

INTRODUCTION

2nd Draft

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Draft of PM's
speech for this afternoon

Mr. Speaker, from the onset of the Falklands crisis, my Right Honourable Friends and I have undertaken to keep the House as closely informed as possible about the situation. Although my last report to Honourable Members was only two days ago, such is the seriousness of this matter that my Right Honourable Friends and I were glad to agree to the suggestion of the Right Honourable Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that time should be found for a debate today - the fourth since the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands four weeks ago tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, during that period the Government has taken every possible step that has a reasonable prospect of helping us to achieve our objectives - the withdrawal of the Argentine forces and the end of their illegal occupation of the Islands; the restoration of the traditional administration; and a long term solution which is acceptable not only to the House but to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands.

It is the Government's most earnest hope that we can achieve these objectives by a negotiated settlement. We have done everything we can to encourage Mr. Haig's attempts to find a solution by diplomatic means, and I shall have something to say about the latest developments in this area in a moment.

/ Military Developments

Military Developments

But as the House knows, the Government has taken military measures as well to strengthen our diplomatic efforts.

Mr. Haig's initiative would never have got underway if the British Government had not sent the naval task force to the South Atlantic within four days of Argentina's aggression against the Falkland Islands. What incentive would there have been for the Argentine junta to give Mr. Haig's proposals more than the most cursory glance if Britain had not underpinned its search for a diplomatic settlement with the despatch of the task force? Gentle persuasion is not going to make the Argentine Government give up what it has seized by force. Mr. Speaker, if we want to solve the Falklands crisis on terms we can accept, we have got to live and act in the real world.

Our military response to the situation has been measured and controlled. On 12 April we declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone. This has been enforced since then against Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries. It has been completely successful, and the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands have been isolated by sea.

Eleven days later we warned the Argentine authorities that any approach by their warships or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British Forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response.

/ Then, on 25 April,

diplomatic efforts.

Diplomatic Developments

Then on 25 April, as I reported to the House on Monday, British forces recaptured South Georgia. This operation was conducted in exercise of our right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The minimum of force was used consistent with achieving our objective and no lives - Argentinian or British - were lost in the operation, though, as was announced yesterday, an Argentine prisoner was most unfortunately killed in an incident on 26 April which is now being urgently investigated by a Board of Inquiry.

The latest of our military measures is the imposition of the Total Exclusion Zone round the Falkland Islands of which we gave 48 hours notice yesterday. The new Zone has the same geographical boundaries as the Maritime Exclusion Zone which took effect on 12 April.

It will apply from noon London time tomorrow to all ships and aircraft, whether military or civil, operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands. A complete blockade will be placed on all traffic supporting the occupation forces of Argentina. Maritime and aviation authorities have been informed of the imposition of the Zone, in accordance with our international obligations.

If the Argentines choose to challenge our authority in that Zone, the responsibility will be theirs. We shall enforce the Total Exclusion Zone as completely as we have done the Maritime Exclusion Zone. The Argentine occupying forces will then be totally isolated. They will be cut off by sea and air.

All these measures have been designed to support our diplomatic efforts.

/Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic Negotiations

Since I last reported to the House, Mr Haig has put formal American proposals to the Argentine Government and requested an early response.

He saw Mr Costa Mendez last evening but no conclusion was reached. He judged it right to put the proposals first to Argentina as the country to whom Security Council Resolution 502 is principally addressed.

Mr Haig has also communicated to us the text of his proposals. They are the result of Mr Haig's talks in London and Buenos Aires and of his discussions in Washington with my Rt Hon Friend last week.

It is difficult both for the House and the Government that we have not been able to say more about them, especially as in our democratic system we need the interplay of opinions and ideas. And we should profit from the views and analysis of Hon Members. But they are Mr Haig's proposals and negotiations are continuing. We understand from Mr Haig that it is his present intention to publish them in full but he of course must judge the appropriate time. The proposals are complex and difficult and inevitably bear the hallmarks of compromise in both their substance and language. We are studying them very carefully indeed in the light of the principles and objectives enunciated in past debates.

It was the Argentine invasion which started this crisis and it is Argentine withdrawal that must put an end to it.

The World Community will not condone Argentina's invasion.

