

DPS(C) 54/1

- ACDS (Ops)
- ACNS (OP)
- DMO
- ACAS (Ops)
- AUS (D Staff)
- FCO (Def Dept)

MILITARY OPTIONS - OPERATION CORPORATE

References:

- A. COS 40th Meeting/82 Item 7.
- B. COS 43rd Meeting/82 Item 5.

please take action on para 2

SEEN : DMO	<i>[Signature]</i>
DDMO	<i>N-2/5</i>
<i>dsc</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

Done. 10/5

1. As you will be aware CDS has directed that we are to revise the paper Military Options - Operation CORPORATE and table it for presentation each Thursday for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.
2. I would be grateful if **amendments could be forwarded to DPS(C) Room 7128 by 1600 hours on Monday 10th May.**
3. **I suggest we provisionally arrange a two star clearance meeting on Tuesday 11th May at 1415 hours in Room 7147.**

DMO
 ✓ *Grierson 1315 hrs
 Told Col Evans we would prefer later time. this will depend on the reaction of others (as DMO to represent)*

[Signature]

M J EVANS
 Colonel
 for ACDS(Pol)
 Ext 7419 MB 7128

used

[Signature]

6 May 1982

COS(Misc) 202/742/1

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MILITARY OPTIONS - OPERATION CORPORATE

The attached paper, prepared by ACDS(Pol) in accordance with the instructions (1) of the Chiefs of Staff, will be tabled for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on Thursday 6 May 1982.

Attachment:

Military Options - Operation CORPORATE (17 pages).

Note:

1. COS 40th Meeting/82, Item 7.

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5 May 1982

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DP 12/82

5 May 82

DEFENCE POLICY STAFF

MILITARY OPTIONS - OPERATION CORPORATE

1. The Chief of the Defence Staff has directed (1) that the Defence Policy Staff should revise the paper (2) setting out the military options for Operation CORPORATE.
2. In accordance with instructions we have consulted the Single Service Departments, the Defence Secretariat and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and have differentiated between those options already implemented and those available for future consideration. The options currently falling into these two categories are identified at Annexes A and B respectively. An attempt has been made to grade these options in ascending order of politico/military impact but this assessment must necessarily be subjective and will change as the situation develops.
3. The adequacy of air support is a pre-requisite to most of the options relating to the repossession of the Falkland Islands and a key factor in sustaining operations. We consider that the Chiefs of Staff will wish to consider further the probable need to replace HERMES and INVINCIBLE in August. ILLUSTRIOUS is being brought forward and should be capable of deploying to the operational area in the required timeframe. The possibility of reactivating BULWARK, at present awaiting disposal, is being investigated. The lease/lend of an amphibious assault ship of the IWO JIMA type is a possible alternative; but the view of the Navy Department is that, given the practical operating and support problems likely to be

Notes:

- (1) COS 40th Meeting 1982
- (2) Attachment to COS(Misc) 187/742/1 dated 1 May 1982

involved, the BULWARK option would probably provide the more feasible and timely solution to the air support requirement.

4. We recommend that the Chiefs of Staff take note of the options detailed at Annexes A and B and instruct the Defence Policy Staff to keep them under review.

At Annex A - Options in Hand:

Attachment:

A. Military Options - Operation CORPORATE (15 pages).

At Annex B - Future Options:

- Option 1: Psychological Operations
- 2: Harassment operations against the Argentine Garrison by Air and Sea attacks
- 3: Harassment operations against the Argentine Garrison by Air and Sea attacks
- 4: Repossession of South Sandwich
- 5: Prolonged cutting of Argentine lines of communication to the Falkland Islands
- 6: Extension of operations against the Argentine Garrison by Special Forces or Commando raids
- 7: Unrestricted attacks against Argentine naval units at sea
- 8: Landing with limited aim of establishing a secure military presence on part of the Falkland Islands without attempting to evict Argentines
- 9: Landing with aim of full and rapid repossession of the Falkland Islands
- 10: Mining mainland Argentine ports
- 11: Blockading mainland Argentine ports
- 12: Attack Argentine mainland targets
- 13: Landing Southern Argentine (Tierra del Fuego)
- 14: Increased military cooperation with Chile (including possibility of formal military alliance).

Annexes:

- A. Options in Hand.
- B. Future Options.

