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184

MIDDLE EAST

PS (2)

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR FERGUSON

SIR D. MIFUS.

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PUSD (2)

NEWS DEPT

RESTRICTED

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 200930Z FCO

TELNO 93

OF 200825Z FEBRUARY 86

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JERUSALEM,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE

MIPT: ARAB/ISRAEL: KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH

1. THE KING'S SPEECH WAS RESTRAINED, DIGNIFIED AND STATESMANLIKE. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO SET OUT JORDAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS OF THE JORDAN/PALESTINIAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE RECENT JORDAN/PLO NEGOTIATIONS AND TO LET THOSE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. AT MANY POINTS WHERE SUBJECTIVE CRITICISM MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED (E.G. IN REFERRING TO THE US DECISIONS ON THE JORDANIAN ARMS PACKAGE) HE AVOIDED IT.
2. THE SPEECH WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY RETROSPECTIVE. THE MAIN MESSAGE, THOUGH CAREFULLY WORDED, IS HOWEVER CLEAR. JORDAN WILL NOT CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO DEVISE A COMMON JORDANIAN/PLO NEGOTIATING POSITION, AT LEAST UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN PLO BEHAVIOUR AND CREDIBILITY. THE KING DID NOT IN TERMS CALL UPON THE PALESTINIANS TO DEVISE AN ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP BUT HIS DECISION TO ABANDON TALKS WITH THE CURRENT PLO AND HIS EMOTIONAL ASSURANCES TO THE PALESTINIANS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT JORDAN WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM WERE STARKLY CONTRASTED. THE REACTION OF WEST BANK PALESTINIANS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN ASSESSING THE LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPEECH.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPEECH.

3. THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN THE KEY POLITICAL FACTOR IN THE MODERN HISTORY OF JORDAN, WITH ITS PALESTINIAN MAJORITY. THE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY HAS LONG BEEN CLOSELY DEPENDENT ON THAT RELATIONSHIP. AS I HAVE REPORTED EARLIER, WHILE EAST BANK JORDANIANS LARGELY SHARE THE KING'S CONTEMPT FOR ARAFAT'S BEHAVIOUR MANY PALESTINIANS HERE BELIEVE THAT ARAFAT WAS RIGHT TO HOLD OUT FOR US RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. IN TERMINATING ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH ARAFAT THE KING HAS THUS TAKEN A BOLD STEP. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THE KING'S PRINCIPAL ADVISERS BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS CAN BE HANDLED. AGAIN, MUCH MAY DEPEND ON REACTIONS ELSEWHERE AND, IN PARTICULAR, WHETHER THE CONSIDERED PLO RESPONSE IS TO STEP UP RESISTANCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OR SEEK TO ALLY THEMSELVES WITH SOME OTHER ARAB COUNTRY OR (CONCEIVABLY) TO TRY TO MAKE TROUBLE IN JORDAN ITSELF.

4. CLEARLY THE ABANDONMENT OF THE KING'S ATTEMPTS WITH THE PLO MEANS THAT THE THOUGHT OF SOME OF OUR EC PARTNERS THAT THE EC SHOULD RECEIVE A JOINT JORDAN/PLO DELEGATION IS ILL-FOUNDED. THIS WOULD BE A DIRECT REBUFF TO THE KING AND IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE.

5. THE KING'S REFERENCE (PARA 8(C) OF MIPT) TO MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 11 FEBRUARY AGREEMENT IS TORTUOUSLY WORDED. HE HAS NOT CONSIGNED THE AGREEMENT TO OBLIVION BUT IT HAS LOST ITS MAIN SIGNIFICANCE AS A BASIS FOR JOINT JORDAN/PLO ACTION ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BEYOND STATING THAT HE NOW TURNS THINGS OVER TO THE PALESTINIANS AND THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES THE KING HAD LITTLE TO SAY ABOUT FUTURE JORDANIAN POLICY ON ARAB/ISRAEL. I SHALL ATTEMPT TO PROBE THIS CAREFULLY WHEN I NEXT SEE HIM. BUT, GIVEN THE COLLAPSE OF ALL HIS EFFORTS WITH THE PLO, THE US ARMS DECISION, SYRIAN COOLNESS AND EGYPTIAN MANOEUVRINGS WITH ARAFAT HE LOOKS FOR THE TIME BEING VERY ISOLATED. A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD MAY NOW ELAPSE WHILE JORDAN RESHAPES ITS FOREIGN POLICY, THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF WHICH FOR THE MOMENT I WOULD NOT CARE TO PREDICT. THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN THE SPEECH WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO DAMASCUS, THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING THE SEVERING OF RELATIONS WITH ARAFAT. THERE IS NOTHING IN IT TO SUGGEST, AS MR RABIN HAS OVERNIGHT, THAT THE TIME IS NOW RIPE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

COLES

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
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TELNO 092

OF 200810Z FEBRUARY 86

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY ABU DHABI, ADEN, AGLIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT
INFO PRIORITY DOHA, DUBAI, RIYADH, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT
INFO PRIORITY RABAT, SANAA, TUNIS, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN
INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE

ARAB/ISRAEL: KING HUSSEIN'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

SUMMARY

1. ON 19 FEBRUARY KING HUSSEIN MADE HIS EXPECTED MAJOR SPEECH. IT WAS MAINLY RETROSPECTIVE. HE ANNOUNCED THAT JORDAN COULD NO LONGER CO-ORDINATE POLITICALLY ITS EFFORTS WITH THE PLO BUT ASSURED THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT JORDAN WOULD REMAIN COMMITTED TO THEIR CAUSE.