/To

To do so would be to encourage further aggression. As the Commonwealth Secretary-General said on 27 April: "In making a firm and unambiguous response to Argentine aggression, Britain is rendering a service to the international community as a whole."

It has been argued in some parts of the House that first that we should not have resorted to the use of force and second that we should seek greater involvement by the United Nations.

Mr. Speaker, with regard to the first argument -
When this House debated the Falkland Islands on 14 April the Rt. Hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition supported the despatch of the Task Force. He said - and I quote -
"I support the despatch of the Task Force. I support it because I believe that it can have strong diplomatic results".
That was absolutely right.

But it would be totally inconsistent to support the despatch of the Task Force and yet to be opposed to its use. It would be highly dangerous to bluff in that way. British servicemen and ships would be exposed to hostile action. Argentina would doubt our determination and sense of purpose. The diplomatic pressure would be undermined. Does the Rt. Hon. Member really suggest that to use our Task Force in self-defence for the recapture of British territory in a swift and almost bloodless operation is not a proper use of force? As long as the Argentines refuse to

The United Nations

As this situation has developed, and as the British Government has made every effort to find a solution, this House has broadly supported both the Government's objectives and its methods. But in the last few days, it has been argued in some parts of the House that first that we should not have resorted to the use of force and second that we should seek greater involvement by the United Nations.

Mr. Speaker, with regard to the first argument -

When this House debated the Falkland Islands on 14 April the Rt. Hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition supported the despatch of the Task Force. He said - and I quote - "I support the despatch of the Task Force. I support it because I believe that it can have strong diplomatic results". That was absolutely right.

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/ comply

comply with the Security Council Resolution, we must continue to intensify the pressure on them. And we must not abandon our efforts to re-establish our authority over our own territory and to free our own people from the invader.

Let me turn now to the United Nations. The House knows that all our action has been based on a Resolution of the United Nations. Before the invasion occurred we went to the Secretary-General and asked him to issue a stern warning calling on Argentina to desist from the use of force. As soon as the invasion had occurred we asked for a meeting of the Security Council. That meeting passed Resolution 502. Since then our efforts, those of Mr. Haig and a large part of the international community have been directed to implementing that mandatory Resolution.

If I may just remind the House once more, that Resolution calls for three things: - the cessation of hostilities, Argentine withdrawal and a negotiated solution to the dispute. The three things are linked. Without Argentine withdrawal there cannot be a cessation of hostilities: we are forced to exercise our right to self-defence. Likewise, if Argentina withdraws it would be out of the question for us to continue hostilities or to refuse to hold negotiations with a view to solving the underlying dispute. We were after all negotiating a few weeks before the invasion. It is quite wrong to suggest

/ that because

that because the invader is not prepared to implement the Resolution, the principles of the United Nations require that we should refrain from limited use of force in self-defence. That would be to condone and encourage aggression.

What do Honourable Members think that further recourse to the United Nations could now achieve? We certainly need mediation. But we already have the most powerful and the most suitable mediator available: Mr. Haig, backed by all the authority and all the influence of the United States. If anyone can succeed in mediation, it is Mr. Haig. Of course we support the United Nations and we believe that respect for the United Nations should form the basis of international conduct. But the United Nations does not have the power to enforce compliance with its Resolutions.

These simple facts are perfectly well understood in the international community. Let me quote the Swedish

/ Foreign Minister

Foreign Minister because Sweden is a country second to none in its opposition to the use of force and its respect for the United Nations. The Swedish Foreign Minister said, and I quote, "We have no objection to Britain retaking British territory. Time and again one is forced to observe that the United Nations is weak and lacks the authority required to mediate". That I think says it all.

The recapture of South Georgia has not diminished international support. No country that was previously with us has turned against us. On Tuesday, my Rt Hon Friend was able to see for himself that the support of the European Community remained robust. The world has shown no inclination to condemn Britain's exercise of the right to self-defence. And even in the Organisation of American States Argentina realised that it would not be possible to obtain any form of sanctions against Britain, despite the traditional sympathy of members for her claim to sovereignty.