ATTACHMENT TO
DP 12/82
DATED 5 MAY 82

MILITARY OPTIONS - OPERATION CORPORATE

1. Options in ascending order of politico - military impact are set out below:

At Annex A - Options in Hand:

- Option 1: Psychological Operations
- 2: Total Exclusion Zone
- 3: Harassment operations against the Argentine Garrison by Air and Sea attacks

At Annex B - Future Options:

- Option 4: Repossession of South Sandwich ✓
- 5: Prolonged cutting of Argentine lines of communication to the Falkland Islands ✓
- 6: Extension of operations against the Argentine Garrison by Special Forces or Commando raids ✓
- 7: Unrestricted attacks against Argentine naval units at sea ✓
- 8: Landing with limited aim of establishing a secure military presence on part of the Falkland Islands without attempting to evict Argentines ✓
- 9: Landing with aim of full and rapid repossession of the Falkland Islands ✓
- 10: Mining mainland Argentine ports ✓
- 11: Blockading mainland Argentine ports ✓
- 12: Attack Argentine mainland targets ✓
- 13: Landing Southern Argentine (Tierra del Fuego) ✓
- 14: Increased military cooperation with Chile (including possibility of formal military alliance). ✓

Annexes:

- A. Options in Hand.
- B. Future Options.

1. OPTION - Psychological Operations.

2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Special.

3. TIMING - From now.

PROS

Political:

Low Cost.

Military:

Preparation already in hand.

Confuses enemy's Command and weakens morale.

CONS

Political:

Might prejudice UK integrity.

Military:

Limited effectiveness.

Supportive of other measures;
not a decisive measure in itself.

Feasibility:

- (1) Feasible.
- (2) Action in hand.

1. OPTION - Total Exclusion Zone
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force as deployed
3. TIMING - In effect now

PMASWilsonMilitary:

Neutralisation of Stanley Airfield has enhanced impact of T-23 and diverted aerial resupply.

Ability to strike from long range has had immediate impact on sense of domestic security within mainland Argentina. Likely to tie down air defence assets to defend key areas remote from area of conflict.

Harriers/Naval BombardmentMilitary:

Selective attacks likely to weaken garrison capability and resolve.

Other features of military importance eg. airstrips, radar/POL/ammunition sites are being attacked discriminately.

Feasibility: (1) Feasible now.

COMSPolitical:

Strategic bombing could undermine international support for ISG.

Some risk of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

1. OPTION - Harassment Operations against the Argentine Garrison by Air and Sea Attacks.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Vulcans, Harriers, DD/FF.
3. TIMING - From 30 April.

PROSVulcansMilitary:

Neutralisation of Stanley Airfield has enhanced impact of TEZ and denied aerial resupply.

Ability to strike from long range has had immediate impact on sense of domestic security within mainland Argentina. Likely to tie down air defence assets to defend key areas remote from area of conflict.

Harriers/Naval BombardmentMilitary:

Selective attacks likely to weaken garrison capability and resolve.

Other features of military importance eg. airstrips, radar/POL/ammunition sites are being attacked discriminately.

Feasibility: (1) Feasible now.

CONSPolitical:

Strategic bombing could undermine international support for HMG.

Some risk of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

Military:

Diverts forces from higher priority tasks.

Supportive of other measures; not a decisive measure in itself.

Virtually impossible to garrison.

Weather conditions could abort operation.

1. OPTION - Repossession of South Sandwich.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Current dispositions.
3. TIMING - From mid May.

PROSPolitical:

Might have some relevance to UK stake in Antarctica.

Military:

Small scale operation.

CONSPolitical:

Looks like a soft option.

Exerts virtually no pressure on Argentina to withdraw troops from Falkland Islands.

Military:

Diverts forces from higher priority tasks.

Supportive of other measures; not a decisive measure in itself.

Virtually impossible to garrison.

Weather conditions could abort operation.

Feasibility: (1) Already of doubtful feasibility on account of deteriorating weather.

1. OPTION - Prolonged cutting of Argentine lines of communication to Falkland Islands - 'Blockade'.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force as deployed up to end July; thereafter it will be necessary to find replacement platforms with an organic air capability. Options are addressed below.
3. TIMING - From 2 May.

PROSPolitical:

Graduated increase in pressure on Argentine.

Maintains political objective with minimum risk to our forces.

Obviates risk of civilian casualties among Falkland Islanders.

Minimises risk of potential action against neutral shipping and aircraft.

