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CGS

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OPERATION SUTTON - INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS

BACKGROUND

1. CINCFLEET has signalled.....FLAG A requesting a minimum increase in force level of one brigade with necessary supporting assets.
2. Some background notes on 5 Inf Bde are at FLAG B for ease of reference..
3. This request marks a fundamental change to the scale of operations envisaged and brings into question whether Ministers would consider that the political aim justifies the use of a force of this size.

AIMS

4. Once again I would remind you of the aims:

a. Op CORPORATE

"The overall aim of HMG in the current situation is to bring about the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, and the re-establishment of British Administration there, as quickly as possible. Military deployments and operations are directed to the support of this aim".

b. Op SUTTON.

"To land a force in the Falkland Islands with a view to repossessing the Islands".

DISCUSSION

5. Political Considerations. All the indications are that as Ministers approach the point of taking decisions on the major use of force, there is a greater need to carry the support of Parliament and public opinion. Furthermore the support of our friends throughout the world for our continued use of force is of paramount importance. Closely associated with this is the perspective presented by the sheer scale of military operations and resultant bloodshed that is likely to result.

6. Political Intentions. What are the long term political intentions of HMG for the Falklands? If the aim (and I only give one example) is to move towards establishing conditions whereby the Falkland Islands can be given the right of self

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determination, it is arguable whether the penalties of such a major operation of war can be justified. I very much doubt whether the Islanders themselves would support an operation of this size, which would be bound to destroy much of the infrastructure of the Islands and be against HMG's intention of causing minimum damage to life and property.

7. Military Implications. The military arguments for a follow-on brigade are logical, but logistic effort to mount and support the force needs more detailed consideration. Sufficient civil shipping is available to move all but a small part of the force from UK; the latter could be flown to Ascension. The resupply of a force of this size, 8000 miles from home, will present difficulties, as will the protection of shipping in the South Atlantic, should it be threatened by Argentine naval forces.

8. Options. This brings us back to the vexed question of whether to adopt your preferred option of 'graduated response' or proceed with an intelligence gathering phase followed by CINCFLEET's plan for Op SUTTON. The implications of these courses for 5 Inf Bde are:

a. Graduated Response. If we were to proceed with the collection of intelligence followed by harrassment operations - DCDS(1)'s paper is at FLAG C the need for a decision regarding 5 Inf Bde can be delayed for 3/4 weeks. It would be possible to retain the force in the UK or at sea; the former would have distinct advantage of not having an impact on world opinion. The Bde would, however, not be able to react so quickly to any sudden change in the situation. There might, however, be no need to deploy the force if Argentine forces were to be isolated and gradually neutralised.

b. Intelligence and Op SUTTON. This option seems favoured by CDS/CNS. Undoubtedly world opinion would question the need for such force to be used. The preferred date for any landing is 16 May and thus the force would have to be embarked to sail in the first half of May. I doubt whether the despatch of additional forces at this stage would have any effect on Argentinian attitudes, but it would be likely to have an adverse affect on opinion and diplonatic attitudes at home and abroad.

LINE TO TAKE

9. Question the justification for this scale of operation in terms of the up-to-date political aim.

10. Question whether Ministers would be likely to support a 40% increase in force levels.

11. Stress the importance of retaining international support for our actions and the danger of jeopardising this by an apparent over reaction.

12. Question whether the logistic effort needed to mount and subsequently support a divisional sized force can be


sustained.

13. Lead discussion into the 'graduated response' option and emphasise:

- a. Time would be needed to evaluate effect of harrassment.
- b. No immediate decision for dispatch of 5 Inf Bde would be necessary.
- c. Flexibility of reinforcement - remain in UK or at sea?
- d. Likely affect on international opinion, and hence ability of UK to see through this operation once launched.

14. You might like to consider whether or not CINCFLEET should be brought into discussion with COS before proceeding further.