The truth is that we have been involved in constant activity at the United Nations. Our representative in New York has been in daily touch with the Secretary-General since the crisis began. He has discussed with him repeatedly and at length all possible ways in which the United Nations could play a constructive role in assisting Mr Haig's mission and, if Mr Haig fails, in securing implementation of Resolution 502. Sir Anthony Parsons has also discussed with Mr de Cuellar his contingency planning about the part the United Nations might be able to play in the longer term in negotiating and implementing a diplomatic settlement. In the light of these discussions our representative has advised that:-

- (a) The Secretary-General is very conscious of the complexity of the problem and of the need for careful preparation of any initiative he might take.

(b) As the Security Council is already seized of the problem, it would be appropriate for the Secretary-General to act under Article 99 of the Charter.

(c) The Secretary-General would not wish to take any initiative which he had not established in advance would be acceptable to both the parties.

(d) He would also require a clear mandate from the Security Council before taking any action.

Our representative has also reported that the Secretary-General has several times stated in public that he was not prepared to take action while Mr Haig's mission was alive and that he had pointed out that not even the Organisation of American States had asked for him to become involved.

In these circumstances the Government have accepted the advice that the only valid course for the Security Council at the present juncture was to insist on implementation of Resolution 502. The United Nations Secretary-General is aware of this view. Our representative was consequently instructed to ensure that no action was taken in New York which would cut across Mr Haig's efforts. He has reported that he has had the full support of the Secretary-General, and of the President of the Security Council, in carrying out these instructions.

Although we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich or British Antarctic Territory, some of my Right Honourable Friends have suggested that we refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.

Since Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the matter cannot be referred without her agreement, except by resolution of the Security Council.

We have never submitted the Falkland Islands themselves to that Court, but we have raised the question of the dependencies on three separate occasions. In 1947, 1949 and 1951. Each time Argentina withheld her consent.

In 1955, the British Government applied unilaterally to the ICJ against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina. Again, the Court advised that it could not pursue the matter since it could only act if there was agreement between the parties recognising the Court's jurisdiction.

In 1977 Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of a Court of Arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results.

It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind.

/There is

There is no reason, given the past history of this question, for Britain, which has sovereignty and is claiming nothing, to make the first move. It is Argentina that is making a claim. If she wanted to refer it to the International Court, we should consider the possibility very seriously. But it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement she did not like.

Mr. Speaker, from the onset of the Falklands crisis, my

Right Honourable Friends and I have undertaken

to keep the House as closely informed as possible

about the situation.

Although my last report to Honourable Members was

only two days ago, such is the seriousness of this

matter that my Right Honourable Friends and I were

glad to agree to the suggestion of the Right

Honourable Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition

that time should be found for a debate today -

the fourth since the Argentine invasion of the

Falkland Islands four weeks ago tomorrow.

Mr. SPEAKER, DURING THAT PERIOD THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN EVERY POSSIBLE STEP THAT HAD A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF HELPING US TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES - THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES AND THE END OF THEIR ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS; THE RESTORATION OF THE TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION; AND A LONG TERM SOLUTION WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO THE HOUSE BUT TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S MOST EARNEST HOPE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES BY A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE MR. HAIG ATTEMPTS TO FIND A SOLUTION BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, AND I SHALL HAVE SOMETHING MORE TO SAY ABOUT THAT IN A MOMENT.

/ MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

BUT AS THE HOUSE KNOWS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN MILITARY MEASURES AS WELL TO STRENGTHEN OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

MR. HAIG'S INITIATIVE WOULD NEVER HAVE GOT UNDERWAY IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT SENT THE NAVAL TASK FORCE TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WITHIN FOUR DAYS OF ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

WHAT INCENTIVE WOULD THERE HAVE BEEN FOR THE ARGENTINE JUNTA TO GIVE MR. HAIG'S IDEAS MORE THAN THE MOST CURSORY GLANCE IF BRITAIN HAD NOT UNDERPINNED ITS SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT WITH THE DESPATCH OF THE TASK FORCE?

GENTLE PERSUASION IS NOT GOING TO MAKE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT GIVE UP WHAT IT HAS SEIZED BY FORCE,

/ MR. SPEAKER

MR. SPEAKER, C

RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION HAS BEEN

MEASURED AND CONTROLLED.

ON 12 APRIL WE DECLARED A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE.

THIS HAS BEEN ENFORCED AGAINST ARGENTINE WARSHIPS
AND NAVAL AUXILIARIES.

