hussein that anything which he can do to allay</p> <p>Mr Peres' concerns about Syria would be very helpful. I</p> </div> <div style="width: 10%;"> <p>///</p> <p>//</p> <p>/</p> </div> </div>				
		<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;">For distribution order see Page</div> <div style="width: 55%;">Catchword: know</div> </div>		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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know that you have reservations, which I fully share, about giving the Soviet Union a wider role. But I wonder whether the time has now come to explore directly how far the Russians might be ready to work positively in a conference.

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My reading of the cable traffic is that we are at the critical point for the chances of an agreement on an international conference on terms acceptable to both Israel and Jordan. It is not reassuring that so much depends on Arafat, who has shown himself such a weak vessel. But so far as your Administration can tip the balance in favour of agreement, I hope that you will be prepared to go the final yard.

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HOWE

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Catchword:

XY 48A (REV)



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 January 1986

Agree attached
message to President

Reagan? I have
suggested some amendments
to sharpen it up (sorry about the mess).

C.D.P. 34/1

Yes no

Arab/Israel: Message to President Reagan

Thank you for your letter of 28 January. I enclose as requested a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan.

As you will have seen from Mr Coles' reporting (Amman telnos 47 and 48), talks between King Hussein and Mr Arafat have reached a critical stage. Mr Arafat is refusing to accept SCRs 242 and 338 without US endorsement of Palestinian self determination within a confederation with Jordan, which the Americans are very unwilling to concede. Continuation of the impasse could lead to renunciation by King Hussein of the 11 February agreement with the PLO, which could have serious consequences for the stability of Jordan. A message from the Prime Minister to the President giving her impression of the broad issues would be particularly helpful while the Americans decide their response to the latest moves.

Our objective should be to encourage the United States to continue trying to bring the parties towards early negotiations, while showing our understanding of the limitations of Mr Peres' freedom of action and the constraints on King Hussein. The King badly needs a gesture of US support, particularly after their failure to help him over the supply of weapons.

Sir Geoffrey Howe intends to delay a more detailed message to Mr Shultz (including a response to the points in his letter of 12 January) until the situation in Amman and US thinking are a little clearer. In this he will wish to develop our own thoughts about Mr Peres' suggestion of a possible British role in arranging a meeting between Israel and Jordan.

Yours ever

Robert Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

PS Top copy of this telegram will be with our Resident Clerk
on the weekend, should you wish to trigger it. Rm

OUT TELEGRAM

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ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	<p>ZCZC</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>FM FCO</p> <p>TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON</p> <p>TELNO</p> <p>OF 301730Z JANUARY 86</p> <p>INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO</p> <p>PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS</p> <p>ARAB/ISRAEL</p> <p>1. Please pass the following message to President Reagan from the Prime Minister.</p> <p>BEGINS As efforts to maintain momentum on the peace process may be at a critical stage, I thought I would send you my personal impressions following my recent talks with King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres.</p> <p>It is indeed encouraging that, with the tireless help of your people, so much progress has been made in recent weeks in devising a framework for negotiations acceptable to both King Hussein and Mr Peres. Agreement will require very difficult decisions by both. I know that they look to you for continuing support in resolving the remaining issues including the key question of Palestinian participation. I also understand the difficulty of getting clear-cut decisions out of Arafat and the PLO.</p> <p>Shimon Peres impressed me with the sincerity of his commitment to get negotiations started. He knows that if this does</p>
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	Catchword: not
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 2 not happen soon another ^{chance} opportunity may not occur for a long time.
 3 While he was in London he took the opportunity to state in public
 4 for the first time his readiness to accept an international
 5 conference in addition to, though not as a substitute for, direct
 6 negotiations. He clearly sees advantage in trying to carry his
 7 coalition partners with him on this. But his room for manoeuvre is
 8 limited. I assured him that Britain would be ready to help if
 9 there was any constructive role we were asked to play by the
 10 parties concerned. ^{He mentioned but did not pursue the idea of}
 11 ^{a preliminary meeting between Israel and Jordan under United Kingdom}
 12 I know that you share my concern about King Hussein's ^{Chairman's}
 13 position. He regards it as important for the stability of ^{his}
 14 kingdom to secure PLO endorsement for his approach to negotiations ^{mention me}
 15 His chances of obtaining concessions from Arafat would be increa- ^{this no U}
 16 sed if he could point to appropriate acknowledgement of ^{King}
 17 Palestinian rights by the United States at this critical stage,
 18 perhaps through a clear restatement of your proposals of
 19 1 September 1982. ^{It would be in none of our interests if}
 20 ^{King Hussein were to write off the 11 February agreement with the PLO!}
 21 Frankly, I found King Hussein in a mood of disillusionment
 22 towards the US. He badly feels in need of reassurance of your
 23 support because of what he sees as your failure to persuade
 24 Congress to provide him with the equipment which he regards as
 25 vital for Jordan's defence. [Failure of the current efforts to
 26 reach agreement on a framework for negotiations would only
 27 strengthen the hand of the radical Arab States and extremists in
 28 Israel, and would give openings to the Soviet Union to damage
 29 Western interests.]
 30 I recognise that serious obstacles remain. Mr Peres
 31 expressed to me his deep scepticism about the attitude of Syria
 32 and the Soviet Union. I have suggested to King Hussein that any-
 33 thing which he can do to allay Mr Peres' concerns about Syria
 34 would be very helpful. I know that you have reservations, which
 I fully share, about giving the Soviet Union a wider role. But
 I wonder whether the time has now come to explore ^{directly} how far the

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		Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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1 <<<<
 2 authority to the efforts which they are making with the help of
 3 your people to reach agreement. We for our part are ready to
 4 help where we can, but I believe that it is to the United States
 5 that the parties are looking, especially Jordan, for ways of
 6 breaking the impasse.
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 8 HOWE
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 10
 11 YYYY
 12 MAIN
 13 MIDDLE EAST LIMITED
 14 NNNN
 15
 16 Alternative Ending
 17 My reading of the cable traffic is
 18 that we are at the critical point
 19 for the chances of an agreement on
 20 an international conference on terms
 21 acceptable to both Israel & Jordan.
 22 It is not reassuring that so much
 23 depends on Arafat, who has shown
 24 himself such a weak vessel. But
 25 so far as your Administration
 26 can tip the balance in favour of
 27 agreement, I hope that you will be
 28 prepared to go the final yard.
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