

OUT TELEGRAM

12

Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Deskby

SECRET

FLASH

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 SECRET
4
5
6 FM FCO
7 FLASH BUENOS AIRES
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY, WASHINGTON
10 INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, BRA^SILIA
11 FALKLANDS CRISIS: YOUR TELNO 126

12 1. We are grateful to you and to the Americans for this report
13 of US/Argentine exchanges on our behalf. While we shall continue
14 to be grateful for American efforts to persuade the Argentine
15 Government away from hasty or violent reactions, we do not see
16 that we can usefully ask them to undertake negotiating a
17 solution of the South Georgia problem on our behalf. For your
18 own information we fear that we would end up with the Americans
19 also exerting pressure on us to reach a solution which was
20 politically unacceptable to us.

21 2. Your TUR was despatched before the prominent UK media stories
22 about nuclear powered submarines and other ships being despatched
23 to the Falklands. We must assume that these speculative reports
24 (particularly taken in conjunction with our own latest secret
25 reports indicating Argentine jumpiness) will give an impression

NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

in

File number

Dept

Distribution

Drafted by (Block capitals)

Standard
SAMd
Cabinet Office

Telephone number

Additional
Falkland Islands

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference

Time of despatch

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CZC
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24 *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).*

25 *Weyland, 22/5/2012* will give an impression

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword in
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OUT TELELETTER (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

SECRET

FLASH

2

1 <<<<

2 in Buenos Aires that we are seeking a naval rather than a
3 diplomatic way ^{OUT} ~~out~~ of our difficulties. This could be a very
4 dangerous impression to leave - even for a few days.

5 3. We therefore think it important that we launch our diplomatic
6 initiative without further delay, even if the Argentine response
7 to this and the despatch of our ^{*}Emissary^{*} is likely to be less
8 speedy (indeed there would be some advantage in not hastening
9 unduly). We therefore wish you to deliver the message in
10 my telno 116.

11 4. However we are very conscious of the skill and firmness with
12 which you have been handling these exchanges so far and we have
13 of course no wish to risk undermining your position as an
14 interlocutor. If you feel it would be helpful you may therefore
15 insert into the message a sentence to the effect that 'The
16 Emissary would be coming to support our Ambassador'. We would
17 rather not drop the references to 'constructive proposals'
18 because we think it important that the Argentines should not
19 think we have run out of any ideas except military ones.

20 5. As regards your further suggestion (your telno 128) that the
21 Emissary should be someone like Lord Carver or Lord Hill-Norton,
22 we think that negotiations would more effectively be carried out
23 at working level and that in any case some of the presentational
24 objections which would apply to sending a Minister to BA would
25 also apply to sending a prominent public figure.

26 6. I have been consulted in Jerusalem and agree~~s~~.

27

28 CARRINGTON

29 NNNN

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34

NNNN ends
teleletter

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Catchword