



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1989

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 Dear Charles,

Anglo-French "Mini-Summit" at Chequers: 1 September

President Mitterrand, M Dumas, the French Ambassador, their Private Secretaries and interpreters will visit Chequers from 11.30am until 4.00pm. The Foreign Secretary and M Dumas will join the Prime Minister and M Mitterrand over lunch and will have separate talks before and after it. A programme and personality notes are attached.

This meeting originated during the Prime Minister's visit to Paris in mid-July when M Mitterrand commented that the press had been trying to create artificial Anglo-French differences: some differences, he said, were genuine and must be respected and tackled, but others could be cleared away. The last full Summit was in Paris on 29 January and a smaller mini-summit took place at Mont St Michel on 30 November 1988. The Prime Minister might confirm to M Mitterrand that we shall act as hosts for the next Summit early next year.

The objectives suggested by M Mitterrand are very appropriate. In addition, but consistent with them, the Foreign Secretary suggests that M Mitterrand should be invited publicly to endorse the aim of strengthening our cooperation on defence and arms control, with particular emphasis on nuclear issues, conventional arms control and procurement. This proposal has been cleared with the MOD.

The Prime Minister may like to recall at the outset the reason why M Mitterrand proposed this meeting and to establish with him which subjects should be covered in the time available. Since we shall have new ideas to propose for strengthening Anglo-French security cooperation, these issues could be taken early, together with the new developments in East/West relations. These would lead naturally into European Community issues. But it would be important to leave time for regional issues of special concern to M Mitterrand notably Lebanon and Cambodia.

We understand that there will be no Press Conference after the talks, although a statement may be issued. There will be a photo opportunity at the outset.



The Scene in France

M Mitterrand met Sr Gonzalez in Madrid on 20 August and should therefore be well briefed after his August holiday in Latché (south-west France). He is to meet Herr Kohl on 7 September as part of a round of EC-related contacts.

Despite the French Socialists' disappointment over their showing in the Euro-elections, in which M Giscard d'Estaing's UDF/RPR group were the main winners, they remain strong domestically: the Right is fragmented; Rocard is popular; and the economy is doing well (GDP growth forecast to be 3.9% this year; inflation 3.5%). The main worries are unemployment (10%) and the current account deficit (0.6% of GDP with the French worried about their hold on their export markets). The prospect of 1992 is concentrating minds on structural reform (tax system; capital movements; and the dismantling of national trade restraints), but no more privatisations (or renationalisations) are planned. No elections are due until 1992 (regional) and 1993 (legislative). The Post will be sending a scene setting telegram.

Defence and Arms Control

Since the constructive discussion at Mont St Michel, the French have been concerned by trends in the Federal Republic of Germany and uncertain about future United States' policies. They have shown many signs of wanting the closest possible cooperation with us over defence and arms control. This would also be to our benefit, not least in resisting pressure for a conventional arms control agreement at almost any price.

The time could now be right to propose to M Mitterrand to upgrade the bilateral security relationship. The Prime Minister might propose that:

- defence relations should be given a higher priority and reviewed by Foreign and Defence Ministers at Anglo-French Summits and possibly in between. We will of course need to ensure that the emphasis is on substance not presentation;
- officials should be charged to bring our thinking as close as possible across the range of defence and security issues. This should cover procurement, nuclear and missile proliferation, chemical weapons and out-of-area issues. But the focus should be on nuclear and conventional matters;



- in the nuclear field we should develop the dialogue on our independent deterrents; coordinate our attitude to Soviet pressures for the inclusion of French and British systems in strategic arms control (START), or any future negotiations on short-range forces (SNF); consult about SNF arms control; and consider how best to sustain credible deterrence as an essential component of European security in the 90s. (The more we can build up this dialogue, the better placed we will be to allay French disappointment if we decide against purchasing our Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM) from them);
- in the conventional area we should make sure that the details of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) are analysed from a European angle; work out a way of dealing with non-circumvention, in particular the problem of Soviet aircraft outside the area to be covered by the agreement (the Atlantic to the Urals); compare notes on how to implement the cuts which will result from a CFE agreement; and share our analysis of possible longer-term conventional reductions;
- we should also build on the programme of military cooperation, including exercises, which has developed since the Prime Minister proposed it to M Mitterrand. (It will be easier to draw the French into this if it is presented as part of a broader pattern of defence cooperation.)