Might in time be sufficient to create favourable climate for negotiated withdrawal.

Clearly related to self defence

Military:

Isolation of Argentine Forces on Falkland Islands would erode will and capacity to counter subsequent landing.

Attrition could be imposed on Argentine naval and air forces (provided that they present targets to our forces).

Feasibility: This option is currently feasible and integral to our objective of wearing down the Argentine Garrison's morale and will to fight. However the air EZ cannot be sustained over a prolonged period without the eventual replacement on station of HERMES and INVINCIBLE. In this context action is in hand to bring forward ILLUSTRIOUS for deployment in August, and to assess prospects for reclaiming BULWARK to an operational state by about September. Further consideration is necessary to determine whether, as another option, it would be practical to lease a United States LPH for timely deployment. Whichever option is selected, it will be necessary to deploy additional Harrier GR3 aircraft to the Falklands area.

B - 2

CONSPolitical:

Could impose some hardship on Falkland Islanders/engender reprisals against UK citizens on mainland.

Could imply acceptance of prolonged crisis.

Military:

Long term degradation of UK commitment to NATO.

Attrition of our own maritime assets could prejudice effective enforcement of blockade.

1. OPTION - Extension of operations against Argentine garrison by Special Forces/Commando raids.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - SAS/SBS/Commando Forces embarked in Task Force and Amphibious Task Force.
3. TIMING - Special forces capability from 30 April. Commando capability from 17 May.

PROSPolitical:

Successful attacks on high value targets would be consistent with minimum use of force, and would demonstrate HMG's resolve to take action against the Garrison without putting the civilian population at risk.

Military:

Scale and nature of attacks can be graduated and controlled to achieve disproportionate and accumulative effect.

Useful preparation for subsequent landing operation.

Confusing command and eroding the will to defend.

Feasibility:

- (1) Feasible now.
- (2) Feasibility will increase when Hercules are provided with extended range capability.

CONSPolitical:

The destruction of targets such as water and power supplies could cause hardship to civilian population.

The failure of a Special Forces/Commando operation could present the Argentines with a significant propaganda weapon.

Limited influence on negotiations.

Could lead to reprisals against civil population in Falkland Islands.

Military:

In the event of something going wrong, extraction would be difficult.

1. OPTION - Unrestricted attacks against Argentine Naval Units at sea.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Sea and Air forces deployed.
3. TIMING - As required.

PROSPolitical:

Potential for clear and early success if enemy presents targets.

Sinkings might bring Argentine to negotiate more seriously.

Demoralising to Argentine public opinion and garrison.

Military:

Sinkings, particularly "25 of May" and SSK will enhance chances of success of TEZ or landing.

Lessens subsequent risk to UK assets.

Smaller UK garrison of FI needed in wake of re-occupation.

Feasibility:

(1) Feasible now - but at cost of reassigning forces allocated to enforcing TEZ.

(2) Current constraints are self-imposed.

CONSPolitical:

High visibility of success could engender strong OAS/World reaction against UK; could alienate our friends and engender increasing political pressures at home.

Spread of conflict area could arouse adverse international reaction.

Possible reprisals, or unrestrained mob attacks, against UK civilians on mainland.

Military:

Not an option if the Argentine fleet remains in port.

May conflict with requirement to enforce TEZ.

Increased risk of attrition to own forces.

1. OPTION - Landing with limited aim of establishing a secure military presence on part of the Falklands without attempting to evict Argentines.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force as presently constituted.
3. TIMING: - 19 - about 31 May.

PROSPolitical:

Negotiation might be possible free from the strong emotions which might be generated by more direct confrontation.

Might help to secure mutual withdrawal.

Civilian casualties and damage could be kept to minimum.

Maintains political initiative consistent with minimum use of force.

Military:

Control of part of Falklands could be established.

Might be possible to establish base ashore for Harrier/support helicopter operations which would reduce the pressure on embarked air assets.

CONSPolitical:

Could lead to long term operations and stalemate.

Military:

Danger of a prolonged campaign with additional need to defend fleet and landing force against air attack.

Limited military advantage with many of the risks associated with full repossession. Need to support effort - military and logistic - could detract from enforcement of TEZ.

Feasibility:

- (1) Increased if TEZ fully enforced during the preceding period and softening up operations vigorously conducted.
- (2) Could be attempted without need to commit 5 Bde.

