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OD(SA) PAPER ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

1. This is to confirm that there are two respects in which the OD(SA) paper distributed yesterday evening on Rules of Engagement for a Total Exclusion Zone may need amendment as a result of points which have arisen since its distribution. Since it appeared conceivable that the paper might be taken at this evening's OD(SA) meeting, I passed you an advance note in manuscript setting out the two changes.
2. Para 5 of the paper explains that the geographical scope of the proposed ROE is wider than the TEZ itself in order to allow attacks on targets within the Zone to be launched from outside it. Nonetheless, the intention is that the targets themselves should only be attacked if they are situated within the Zone. Hence the caveat which accompanies surface vessel ROE 123 (page 4 of ANNEX A). However, no such caveat applies to the corresponding SSN ROE, Number 4 (page 7 of ANNEX A). The Navy Department have pointed out that this may cause confusion, and we therefore recommend that the Secretary of State proposes adding the following caveat to SSN ROE Number 4: "Caveat: Applicable to targets within Exclusion Zone only".
3. The second change concerns the draft Parliamentary announcement at ANNEX B to the paper. Having had time to reflect on this the FCO Legal Advisers have prepared a revised announcement (copy attached - changes to previous version underlined). This removes the anomalous reference to an "Air Exclusion Zone", and proposes that reference is made to the closure of Port Stanley airfield. The Foreign Secretary is being advised in parallel to propose the amendments. Both appear desirable, and the Secretary of State is recommended to support their inclusion.

*C.B.T.*  
 2h

24 April 1982

C B JENNINGS  
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Now that the Task Force has virtually reached the Falkland Islands area, the Total Exclusion Zone has been declared and South Georgia re-possessed, it is prudent to review our future military options for fulfilling the Government's overall aims.

The Commander in Chief has been instructed by the Chiefs of Staff to plan to effect a landing with a view to the re-possession of the Falkland Islands with the constraints of minimum damage to civilians and to civilian property. On present intelligence estimates, we must assume that the Argentine garrison on the Falkland Islands numbers some 6-7,000 men or roughly 7 battalions. Against that, with his present forces, the Commander in Chief could land with about 5,500 men, roughly 5 battalions. His military judgement, which the Chiefs of Staff endorse, is that this force level should be adequate to establish a viable bridgehead and advance inland. But if Argentine forces are established in strength in well prepared defensive positions in and around Port Stanley, he could get bogged down. The situation could develop into a siege or stalemate. Time would not be on our side, and our forces could face air attacks from Argentine aircraft, husbanded during the imposition of our TEZ.

If the Commander in Chief is required to achieve the swift and decisive re-possession of the Falkland Islands as a whole, he will need more forces. His judgement, with which the Chiefs of Staff concur, is that arrangements should be made now to deploy the 5th Brigade (and supporting elements) which is trained and ready for the task. This would give him 3 battalions more - a slight margin of superiority over the currently assessed Argentine garrison. Reinforcements would have to be

accompanied by additional air assets and the neutralization of the Argentine aircraft carrier.

If we are to get these extra forces to the area to meet the earliest date for a landing, we shall have to move fast. There will be a significant addition to the logistic task. We shall have to take up more ships from trade, possibly going to foreign sources. We shall certainly need the QE II and will have to take up an option on her before 4 May if we are to get her in time. For a full brigade reinforcement we shall also require one further cruise liner, two more ferries, a bulk carrier and a number of tankers. Decisions therefore must be reached now.

Finally, it must be accepted that if we achieve repossession on military terms without an accompanying political settlement, we need to consider what further military provision must be made. Unless there is some kind of political solution, effectively guaranteed, we shall have to plan on a substantial garrison on the Falkland Islands while the threat remains.