IT HAS BEEN COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE
ARGENTINE FORCES ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAVE BEEN
ISOLATED BY SEA.

ELEVEN DAYS LATER WE WARNED THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES THAT
ANY APPROACH BY THEIR WARSHIPS OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT
WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE
MISSION OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
WOULD ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.

/ THEN, ON 25 APRIL

ON 25 APRIL 1982, BRITISH FORCES RECAPTURED SOUTH GEORGIA,

BRITISH FORCES RECAPTURED SOUTH GEORGIA.

THIS OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED IN EXERCISE OF OUR
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN
CHARTER.

THE MINIMUM OF FORCE WAS USED CONSISTENT WITH
ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVE AND NO LIVES - ARGENTINIAN
OR BRITISH - WERE LOST IN THE OPERATION, THOUGH,
AS WAS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY, WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT
AN ARGENTINE PRISONER LOST HIS LIFE IN AN INCIDENT
ON 26 APRIL WHICH IS NOW BEING URGENTLY INVESTIGATED
BY A BOARD OF INQUIRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS
OF THE RELEVANT CONVENTION.

/ THE LATESTS OF OUR

THE LATEST OF OUR MILITARY MEASURES IS THE IMPOSITION OF THE

TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE ROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
OF WHICH WE GAVE 48 HOURS NOTICE YESTERDAY.

THE NEW ZONE HAS THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES
AS THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE WHICH TOOK EFFECT
ON 12 APRIL.

IT WILL APPLY FROM NOON LONDON TIME TOMORROW TO ALL SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT, WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVIL, OPERATING IN
SUPPORT OF THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS.

A COMPLETE BLOCKADE WILL BE PLACED ON ALL TRAFFIC
SUPPORTING THE OCCUPATION FORCES OF ARGENTINA.

MARITIME AND AVIATION AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN INFORMED
OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE ZONE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

/ WE SHALL ENFORCE

WE WILL NOT... THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AS COMPLETELY AS
WE HAVE DONE THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE.

THE ARGENTINE OCCUPYING FORCES WILL THEN BE TOTALLY
ISOLATED - CUT OFF BY SEA AND AIR.

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

ON THE DIPLOMATIC SIDE, MR. HAIG HAS PUT FORMAL AMERICAN
PROPOSALS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND REQUESTED
AN EARLY RESPONSE FROM THEM.

I STRESS THE STATUS OF THESE PROPOSALS - THEY
ARE OFFICIAL AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

MR. HAIG JUDGED IT RIGHT TO ASK ARGENTINA TO GIVE ITS
DECISION FIRST, AS THE COUNTRY TO WHOM SECURITY
RESOLUTION 502 IS PRINCIPALLY ADDRESSED.

/ HE SAW

HE SAW MR. COSTA FLY LAST NIGHT, BUT NO CONCLUSION WAS
REACHED.

MR. HAIG HAS ALSO COMMUNICATED TO US THE TEXT OF HIS PROPOSALS

IT IS DIFFICULT BOTH FOR THE HOUSE AND THE GOVERNMENT THAT
WE ARE NOT ABLE TO SAY MORE ABOUT THEM PUBLICLY,
ESPECIALLY AS IN OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM WE NEED
THE INTERPLAY OF OPINIONS AND IDEAS.

BUT THEY ARE MR. HAIG'S PROPOSALS, AND WE UNDER-
STAND FROM HIM THAT IT IS HIS PRESENT INTENTION TO
PUBLISH THEM IN FULL. BUT HE OF COURSE MUST JUDGE
THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

/ THE PROPOSALS ARE

THE PROPOSALS ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT AND INEVITABLY BE

ALL THE HALLMARKS OF COMPROMISE IN BOTH THEIR
SUBSTANCE AND LANGUAGE.

THEY HAVE TO BE MEASURED AGAINST ^{THE} PRINCIPLES AND
OBJECTIVES EXPRESSED SO STRONGLY IN OUR DEBATES
IN THIS HOUSE.

MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND REMAINS IN CLOSE TOUCH
WITH MR. HAIG.

I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY MORE
TODAY, BUT THEY ARE MR. HAIG'S PROPOSALS AND HE HAS
PUT THEM FIRST TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

IT WAS THE ARGENTINE INVASION WHICH STARTED THIS
CRISIS AND IT IS ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL THAT MUST PUT
AN END TO IT.