None of these ideas will be new to the French. They have already been raised in exchanges with M Dumas and M Chevenement or their officials. The novel element would be to endorse this activity at Head of Government level, to treat it as a coherent and deliberate programme of cooperation, and possibly to seek some publicity for it. A short statement or press briefing on the lines of the attached draft would help to demonstrate that, despite differences on some Community topics, we and the French are working more closely than ever on the other main issue of the day. This would be welcome to President Bush, whose Administration has explicitly encouraged European and Anglo-French cooperation. It may also have a steadying influence on other European allies. It would, of course, not prejudice our commitments to NATO in any way.

If the Prime Minister agrees that it would be worth putting the proposal to M Mitterrand, the Foreign Secretary suggests that it might be best to do so in the course of the morning's discussions, and then to amplify the proposal at lunch (when the Foreign Secretary and Dumas will be present). The chances of success would be increased if we were able to give Mitterrand's office an indication in advance that the Prime Minister will be speaking on these lines.



East/West; Soviet Internal

The Soviet leadership's attention is virtually monopolised by domestic developments. In the nationality crisis, there is anxiety about Baltic demands. Gorbachev's economic reforms are making little impact. The current import of consumer goods (about £1 billion) is a stop-gap measure, but reflects the concern about growing popular discontent. Similarly, the decision to concede demands of striking miners in late July and early August has only stored up problems for the future - with other workers likely to follow the miners' example. The West can have little immediate influence. Our best contribution will be through political encouragement, training, advice, expertise and joint ventures. These were amongst the areas covered by agreements signed during Gorbachev's visit to France (4-6 July).

Poland and Hungary

Soviet MFA spokesmen have recently indicated disquiet over events following the Polish elections and over Solidarity's truculence over the formation of a PZPR government. Nothing has been said, however, to counter Gorbachev's affirmations of the right of each people to choose its own social system. No obvious solution seems available to Gorbachev but he must be very aware of the consequences of overt interference for East-West relations and the continuation of reform.

In Poland, the nomination of a non-Communist Prime Minister (Tadeusz Mazowiecki) is a momentous step, with potentially far-reaching implications for the rest of Eastern Europe. The Party is expected to retain the Defence, Interior and (perhaps) Foreign Ministries once a Government has been formed. The prospects are uncertain. Any Solidarity-led coalition will have to tackle Poland's crippling economic problems without alienating their own supporters or the population as a whole, or being undermined by the Communists in the bureaucracy. It will also have to allay the misgivings of Moscow and Poland's more staunchly Communist neighbours. The Prime Minister might like to note that plans to coordinate Western help will be all the more important if Mazowiecki produces a new stable government. In Hungary too, the processes of reform are continuing apace. Round Table talks are under way, involving the Party, official organisations and opposition representatives, but major differences remain, for example on the proposed electoral law. Within the Party, the reformists hold the upper hand, but the Party Congress in October is likely to see heated debate on the pace and complexion of reform. Opposition candidates scored successes in recent by-elections. The outcome of free national elections, which may be held in Spring, is difficult to predict.



EC Issues

The Prime Minister may wish to lead into discussion of EC external subjects by congratulating M Mitterrand on the success of the Summit of the Arch. She could stress the importance of the Summit Declaration on support for reform in Poland and Hungary, making the following points:

- The Community has done well to agree substantial food aid for Poland, and finalise the EC/Poland trade and cooperation agreement; the Commission has made a good start with coordinating the wider Western efforts.
- There must be a coherent Western effort targetted at agricultural reform and building up the private sector (eg with management training). But we cannot remove from the Poles and the Hungarians the primary responsibility for ensuring political and economic reform is carried through.

On relations with the Soviet Union, the Prime Minister might make the following points:

- She has noted M Mitterrand's reply (copy attached) to President Gorbachev's letter to the Summit Seven.
- We want Perestroika to succeed, and see advantage in Western bodies, such as the OECD Secretariat, providing advice on how to run a free-market economy. But the Soviet Union has a very long way to go before there can be any question of closer association with, let alone membership of, bodies such as GATT and IMF/IBRD.
- It would be a mistake for the Community to set an artificial deadline for an EC/USSR trade and cooperation Agreement (the French have said they want one within their Presidency). The Russians will be tough negotiators.

Turning to relations with the US, the Prime Minister might take the following line:

- Judicious restraint on both sides of the Atlantic, has kept EC/US trade disputes under control; and the US are now more positive about 1992;
- The Community must continue to resist US unilateralism. Must also demonstrate that US fears about "Fortress Europe" were unfounded. (The French continue to toy with a protectionist approach to the Single Market.)



