

- 1. At Reference A you asked for comment on the paper at Reference B. Events have moved quickly since Reference B was first drafted. Two of the options have already been implemented (Option 3 pt 1 and Option 5). The American decision to offer assistance to the UK has also removed some of the uncertainties expressed over US attitudes.
- 2. There is scope for discussion over the arrangement of the options in degree of severity. The precedence accorded to each option depends on whether we take 'severity' to mean: the effect on Argentina, the difficulty for us in mounting the option or the view of an impartial Third World observer. It is by no means clear which criterion has been used. The options most likely to have their precedence called into question are Option 6 unrestricted attacks against Argentine naval units at sea, and Option 12 Co-operation with Chile. More detailed comments on these and other options are given below.
- 3. Option 3 pt 2 Page 5. The now unequivocal support of the US makes the lend/lease option of an American CV much more attractive. The OAS now knows clearly the American position and the stated political 'con' is now of less significance. The argument that RN crews lacked sufficient expertise to operate an American CV is possibly overstated. Provided that the carrier itself was fully serviceable and a going concern when taken over, surely sufficient 'dual instruction' could be provided by the Americans on passage to Ascension for the CV to carry out at least a limited role as a deck until it was further worked-up.
- 4. Option 6 Page 9. In discussing unrestricted attacks against Argentinian Naval units, the 'con' of the possible significant losses of UK ships and aircraft in prosecuting this option needs to be considered.





- option 7 Page 10. Although acknowledging the first military 'con', as a balancing factor it might be argued that the blockade (Option 3) would make it much more difficult for the Argentine garrison to mount a credible defence against Option 7, particularly if the blockade had begun to bite before Option 7 was implemented.
- 6. Option 8 Page 11. Presumably the second military 'con' is meant to apply to the situation facing a UK garrison once the option has succeeded, rather than to the option itself.
- 7. Option 9 Page 12. Under 'Forces Required/Available', mention should be made of both Hercules and Vulcan aircraft which may be used for mining.
- 8. Option 10 Page 13. Under military 'pros', ports (and shipping therein), military installations and supply dumps should be included as profitable targets which would directly influence the situation in the Falklands. Moreover, there is still an option for an air insertion of a SAS troop.
- 9. Option 12 Page 15. This option, in itself, covers such a wide range of activities which could vary from the covert use of Chilean transit facilities to an all-out Chilean stab in the Argentinian back. Unlike the other options, its implementation is not within our direct control, and is worthy of separate consideration.

K W HAYR

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e. That no additional resources are included to support prisoners or local inhabitants.


pesible until the conclusion of operations,

2. In the absence of any operational plan clearly the los

concept must be based on the worst case in which the a bulker

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beaches' operation.