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FM AMMAN

TO GRIGORITY FCO

TELNO 216

OF 150720Z MAY 86

LINFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAHRO, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD

LINFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, RILYADH

CURRENT MADDLE EAST SATUATION: KHING HUSSEAN'S VALEWS

SUMMARY

1. NO SEGN OF EARLY CHANGE ON JORDANDAN POLICY. THE KING
BELLEVES OF RIGHT FOR THE TIME BEING TO FOCUS ON EMPROVING
CONDITIONS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE AS MEANWHILE
WORKING TO BRONG SYRMA, ARAQ AND EGYPT CLOSER TOGETHER.
FURTHER AND CATHONS THAT HE HOPES TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH
SYRMA ON A WAY FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS BUT HE BELLEVES
THIS WILL TAKE TIME.

DETAIL

THAT IT WAS SURE THE PRIME MEMBESTER WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN UP-TO-DATE ACCOUNT OF HIS VIEWS AS SHE PREPARED FOR HER VISIT TO ISRAEL. THE KING SAID HE HOPED THE VISIT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS WELL AWARE OF JORDAN'S DILEMMA AND THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE AREA. SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING IN LONDON SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE LIST OF MEASURES WHICH MR PERES HAD PROPOSED FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. JORDAN HAD NOW REPLIED TO PERES AND HE WOULD LET ME HAVE DOCUMENTS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEE SHORTLY (IN WILL TELEGRAPH WHEN HE DOES SO). HE THOUGHT THE BEST APPROACH IN THE PRESENT CONFUSED SITUATION IN THE AREA WAS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PROBLEMS OF THOSE LIVING UNDER OCCUPATION.

3. DURING PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S SHORT VISIT TO JORDANSDL 12
MAY THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE SHAWWA'S IDEAS FOR
AUTOMONY IN GAZA. THE KING HAD SAID THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO
''GAZA FIRST'' SOLUTIONS. ANYTHING DONE FOR GAZA SHOULD
BE DONE SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR THE WEST BANK. HE HAD ALSO TOLD
MUBARAK FIRMLY THAT HE SAW NO REASON TO GIVE THE PLO ANY
ROLE IN GAZA.

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WHITH MUBARAK REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS. AS TO PERES'
HDEAS NO PLAN WITH AN ISRAELIP STAMP ON IT HAD ANY CHANCE OF
SUCCEEDING. ON THE OTHER HAND, SINCE THE INDUSTRIBLISED
COUNTRIES WOULD CERTAINLY BENEFIT GREATLY FROM THE FALL INN
OIL PRICES HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE REGHT FOR THEM TO DEVOTE
AT LEAST PART OF THIS GAIN TO AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
THE AREA. IN SAID THAT IN HAD NOTED WHITH INTEREST REFERENCES
TO PREPARATION BY JORDAN OF A DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES BUT HE MADE NO COMMENT. IN CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS
NOT YET CONSIDERED INT PERSONALLY.