The GATT Uruguay Round will begin its critical last phase in the autumn. Agriculture remains a key issue; the French are reluctant to envisage the necessary reforms for fear of undermining the CAP. The Prime Minister might say:

- We all have much to gain from a successful Uruguay Round - and to lose from failure. It is essential that the Community should play a constructive role in the final phase.
- In particular, we must live up to our obligations to make agriculture more responsive to market forces.

That will require further substantial reform of the CAP.

The French strongly share our caution over any further enlargement of the Community. The Prime Minister might take the following line:

- Pressure for enlargement is likely to grow; it will be important to consider the implications in the round. Major enlargement could significantly effect the nature and functioning of the Community.
- We are grateful for the deft French handling of the recent Austrian application; there must be full discussion of the implications of Austrian neutrality.

The Prime Minister might open discussion of the Community's internal agenda with the Single Market, on which the French Presidency is proving pragmatic and energetic. But we need to encourage them to push ahead on investment services and transport, particularly cabotage. The Commission are responding to our emphasis on implementation and enforcement, and will issue a communication in September. The French record, like ours, is good. On frontiers too the French have adopted a pragmatic approach. The line might be:

- Share French commitment to maintaining Single Market momentum. Importance of pushing ahead on transport. Genuine financial services market needs Investment Services Directive in place simultaneously with Second Banking Directive (end 1992). Welcome Commission initiative on implementation/enforcement.
- Need to focus on areas of practical cooperation in frontiers discussions. Drugs a top priority.



The economic and monetary work programme post-Madrid is to complete preparations for Stage 1, and to start preparations for an inter-governmental conference (after 1 July 1990) on any subsequent stages. The French will try to force the pace on both elements, which will be discussed at the informal ECOFIN on 8-10 September. Our objective remains to focus attention on Stage 1 preparations, and reinforce the need for deliberation before an IGC. On subsequent stages, we shall want to encourage a dialogue in the Community on the fundamental questions involved. Work is proceeding in Whitehall on alternative approaches to the Delors prescription. But ECOFIN's work is just beginning, and it is too early to speculate where this work will lead and how best it should be deployed.

The Prime Minister's line might be:

- UK strongly supports Presidency effort to secure rapid progress on Stage 1. Good prospect of completing work by Strasbourg Council.
- Stage 1 will be a major undertaking. Removal of all remaining barriers to capital liberalisation necessary.
- UK will also contribute positively to work on subsequent stages. But this will be as agreed at Madrid, ie Delors Report a basis, not the only basis, for developments beyond Stage 1. Comprehensive and thorough preparatory work needed before any IGC. Fundamental questions still to be answered.
- There was no Madrid agreement on any developments after Stage 1. Timing and objectives of IGC must depend on outcome of ECOFIN debate.

Advice is being sent separately on the French proposal for a high-level group of officials to work on possible texts for an IGC.

Social issues are a French Presidency priority. They are fully aware of the unacceptability to us of existing Commission proposals for a Charter, but remain determined to issue a declaration of social rights at Strasbourg. This will be discussed by an ad hoc group of senior officials and subsequently by Ministers in the autumn following publication of revised Commission proposals in mid-September. These will probably comprise a draft declaration by Heads of Government accompanied by a separate programme of Community and other measures. The French will also push on the proposed European Company Statute. We have objected strongly to the worker participation provisions and to the (qualified majority



voting) legal base. The Prime Minister could take the following line:

- agree that the Single Market must benefit all Community citizens, and advance social progress. We can do that without unnecessary regulation of labour market.
- Commission Charter proposals unacceptable. Any statement at Strasbourg Council must take full account of Madrid Conclusions, ie respect diversity and principle of subsidiarity.
- Will not give up UK voluntarist approach. Object to worker participation provisions in European Company Statute which in present form require legislation and would ostracise UK worker involvement practices.

M Mitterrand has raised audio-visual policy at three successive European Councils, and will see Strasbourg as a further showcase for French views. Attention is now focussed on the Paris Conference for industry and government representatives on 30 September - 2 October. Non-EC Western European and some Eastern European countries will participate. We hope there will be North American involvement too. The Prime Minister could:

- welcome the French initiative, and offer continued British support for their industry-led approach.
- welcome French undertaking (at FAC on 17 July) to consider how North American interests should be involved in September Conference. Initiative should not be seen as anti-American.

