

COS(Misc) 196/742/1

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OPERATION CORPORATE - LONG TERM MEASURES

1. The attached paper has been prepared by DCDS(OR) in accordance with the instructions (1) of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

2. Unless the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, hears to the contrary by telephone (Ext 6575) by 0900 on Friday 7 May 1982, it will be assumed that the Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the paper and agreed its recommendations.

Attachment:

Operation CORPORATE - Long Term Measures (10 pages).

Note:

1. CDS 2038/1/1 dated 22 April 1982.

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4 May 1982

COS S9(8)

OPERATION CORPORATE - LONG TERM MEASURES

References:

- A. CDS/2038/1/1 dated 22 April 1982.
- B. D/DORS/58/1 dated 23 April 1982.
- C. D/DORS/58/1 dated 28 April 1982.

INTRODUCTION

1. In Reference A, CDS requested an examination of the equipment and support measures needed to sustain Operation CORPORATE for a 6 month period. Consideration of the measures was to be based on three broad assumptions agreed by the Chiefs of Staff:

a. Operational and support planning should be based on 6 months duration of operations in the area, assuming 25% battle attrition of naval and maritime air forces.

b. The duration of the land battle would not be more than 30 days, but logistics would be required for an occupation force of up to 6 months.

c. Strength of units, weapons and logistic support within the NATO area should be restored to declared levels as soon as possible.

2. Reference C was an initial response to CDS's request; this paper provides a fuller, though as yet incomplete answer, as certain questions on manpower implications and costs cannot yet be answered fully and need further study. The examination is wholly assumption-driven, and since assumptions may change with operational developments, it will be necessary to keep them and the conclusions of this paper, continually under review.

3. In Reference A, CDS also requested a study into the implications of sustaining Operation CORPORATE for longer than 6 months or for more than 30 days at limited war rates. This is largely beyond the scope of this paper and will be undertaken later.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to examine the measures required to sustain Operation CORPORATE for a period of up to 6 months.

INITIAL FORCE LEVELS

5. Force levels committed to Operation CORPORATE have been calculated on the basis of the need to conduct a sea/air blockade for 6 months and an amphibious assault on the Falkland Islands

resulting in a land campaign of no longer than 30 days duration. Naval, land and air forces, together with their necessary support, have been deployed or are in the process of deploying for planned and contingency tasks. These forces, including those deployed to Ascension Island, are included in the overall total published in the daily Tote by the DSC. As at 040600A MAY 82 this (1) amounted to some 104 ships, 48 fixed wing aircraft, 64 helicopters and 5,676 troops. 5 Infantry Brigade figures, which have not been finally settled at this stage, are additional to these totals.

6. It is not possible to be precise about the scale of the RAF commitment at this stage. Various air units are available at short notice, but the flexibility of our air power and the range of options open are such that deployment decisions may be made relatively late in the course of the campaign. It is hard to envisage contingencies in which all provisionally earmarked air forces would be employed, but for the purpose of this study, the deployment of certain combat, tanker and transport aircraft to Ascension Island is taken as likely to be the minimum RAF initial involvement. However, the possibility of deployment of RAF Harriers, Phantoms, Nimrods, Hercules, Buccaneers and helicopters to the Falklands in certain circumstances within the 6 month period cannot entirely be discounted. This paper therefore includes some consideration of the larger RAF force levels which could be involved.

LOSSES

7. In assessing the assumed attrition to forces committed to Operation CORPORATE, the total figures at the end of the 6 months period depend on two 'worst case' scenarios which are:

- a. An earliest possible assault landing on the Falklands, resulting in a 30 day land operation, followed by a continuing blockade.
- b. A long blockade without a landing.

8. For these cases it has been assumed that attrition levels could reach 25% for equipment and 10% for troops. The consequent casualty figures, lost and damaged, have been calculated based on initial force levels. In total, together with illustrative division by type shown in brackets, they are:

<u>Scenario A.</u> Ships	: <u>14</u> (1 x CVS, 1 x SSN, 4 x DD/FF, 8 amphibious and other support vessels).
Naval & RM Aircraft	: <u>30</u> (8 Sea Harrier, 22 helicopters).

Note:

1. Force Tote Sitrep.

RAF Aircraft : 8 (1 x Nimrod,
1 x Victor,
1 x Vulcan,
1 x C130 Hercules,
2 x Harrier GR3,
2 x helicopters).

Troops. (RM and Army) : 568

Vehicles ('A' and 'B') : 54

Scenario B. Ships : 12 (1 x CVS, 1 x SSN,
4 x DD/FF, 6 x others).

Naval Aircraft : 20 (8 x Sea Harrier,
12 helicopters).

RAF Aircraft : 7 (1 x Nimrod,
1 x Victor, 1 x Vulcan,
2 x Harrier GR3,
2/3 x helicopters).