1. OPTION - Landing with aim of full and rapid repossession of the Falkland Islands.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force as presently constituted with addition of 5 Bde Gp.
3. TIMING - 19 - about 31 May.

PROSPolitical:

Direct and unambiguous demonstration of HMG's resolve.

Climate could be created for negotiated settlement.

Military:

Concentration of force would put early and maximum pressure on Argentine garrison.

Possibility of evicting Argentines militarily.

Most direct means of attempting to restore British control.

CONSPolitical:

International (and domestic) support could be undermined.

Military stalemate could ensue.

Military:

Achievement of objective could be delayed by need to minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

Capability to maintain intensive air operations could decline from end May.

Likely to involve direct confrontation possibly with heavy casualties and battle damage.

Feasibility:

- (1) Not feasible without 5 Bde Gp and additional Harrier and helicopter support. Potential for success increased if TEZ fully enforced during preceding period and softening up operations vigorously conducted.
- (2) Weather conditions, extended supply lines and need to defend high value merchant shipping and landing area over a potentially lengthy period demand air and maritime supremacy of an order that might be difficult to achieve. Sinking of "25 of May" and SSK would greatly enhance success.
- (3) Loss of carrier or Canberra/QE2 would jeopardise landing and/or subsequent operations.

1. OPTION - Mining mainland Argentine ports.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - SSK, Hercules, Vulcan.
3. TIMING - Most assets immediately available.

PROSPolitical:

Likely to lead to immediate cessation of trade.

CONSPolitical:

Difficult to present internationally; relevance to Article 51 unclear; Indiscriminate effect; mining of neutral merchantmen likely to alienate international support, undermine domestic support, jeopardise safety of British business community in Argentine.

Military:

Would entail dispersing UK naval capability; air laying likely to be opposed, difficult and costly of assets.

Feasibility: At detriment to other tasks assets could be made available for mining tasks. Uncertain and indiscriminate results currently make this an unattractive option.

1. OPTION - Blockading the mainland Argentine ports.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - SSN/SSK; scuttle block ships.
3. TIMING - Most assets immediately available apart from scuttle block ships.

PROSPolitical

Immediately increases economic pressure.

Some port closures might be achieved for a limited period.

Impact on Argentine domestic opinion would be immediate. Not certain whether this would strengthen or weaken their resolve to hold the Falkland Islands.

Military:

Surprise might be achieved.

Bombing of airfields would reduce effectiveness of Argentine air

Special forces operations could be carefully controlled.

Feasibility: Blockade is feasible; might be necessary if Argentine naval units retire into mainland harbour.

CONSPolitical

Increased motive for Soviet involvement because of disruption to grain supplies.

Difficult to present internationally; likely to generate international resentment.

Military:

Scuttle ships only effective in narrow channels and very difficult to place in position.

High risk to personnel involved.

Military:

Only a limited capability for air attack in view of range and AAR support needed.

Insertion and extraction of special forces would be difficult and could put at risk the delivery vehicles.

Could give rise to large number of

casualties. Not generate active military support for Argentine. British forces could be greatly outnumbered.

High risks to our own forces are involved.

Feasibility: (1) Feasible now.

(2) The scale of bombing raids would be limited by need to provide AAR.

(3) Surprise would be a key element of success.

1. OPTION - Attack Argentine mainland targets.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Vulcan and/or Special Forces.
3. TIMING - Vulcans - Available at Ascension Island 29 April 1982. Special Forces Embarked on Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force (available shortly). An air insertion option is also available.

PROSPolitical:

Military targets could be chosen to minimise casualties.

Attacks would be highly visible manifestation of HMG's resolve.

Impact on Argentine domestic opinion would be immediate. Not certain whether this would strengthen or weaken their resolve to hold the Falkland Islands.

Military:

Surprise might be achieved.

Bombing of airfields would reduce effectiveness of Argentine air force.

Special forces operations could be carefully controlled.

- Feasibility:
- (1) Feasible now.
 - (2) The scale of bombing raids would be limited by need to provide AAR.
 - (3) Surprise would be a key element of success.

CONSPolitical:

Severe repercussions internationally for the bombing option.

Difficult to justify attacks on military facilities not operating in support of Argentine effort.

Legitimacy might be challenged in context of Article 51 of UN charter.

International and domestic support for HMG could be severely affected.

Direct incentive for reprisals against British ex-patriates in Argentina.

Military:

Only a limited capability for air attack in view of range and AAR support needed.

