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GRS 460
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM ROME 271300Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 205 OF 27 APR 82
INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING BIS BUENOS AIRES

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TOP COPY

181
See 190

ALQ 050/598/1

DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

168

MY TELNO 189 : FALKLANDS: ITALIAN REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. BARBARANI HAS SHOWN US TWO FURTHER TELEGRAMS FROM BUENOS AIRES.
2. IN THE FIRST, KOCIANCICH REPORTS A DEMARCHE MADE TO ROS, MFA UNDER SECRETARY, ON 25 APRIL ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COMMUNIQUE (MY TELNO 196). KOCIANCICH SAW ROS BECAUSE COSTA MENDEZ WAS IN WASHINGTON: HIS DEMARCHE CAME AS FIRST NEWS OF THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION WAS REACHING BUENOS AIRES. ROS THANKED ITALY FOR HER CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE, WHICH HE PARAPHRASED AS RECOGNISING THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW BASIS TO LEAD TO A RAPID SOLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY BRITAIN HAD NOT ACCEPTED THIS, AND DESIRED A RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS SITUATION, KNOWING THAT INSISTENCE ON SELF- DETERMINATION WOULD RULE OUT ANY PROSPECT OF A REASONABLE SOLUTION. ROS CRITICISED BRITAIN FOR ATTACKING SOUTH GEORGIA WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS: KOCIANCICH RETORTED THAT ARGENTINA'S INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS WAS OPEN TO THE SAME CRITICISM. ROS ADDED THAT THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION DID NOT MEAN THE FAILURE OF US MEDIATION EFFORTS: ARGENTINA STILL HOPED FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY CONCILIATORY ACTION ITALY COULD TAKE.
3. THE SECOND TELEGRAM, DATED 26 APRIL, CONTAINS KOCIANCICH'S COMMENTS AFTER THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION, AS FOLLOWS:
 - A) THE ATTACK WAS NOT WHOLLY UNEXPECTED BY ARGENTINA, GIVEN THE KNOWN DIVISION OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE INTO TWO GROUPS.
 - B) THE TIMING WAS A SURPRISE, SINCE THE JUNTA EXPECTED BRITAIN TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE OAS MEETING.
 - C) THE JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT ALL FUTURE NEWS WOULD BE ISSUED THROUGH COMMUNIQUES OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (JUNTA PLUS CHIEF OF STAFF). KOCIANCICH COMMENTS THAT THIS AMOUNTS TO A NEWS BLACKOUT FOR MOST ARGENTINES.

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D) THERE WAS WORRY IN BUENOS AIRES ABOUT THE GROWING HOSTILITY OF THE US PRESS AND OF CONGRESS, LEADING TO PRESSURE ON REAGAN'S ADMINISTRATION TO BACK BRITAIN.

123 → E) ARGENTINE POLITICIANS RETURNING FROM EUROPE INCLUDING CERRO AND RAYMONDA (MY TELNO 168) HAD ARGUED THAT EUROPEAN ATTITUDES COULD BE MODIFIED IF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA IMPROVED. THEY WERE HOPING FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL SALVATION, AND A PLEDGE TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN 1983. KOCIANCICH COMMENTS THAT THIS IS PURE WISHEFUL THINKING.

4. BARBARANI EMPHASISED THAT IN HIS DEMARCHE KOCIANCICH HAD NOT ~~HAD THEREFORE~~ HAD NO GROUNDS FOR ATTRIBUTING STACY'S SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW BASIS (PARA 2 ABOVE). BARBARANI ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH A PARALLEL APPROACH WAS TO BE MADE IN LONDON ON 26 APRIL, THIS WOULD BE AT A LOWER LEVEL : THE MFA WAS TAKING CARE NOT TO TREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IDENTICALLY. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT LINE THE ITALIAN EMBASSY TAKE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
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ARCULUS

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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2

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