(Attrition of aircraft and ship crews are not included as they are considered reprovided with replacement equipments.)

9. Replacements. The feasibility of replacement for major equipment casualties has been provisionally assessed by the three Service Departments:

a. Ships. Initial replacements, both for battle casualties and for routine roulement, have already been detailed or earmarked, but some of these may not be available in the operational area before late May/early June. This follow-up group includes HMS INTREPID and 7 DD/FF. A roulement plan has been made for SSNs (the first replacement being in area by mid-May) and replacement auxiliary support ships have been earmarked. No replacement is available for either of the two CVS nor for HMS ENDURANCE. The former is of particular concern and a submission has been made (2) to bring forward the operational availability of HMS ILLUSTRIOUS to the earliest possible date. A contingency plan for procurement of an alternative Ice Patrol Vessel, probably from abroad, is now being prepared.

b. RN and RM Aircraft. Sufficient Sea Harriers and helicopters exist either in the follow-up support ships or in the UK to cover the assumed casualty rate.

Note:

2. COS(Misc) 183/742/1 dated 30 April 1982.

c. RAF Aircraft. In total force terms there are no immediate replacements for lost aircraft, and existing fleets would simply reduce in size, but the numbers of Phantom, Buccaneer, Wessex and Chinook likely to be deployed are not thought to present a problem over replacement from within the existing fleets. However, it might be possible to order additional Harriers from BAe' to be added to the top-up buy currently underway. It might also be possible to acquire further Hercules C130 from US sources although the variant might be different. There would be no prospect of replacing Vulcans and Victors, though the latter's capability could be replaced by accelerating the VC10 conversion programme.

d. Vehicles: Replacement vehicles are readily obtainable, although in the case of the RM Oversnow BV 202 vehicles the WMR afloat falls short of the estimated possible losses. This would not be considered a critical shortage, however, and all other vehicles have replacements at 7 days NTM in the UK.

10. Repair. Because of the distances involved and the inadequacy of major repair facilities afloat and at Ascension Island, it is assumed that all aircraft damaged are lost. Consideration of replacements above already takes this into account. Only 50%, however, of ship casualties are estimated to be sunk, and the following are assumed repairable (though this is highly speculative and cannot be taken as a sound basis for decisions on future dockyard facilities):

1 x CVS
 1 x DD/FF
 1 x LSL
 3 x Others

A forward repair ship is now at Ascension Island with an option of deploying further forward to South Georgia. This is capable of carrying out extensive repairs, to enable damaged ships to return to operations or to a home dockyard. There is spare capacity for ship repair at Gibraltar and in UK dockyards, but the availability of a mobile floating dock for deployment is under investigation. There may be a need to re-examine present plans for the future of UK dockyards. For vehicles, 2nd Line repair facilities are organic to the forces deployed.

LOGISTICS

11. ACDS(P&L) has prepared an initial assessment of the possible shortages in logistic support that could exist after 30 days battle (3). There appear to be few problems of major significance.

Note:

3. VCDS(P&L) 127/6/2 dated 27 April 1982.

Only in AIM 9G/9L Sidewinder missile systems, of which there are initially only just enough for first line holdings, are there likely to be critical shortages. Army ammunition expenditure is based on limited war rates for 30 days. There is unlikely to be any logistic problem in ammunition re-supply from existing UK and Priority 1 stocks, but reconstitution of NATO-declared stock levels will not be achieved quickly, as production of most natures is subject to long lead times.

POST-REOCCUPATION FORCE LEVELS

12. The force levels needed to sustain the occupation and defence of the Falkland Islands (short of a negotiated withdrawal by both sides) (4), are calculated on the basis of two main threat scenarios:

a. Threat Level A. That following an Argentinian withdrawal after severe losses to their naval and air forces.

b. Threat Level B. That following an Argentinian withdrawal with their forces still largely intact.

13. The different force levels required for these situations are further affected by the condition of the Port Stanley airfield. VCDS(P&L) has reported (5) on the logistic implications of repairing and extending the runway, and its effect on RAF force levels. In broad terms these garrison force levels are:

a. Threat Level A. 1 x SSN, 10-12 other ships, 1 battalion group, 12 Harriers and 8 other aircraft.

b. Threat Level A with improved airfield. 1 x SSN, 10-12 ships, 1 battalion group, 6 Phantoms and 2 Nimrods and 8 other aircraft.

c. Threat Level B. 1 CVS, 2-3 SSN/SSK, 15-16 other ships, 1 Brigade Group (+), 12 Harriers and 10 other aircraft.

d. Threat Level B with improved airfield. 2 SSN, 11-15 other ships, 1 battalion group (+), 12 Phantoms, 4 Buccaneers, 3 Nimrods and 10 other aircraft.

