

**SECRET**

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D/DS12/18/69

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Copy to

- PSO/CDS
- PS/PUS
- ACDS(Pol)
- AUS(D Staff)
- Head of DS11
- Head of DS4
- Head of DS7
- Head of DS9
- FCO Defence Dept - Mr Pearce

Head of DS4 suggests that the perultimate line of para 6 of the DPC speaking note should read "... hunter killer submarines to 17". We only have 11 at present. We also theoretically have 3 CVSs declared to NATO and the range of new ships will not be as numerous as the present fleet.

*Pilb*  
30/4/82

FALKLAND ISLANDS - INFORMING NATO

Further to the request in PS/S of S's recent minute to you I attach draft speaking notes for the Secretary of State's use at the Eurogroup dinner and DPC next week. Of course these may well need to be modified in the light of events over the next five or six days, and DS11 are still working on the specific input which you requested - ie a chronology/check list of events and reasons behind UK military actions. This input will be provided direct to the Private Office over the weekend, but you may care to forward the attached drafts at this stage.

*[Handwritten signature]*

30 April 1982

N J BEAUMONT  
Head of DS12

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DRAFT SPEAKING NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE  
EUROGROUP DINNER

1. The White Paper which I published last June recorded the Alliance's general recognition that Western security concerns could not be limited within the boundaries of the NATO area. It went on to note that Britain's own needs, outlook, and interests gave her a special interest in this respect. And it stressed the Royal Navy's particularly valuable role, stating the intention to resume from 1982 onwards the practice of sending a substantial naval task group for visits and exercises to - among other places - the South Atlantic!

2. I need hardly say that when that White Paper was written I did not envisage those plans would have to be replaced by the military operations in earnest which you have witnessed in the last few weeks. Of course, these operations have taken place in response to a crisis that has no direct relation to the obligations that we all share as members of the Alliance. But your countries have given valuable sympathy and support in upholding the UK's efforts to resolve a situation where there has been a clear act of aggression against a small group of peaceful and peace-loving British people. The UN Security Council has passed a mandatory resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces. A large number of states throughout the world have echoed this resolution. The European Community, Norway, [the US] and Canada, as well as Australia and New Zealand, have imposed economic sanctions against Argentina. We are grateful for these actions, and we are also grateful for the efforts of our US allies to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

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3. The UK remains determined to seek a solution to the crisis by peaceful means if at all possible, but we believe that our efforts must continue to be backed by military strength. And we will not shrink from further military action if it becomes clear that no other means will persuade Argentina to conform with the requirements of UN Resolution 502 and end its illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands.

4. Of course these essential military deployments have affected some of the land, sea and air forces which the UK has committed to NATO. In the last weeks, in compliance with NATO procedures, we have notified the Major NATO Commanders of the effects of these operations on our declaration states. Inevitably there has been a temporary lowering in the availability status in some instances and a withdrawal from NATO exercises in others. This must be a matter for concern and regret. But I have been grateful for the understanding of the NATO Commanders and our allies in this regard, and I believe that there are also important positive aspects from an Alliance viewpoint. I think it must be reassuring to everyone in the Alliance that the British forces engaged in these operations have demonstrated an outstanding capability to respond to an emergency. To have put to sea initially a task force of this size in just three days, and subsequently to have trained men and to have converted or adapted a variety of ships, aircraft and equipment to the unique requirements called for in a potential sub-Antarctic battle zone 8,500 miles from home, must be a remarkable achievement by any standards. I believe that it reflects great credit on the united efforts of all the sailors, soldiers and airmen concerned.

5. Many valuable lessons have been learned, which must be as

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important in a NATO context as in the situation with which we in the UK are dealing at the moment. I intend to say more about these lessons and about the current situation in the South Atlantic at tomorrow's DFC meeting. But I wanted to take this opportunity tonight to speak particularly to my European colleagues and friends and to let them know that in the UK we were enormously heartened by the support which your countries gave so readily and so swiftly at the outset of the Falkland Islands crisis. We shall not forget it, and it must be a sure token of the strength of our commitment within the Alliance to common ideals and collective security.