28 Apr 82


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27 APR 1982

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OPERATION SUTTON - INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS

1. LATEST INTELLIGENCE INDICATES ENEMY FORCE LEVELS ASHORE OF UP TO 7 BATTALIONS, PROBABLY DEPLOYED IN BRIGADE STRENGTH AT PORT STANLEY AND IN WELL DEFENDED POSITIONS AT OTHER KEY CENTRES OF POPULATION. IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE MAIN ENEMY POSITIONS AND MAINTAIN A STRONG RESERVE, I SHALL REQUIRE AT LEAST 8 BATTALIONS.
2. I REQUIRE A MINIMUM INCREASE IN MILITARY FORCE LEVELS OF BRIGADE SIZE WITH NECESSARY SUPPORTING ASSETS.
3. GIVEN THE NEED TO ACHIEVE REPOSSESSION IN THE QUICKEST AND MOST ECONOMICAL WAY, IN WORSENING WEATHER AND IN THE ~~FACE~~ *face* *you* *of* *the* MATERIAL ATTRITION, I ASSESS THAT THESE REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD

PAGE 2 RBDJCR 647 SECRET EXCLUSIVE UK EYES ALFA
ARRIVE IN THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS WITHIN 14 DAYS OF THE MAIN LANDING, I.E. 30 MAY, IF THE MOMENTUM IS TO BE MAINTAINED.

4. REINFORCEMENTS COULD BE FLOWN TO ASCENSION AND TRANSPORTED IN PRESENT STUFF RELEASED AFTER THE MAIN LANDING. IN THIS CASE, TH *landings* COULD NOT ARRIVE IN FALKLAND ISLANDS UNTIL 16 JUN AT EARLIEST, TOO LATE FOR MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO BE FULLY ACHIEVED. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT REINFORCEMENTS EMBARK IN FRESH STUFF DEPENDING UK 5 MAY

BT
Ships taken up from beach

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FOLLOW UP FORCE

1. 5 Inf Bde has been earmarked as the possible follow up force. Currently at 7 days NTM, 5 Inf Bde comprises 3 infantry battalions, a light gun battery, an engineer regiment, an Army Air Corps squadron, and logistic support. Additional units (armoured recce, more artillery) could be added if the required sealift is available. A detailed ORBAT of 5 Inf Bde is at

SIDE FLAG 2

2. Deployment. The best means of deployment for 5 Inf Bde would be by commercial shipping direct from UK to the Falkland Islands. We estimate it would take a maximum of 15 days to acquire and load the necessary shipping. QE 2 is next available to be taken up 3 May. Extra time would obviously be needed to modify ie fit flight decks, fitting for RAS - rough estimate 4 days.. In addition further shipping for personnel and also for equipment would be required. Sailing time would depend on shipping selected (QE 2 would take approx 15 days, other ships would take longer). Any option involving flying to a nearer point of embarkation, for example Ascension Island, would impose severe penalties in logistic support for a marginal possible time advantage.

3. Capability. 5 Inf Bde is not trained or equipped for an amphibious landing. In theatre it would only be capable of reinforcing 3 Cdo Bde once a suitable bridgehead had been established. The brigade would also be capable of relieving 3 Cdo Bde as a garrison force.

4. Logistics. The Brigade could deploy with sufficient stocks and logistic support to fight for 30 days at limited war rates. The additional logistical support necessary to sustain the brigade on the Falkland Islands has now been considered. It is estimated that 45 days stocks should be established after hostilities cease to allow for the sailing time involved. In view of the climate there will also be a requirement for extra accommodation for the brigade.

5. Command and Control. With a second brigade deployed consideration should be given to deploying a 2 star land headquarters for overall command of the land forces. Detailed planning on this has yet to be finalised. (A deployed 2 star headquarters could require an increased level of command for the TF).