14. The number of aircraft proposed to respond to Threat Level B after runway enhancements is the 'worst case' for long-term RAF force levels, including as it does Buccaneer, Phantom and Nimrod deployment to the Islands. The levels

Notes:

4. ACDS(Pol) 107/82 dated 23 April 1982.

5. COS(Misc) 185/742/1 dated 30 April 1982.

recommended are those forces necessary to defend the Falklands and South Georgia in the longer term; supporting forces and facilities needed at Ascension Island must be considered and added to these.

15. Measures needed to support the alternative force levels described in paragraph 13 have also been covered in VCDS(P&L)'s report.

EQUIPMENT

16. Each Service Department has drawn up a list of items of equipment needed immediately to improve combat capabilities and a list of items which could be required, given more time. (6), (7), (8). Many items of the first list, such as additional DN181 radars, Blue Fox radars for Sea Harrier, ALQ99 Jammers, UHF Secure Speech Equipment (NESTOR) and HF radio equipment for ships taken up from trade, can be, and in some cases have been, procured immediately. Most importantly, operational requirements such as Stingray for RN Lynx, and MK 44 torpedo shallow water modification kits represent critical enhancements requiring urgent procurement action. In such cases it is operationally unacceptable to wait to see if first line holdings are actually used in action before desired stock levels are achieved and resupply is assured, and in most instances urgent procurement action is in hand. While there remains any possibility at all that even earmarked units could be deployed, procurement action to fully equip them for war should proceed with urgency. The SAS list is especially important, as is provision of anti-EXOCET EW equipment to Lynx, and the fitting of Sidewinder to Harrier GR3.

17. It may be possible to satisfy a number of pressing operational requirements, especially for secure communications equipment, promptly from US sources. The costs of these, and all equipment measures in hand are being continuously monitored under the direction of DS1.

18. In the longer term, it may be necessary to differentiate between desirable and essential items to ensure that excessive expenditure is not unnecessarily incurred. In this respect, it might be considered to be important to show whether or not there are any items in the longer term lists that arise exclusively from the Operation CORPORATE commitment and whose relevance to our Priority 1 commitment to NATO is not yet clear. At this stage the only major items in this category are possibly measures to equip Nimrods and Hercules with an air-to-air refuelling capability, and the proposed size of the Vulcan force to be retained in Service. Such measures, as well as Navy Department proposals for an acceleration to the completion and refitting of ships, and a consequential wide-ranging naval weapon procurement

- (6) D/DNOR/A/2(CORPORATE) dated 28 April 1982
- (7) D/GS(OR)1/24/3 dated 27 April 1982
- (8) ACAS(Pol)/TS(Temp)/(B)/986 dated 28 April 1982

plan, may require closer examination. So far, however, the number of major items of this sort appear limited and it can be fairly shown that the majority of the measures will be of direct value both to the UK's 'out of area' and 'within NATO' capabilities. Full justification will obviously be necessary whenever major items are identified which could in any way distort the future long-term equipment programme; at present there appear to be none in this category. If weapons or equipment are obtained from abroad as an emergency measure, the dangers of distortion will clearly be reduced if lend-lease or sale or return arrangements can be made. The two sets of Vulcan/Phalanx CIWS urgently needed for HM ILLUSTRIOUS are a possible example (9).

19. Many equipment requirements for post-occupation garrisoning of the Falkland Islands, for example those required for the extension and improvement of Port Stanley airfield and runway, are as yet incomplete, but action is in hand to estimate quantities, transportation and cost.

MANPOWER

20. ACDS(P&L) has outlined several areas for further study into manpower matters, including use of reserves, retention in service and redundancy. (3) While some aspects cannot be fully considered until the outcome of the operation is known, contingency plans for possible extra recruiting and call-up of reserves could usefully be formulated now.

IMPACT ON NATO

21. Each Service Department has identified the effect on NATO declared levels of the diversion of forces to Operation CORPORATE, of possible 25% losses, of the provision of replacements and what measures might be taken, finance permitting, to remedy the temporary loss of NATO capability.

22. The principal effect upon NATO of Operation CORPORATE is a serious loss of conventional maritime capability in the Eastlant and Channel areas, rendering the area more vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact threat. The deployment of naval forces to the South Atlantic reduces NATO's peacetime surveillance capability and deterrent effect. The distances involved are such that the forces involved could not be available in their primary NATO operational area in less than 15-30 days, a relatively long period in terms of an East/West crisis. The involvement of 3 Cdo Bde and associated ships removes the option of deploying the UK/NL Amphibious Force to N. Norway. Air assets (with the exception of Harriers and support helicopters) will generally be at better than 48 hours availability for NATO operations but holdings of Sidewinder missiles

Note:

(9) D/DNOR/B/A/2/CORPORATE of 28/29 April 1982

in the UK for air defence Phantoms are very low. Army units have been specifically selected to avoid using NATO-declared forces although the deployment of 5 Inf Bde brings into question the viability of the UKMF(L), since much of its artillery, air defence, helicopters and logistic units will have been removed.

