

CONFIDENTIAL

CCDP
GJ
GR
DL
PC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1989

CDP
24/2

Dear Charles,

Anglo/French Summit: Briefs

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Brief for the Summit requires minor updating to take account of the fact that the French, like us, have now activated the human rights Vienna CSCE mechanism. It would no longer be right to take them to task for not pressing human rights cases.

I attach a copy of the amended pages of the brief. As this is a narrow point, we do not propose to circulate an amendment to all recipients of the brief.

I am copying this letter to Philip Mawer (Home Office), Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Richard Gozney
(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR OBJECTIVES

GENERAL

- To influence French views and underline importance of working closely with the UK.
- To demonstrate our commitment to the relationship.

A. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

- To influence French plans for their EC Presidency, particularly:
 - to maintain momentum on the Hanover/Rhodes single market priorities;
 - to ensure social issues focus on measures to bring down unemployment;
 - to encourage a pragmatic approach to monetary cooperation, with no leap in the dark.
- To persuade France that the Community will have to give more on agriculture if the GATT Round is to succeed.
- To press for an end to French discrimination against imports of UK-built Nissans.
- To agree to maintain the Community's constructive but cautious approach to relations with Eastern Europe.

B. EAST/WEST

- To confirm that our analysis of East/West relations is similar and discuss our approach to the different perception in the FRG.
- To compare notes on approach to Gorbachev in forthcoming bilaterals.
- CSCE: to welcome the fact that the French have activated the new human rights mechanism, and to encourage them to field a strong team at the London Information Forum.

C. SECURITY ISSUES

- To enlist French help with the Germans over SNF modernisation.
- To underline the importance of a fully agreed Western conventional arms control proposal being ready for tabling

ARGUMENTS FOR USE

US-Soviet exchanges. Valuable that Gorbachev visiting London, Bonn and Paris: should hear same message.

- Must not appear to endorse empty Soviet concept of Common European Home.
- Inevitable that FRG perceptions differ. Geography, emotion. Should be candid listening friend, but firm on Western security and unity. German public needs firmer lead from Bonn.
- Security policy must still be based on something like worst case.
- Soviet Internal: increasing contrast between Gorbachev's success abroad and growing internal problems.
- Economic problems daunting (Government deficit of 100 billion roubles, disappointing harvest, costs of Chernobyl and Armenia etc).
- Will get worse before improvement.
- Difficult to overestimate task facing Gorbachev. Not under immediate threat, but cannot go on indefinitely without economic success/popular support.
- Western Response: help Soviets face up to problems where we can, eg management training. Do nothing to help postpone decisions.
- Impossible for West to "rescue" perestroika economically. Soviet economists estimate short-fall of consumer goods and services at 90 billion roubles.
- COCOM blunt instrument, but necessary. Work to focus its efforts but resist pressure (eg from FRG) to relax controls.
- CSCE: progress at Vienna. Long way to go. Good that both France (over Czechoslovakia) and Britain (over Romania) have given a strong lead over use of new human rights mechanism. We must come down hard on backsliders. Important to have tested mechanism fully by (May) Paris Human Dimension meeting.
- Important to have tested mechanism by (May) Paris Human Dimension meeting.
- London Information Forum preparations on course. Hope for strong French team. Independent media figures for frank, spontaneous debate.

BACKGROUND

Solidarity agreed subject to latter's support for official policies.

- CSCE: Human Rights Mechanism: In the past France has been less disposed than others to take up specific cases and issues. However they have recently used the new CSCE human rights mechanism (over Havel, the jailed Czech dissident). Britain has similarly activated the mechanism over Romania. The new mechanism agreed at Vienna needs to be activated by as many partners as possible before the Paris meeting on the "human dimension" in June 1989. It allows specific cases to be tackled.

C. ARMS CONTROL

- Nuclear: French Ministers suggested publicly (1988) that LANCE modernisation be postponed pending developments in conventional arms reduction talks. When the Prime Minister met President Mitterrand on 30 November, he assured her that he would not be an obstacle to a 1989 decision to modernise LANCE.

- The French are as opposed as we to NATO/Warsaw Pact negotiations on short range nuclear forces: they fear involvement of French SNF systems. But danger is: if French believe that they face a choice between LANCE modernisation with SNF negotiations or no modernisation at all, they may prefer to put off a modernisation decision.

- Conventional: securing Alliance agreement on European zones for conventional arms control purposes has created major difficulties: French, for bloc to bloc reasons, have opposed treating Europe as a single entity with a common ceiling between East and West. Germans have resisted any focus on the central front because it "singularises" them; flank countries, in particular Turkey, have been fearful of arrangements that might isolate them. The Western Proposal, which all bar Turkey now support, gives priority to the measures applying to the whole zone and emphasises Alliance solidarity. But one of provisions is for a regime applied to an extended central zone (from which Turkey, Greece, Norway and Iceland would be excluded on the NATO side). The Turks fear that this extended "central zone" represents the WEU (even though it includes Denmark), from which they feel excluded. Their preferred alternative (based on NATO's