



No. 7331/5

SECCOS

44

Copy to: PSO/CDS
MA/CGS
PS/CASFALKLAND ISLANDS LANDING OPERATIONS - REINFORCEMENTS

Reference A. COS(Misc)177/742/1 dated 29 Apr 1982

1. CNS has agreed to clear the paper at Reference A out of committee subject to the following amendments:

- Para 3, Lines 5-6 Amend to read:
"..... forward to the area 5 Brigade (and appropriate combat support) which is...."
- Para 3, Line 10 Delete all after "needed"
Insert
"A precondition of full repossession of the Falkland Islands is neutralisation of the Argentine CVA7"
- Para 4, Line 5 After "foreign" insert "(EEC)"
- Para 6, Line 2 Amend to read
"..... reinforced with 5 Brigade and"
- Annex A
Para 4, Line 7 Delete "will" insert "should"
- Annex A
Para 8, Lines 3-4 Amend to read
"..... obtained. The earliest a landing could take place is about mid May....."
- Annex A
Para 9 Delete final sentence and insert "A stalemate could then ensue".
- Annex A
Para 10, Lines 7-9 Amend to read
"..... Harrier aircraft and helicopters. He has also sought authority to neutralise the Argentine CVV. These forces would have to arrive some 2-3 weeks....."



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Annex A, Para 11

Amend to read

"11. The foregoing options are directed to bringing about conditions for an Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands. CinC Fleet's landing operation (Op SUTTON) has so far been planned 'with a view to repossession' of the Falklands. We judge that this is feasible with present forces, but there could be a danger of a military stalemate on the Islands. The likelihood of a stalemate would be accentuated if the Commander-in-Chief is required to achieve full repossession. Whilst on the one hand Op SUTTON might create the conditions for a negotiated settlement, on the other hand time, distance and winter weather would be against us if we had to undertake protracted military operations. In these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief Fleet considers and the COS agree that he would need an extra Brigade with appropriate combat support including Harrier aircraft and helicopters /and authority to neutralise the Argentine CVA/.

2. CSN considers that DCDS(I) should confirm the troop figures at para 2, line 5.

3. CNS understands that a satisfactory OD(SA) decision on the need to neutralise the Argentine CVA is likely early this afternoon; he is not prepared to delete the /contents/ until that is actually received.

Secretary/CNS
30 April 1982