Other Economic Summit issues

M Mitterrand may raise environmental issues, which concern him deeply, though he does not seem to share M. Rocard's enthusiasm for a new international authority. The Prime Minister could respond:-

- by welcoming the wide agreement reached at the Paris Summit and our similar approaches to the EC environmental agenda.
- by urging that we work together to strengthen existing international bodies, such as UNEP and the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to encourage developing countries to play a full part there and to promote a climate convention and good environmental economics.



If M Mitterrand reverts to a North/South Summit, the Prime Minister could argue that this would detract from the work of existing institutions, such as the UN Special Session on economic recovery and development due in April 1990. For example environmental meetings, including UNEP, IPCC and the London Ozone Layer Conference, show that developing countries do not see these problems in North/South terms.

Drugs were also highlighted at the Summit. We hope the French will give full support to the international conference on demand reduction in the context of the cocaine threat, to be held in London in April 1990. We will participate fully in the Financial Action Task Force created by the Summit, for which the French will chair the first meeting. We also want to negotiate with the French a bilateral agreement for the tracing, freezing and confiscation of drug traffickers' assets.

Lebanon

The heavy Syrian shelling of East Beirut between 11 and 15 August and the Druze attack on Souk El Gharb, south of Beirut (under Syrian coordination) prompted a French diplomatic blitz in Arab capitals, Moscow and New York and additional naval deployments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Their tactics produced few positive results (eg Security Council Presidential statement on 15 August) but considerable resentment amongst the Arabs given France's traditional close association with the Maronites. An emergency meeting of the Political Committee called by the French on 21 August agreed that a further EC ministerial statement should be made underlining the Twelve's concern about Lebanon and reiterating support for the efforts of the Arab League Committee of Three Heads of State (Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco). It was also agreed that a mission to evaluate aid needs would be sent to Lebanon shortly.

Our objective is to demonstrate support for French diplomatic activity while keeping the focus on the need for the Committee of Three to resume its mediation efforts.

We see three requirements for this:

- end to Iraqi support for Aoun (no more arms supplies);
- ceasefire and Syrian lifting of blockade;
- Aoun's agreement to re-creation of some Lebanese national political structure.

The Prime Minister might underline the need for the Twelve to support Arab League efforts to meet these requirements and the importance of maintaining an impartial approach to the contending factions in Lebanon.



Arab/Israel

Since the discussion with M Mitterrand last January, Arafat has visited Paris and Shamir has visited London. Although Arafat declared that the Palestine National Covenant had been superseded, the Israelis still refuse to concede any role for the PLO in the peace process, or to offer the undertakings on "land for peace" required if their plan for elections in the Occupied Territories is to be taken up. As President Bush recently told the Prime Minister, the Americans see the way forward as urging the PLO to allow Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to discuss the Israeli plan.

Against this unpromising background, the Prime Minister might recall our common interest with the French in using the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council as a forum for maintaining progress. Despite American reluctance to concede even the prospect of informal talks, we should keep the idea alive in case it can be developed during the forthcoming General Assembly. We should also encourage the Arabs/PLO to use the UNGA constructively, putting forward sensible, moderate resolutions rather than indulging in anti-Israeli rhetoric. This would bolster the PLO's moderate diplomacy and help to undermine Israeli intransigence.

Iran

Rafsanjani's election offers some opportunity for change. But he has as yet made no significant policy changes towards the West and has been careful to stress continuity with Khomeini. The hardliners have not been silenced. Iranian threats of violence against British citizens have not been withdrawn. A firm stance towards Iran should be maintained (the EC ban on high-level visits) in order to show that a price must be paid for failure to respect international norms of behaviour. Iran's attitude to the hostages is a decisive element. Pressure should be kept up, even if Rafsanjani may not yet be able to act.

Cambodia

The International Conference on Cambodia currently in Paris is due to end on 30 August. We shall update the briefing nearer the time.

Some useful work has been done on the mandate for an International Control Mechanism (ICM) and a UN reconnaissance team was sent to Cambodia to assess the situation on the ground. Its conclusions are not yet known.



The Chinese position is crucial. Publicly they have stuck to the principle that power should be shared equally between the four factions during the period following Vietnamese troop withdrawal (due to be completed on 26 September) and before general elections are held. But they have let it be known on the margins of the Conference that the Khmer Rouge presence need only be token provided Prince Sihanouk is given real power to prevent Hun Sen from monopolising it.

