

FC 044

30/4/82

SWI
3-APR
10 30
Pso

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS11/10/6/4

PS/PUS

Copied to:

2033/11

PSO/CDS

Please see
quarterly CDS has
a copy of 1a/1ad
1d. in his Maritime
file (RAB 4.1.1.1).
We shall need RAB
to terminate CDS.

29 Apr

104
(11)

OD(SA) : FRIDAY 30 APRIL 1982

1. I attach drafts of papers for OD(SA) on:

a. Enforcement of the TEZ, including attacks against Port Stanley airfield;

att

b. Special forces offensive operations (prepared by DS6 in accordance with instructions from CDS);

att

c. The threat to our forces from carrier "25th of May" (revised by ACNS(O) following the discussion at COS this morning - a typed version will follow);

att

d. CLOSED FOR 40 YEARS UNDER FOI SECTION 27

att

2. A paper on force levels in in hand with AUS (D Staff), and a paper on the sailing of the balance of the amphibious force will be available shortly.

CLOSED FOR 40 YEARS UNDER FOI SECTION 27

The recommendations of the brief are consistent with CAS' proposed submission.

R. T. Jackling

29 April 1982

R T JACKLING
Hd of DS11
MB 9326 3287 MB

DRAFT

OD(SA)82

ENFORCEMENT OF THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONEOBJECTIVES

1. The main elements of the Task Force, comprising INVINCIBLE, HERMES, 12 Escorls and SSN's were expected to be in position to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone when it comes into effect at noon British Summer time on Friday, 30 April but have been delayed by weather. They are now expected to arrive on 2 May. The objective will be to achieve complete air and sea control of the area, thereby isolating the Argentine garrison and reducing its will and capacity to resist a determined amphibious assault. This should progressively increase pressures on the junta. Hence, the successful enforcement of the Exclusion Zone could in itself have a significant impact on the outcome of the crisis; in any case it is a necessary precursor to further military options.

2. We cannot say with certainty when successful enforcement of the Exclusion Zone would begin to effect the garrison, but the garrison's will to resist may begin to crumble from mid-May onwards. However, further decisions need to be taken if the Task Force is to have the best possible chance of achieving this objective. The neutralisation of Port Stanley airfield would prevent air landed resupply and deny Argentine air Forces a forward base from which to sustain operations within the Exclusion Zone.

3. Port Stanley airfield is most vulnerable to air attack. HARRIERS' embarked on INVINCIBLE and HERMES are likely to be fully

committed initially to Air Defence of the Task Force and the enforcement of the Exclusion Zone. The airfield could be attacked by VULCANS operating from Ascension Island. There is a high probability that a single aircraft raid would cause significant damage to the runway and the airport installations without damage to Port Stanley town or its outskirts. In view of their heavy reliance upon in-flight refuelling from the VICTOR tanker force, VULCAN operations from Ascension Island could only be sustained from [] to [] days without detriment to the planned deployment of the [] HARRIERS from the UK to ASCENSION ISLAND on [] May, since this too would make heavy demands on in-flight refuelling support from the VICTORS. If, however, it proves necessary to sustain air operations against Port Stanley airfield or any other key installations during this period the task could be assumed by SEA HARRIERS provided they could be released from their primary fleet protection task.

RECOMMENDATION

4. Against this background, OD(SA) is recommended to:
 - a. authorise the immediate use of suffixes SIERRA and TANGO to ROE 123, thereby enabling attacks on the airfield and its installations to commence without delay;
 - b. allow the Task Force commander discretion to achieve the objective of neutralising Port Stanley airfield and its installations, and destroying any aircraft or helicopters which are based there, using all the means at his disposal.

FALKLAND ISLANDS - SPECIAL FORCES: DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS

OD(SA) agreed on 28 April to the insertion of Special Forces intelligence gathering patrols into the Falkland Islands. These patrols are currently planned to land by helicopter from the Task Force during the night 1/2 May, and the targets to be reconnoitred include those suitable for direct action operations.

Direct action targets can be grouped into three categories. Annex A gives examples of the targets in each category.

- i. Military Installations. Within this category there are two sorts of targets. The first comprises those assets the destruction of which will make the blockade take effect earlier or harder. The second group covers military assets of direct value to the Argentine garrison in resisting any landing.
- ii. Civil Installations. Targets in this category are principally public utilities. If operations against **military installations** force the garrison to rely more heavily on the civil installations to withstand the blockade, plans for action against such targets will be needed to sustain the pressure of the blockade.
- iii. Argentinian Personnel. Special Forces are well trained for operations against enemy outposts, observation posts, and command organisations and personnel. Such operations are designed principally to damage morale and the military effectiveness of an enemy's forces.

It is proposed that the Force Commander should be delegated authority

to mount direct action operations by Special Forces at his discretion. This will allow the exploitation of local conditions favourable to Special Forces. In the first instance, the Force Commander will only have authority to mount operations against Category I targets. If and when the Force Commander believes operations in Categories II and III are necessary, OD(SA) approval will be sought again.

OD(SA) is therefore invited to agree that the Force Commander should be delegated authority to mount Special Forces operations at his discretion against targets in Category I.

OD(SA) is invited to note that if and when the Force Commander believes action against targets in Categories II and III is necessary, further approval for this authority to be delegated will be sought.

CATEGORY I - CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Road bridges.
2. Power Stations.
3. Water Pump Stations.

CATEGORY III - PERSONNEL

1. Military barracks and tactical headquarters.
2. The Commander's HQ Staff.
3. High authority/Deputy HQ Staff.

CATEGORY I - MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

1. Anti-Blockade.
 - a. Fuel dumps especially aviation.
 - b. Naval and Merchant Shipping.
 - c. Food stores.
2. Anti-Force.
 - a. Aircraft (helicopters/fixed wing).
 - b. Ammunition dumps.
 - c. Radars and Communications.

CATEGORY II - CIVIL INSTALLATIONS

1. Road bridges.
2. Power Station.
3. Water Pump Stations.

CATEGORY III - PERSONNEL

1. Military barracks and tented accommodation.
2. Gen Menendez and HQ Staff.
3. Argie outposts/OPs and sentries.