

SECRET



E. MEASURES TO NEUTRALISE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Right approach at this juncture is to issue warning to Argentines to keep aircraft carrier behind a stipulated line out of range of British Task Force (viz map attached).
2. MOD will argue that this is not adequate because carrier is mobile and unless attacked soon will continue to pose threat to British forces. They will claim this is true even from behind the line since it can be moved forward quickly. At a minimum we expect them to argue that:
 - a. in addition to warning the carrier to stay behind the demarcation line we should say that any attack on any UK naval unit will be countered by an attack on any Argentine naval unit (including the carrier) wherever it may be found;
 - b. ROEs for SSNs outside the TEZ should be amended to allow for the possibility of submarine attack on the aircraft carrier (SSNs at present may take offensive action only in self-defence or against conventional submarines detected).

3. *Sub I Sinclair referred to the legal problems at your meeting this afternoon. He does not agree to (a) above.*

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
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Chiefs of Staff are willing to add 5 possible options for dealing with aircraft carrier. In broad terms they are as follows:

- a. to sink the carrier as soon as possible wherever she is on the high seas. No warning;
- b. to sink the carrier immediately our own naval forces were attacked by Argentine forces, regardless of whether or not the carrier was involved in the attack. The CNS would like the ROEs for the submarine outside the TEZ to be changed (at present ~~it~~ can only attack other conventional submarines) in order that the submarine could carry out this task);
- c. to issue a warning to the Argentines that the carrier should be returned to port and remain there. If they did not do this, the carrier would be sunk;
- d. to issue a warning that the carrier should remain within the Argentine internationally recognised territorial waters (ie 12 miles) and north of 43°S;
- e. to issue a warning that the carrier should be kept within a demarcated sea boundary for which co-ordinates would be given (see attached map). This would keep its aircraft out of range of the British task force both in transit on the high seas and within the TEZ.

2. I believe the Chiefs of Staff are likely to recommend a combination of options e. and b. I see no objection to option e. But option b. is tantamount to a challenge to the Argentines. I see no reason to take a decision on this at once. It would be sufficient to consider this in the light of military circumstances (including the deployment of the carrier) as the situation develops.

A T L A N T I C



WEST INDIES

CARIBBEAN SEA

VENEZUELA

COLOMBIA

GUYANA

R Amazon

B R A Z I L

BOLIVIA

A R G E N T I N A

TEZ

FALKLAND IS

SOUTH GEORGIA

SOUTH SANDWICH

Drake Strait

ISLAS CANARIAS

THE BAHAMAS

HISPANIOLA ANTILLES

LEEWARD IS

WINDWARD IS BARBADOES

TRINIDAD

Caracas

Georgetown Paramaribo Cayenne

Bogota

SURINAM FRENCH GUIANA

Belém (Para)

CAPE VERDE IS

Nouakchotto

St Louis

Dakar

Banjul

GUINEA BISSAU

Freetown

Monrovia

Equator

ST PAULS ROCKS (Brazil)

O C E A N

ASCENSION I

200 MILE LIMIT

TRINDADE (Brazil)

Tropic

23°S
35°W

43°S
56°W

TRISTAN DA CUNHA

GOUGH I

Cabo de Hornos