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BRIEF FOR 1SLTHE INCREASE IN SCALE OF OPERATION SUTTON IF 5 INF BDE IS ADDED TO THE FORCEINTRODUCTION

1. If 5 Inf Bde is to be deployed concurrently with 3 Cdo Bde Gp then, as a military operation, CP SUTTON will take on a quite different scale. In broad terms the addition of another brigade has major implications for the tonnages to be moved, the assets needed to move them and the ability to disembark and distribute these stocks in the operational area. However, the escalating of the operation from brigade to divisional level has other implications. As stated in recent minutes of the COS Meeting a small divisional HQ will be needed to coordinate and control the two formations and the air, sea and land assets associated with them. It is not envisaged in this situation that the augmentation of combat arms on a standard Divisional Force Troop scale would be appropriate, nevertheless coordination of the combat and logistic support within the two independent brigades will be necessary. Probably the most significant problem would be that the existing and augmented facilities for the reception and movement of men, vehicles and supplies within the Falkland Islands are likely to reach saturation point with the present force. If, as is possible, the Puma helicopters do not deploy with 5 Inf Bde the movement problems may be insurmountable.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2. A Divisional HQ, commanded by a 2 Star General, is required to direct the operations of the two independent brigades who may well be operating in geographically separated areas within the Falklands. This is envisaged to be a substantially reduced Divisional HQ, probably functioning from HMS INTREPID, tailored specifically to the task. However, strong Ops, Int and Logistic staff representation will be required. Arms and Services Staff are liable to be at representational level: e.g. Lieutenant Colonels RA and RE and reduced staffs to coordinate both brigades' artillery and engineer assets. A comprehensive organisation would however be required to control sea and air assets and airspace, together with adequate signals support.

STAFF TABLES

3. Annex A gives in broad outline the numbers of men and vehicles in the present landing force. For comparison purposes the staff tables also show:

- a. 5 Inf Bde.
- b. Div HQ.

SHIPPING

4. The ships which have been used to transport the present landing force and its impedimenta total thirteen: HMS HERMES, HMS FEARLESS, LSLs SIR GALAHAD, TRISTRAM GERAINT, PERCIVALE, LANCELOT, RFAs STROMNESS, FORT AUSTIN, RESOURCE AND CAMBERRA, ELK, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR AND EUROPIG FERRY.

9. The ships which it is anticipated would be needed for 5 Inf Bde are: QEII, BALTIC AND NORDIC FERRIES, but additional ships may be required. (NB: This does not include shipping for the second WMR of 30 days stock which would amount to approx 4600 tons).

STOCKS

6. The WMR stocks for the Landing Force for 60 days amount to approximately 8500 tons.

7. The fuel embarked with the task force amounts to 320 metric tons in the following ships: HMS FEARLESS, HMS HERMES, RFAs BLUE ROVER and OLNA.

8. While these stocks will not be doubled by the addition of 5 Inf Bde the figures give some indication of the order of increase in lift and handling capacities that will be required.

DISEMBARKATION OF STOCKS INTO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND SUBSEQUENT DISTRIBUTION TO THE DEPLOYED FORCE

9. Before Port Stanley is taken a large percentage of stocks will remain embarked until required. They will then be disembarked by helicopter, mexefloat and landing craft. It is also possible that LSLs will be able to beach. Stocks in freighters will first have to be cross-decked into LSLs. When Port Stanley is secure limited disembarking facilities will be available, but all the facilities mentioned above will still be required. Moreover, operations in other parts of the islands will require stocks to be disembarked where no facilities exist.

10. Apart from in the immediate area of Port Stanley the movement of supplies inland will be by helicopter and to a limited extent by landrover and BV 202. This will impose a significant load on the helicopter resources, thus restricting their tactical use.

11. If 5 Inf Bde joins the force there will be no increase in the LSLs, mexefloats, landing craft, BV 202s or logistic helicopters available. (The deployment of the Puma helicopters in this context is crucial). The ability of the enlarged force to land and distribute its stocks is thus likely to be severely strained. This is exacerbated because the existing movement facilities, only marginally increased, will have to serve a much larger geographic area with two brigades deployed. Thus even the initial loading of 5 Inf Bde will be an extremely difficult and complex problem.

WMR

12. The present landing force has WMR stocks for 60 days at limited war rates. 5 Inf Bde will deploy with 30 days stocks. If it is considered that 5 Inf Bde should increase its stocks to match the rest of the force, the Army may have considerable difficulty in assembling the stocks without breaching stocks earmarked to other formations.

RESUPPLY FROM THE UK

13. Although in theory any commodities needed by the force once committed will be available from its WMR, inevitably, there will be a steady demand for high priority items to be supplied from the UK. These will be supplied by air and sea. The additional brigade will significantly increase the demand and thus the allocation of movement assets for the task.

SUMMARY

14. The addition of 5 Inf Bde to the force will impose severe logistic problems. Without 3rd line logistic support the 2 Brigades would in effect be operating as two independent, logistically self contained formations as opposed to an integrated Divisional force. With inland movement heavily dependent on helicopters the logistic burden could well be a major constraining factor on the Commanders tactical plans. This could prove insurmountable if the Pumas do not deploy with the force. Finally the problems of landing 5 Inf Bde across a beach from commercial ships are very considerable and require urgent study.

STAFF TABLES OF: OP CORPORATE LANDING FORCE; 5 INF BDE; D V HQ; FORCE TPS

Serial	Formation	Men	Vehicles	Remarks
1.	Op CORPORATE LF	6000	330 wheeled and tracked vehicles, plus approx 200 trailers and guns.	1. Includes 77 BV202s (oversnow vehicles) 2. LF includes 3 Cdo Bde Gp plus 2 and 3 PARA Bn Gps, SAS and SBS.
2.	5 Inf Bde	3000	290 vehicles plus 214 trailers and guns.	
3.	Div HQ	100?	20?	A planning figure only.