5 INF BDE PLANNING STAFF TABLE
AS AT 271200A APR 82

Serial	Unit	Pers	Ammo Tonnes (5xDAER)	Freight (incl 30 day rats)	L/R	4 or 10 Ton	Tlrs	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	5 Inf Bde HQ & Sig Sqn	138	.45	14.9	9	-	9	Incls indiv rfts
2	97 Fd Bty	115	64.86	15	10	1	4 1xCymb eline	6 x Lt Gun. No ammo vehs.
3	656 Sqn AAC (-)	83	0.94	40	3	-	3	3 x Sc [with ATGW] 6 x Gz
4	36 Engr Regt	483	9.74	100	6	12 2 x Eager Beaver 38 x Plant	6	Incls 2 x Fd Sqns, Fd Sp Sqn (but less one para fd tp)
5	50 Fd Sqn (Const) (Airfield Damage Repair)	193	6	20	11	11 x 4 ton 16 x Plant (weighs 300t)	11 10 x towed eqpts	(1) Plant may be required from BAOR 1 fd tps worth in UK. (2) Const material not incl. (3) NATO earmarked.
6	2 SG	650	41.41	100	10	-	10	No WOMBAT/CONBAT
7	1 WG	610	37.32	100	10	-	10	No WOMBAT/CONBAT
8	1/7 GR	530	37.32	100	10	-	10	No WOMBAT/CONBAT

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
9	7 Tpt Tp	47 see col (1)	0.31	20	-	12	-	May be replaced by RCT Sqn but vehs remain at tp str.
10	16 Fd Amb	190	0.43	46.5	12	2	13 1 x KVA	Max hel casevac. Less PCT (part of leading PBG)
11	81 Ord Coy (-)	96	0.3	185	4	5 2 x Eager Beaver	9	Col (e) is 2nd line Ord Stores for Bde
12	10 Fd Wksp	106	0.36	36.1	8	12 7 x Plant	17 1 x KVA	Rft from 3 Fd Wksp
13	Pl 160 Pro Coy	16	0.02	3.9	1	-	1	
14	AMG	30	0.32	21	-	-	-	
15	Minor Svces (6 Fd Cash Office, PC Det)	7	0.02	4	2	-	2	
16	SH Det RAF	115		100	3	1	10	10 x Puma SH AVTUR not incl
17	Total (Bde)	3409	199.8	906.4	99	56 61 x Plant 4 x Eager Beaver	115 13 x towed eqpts	
18	25 x DAER at Limited War Rates		867.44					Not incl fuel
19	Total Tonnages		1067.24	906.4				
20	3rd Line Sp	552		223	41 12 M/Cs	9 24 Eager Beaver	81 5 x towed eqpts	For breakdown of units and figs see Annex A
21	Total	3961	1067.24	1129.4	140 12 M/Cs	65 61 x Plant 28 x Eager Beaver	115 13 x towed eqpts	

3RD LINE SP

Serial	Unit	Pers	Ammo Tonnes (5xDAER)	Freight (incl 30 days rats) Tonnes	L/R	4 or 10	Tlrs	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	HQ LSG	15		3	3	-	-	
2	9 Ord Bn	177(1)		56	6	2 9 Eager Beaver	16(3) 2xKVA	(1) a. Incls Base Camp admin org. b. CO 9 Ord to be Dep Comd. c. Incls Laundry, Bakery, EPI. (2) 2 x Specialist bakery vehs approx 4 ton size. (3) Incls: a. 2 x spec laundry trl b. 2 x spec bakery trl c. 6 x 5 ton flat bed trl d. 2 x water trl
3	2 Fd Hosp	109(4)		80	3	1	8(5) 3xKVA	(4) a. 50 Bed Ward b. 2 Surgical Team. c. Incls 15 Females. (5) Incls 6 x Blood Sup tlr
	8 Sqn RCT	96(6)		8	16(7) 12 MCs	7(8) 15 EAGER BEAVER	41(9)	(6) Incl Wksp det. (7) Incl 6 x Ambs and 2 FFR (8) Incls: 1 x Lt Rec veh. 2 x UBRE 4 x 4 Ton (9) Incls: 1 x Water trl 5 Ton APFP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
5	Comp Port Sqn RCT	20(10)		25 (11) 1 x Workboat (2 lt) 4 x Pallet lifter (12)	1	6(13)	3(14)	(10) Addl 70 already deploy to rejoin on arr (11) Incl 5 x Minicons (12) Addl to 4 already deployed (13) a. 1 x T25 crane b. 2 x Hydra Huskey c. 1 x MC d. 2 x Hyster e. Already deployed: (1) 4 x Fiat Allis (2) 2 x Hyster (14) a. 1 x $\frac{1}{2}$ t b. 1 x tower lighting set c. 1 x water trl 200 gal
6	59 MC Sqn (Airfd Ops)	20(15)			2(16)	-	2	(15) a. Incl 2 Pax already deployed. b. Incl 1 x Air Despatch Team. (16) One to be fitted with RACAL HF 93. (17) Assumes Air Despatch Freight would be flown out as reqd.
7	518 Coy RPC	57(18)			3	-	3	(18) 2 x Pls for general labour.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
8	STREs	16(19)		-	2	-	-	(19) Some Engr specialists may be reqd for well drilling, construction & power supply. Only recce parties reqd in early stages subject to more info. Could be att to 36 Engr Regt.
9	Det 30 Sig Regt	37(20)		8	8		8	(20) To provide: a. 1 x 40/160 Exchange b. 5 x radio dets c. If required to provide strategic comms (2 x D13 and SATCOM) figures increase by: (1) 37 fax (2) 5 x LR (3) 5 x 1/2 trls (4) 1 x 5 KVA gen
10	FMED	5		43				
11	Total	552		223	41 12M/Cs	9 + 24 EAGER BEAVER	81 5 x KVA	