/ THE WORLD COMMUNITY

THE WORLD COMMUNITY WILL NOT CONDONE ARGENTINA'S INVASION.

TO DO SO WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER
AGGRESSION.

AS THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID ON
27 APRIL:

"IN MAKING A FIRM AND UNAMBIGUOUS RESPONSE
TO ARGENTINE AGGRESSION, BRITAIN IS
RENDERING A SERVICE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE".

THE UNITED NATIONS

AS THIS SITUATION HAS DEVELOPED, AND AS THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO FIND A
SOLUTION, THIS HOUSE HAS BROADLY SUPPORTED
BOTH THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES AND ITS ACTIONS.

/ BUT

BUT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS IT HAS BEEN ARGUED IN SOME PARTS OF THE HOUSE, FIRST, THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE RESORTED TO THE USE OF FORCE AND, SECOND, THAT WE SHOULD SEEK GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

MR. SPEAKER, WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT -

WHEN THIS HOUSE DEBATED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 14 APRIL THE RT. HON. MEMBER THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION SUPPORTED THE DESPATCH OF THE TASK FORCE. HE SAID - AND I QUOTE -

"I SUPPORT THE DESPATCH OF THE TASK FORCE. I SUPPORT IT BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT IT CAN HAVE STRONG DIPLOMATIC RESULTS".

THAT WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT,

/ BUT

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11. IT WOULD BE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT TO SUPPORT THE

DESPATCH OF THE TASK FORCE AND YET TO BE
OPPOSED TO ITS USE.

IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO BLUFF IN
THAT WAY.

BRITISH SERVICEMEN AND SHIPS WOULD BE EXPOSED
TO HOSTILE ACTION.

ARGENTINA WOULD DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION AND
SENSE OF PURPOSE.

THE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

IS IT REALLY SUGGESTED THAT TO USE OUR

TASK FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE FOR THE RECAPTURE
OF BRITISH TERRITORY IS NOT A PROPER USE OF
FORCE?

/ AS LONG

AS LONG AS THE ARGENTINES REFUSE TO COMPLY
WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE
MUST CONTINUE TO INTENSIFY THE PRESSURE ON
THEM.

AND WE MUST NOT ABANDON OUR EFFORTS TO RE-
ESTABLISH OUR AUTHORITY OVER OUR OWN
TERRITORY AND TO FREE OUR OWN PEOPLE FROM
THE INVADER.

LET ME TURN NOW TO THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ALL OUR ACTION HAS BEEN BASED ON A RESOLUTION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE ARGENTINE INVASION WAS CARRIED OUT IN
DEFIANCE OF AN APPEAL ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT OUR URGENT REQUEST
ON 1 APRIL.

/ THIS SOLEMN

THIS SOLEMN AFFAIR WAS ENDORSED BY THE WHOLE
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

BUT IT WAS IGNORED.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INVASION WE ASKED FOR
ANOTHER MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THAT MEETING PASSED RESOLUTION 502.

SINCE THEN OUR EFFORTS, THOSE OF MR. HAIG

AND A LARGE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO IMPLEMENTING
THAT MANDATORY RESOLUTION.

THAT RESOLUTION CALLS FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND A
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE.

/ WITHOUT

WITHOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WE HAVE NO CHOICE
BUT TO EXERCISE OUR UNQUESTIONABLE RIGHT
TO SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.
OF COURSE, IF ARGENTINA WITHDRAWS WE SHOULD
IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES AND BE READY TO
HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO SOLVING THE
UNDERLYING DISPUTE.

AFTER ALL, WE WERE NEGOTIATING ONLY A FEW WEEKS
BEFORE THE INVASION.

IT IS QUITE WRONG TO SUGGEST

/ THAT BECAUSE

THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOT PREPARED TO

IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION, THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS REQUIRE THAT WE,
THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SHOULD FORFEIT THE
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE.

SUCH AN ARGUMENT HAS NO VALIDITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

IT WOULD BE TO CONDONE AND ENCOURAGE
AGGRESSION AND TO ABANDON OUR PEOPLE.

WHAT COULD FURTHER RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ACHIEVE AT THE PRESENT STAGE?