Insertion and extraction of special forces would be difficult and could put at risk the delivery vehicles.

Could give rise to large number of civilian casualties.

Action might generate active military support for Argentine. British forces could be greatly outnumbered.

High risks to our own forces are involved.

1. OPTION - Landing in Southern Argentine (Tierra del Fuego).

2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force as deployed.

3. TIMING - From end May at the earliest.

PROS

Political:

Severe blow for junta.

Might provide bargaining counter for withdrawal of Argentine forces from Falkland Islands.

Would be positive measure of HMG resolve.

Military:

Demonstrates capability to extend conflict.

CONS

Political:

Severe repercussions internationally.

Legitimacy under Article 51 of UN Charter would be challenged.

Any Chilean involvement would widen scope of conflict.

Likely to increase Argentinian resistance.

Military:

Very high risk involved.

Would greatly reduce capacity for subsequent operations against Argentine Forces on Falkland Islands, which is UK aim.

TEZ could not be maintained in parallel.

Feasibility:

(1) This option could only be achieved with either the full co-operation of the Chilean Air Force or use of appropriate Chilean airfields.

<p>DEPARTMENT/SERIES DEEE 70</p> <p>PIECE/ITEM 834 (one piece/item number)</p>	<p>Date and sign</p>
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ACDS(Fo1)115/82

ACDS(Ops)
 Mr Weston (FCO)
 ACNS(OP)
 DMO—
 ACAS(Ops)
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 Head of DS11

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
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MILITARY OPTIONS -- OPERATION CORPORATE

Reference: COS(Misc)187/742/1 dated 1 May 82.

1. The paper at Annex has been revised to take account of the comments you forwarded yesterday on the reference.
2. I would be grateful if you would be present or represented at a meeting in my office arranged for 1600 this afternoon at which I plan to take a final look at these options before submitting them to the Chiefs of Staff.
3. Head of DS11 will be circulating separately a draft* submission, which might be used to cover the attached options (should the Chiefs of Staff decide to put them to Ministers). He would be grateful for your comments on it at my meeting.

*
Note: Now attached.



J A GILBERT
 AVM
 ACDS(Fo1)

5 May 82

ATTACHMENT TO
ACDS (POL) 115/82
DATED 5 MAY 82

MILITARY OPTIONS - OPERATION CORPORATE

1. Options in ascending order of politico - military profile are set out below:

At Annex A - Options in Hand:

- Option 1: Psychological Operations
- 2: Prolonged cutting of Argentine lines of communication to the Falkland Islands
- 3: Harassment operations against the Argentine Garrison by Air and Sea attacks.

At Annex B - Future Options:

- Option 4: Repossession of South Sandwich
- 5: ^{Extension 2} ~~Harassment~~ operations against the Argentine Garrison by Special Forces of Commando raids.
- 6: Unrestricted attacks against Argentine naval units at sea.
- 7: Landing with limited aim of establishing a secure military presence on part of the Falkland Islands without attempting to evict Argintines.
- 8: Landing with aim of full and early repossession of the Falkland Islands.
- 9: Mining/Blockading mainland Argentine ports.
- 10: Attack Argentine mainland targets.
- 11: Landing Southern Argentina (Tierra del Fuego).
- 12: Increased military cooperation with Chile (including possibility of formal military alliance).

1. OPTION -- Psychological Operations.

2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Special.

3. TIMING -- From now.

PROS

Political:

Low Cost.

Military:

Preparation already in hand.

Confuses enemy's Command and weakens morale.

Feasibility: (1) Feasible.
(2) Action in hand.

CONS

Political:

Prejudices integrity of UK.

Military:

Limited effectiveness.

Supportive of other measures; not a decisive measure in itself.

1. OPTION - Prolonged cutting of Argentine lines of communication to Falkland Islands - 'Blockade'.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force as deployed up to end July; thereafter it will be necessary to find replacement air platforms with an organic air capability. Options are addressed below.
3. TIMING - From 2 May.

PROSPolitical:

Graduated increase in pressure on Argentine.

Maintains political objective with minimum risk to our forces.

Obviates risk of civilian casualties among Falkland Islanders.

Minimises risk of potential action against neutral shipping and aircraft.

Might in time be sufficient to create favourable climate for negotiated withdrawal.

Clearly related to self defence

Military:

Isolation of Argentine Forces on Falkland Islands would erode will and capacity to counter subsequent landing.