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THE SIEGE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Attached is my paper assessing the capability of the Argentine to withstand a blockade of the Falkland Islands. The detailed work supporting the paper will be circulated separately to your staffs.

2. I suggest that this paper should form the basis of the intelligence contribution to the presentation to OD(SA) on Friday 23 April.

21 April 1982

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THE ARGENTINE CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND A

SIEGE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

INTRODUCTION

1. The COS are considering an air and sea blockade of the Falkland Islands. An assessment is therefore needed of the effects on the Argentine Garrison of the blockade, at various critical dates related to the arrival of the Task Force.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to determine the capability of the Argentine Garrison on the Falkland Islands to withstand a siege.

ASSUMPTION

3. We assume that the United Kingdom will impose a sea and air blockade of the Falkland Islands by 1 May 1982.

THE LOGISTIC PROBLEM

The Requirement

4. We are not privy to Argentine plans for the Falkland Islands. But we believe they will be attempting to build up the materiel the Garrison will need to withstand a seige of at least 60 days during which they may have to fight (at limited war rates) for up to 30 days. We have calculated the Argentines' logistic needs on the basis of the requirement of a UK force in similar circumstances. But the Argentines may see matters differently. We could, for instance, have over-insured on engineer stores, ammunition and even food. Our detailed working reveals a requirement of 3,000 and 4,000 tons for 7,000 and 10,000 troops respectively.

5. Our estimate excludes aviation fuel. The amount required is wholly dependent on the number and type of aircraft based at Stanley. Transport aircraft always carry sufficient fuel for the return journey. We know the Argentines have stock piled some aviation fuel but we do not know the quantities. Intensive flying operations from Port Stanley would certainly stretch the Argentine logistic system. In particular, the large fuel requirements of tactical fighters could well preclude their use.

Movement Capability

6. Air. The Argentines have used the C130, the F27, the F28 and Boeing 737 to move men and materials to Port Stanley. We have calculated the total lift of these aircraft making an allowance for bad weather, and other considerations which reduce the payload actually carried. However, we lack convincing evidence of the total sortie rate and our estimates could be badly out. The principal result compared with our estimated requirement (for 60 days) is given below:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Materiel</u>	
		<u>Delivered</u>	<u>Required</u>
1 May	7,000	2,900 tons	3,000 tons
	10,000	2,400 tons	4,000 tons
7 May	7,000	3,700 tons	3,000 tons
	10,000	3,200 tons	4,000 tons
15 May	7,000	4,500 tons	3,000 tons
	10,000	4,000 tons	4,000 tons

7. Sea. Two tankers and 3 transport ships have visited Stanley between the invasion and 9 April. We believe that the former were used to top up the existing two x 4,000 ton diesel fuel

storage tanks and fill some 'pillow' type tanks that had been delivered. The tankers and the other transports probably off-loaded a large number of 45 gallon drums of aviation fuel. In addition we believe some 400 tons of stores was brought in on the transports. We also assume that the LST and amphibious assault vessels discharged the heavy equipment and vehicles of the initial invasion and follow-up force, equivalent to a strong brigade of four battalions.