WE CERTAINLY NEED MEDIATION.

BUT WE ALREADY HAVE THE MOST POWERFUL
AND THE MOST SUITABLE MEDIATOR AVAILABLE:

MR. HAIG, BACKED BY ALL THE AUTHORITY AND

/ALL THE

THESE SIMPLE FACTS ARE GENERALLY WELL UNDERSTOOD

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

LET ME QUOTE THE SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER

BECAUSE SWEDEN IS A COUNTRY SECOND

TO NONE IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE USE

OF FORCE AND ITS RESPECT FOR THE

UNITED NATIONS.

THE SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID OF THE

SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION, AND I

QUOTE, "WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO BRITAIN

RETAKE BRITISH TERRITORY.

TIME AND AGAIN ONE IS FORCED TO OBSERVE

THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS WEAK AND

LACKS THE AUTHORITY REQUIRED TO MEDIATE."

COUNCIL RESOLUTION /THE RECAPTURE

ARGENTINA NOT TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

/THE TRUTH

THE RECAPTURE OF SOUTH GEORGIA HAS NOT

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

NO COUNTRY THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY WITH US
HAS TURNED AGAINST US.

ON TUESDAY, MY RT. HON. FRIEND WAS ABLE
TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT THE SUPPORT
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REMAINED ROBUST.
THE WORLD HAS SHOWN NO INCLINATION
TO CONDEMN BRITAIN'S EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT
TO SELF-DEFENCE.

IN THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES
ITSELF ARGENTINA WAS CRITICISED FOR HER USE
OF FORCE, DESPITE THE CLAIMS OF TRADITIONAL
LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY, AND THE ONLY
RESOLUTION PASSED CLEARLY REFERRED TO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, AND CALLED ON
ARGENTINA NOT TO EXACREBATE THE SITUATION.

/THE TRUTH

... THAT WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN CONSTANT
ACTIVITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN
IN DAILY TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN.

HE HAS DISCUSSED WITH HIM REPEATEDLY AND
AT LENGTH ALL POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH THE
UNITED NATIONS COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE
ROLE IN ASSISTING MR. HAIG'S MISSION AND,
IF MR. HAIG FAILS, IN SECURING IMPLEMENTATION
OF RESOLUTION 502.

/SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

SIR ALBERT THOMSON HAS ALSO DISCUSSED
WITH MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONTINGENCY
PLANNING ABOUT THE PART THE UNITED NATIONS
MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY IN THE LONGER TERM
IN NEGOTIATING AND IMPLEMENTING A DIPLOMATIC
SETTLEMENT.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS OUR
REPRESENTATIVE HAS ADVISED US THAT:-

FIRST, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS VERY CONSCIOUS
OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM AND OF THE
NEED FOR CAREFUL PREPARATION OF ANY
INITIATIVE HE MIGHT TAKE.

/SECOND,

S. COULD, THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1961/02 OF

THE PROBLEM, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE
FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACT UNDER
ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER.

MISSION WAS CONTINUING.

THIRD, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD NOT WISH TO TAKE
ON TUESDAY ANY INITIATIVE WHICH HE HAD NOT ESTABLISHED
IN ADVANCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH
THE PARTIES.

FOURTH, HE WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A CLEAR MANDATE FROM
THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE TAKING ANY
ACTION.

I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE HOUSE ALREADY THAT OUR OWN

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN IN

/OUR REPRESENTATIVE

COMMUNICATION, DAILY WITH MR. PEREZ DE CUALLA

/IF, AT ANY

SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS SEVERAL TIMES
STATED IN PUBLIC THAT HE WAS NOT
PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION WHILE MR. HAIG'S
MISSION WAS CONTINUING.

ON TUESDAY THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION SUGGESTED
THAT MY RT. HON. FRIEND, THE FOREIGN
SECRETARY, SHOULD GO TO NEW YORK TO
DISCUSS THE CRISIS WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE HOUSE ALREADY THAT OUR OWN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN IN
COMMUNICATION, DAILY WITH MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

/IF, AT ANY

I, ... THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR
MY RT. HON. FRIEND THOUGHT THAT A MEETING
BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM WOULD BE LIKELY
TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
THEN I SAY TO THE HOUSE THAT MY RT. HON.
FRIEND WOULD OF COURSE GO TO NEW YORK
STRAIGHTAWAY.