23. There will clearly be a need to bring NATO assigned and earmarked forces back to declared levels as a matter of the highest priority as soon as the Operation CORPORATE commitments decline. At this stage it is possible to identify some areas of potentially serious concern such as depletion of already low Priority 1 stocks of Milan, Rapier, Blowpipe and 105mm artillery ammunition. However, a separate paper will in due course be produced identifying major equipments and stocks that require priority replacement action.

COSTS

24. The necessary work has been initiated to identify the costs attributable to Operation CORPORATE. The aim is to provide a first estimate of extra costs involved in the Operation, based on the assumptions for this study, by late May. It could, however, be clear by the time whether any of those assumptions can be discarded, so the costing exercise will be one needing continual refinement as the Operation progresses. It is essential, however, that this is done to maintain sensible cost control on equipment proposals.

25. A study has also been initiated to assess the costs that could arise from the maintenance of the various post-occupation garrison force levels described in this paper. A policy decision will be required over whether the long term cost of maintaining these forces in the area must be encompassed within the planned defence budget or whether special financial provision will be made for sustaining the proposed force levels for a considerable time.

26. In the final assessment it is important to include all costs involved in preparing for the Operation, as well as those incurred in its execution. Among such costs will feature expenditure on extra training.

CONCLUSIONS

27. Based on the assumptions given and the two alternative scenarios for the timing of the assault landing on the Falkland Islands, the Force Levels presently deployed and earmarked would suffer losses to equipment and men by the end of 6 months which are largely replaceable and sustainable in the long term. Losses to certain major equipments such as CVS, are not immediately replaceable and the effect of their loss on operations must be considered. In the meantime every effort must be continued to bring

HMS ILLUSTRIOUS to operational readiness as quickly as possible, and a contingency plan for foreign purchase of a replacement Ice Patrol Vessel should be progressed.

28. Combat supplies and stocks are available in sufficient quantity to sustain the assumed length of operations at limited war rates of expenditure, or at a prudent estimate of likely expenditure. The only exception is AIM9L/Sidewinder missiles for which critical shortages exist and steps are urgently needed to complete the required first line holdings for the Operation. Replenishment stocks are adequate for most weapons and ammunition except for AIM9G and 9L Sidewinder.

29. Equipment measures are in hand to bring about a large number of capability enhancements in the short term. Important among these is the provision of Stingray and anti-EXOCET ECM for Lynx ASW helicopters, and the fitting of Sidewinder to Harrier GR3, as well as several items for the SAS.

30. The impact on the UK's NATO-declared assigned and earmarked forces is very severe in terms of RN and RM forces, and the small Harrier GR3 deployment has a significant impact on NATO-declared air forces. The Army's deployment is taken mainly from the UK base, but of serious concern in the long-term is the possible depletion of already low Priority 1 stocks of Milan, Rapier, Blowpipe and 105mm artillery ammunition.

31. Contingency manpower plans should be prepared without delay to take possible casualty figures into account. Measures are already underway to obtain a first estimate of the cost of mounting Operation CORPORATE, and of maintaining a garrison in the South Atlantic in the longer term. Initial figures should be available by late May.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. It is recommended that the Chiefs of Staff take note of this situation report and endorse the requirement for the on-going further studies mentioned, these being:

- a. Formulation of contingency manpower plans to cater for assumed casualty rate and future garrisoning commitments.
- b. Consideration of measures required to replace NATO-declared equipment and stocks where necessary as soon as possible after the Operation.
- c. Continuation of monitoring of Service equipment proposals to guard against distortion of the long-term equipment programme.

LOOSE MINUTE

d. Assessment of the implications of sustaining Operation CORPORATE beyond the 6 month/30 day level.

e. Initial assessment of the extra costs of mounting Operation CORPORATE - report required by late May.

f. Estimates of costs of maintaining a garrison in the South Atlantic in the longer term.

OP CORPORATE - RATIONALISATION OF ROE

Reference:

1. ACNS(O) 0.39/2(a) of 4 May 1982.

I agree that we should rationalise the current ROE and that we should proceed with this on the lines of your paragraph 5. However, it may turn out to be necessary to obtain CD(SA) approval and the paperwork should be prepared with this possibility in mind.

D W Brown

D W BROWN
Rear Admiral
ACD3(Ops)

4 May 1982

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OPERATION CORPORATE - LONG TERM MEASURES

Reference:

D/D Air Plans/85/2 dated 2 May 82

Paragraph 7 of the Reference was based on incorrect information and should therefore be disregarded. Apologies are tendered for this error.

M J GIBSON
Wg Cdr
NATO(Pol)2(RAF)
MB5202 3685MB

4 May 82

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