DETAIL

2. KING HUSSEIN MADE HIS EXPECTED TELEVISION ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE EVENING OF 19 FEBRUARY. HIS SPEECH WAS UNUSUALLY LONG FOR HIM, LASTING SOME 3 1/2 (THREE AND ONE HALF) HOURS. THE FULL TEXT, TOGETHER WITH THE OFFICIAL JORDANIAN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WILL FOLLOW BY CONFIDENCIAL BAG ON 23 FEBRUARY.

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3. THE KING BRIEFLY RECALLED JORDAN'S EARLIER POST - 1967 ATTEMPTS TO START PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE THEN ANALYSED AT SOME LENGTH THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL VISION OF ISRAEL AND ITS CURRENT TREATMENT OF, AND LIKELY INTENTIONS TOWARDS, THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN THE COURSE OF THIS ARGUMENT KING HUSSEIN REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY.

4. IN A PASSAGE DEALING WITH PAST EFFORTS TO BUILD UP JORDAN'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH THE KING REFERRED TO PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ARAB FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ARMS PURCHASES AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THOSE ARAB COUNTRIES WHO HAD DONATED MONEY IN THE PAST 'WOULD RENEW THE COMMITMENT TO PROVIDING US WITH THE WEAPONS WE NEED'.

5. HE NEXT ANALYSED THE FOUR BASES OF JORDAN'S POLICY TOWARDS THE PEACE PROCESS - 242, 338, THE 1974 RABAT SUMMIT RESOLUTION AND THE 1982 FEZ PEACE PLAN. IN DEALING WITH THE RABAT RESOLUTION HE EMPHASISED THAT THE PLO WAS ESTABLISHED NOT WITH THE PURPOSE OF GIVING THE PALESTINIANS AN EXCLUSIVE SAY ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE BUT OF GIVING THEM A VOICE IN ARAB POSITIONS ON THAT ISSUE.

6. NEARLY ALL OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE SPEECH WAS DEVOTED TO AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF JORDANIAN ATTEMPTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1982 TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR JOINT JORDANIAN/PLO ACTION ON THE PEACE PROCESS. THE KING RECALLED THAT HIS AGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT IN EARLY 1983 WAS REJECTED BY THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. HE REMINDED HIS AUDIENCE OF THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS SPEECH TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL IN NOVEMBER 1984 AND OF THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE 11 FEBRUARY 1985 AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO. HE CONTRASTED THE FAILURE OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS TO ENCOURAGE HIS EFFORTS WITH THE SUPPORT RECEIVED FROM E.G. THE EC AND THE OTHER THREE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HIS ONLY REFERENCE TO THE ABORTIVE LONDON MEETING WAS, 'WE HAD PLANNED FOR A JOINT DELEGATION TO VISIT LONDON IN OCTOBER 1985'.

7. AN EXTENSIVE PASSAGE, 24 OUT OF 85 PAGES, DEALT WITH JORDAN'S RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION AND THE PLO, ENDING WITH ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN ON 7 FEBRUARY. THIS PASSAGE NOTED, THOUGH WITHOUT ACRIMONY, THE TIME WASTED IN TRYING TO OBTAIN US AGREEMENT TO PALESTINIAN NAMES LAST SUMMER, AND THE BLOCKING BY CONGRESS OF THE SALE OF US ARMS TO JORDAN. BUT THE

BLOCKING BY CONGRESS OF THE SALE OF US ARMS TO JORDAN. BUT THE PRINCIPLE EMPHASIS WAS ON ARAFAT'S TORTUOUS BEHAVIOUR NOTABLY HIS AGREEMENT TO THE KING'S WHITE HOUSE ROSE GARDEN STATEMENT OF 29 MAY, HIS AGREEMENT, WITH MANY WITNESSES, ON 15 AUGUST, TO ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE FACT THAT, IN HIS RECENT STAY IN AMMAN, ARAFAT CONCEALED UNTIL LATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS THAT THE PLO'S DECISION TO REJECT 242 HAD BEEN TAKEN IN BAGHDAD IN NOVEMBER 1985.

8. THE KING'S MOST IMPORTANT POLICY STATEMENTS WERE RESERVED FOR THE CONCLUDING SECTION:

(A) BY THE FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT THIS MONTH THERE "CAME TO AN END ANOTHER CHAPTER IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. ANOTHER EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT ROUND OF JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN ACTION WAS TERMINATED".

(B) "WE HAVE FELT IT IMPERATIVE TO GIVE A FULL PUBLIC ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION AND ONCE AGAIN TURN THE MATTER OVER TO THE PALESTINIAN FORA IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE DIASPORA AS WELL AS ARAB CAPITALS AND ORGANISATIONS."

(C) "THE PRINCIPLES AND TENETS OF THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN ACCORD WILL CONTINUE TO EMBODY THE FOUNDATIONS GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLES WITH REGARD TO EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN FACING OUR JOINT DESTINY."

(D) "I AND THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HEREBY ANNOUNCE THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO CONTINUE TO CO-ORDINATE POLITICALLY WITH THE PPO LEADERSHIP UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEIR WORD BECOMES THEIR BOND, CHARACTERISED BY COMMITMENT, CREDIBILITY AND CONSTANCY."

(E) BUT IN CONCLUSION HE ASSURED THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT JORDAN WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THEIR CAUSE.

9. FOR COMMENT SEE M.I.F.T.

COLES

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