BUT NEITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOR
MY RT. HON. FRIEND JUDGE THAT ANY USEFUL
PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED, AT PRESENT,
BY SUCH A MEETING.

INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR SOVEREIGNTY OVER
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA, SOUTH
SANDWICH OR BRITISH ANTARCTIC TERRITORY,
SOME OF MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIENDS HAVE SUGGESTED
THAT WE REFER THE MATTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE.

SINCE ARGENTINA DOES NOT ACCEPT THE COMPULSORY
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, THE MATTER CANNOT
BE REFERRED FOR A BINDING DECISION WITHOUT
HER AGREEMENT.

/WE HAVE

WE HAVE NEVER SOUGHT A RULING ON THE FOLKLAND

ISLANDS THEMSELVES FROM THAT COURT, BUT

WE HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE

DEPENDENCIES ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS.

IN 1947, 1949 AND 1951.

EACH TIME ARGENTINA REFUSED TO GO TO THE COURT.

IN 1955, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT APPLIED UNILATERALLY

TO THE ICJ AGAINST ENCROACHMENTS ON BRITISH

SOVEREIGNTY IN THE DEPENDENCIES BY ARGENTINA.

AGAIN, THE COURT ADVISED THAT IT COULD NOT

PURSUE THE MATTER SINCE IT COULD ONLY ACT

IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES

RECOGNISING THE COURT'S JURISDICTION.

/IN 1977

IN 1977 ARGENTINA, HAVING ACCEPTED THE
JURISDICTION OF A COURT OF ARBITRATION ON
THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE WITH CHILE,
THEN REFUSED TO ACCEPT ITS RESULTS.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE IN ARGENTINA'S GOOD FAITH
WITH THAT VERY RECENT EXAMPLE IN MIND.

THERE IS NO REASON, GIVEN THE PAST HISTORY OF THIS
QUESTION, FOR BRITAIN, WHICH HAS SOVEREIGNTY
AND IS CLAIMING NOTHING, TO MAKE THE FIRST
MOVE.

IT IS ARGENTINA THAT IS MAKING A CLAIM.

IF SHE WANTED TO REFER IT TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY VERY
SERIOUSLY.

/BUT

LIGHT OF PAST EVENTS IT WOULD
BE HARD TO HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT ARGENTINA
WOULD RESPECT A JUDGMENT SHE DID NOT LIKE.

MR SPEAKER MAY I BRIEFLY RECALL THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
THAT PRECEDED THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

UNTIL THE END OF FEBRUARY WE WERE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

OUR DELEGATION WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE ISLANDS COUNCILS.

THE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE
ATMOSPHERE, AND PRODUCED AN AGREED COMMUNIQUE
THOUGH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CHOSE NOT TO
PUBLISH IT.

/On

ON 20 MARCH, THE SOUTH GEORGIA INCIDENT BEGAN WITH

THE ILLEGAL LANDING OF ARGENTINE CIVILIANS.

WE OFFERED TO SOLVE THAT PROBLEM BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS

AND PROPOSED THAT AN EMISSARY SHOULD TRAVEL

TO BUENOS AIRES TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS OVER

THE PROBLEM AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

IT WAS COSTA MENDEZ HIMSELF WHO ON 1 APRIL SAID THAT

THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL WAS NOW CLOSED.

THAT SAME DAY, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S APPEAL

WAS REBUFFED BY THE PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA.

YET ON FRIDAY 2 APRIL THE ARGENTINIANS INVADED

AND THE FALKLANDS WERE OCCUPIED.

/THE FOLLOWING

THE FOLLOWING DAY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED

FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL,

SINCE THAT MANDATORY INSTRUCTION, THE

GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAVE MADE NO MOVE

TO COMPLY.

ON THE CONTRARY THEY HAVE POURED IN

ADDITIONAL TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT.

MR. SPEAKER, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT WHERE THE

INTRANSIGENCE LIES IN THIS MATTER.

THE KEY TO PEACE IS IN THE HANDS OF THE ARGENTINE

GOVERNMENT.

THE RESPONSIBILITY IS THEIRS.