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DRAFT SPEAKING NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE 6 MAY DPC

1. I asked the Secretary General for an early opportunity to inform all of my NATO colleagues on the current situation in the South Atlantic, because I am afraid it is just that situation which compels me to return to the UK at the end of our meeting this morning. But I am very much aware that it is a matter that affects not just the UK, but our Allies as well, and I welcome this chance to speak to you and particularly to thank you all for your support and sympathy in these difficult weeks.

2. The support which we have received from our Allies has greatly heartened us. Nearly all of them have condemned Argentina's aggression, and called for her to withdraw her forces. The European Community, and [the US] Canada and Norway, have gone further and introduced economic sanctions. The United States has made strenuous efforts to achieve a peaceful solution; efforts in which we have cooperated wholeheartedly. Our position is based on the principles that aggression must not be allowed to succeed; that the rights of the Islanders to self-determination must be upheld; and that the mandatory resolution of the Security Council must be observed. Whilst this crisis remains one that does not relate directly to the obligations which we all share as members of the Alliance, I think that your response to the UK's predicament must be a reassurance to all of the strength of our commitment to the same ideals. It also represents a concrete expression of the growing recognition in NATO - reflected in successive communiques - that Western security interests are not limited to the Treaty area boundaries.

3. But this is not to say there can be any deflection from the

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Alliance's primary purpose, which is to deter the Soviet threat. In one sense the removal of some important UK forces from the NATO Command areas may have temporarily reduced their capability to respond to that threat, should it develop. But I believe that in an important sense the events of these last weeks have strengthened deterrence. They have demonstrated the solidarity of the countries in the Alliance in a crisis affecting one of its members, and they have demonstrated the UK's defence capabilities in a fashion that can leave few doubts in Soviet minds as to their effectiveness.

4. I am sure that you will understand that in the last weeks it has not always been possible to keep everyone right up to date on the development of national plans. But within the practical constraints of time and security, we have endeavoured through our staffs here in NATO and our Ambassadors in your capitals, to respond to our friends' understandable interest and concern.

You will know from these contacts - at least - broad terms - the scale and pattern of our defence operations in the South Atlantic. I do not think now is the time for me to give you a detailed description of these, but I thought that I should report some main features.

... From the outset we have been conscious of the need to ensure that both the timing and the nature of our military operations in the South Atlantic would strengthen our diplomatic efforts to achieve early Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands. Our aim has been to use the minimum force necessary to meet this objective. The announcement on 7 April of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands and on 28 April of a Total Exclusion Zone were part of this strategy. They were essentially deterrent measures providing full warning of our military intentions so that Argentina would have time to withdraw her forces from the area and suitably adjust her position in negotiations. But as the military exchanges during the last week have shown, Argentina has chosen to ignore the Exclusion Zone and thereby incur damage to her forces.

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We have also taken care to notify the NATO Commanders where our actions must cause a reduction in the availability or readiness of UK units declared to NATO.

I know that SACLANT and CINCHAN have made their assessment of the effects of these withdrawals and I believe this to be fair and objective. Although where that assessment focussed primarily upon perceived reductions in capabilities, it also recognised the positive aspect of improved readiness. I should like to point up in more detail some further positive aspect. I have already mentioned the demonstration of an outstanding readiness capability. To have put to sea initially a task force of this size in just three days, and subsequently to have trained men and to have converted or adapted a variety of ships, aircraft

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/and .....



5. The decision to retake South Georgia was also consistent with our overall aims. It was designed to provide a moderate but unambiguous demonstration of our resolve and so to convince Argentina that she should withdraw from the Falkland Islands so that meaningful negotiations on the future of the Islands could take place. Repossession of South Georgia suited this purpose because it was only lightly defended. A number of RN ships were involved in this operation, including the destroyer, ANTRIM, the frigate, PLYMOUTH, and the support ship, TIDESPING. Special forces were also involved in reconnaissance activity some days in advance of the main landing on 25 April. Despite the fact that the Argentine submarine, Santa Fe, had landed reinforcements, and had to be neutralised prior to the landing, the operation was a complete and virtually bloodless success.
6. Operations were also carried out at the end of last week to ensure

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that we would be able to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone effectively. The closure of Port Stanley airfield on the Falkland Islands was crucial to enable us to achieve air superiority in the Zone, and thereby maintain a survivable Task Force while cutting off airborne military supplies to the Argentine garrison. That air operation was carried out by a single Vulcan bomber from Ascension Island, refuelled in flight by Victor tankers, followed up by low-level raids by Sea Harriers from HMS HERMES, sitting some 90 miles offshore. No British aircraft were lost. There were no British casualties and both the permanent airfield at Port Stanley, and a temporary one elsewhere on the Islands have been rendered inoffensive. To my knowledge there were 16 Argentine casualties.

