

5. Option 7 Page 10. Although acknowledging the first military 'con', as a balancing factor it might be argued that the blockade (Option 3) would make it much more difficult for the Argentine garrison to mount a credible defence against Option 7, particularly if the blockade had begun to bite before Option 7 was implemented.
6. Option 8 Page 11. Presumably the second military 'con' is meant to apply to the situation facing a UK garrison once the option has succeeded, rather than to the option itself.
7. Option 9 Page 12. Under 'Forces Required/Available', mention should be made of both Hercules and Vulcan aircraft which may be used for mining.
8. Option 10 Page 13. Under military 'pros', ports (and shipping therein), military installations and supply dumps should be included as profitable targets which would directly influence the situation in the Falklands. Moreover, there is still an option for an air insertion of a SAS troop.
9. Option 12 Page 15. This option, in itself, covers such a wide range of activities which could vary from the covert use of Chilean transit facilities to an all-out Chilean stab in the Argentinian back. Unlike the other options, its implementation is not within our direct control, and is worthy of separate consideration.

*Approved by ACAS(Ops) and signed
in his absence.*

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LOGISTIC CONCEPT

2. In the absence of any operational plan clearly the logistic concept must be based on the worst case in which the 2 brigades cannot share logistic resources. Therefore they continue to require their own organic 2nd line logistic units and depots of stocks of combat supplies and materiel.