8. Accumulated Stores/Men. We therefore assess that by 18 April the Argentines could have moved at least 6,000 men and 2,000 tons of equipment and supplies by air and sea. This would be in addition to that delivered by the invasion force.

SIZE OF THE GARRISON

9. As I have previously reported (1), the Argentines are likely to hold the Falkland Islands with a reinforced brigade group concentrated at four main locations. The major portion of the force, consisting of up to four battalions probably holds Fort Stanley and the airfield, a further battalion is at Darwin and another possibly divided between Fox Bay and Port Howard on the West Island. This order of battle, supported by some armoured vehicles, artillery and engineers, produces a force level of at least 6,000 troops.

10. But the Argentines may be worried that either their reserve is too weak or that the battalion on West Island is too stretched. In which case they may decide to reinforce further by an additional battalion. This would raise the force level to about 7,000.

Note:

1. DCDS(I) 26 dated 14 April 1982

11. Alternatively the Argentines may attempt to deny us a foothold on the Islands by occupying and holding the larger settlements and by dominating the likely landing beaches. At least 3 additional infantry battalions are needed for this option, raising the strength to about 10,000 troops and even at this level the defence is unlikely to be wholly effective.

12. The Argentines will have to balance strengths against logistics. We assess that by mid April they had at least 6,000 men together with most of the major equipments. At this stage they probably had 2-3 weeks of combat supplies. It would take them until 15 May to build the force up to 10,000 men with the appropriate logistic backing. The Argentines could build-up their manpower at the expense of logistic support. For example, reducing the ammunition requirement to 15 days combat would enable sufficient supplies to be in place by 7 May. Whatever the precise arrangements the Argentines could probably have a force of 7,000, with adequate supplies in place by 1 May 1982, to endure a blockade for two months and possibly longer.

ARGENTINE COUNTERS TO A BLOCKADE

Interdiction of the Task Force

13. Argentine Navy. The Argentine Navy could attempt to break the blockade by attacking the UK naval force. We believe the Argentines would be most unlikely to risk their surface fleet. But they would probably deploy their submarines, especially the two Type 209s. These are quiet running diesel driven boats which would pose a threat to the blockading force.

14. Argentine Air Power. The Argentines could launch air attacks against the UK naval force with their carrier-borne aircraft. However, they would be unlikely to raise more than about 7 aircraft for this task. In addition there are over 100 Argentine Air Force aircraft with radius of action to attack the Task Force out to about 550 nm. But these are essentially limited to visual conditions and their effectiveness is low. Nevertheless, we must assume they would try. The most significant threat is posed by the 5 Super Etendards with their EXOCET missiles. Although these aircraft have a modern weapons system they could still have difficulty in locating the Task Force and particularly in identifying the high value units. Moreover, their radius of action without inflight refuelling is limited to 350 nm. The Argentines' capabilities are covered in detail in our earlier assessments (1) (2).

Breaking the Blockade

15. The Argentines may use merchant ships (perhaps flying flags of convenience) or civil aircraft in an attempt to beat the blockade. While merchant ships could be intercepted by the Task Force it would be impossible to stop a determined ship's captain without authority as a last resort to open fire. The Task Force could also have difficulty in stopping fast patrol craft - but these are unlikely to risk the open sea crossing in foul weather and carry little. But some helicopters could be used to ferry in

Notes:

1. DCDS(I) 26 dated 14 April 1982.
2. DCDS(I) 26 dated 16 April 1982.

small stores at the price of refuelling at Stanley. Light aircraft could possibly make use of the few airstrips usable in winter. and the Argentines could resort to air dropping from C130s.

Exploit Civilians

16. We have already argued (3) that the Argentines may interweave their defences with the civilian population to inhibit any UK attack. Indeed one of the problems facing the UK is the requirement to avoid harming the civilian population largely centred on Port Stanley. But there is now growing evidence that most of the civilians have moved out of Port Stanley to the settlements. Reports indicate that the population may have fallen to as little as 150. Should this be true it reduces one of the most severe constraints on the Task Force.