- ESTABLISH A JOINT WORKING COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS ALL MATTERS
 RELATING TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS MIGHT HELP TO
 PREVENT PEOPLE GOING OFF AT A TANGENT AND UNCO-ORDINATED
 PLEAS POPPENG UP ALL OVER THE PLACE. IN WELCOMED THIS MOVE.
- O. THE KING SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE STILL TALKING ABOUT JORDAN/PLO RECONCILIATION BUT IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE WALTING THEIR TIME. (THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT MUBARAK HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONVEY ANY CHANGE IN ARAFAT'S POSITION AND THE JORDANIANS HAD SAID THAT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE THEY COULD EVEN CONTEMPLATE RECONCILIATION.)
- 7. THE KING HAD FOUND MUBARAK ANGRY WITH THE SAUDIS, PARTLY BECAUSE HV BELLEVED THEY WERE FINANCING EXTERMIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN EGYPT. BUT KING FAHD WAS ALST UPSET BY RECENT EGYPTIAN SPEECHES AND ARTICLES WHICH HAD APPEARED TO CRUTICISE SAUDIN ARABIA.
- 8. HUSSENN SPOKE IN SOME DETAIL ABOUT PRESEDENT ASAD'S RECENT VISIT TO JORDAN. HE BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. IN PARTICULAR, THOUGH THIS WAS VERY DELICATE (PLEASE PROTECT), ASAD NOW SEEMED TO BE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN OPENING A DIALOGUE WITH SADAAM HUSSENN IN ORDER TO TRY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE GULF CONFLICT, AVOIDING THE RECRIMINATION OPNTHE PAST. AHAATWAS THE MESSAGE WHICH THE KING HAD CONVEYED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN ON HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD THE PREVIOUS EVENING (13 MAY). HE NOW AWAITED THE HRAQII REPLY, BUT HE BU EVED THERE WAS AT LAST SOME HOPE OF PROGRESS IN SYRIAN/HRAQII RELATIONEUS. (HE ADDED THAT HE WAS ALSO WORKING TO RESTORE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND CARRO, AND AN GENERAL TO PROMOTE MORE SOLIDARITY IN THE AREA.)
- 9. HE HAD CHALLENGED ASAD RATHER ROUGHLY ABOUT TH SYRIAN
 CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARKITY WITH INSRAEL. WHAT DID HE MEAN BY INT?
 HOW DID HE THANK HIT COULD EVER BE ACHIEVED? AND WHAT WAS THE
 PURPOSE ANYWAY TO THROW THE ISRAELIS INTO THE SEA? ASAD HAD
 SALD THAT THAT WAS NOT THE PURPOSE. NOR WAS HE THINKING IN
 MILITARY TERMS, BUT MORE IN TERMS OF CREATING SUFFICIENT ARQB
 SOLIDARITY TO ENSURE A REASONABLY BALANCED NEGOTIATION.

TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS NOW

JORDANIAN/SYRLAN AGREEMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE
TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, ATTENDED BY THE FIVE
PERMANENT MEMBERS, WITH AUTHENTIC PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES
TO ATTENDANCE. THE DIALOGUE WITH SYRLA ON HOW TO PROMOTE THIS
CONCEPT FURTHER WOULD CONTINUE (CF MY TELNO 202 NOT TO BAGHDAD).
IN SAND THIS SOUNDED LIKE AN ATTEMPT TO REVIVE THE PEACE PROCESS.
WHAT THIMESCALE DEED HE HAVE IN MIND? HE REPLIED THAT NOTHING
COULD HAPPEN FOR SOME THME YET. THE PERMOD OF REFLECTION WOULD
CONTINUE.

11. HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ASAD THE QUESTION OF AN ARAB SUMMENT AND CLAIMED THAT ASAD NOW ACCEPTED THE NOTION OF AN AGENDA DEALING WITH ALL CURRENT ARAB PROBLEMS. THERE WOULD NOW BE CONTACTS WITH OTHERS, PARTICULARLY MOROCCO, ALGERIA AND SAUDI ARABIA, TO SEE WHETHER THE CURRENT OBSTACLES COULD BE OVERCOME. IF THE VENUE WAS A PROBLEM, AMMAN COULD BE CONSIDERED. BUT THE AGENDA HAD TO BE GENERAL. NOTHING WOULD HELP THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMENT MORE THAN AN AMPROVEMENT AN ARACHISTRAN RELATIONS.

12. HUSSELN SALD THAT ASAD HAD MADE NO REFERENCE DURANG HIS

13. MAFT (NOT TO ALL) DESCRABES HAS EXCHANGE WATH ASAD ON TERRORASM. MY SECOND OFT CONTAINS MY OWN THOUGHTS, PARTICULARLY ON THE LAGHT OF THE ABOVE, ON THE PROME MAINISTER'S VASALT TO ASRAEL.

COLES

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