Attrition could be imposed on Argentine naval and air forces (provided that they present targets to our forces).

Feasibility: This option is currently feasible and integral to our objective of wearing down the Argentine Garrison's morale and will to fight. However the air EZ cannot be sustained over a prolonged period without the eventual replacement on station of HERMES and INVINCIBLE. In this context action is in hand to bring forward ILLUSTRIOUS for deployment in August, and to assess prospects for reclaiming BULMARK to an operational state by about September. Further consideration is necessary to determine whether, as another option, it would be practical to lease a United States CVS for timely deployment. Whichever option is selected, it will be necessary to deploy additional Harrier GR3 aircraft to the Falklands area.

CONSPolitical:

Could impose some hardship on Falkland Islanders/engender reprisals against UK citizens on mainland.

Could imply acceptance of prolonged crisis.

Military:

Long term degradation of UK commitment to NATO.

Attrition of our own maritime assets could prejudice effective enforcement of blockade.

1. OPTION - Harassment Operations against the Argentine Garrison by Air and Sea Attacks.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Vulcans, Harriers, DD/FF.
3. TIMING - From 30 April.

PROSVulcansMilitary:

Neutralisation of Stanley Airfield has enhanced impact of TEZ and denied aerial resupply.

Ability to strike from long range has had immediate impact on sense of domestic security within mainland Argentina. Likely to tie down air defence assets to defend key areas remote from area of conflict.

Harriers/Naval BombardmentMilitary:

Selective attacks likely to weaken garrison capability and resolve.

Other features of military importance eg. airstrips, radar/POL/ammunition sites are being attacked discriminately.

Feasibility: (1) Feasible now.

CONSPolitical:

Strategic bombing could undermine international support for HMG.

Some risk of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

1. OPTION - Repossession of South Sandwich.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Current dispositions.
3. TIMING - From now. *in Oct/Nov*

PROSPolitical:

Could have relevance to UK stake in Antarctica.

Clear indication of UK resolve to reclaim all areas of Falkland dependencies.

Military:

Small scale operation.

CONSPolitical:

Looks like a soft option.

Exerts virtually no pressure on Argentina to withdraw troops from Falkland Islands.

Military:

Diverts forces from higher priority tasks.

Supportive of other measures; not a decisive measure in itself.

Virtually impossible to garrison.

Weather conditions could abort operation.

Feasibility: (1) Already of doubtful feasibility on account of deteriorating weather.

1. OPTION - Harassment Operations against Argentine garrison by Special Forces/Commando raids.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - SAS/SBS/Commando Forces embarked in Task Force and Amphibious Task Force.
3. TIMING - Limited capability from 30 April. Greater capability from 13 May.

PROSPolitical:

Successful attacks on high value targets would be consistent with minimum use of force, and would demonstrate HMG's resolve to take action against the Garrison without putting the civilian population at risk.

Military:

Scale and nature of attacks can be graduated and controlled to achieve disproportionate and accumulative effect.

Useful preparation for subsequent landing operation.

Confusing command and eroding the will to defend.

CONSPolitical:

The destruction of targets such as water and power supplies could cause hardship to civilian population.

The failure of a Special Forces/Commando operation could present the Argentines with a significant propaganda weapon.

Limited influence on negotiations.

Could lead to reprisals against civil population in Falkland Islands.

Military:

In the event of something going wrong, extraction would be difficult.

Feasibility:

(1) Feasible now.

(2) Feasibility will increase when Hercules are provided with extended range capability.

1. OPTION - Unrestricted attacks against Argentine Naval Units at sea.

2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Sea and Air forces deployed.

3. TIMING - As required.

PROS

Political:

Potential for clear and early success if enemy presents targets.

Sinkings might bring Argentine to negotiate more seriously.

Demoralising to Argentine public opinion and garrison.

Military:

Sinkings, particularly "25 of May" and SSK will enhance chances of success of TEZ or landing.

Lessens subsequent risk to UK assets.

Smaller UK garrison of FI needed in wake of re-occupation.

CONS

Political:

High visibility of success could engender strong OAS/World reaction against UK; could alienate our friends and engender increasing political pressures at home.

Spread of conflict area could arouse adverse international reaction.

Possible reprisals, or unrestrained mob attacks, against UK civilians on mainland.

Military:

Not an option if the Argentine fleet remains in port.