7. The way in which the RN ships and aircraft have responded to these challenges are, I believe, evidence of the high level of quality and readiness of the British forces. Mounting a maritime operation 8000 miles from home is difficult but by ensuring that the resupply lines are adequate - and this, I believe, means making the maximum use of merchant shipping - it can be done successfully.



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equipment to the unique requirements called for in a potential sub-Antarctic battle zone 8,500 miles from home, must be a remarkable achievement by any standards. I believe that it reflects great credit on the united efforts of all the sailors, soldiers and airmen concerned. We have also seen how rapidly it is possible in an emergency to convert civil resources to defence needs, and how quickly the political will of the nation can overcome any doubts about rapid decision-making when the situation requires it. All of these points are highly relevant to NATO objectives, and so are many of the lessons we have learned, for example, about the importance of logistic back-up - stocks and spares and fuel.

Q. When the current crisis is over we shall certainly look at the lessons to be learned from it. And consider whether any adjustments should be made within the policy laid down in last year's Defence White Paper. As you may know, there has been some parliamentary excitement about my decision to postpone publication of this year's White Paper. But this postponement until the crisis is over does not foreshadow a major re-write. We intend - as the White Paper will make clear - to proceed in developing the general policy outlined last June. That includes the maintenance of a capability to operate effectively outside the NATO area. It also includes plans for bringing into service a range of advanced and highly effective fighting ships - for example we have 29 new warships and submarines under construction or on order. This will involve an increase in the number of nuclear hunter killer submarines from 12 to 17. We shall continue to keep two aircraft carriers in service. .

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I thought it was worth stressing the firmness of these plans to you, for I should not like any false impression to spread from all the recent speculation about the future capability of our maritime forces. And I hope that you will take it as read that the other major elements of our contribution to NATO - nuclear, land and air forces, and defence of the UK base - will remain equally firm. The central thrust of Britain's defence policy remains - and it will remain so, long after the Falkland Islands dispute is settled - an essentially NATO-oriented policy, though we must always preserve some out of area capability.

8. Finally, to return to the Falkland Islands situation, you will know - at least in broad terms the scale and pattern of our defence operations in the South Atlantic. I do not think now is the time for me to give you a detailed description of these, but I thought that I should report some main features.

[DS11 to provide]

19. In conclusion, I would once more stress that every UK action is designed to secure a peaceful settlement of the dispute. But all that we have seen so far confirms there is no easy path. The support and sympathy of our friends is therefore all the more valuable to us, and I am glad, Mr Secretary General, to have this opportunity to thank all of you. It would be helpful if your support could find expression in the communique of this meeting and I should like to propose the following text for your consideration:

"Ministers reaffirmed the total support of their Governments for United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, in particular its call for the immediate

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/withdrawal ....



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
withdrawal from the Falkland Islands of all Argentine forces, who by their action breached the principle of non-use of force for the settlement of international disputes. Noting that the will and readiness of members of the Alliance to defend themselves against aggression is vital to the deterrent posture of the Alliance, they recognised the right of the UK under article 51 of the UN Charter to act in self-defence in the face of armed attack, while continuing to express their hope for a diplomatic solution."

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D/DS12/18/69

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PSO/CDS  
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 ACDS(Pol)  
 AUS(D Staff)  
 Head of DS11  
 Head of DS4  
 Head of DS7  
 Head of DS9  
 FCO Defence Dept - Mr Pearce

*Now combined in  
 one draft with DS11's  
 piece.*

5/21.

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "N J Beaumont".

30 April 1982

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3. The UK remains determined to seek a solution to the crisis by peaceful means if at all possible, but we believe that our efforts must continue to be backed by military strength. And we will not shrink from further military action if it becomes clear that no other means will persuade Argentina to conform with the requirements of UN Resolution 502 and end its illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands.

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