Vietnamese Boat People

More than 31,000 Boat People have arrived in Hong Kong since the beginning of the year. The International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees held in Geneva in June endorsed the principle that non-refugees (of which there are likely to be some 40,000 in Hong Kong) should be returned to their country of origin, but it was imprecise on the mechanism for repatriating those who do not volunteer to return.

Officials representing countries that participated in the Geneva Conference will be considering alternatives to voluntary repatriation when the Plan of Action adopted by the Conference is reviewed in October. The French (and Americans) are likely to maintain their opposition to mandatory repatriation as an acceptable alternative.

The Prime Minister might make the following points:

- grateful for France's pledge at Geneva Conference to resettle up to 4,400 Indo-Chinese refugees;
- the situation in Hong Kong remains desperate with arrivals continuing at up to 300 a day;
- urgent need to deal with all those who are screened out as non-refugees;
- clear that voluntary repatriation alone unlikely to meet the scale of the problem;
- hope French will support search for alternative and effective arrangements when the Conference Plan of Action is reviewed in October.

Hong Kong

Confidence in Hong Kong remains bruised and Hong Kong people continue to have deep anxieties about the future. We are trying to rebuild confidence (including reviewing the



programme for democratisation, introducing a Bill of Rights and working out a nationality package to encourage key personnel to encourage them to remain in Hong Kong). We are also making plain to the Chinese that it is above all for them to regain the trust of Hong Kong people. There is a general Western interest in sustaining confidence in maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity. The French can help by reiterating their confidence in Hong Kong (and by giving as clear and firm an assurance as possible that, if the worst happened, they would help to provide homes of last resort for those who needed them).

Argentina/Falkland Islands

Sir C Tickell's talks on 16-17 August were useful in setting the ground rules for a substantive meeting in October. We hope it will prove possible to move forward on practical matters - but there will be no question of compromising on our commitment to the Falkland Islanders.

Counter-Terrorism

Bilateral cooperation is excellent. Good recent examples were the arrest in Northern France on 14 July of three members of a PIRA armed service unit; and the arrest in Paris in April of three Loyalists for their part in the missile/arms deal.

South Africa

The Prime Minister may wish to refer to the elections to be held on 6 September. We believe the National Party will achieve a majority. With the elections behind him, we hope de Klerk will press on with reform. His recent meetings with Mobutu and Kaunda are indications of a better atmosphere for cooperation in the region. It is important we give him the chance to initiate reforms.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD), Alex Allen (HMT) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Jans.
Stephe Wall
 (J S Wall)
Private Secretary

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRESS GUIDELINES ON COOPERATION ON DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL

The Prime Minister and President had a very good discussion on East-West relations and European security

- they agreed that there is a priority need for the two Governments to cooperate as closely as possibly on defence and arms control issues
- they directed that contacts across the range of these issues should be strengthened, with particular emphasis on nuclear issues, conventional arms control and procurement
- they also decided that defence and arms control cooperation should be reviewed systematically by Foreign and Defence Ministers at and between bilateral summits.

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ANGLO-FRENCH "MINI-SUMMIT" AT CHEQUERS: 1 SEPTEMBER

OUTLINE PROGRAMME

- 1040 Arrive RAF Northolt by special flight
Met by [REDACTED]
- 1050 Drive to Chequers
- 1125 Photo call
- 1130 Separate talks between Prime Minister/M Mitterrand
and Foreign Secretary/M Dumas
- 1300 Combined lunch
- Later Separate talks resume
- 1600 Depart Chequers for RAF Northolt
- c1645 Depart RAF Northolt by special flight
(This may be preceded by a Press Conference)

MITTERRAND, FRANÇOIS GCB

President of the Republic.

Born 1916 in Charente. Son of a railway official. Trained as a lawyer in Paris. Wounded in action during the French campaign, he was a prisoner of war 1940-42. He escaped, characteristically at the third attempt, settled in the unoccupied part of France and played an active part in the Resistance, which included missions in London and Algiers, 1943. His opponents have questioned his Resistance record but General de Gaulle was sufficiently satisfied with him in 1944 to appoint him Secretary General for Prisoners and Deportees. At the end of the war M. Mitterrand became Deputy for the Nièvre, an area of North Central France that he represented in the National Assembly, and briefly in the Senate until his election as President in 1981. Under the Fourth Republic Mitterrand led his own centre-left party and was a member of several administrations, some of them far from left-wing. When he first took office, he was the youngest Minister to be appointed since the 19th century. Among his Ministerial posts his principal ones were Minister for Overseas France (1950-51), and Minister of the Interior (1954-55). His career was marked by controversy, eg over the "Observatory affair" in which he escaped assassination in what some claimed was a staged attempt. Mitterrand was one of the few French politicians to oppose General de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, mainly because he considered that the latter had been imposed on France by the armed forces.