17. The Argentines could also exploit on humanitarian grounds, the hardships imposed on the civil population. Although imported food stuffs for the civilians will probably run out in 1-2 months there are virtually unlimited supplies of local produce which would provide an adequate, through restricted diet. There is a small hospital in Port Stanley but it cannot deal with serious cases which must be transferred to Buenos Aires. This might give the Argentines some useful opportunities for anti-British propaganda.

18. The residents would also be affected by fuel shortages. They depend on diesel oil to generate electricity and to drive their landrovers. However the main fuel used for cooking and
Note:

3. DS(Int)5/2/15 dated 14 April 1982.

heating is peat which is readily available. Thus a lack of fuel oils would cause inconvenience rather than serious hardship.

ARGENTINE VULNERABILITIES

The Port Stanley Airfield

19. We have already identified that the airfield at Port Stanley is the garrison's jugular vein. Its neutralisation would not only cut the prime remaining link with the mainland but would also preclude the effective use of fighter aircraft for air defence. It is vulnerable to attack from the air, its installations are susceptible to special forces operations and its land link with the town could be severed. Its loss would also be a major psychological blow.

Deployment

20. The operational effectiveness of the Garrison will, of course, be governed by their deployment. At Stanley the bulk of the Garrison will be drawn into the built-up areas by the harsh weather. At night outposts will be hard pressed to stay alert. Their defensive positions, given the lack of experience of most of their troops, are probably especially vulnerable to special forces.

21. Outside Stanley, movement to the deployed battalions will be almost entirely by helicopter. If the latter can be destroyed on the airfield, the Argentines' would forfeit operational flexibility. Reserves could not be moved nor casualties evacuated and re-supply would become tenuous. The forward positions would be marooned and insecure. Morale would undoubtedly suffer.

Logistics

22. The Argentine Garrison with its L of C severed would have to fall back on its stocks. Food could be supplemented from the sheep, and fuel by the Islands' peat. We suspect there is a substantial stock-pile of supplies at Moody Camp and at the airfield. There are probably others. But the pattern does not bear the hallmark of a carefully prepared logistic plan. Therefore, when identified, stocks may prove comparatively easy to destroy - from the air or from the ground.

23. Another weak link is the fresh water supply. Port Stanley relies on a single pump house and filtration plant which is barely adequate for the normal population of 1,000. Its loss would have the most serious consequences for the Garrison and for the remaining civilians.

Command and Control

24. The whole cohesion of the Garrison's defence depends, of course, on effective command and control. The Joint Force Headquarters, probably located in the Governor's House, is the key. It is therefore a critical target.

Morale

25. The Garrison faces an obvious morale problem. Most will have been on the Islands for approaching a month by the start of the blockade. The environment is inhospitable, the weather harsh, the atmosphere unfriendly, living conditions primitive and food barely adequate. Some 80 per cent are young conscripts with a few months service, ill-prepared and unaccustomed to the rigorous life now imposed upon them. There can be few enjoyable distractions.

Above all the ordinary soldier will feel increasingly isolated, and perhaps abandoned, once the air L of C is cut. His motivation will be difficult to sustain.

26. Any reverses the Argentines suffer, such as the loss of South Georgia or ships sunk, must be forcibly and graphically rammed home. If they are accompanied by a vigorous campaign of harrassment, from the air and on the ground, the Garrison's will to fight will be further sapped. In sum, Argentine morale is vulnerable to a carefully orchestrated attack, embracing all methods both psychological and physical.

CONCLUSIONS

28. We conclude that by 1 May a Garrison of 7,000, and in the extreme case up to 10,000, could be in place with sufficient supplies to endure a siege of up to two months and possibly longer.

29. We also conclude that the effects of the blockade will only bite deep if they are accompanied by an aggressive campaign of attrition - by attack from the air and by special forces operations on the ground - directed at the Garrison itself, its command links, its critical stocks and above all the airfield.

30. Finally we conclude that the Garrison's morale is the crucial, and most vulnerable, element in the Argentine defence. A carefully orchestrated attack upon it has promise of success. From mid-May and onwards the Garrison's will to resist may start to crumble. Thereafter morale will continue increasingly to deteriorate to the point when, in about late July, the Garrison might not offer effective resistance to direct assault.