From 1958-81 Mitterrand was the de facto leader of the Opposition. His political fortunes ebbed and flowed but he never gave up his attempt to create a majority that would allow the Left to accede to power. He ran unsuccessfully for President in 1965 and 1974. From 1971 until the beginning of 1981, when he gave up the post to run for the Presidency, Mitterrand was First Secretary of the renovated Socialist Party (PS). Under his leadership the PS has grown to become the dominant force on the Left of French politics. Mitterrand, the supreme party tactician, has the distinction of having held the warring factions of the PS together during its long period of opposition and of difficult relations with the Communist Party (PCF).

Mitterrand calculated that the only way the Socialists could hope to come to power was with the support of those voters who had traditionally supported the PCF. From 1972-77 he took the PS into alliance with the PCF, but the alliance collapsed before the 1978 legislative elections when Mitterrand rejected the PCF's attempts to dictate the terms of the revision of the Common Programme of Government which had been drawn up in 1972. When Mitterrand was elected President in 1981 he accepted a number of Communists into the Mauroy Government, primarily for tactical reasons. The episode was disastrous for the PCF whose support slumped. Since then relations between Mitterrand and the PCF at leadership level have been strained. In 1988 Mitterrand fought his second successful presidential campaign on moderate policies and the offer of places in the government for the Centrists.

Mitterrand is not a doctrinaire Socialist. He enjoys power for the sake of it. Keen on books and painting, addicted to writing and he seems to be a humanist with egalitarian instincts and a sense of public responsibility. He is on the side of the under-dog and is concerned about the welfare of people in general, but he is by nature aloof. He has few personal friends and is not much inclined to share confidences. His habit of keeping his own counsel has not changed since he took office.

Mitterrand has a strong sense of history, especially French history. He is an intellectual. He speaks, and writes, superbly well; but sometimes there is little substance below the elegant surface.

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During his 1981 and 1988 election campaigns Mitterrand managed to appear very calm and self-possessed. There was a good deal of art in this, but also a fair amount of nature. As President, Mitterrand has continued to adopt an outward air of serenity whatever the government's difficulties and his own often relatively low popularity rating. His critics have accused him of modelling himself on Louis XIV or even the Divine Presence, and of practicing nepotism.

Mitterrand has three brothers. One brother, General Mitterrand, is a former President of Aérospatiale, the nationalised air-craft company, one is President of Havas and one a professor at the Sorbonne. He is married to a retiring wife, Danielle, who had a good Resistance record and whose strong interest in Human Rights causes throughout the world is occasionally demonstrated in public can sometimes be detected in her husband's actions. They have two sons, one of whom was elected a PS Deputy in 1981, while the other works on African affairs at the Elysee.

Neither the President nor his wife speak English.

SPEAKING POINTS FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND/M DUMAS,
1 SEPTEMBER 1989

COLOMBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

- increasingly concerned about developments in Colombia
- at Paris Economic Summit we undertook to support drugs producing countries in their efforts against drugs-traffickers
- President Barco taking courageous action: he needs our support
- good that Twelve have made public statement of support
- but we must do more. Consider it urgent that the Twelve move quickly to explore the scope for further practical initiative to help Colombia. Can you as Presidency take this forward?
- British Government already in close cooperation with Colombians on drugs and we are urgently considering further support in the fields of training and technical assistance
- another area of particular concern to Barco is supply of precursor chemicals from Europe
- you as Presidency will wish to decide how best to proceed in this critical situation which affects us all.



BACKGROUND

Precursor Chemicals

In his letter to the Prime Minister of 21 July, welcoming her drugs initiative at the Paris Economic Summit, President Barco expressed his concern about the supply of chemicals from the industrialised nations which are used in the manufacture of cocaine. For our part the UK is well down the road in developing a system for monitoring the supply of these chemicals, and in preparing legislation to implement relevant provisions in the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Drug Trafficking. Much remains to be done to develop this monitoring on a European basis, and we propose to raise the subject at a meeting which we hope the French Presidency will convene in the margins of the Second Interregional Meeting of Heads of National Drugs Law Enforcement Agencies which will take place in Vienna from 11-15 September. This meeting could also provide a forum for discussing other technical assistance to the Colombians.

SOUTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT
August 1989

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