May conflict with requirement to enforce TEZ.

Increased risk of attrition to own forces.

Feasibility:

(1) Feasible now - but at cost of reassigning forces allocated to enforcing TEZ.

(2) Current constraints are self-imposed.

1. OPTION - Landing with limited aim of establishing a secure military presence on part of the Falklands without attempting to evict Argentines.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force as presently constituted.
3. TIMING:- 19 - about 31 May.

PROSPolitical:

Negotiation might be possible free from the strong emotions which might be generated by more direct confrontation.

UN might intervene and secure mutual withdrawal.

Civilian casualties and damage could be kept to minimum.

Maintains political initiative consistent with minimum use of force.

Military:

Control of part of Falklands could be established.

Might be possible to establish base ashore for Harrier/support helicopter operations which, with embarked air assets, could significantly increase our overall air capability.

Feasibility:

- (1) Increased if TEZ fully enforced during the preceding period and softening up operations vigorously conducted.
- (2) Could be attempted without need to commit 5 Bde.

CONSPolitical:

UN intervention might not result in resolution of sovereignty issue to HMG's satisfaction.

Could lead to long term operations and stalemate.

Military:

Danger of a prolonged campaign with additional need to defend fleet and landing force against air attack.

Limited military advantage with many of the risks associated with full repossession. Need to support effort military and logistic - could detract from enforcement of TEZ.

OPTION - Landing with aim of full and early repossession of the Falkland Islands.

2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force as presently constituted with addition of 5 Bde Gp.
3. TIMING - 19 - about 31 May.

PROSPolitical:

Direct and unambiguous demonstration of HMG's resolve.

Climate could be created for negotiated settlement.

Military:

Concentration of force would put early and maximum pressure on Argentine garrison.

Possibility of evicting Argentines militarily.

Most direct means of attempting to restore British control.

Operational planning already well underway.

CONSPolitical:

International (and domestic) support could be undermined.

Military stalemate could ensue.

Military:

Achievement of objective could be delayed by need to minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

Capability to maintain intensive air operations could decline from end May.

Might be impossible to avoid direct confrontation with possible heavy casualties and battle damage.

Feasibility:

(1) Feasible with the addition of 5 Bde Gp to the landing force. Potential for success increased if 1E2 fully enforced during preceding period and softening up operations vigorously conducted.

(2) Weather conditions, extended supply lines and need to defend high value merchant shipping and landing area over a potentially lengthy period demand air and maritime supremacy of an order that might be difficult to achieve. Sinking of "25 of May" and SSK would greatly enhance success.

(3) Loss of carrier or Canberra/QE2 would jeopardise landing and/or subsequent operations.

1. OPTION - Mining/blockading the mainland Argentine ports.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Blockade: SSN/SSK; Scuttle block ships
Mining: SSN/SSK; Hercules, Vulcan.
3. TIMING - Most assets immediately available apart from scuttle block ships.

PROSBLOCKADEPolitical:

Immediately increases economic pressure.

Some port closures might be achieved for a limited period.

MININGPolitical:

Likely to lead to immediate cessation of trade.

Feasibility:

(1) Mining: At detriment to other tasks assets could be made available for mining tasks, uncertain and indiscriminate results currently make this an unattractive option.

(2) Blockade is feasible; might be necessary if Argentine naval units retire into mainland harbour.

CONSBLOCKADEPolitical:

Increased motive for Soviet involvement because of disruption to grain supplies.

Difficult to present internationally; likely to generate international resentment.

Military:

Scuttle ships only effective in narrow channels and very difficult to place in position.

High risk to personnel involved.

MININGPolitical:

Difficult to present internationally; relevance to Article 51 unclear; Indiscriminate effect; mining of neutral merchantmen likely to alienate international support, undermine domestic support, jeopardise safety of British business community in Argentina.

Military:

Would entail dispersing UK naval capability; air laying likely to be opposed, difficult and costly of assets.

1. OPTION - Attack Argentine mainland targets.
2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Vulcans and/or Special Forces.
3. TIMING - Vulcans - Available at Ascension Island 29 April 1982
Special Force - Embarked on Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force.
Available shortly.

PROSPolitical:

Military targets could be chosen to minimise casualties.

Attacks would be highly visible manifestation of HMG's resolve.

Impact on Argentine domestic opinion would be immediate. Not certain whether this would strengthen or weaken their resolve to hold the Falkland Islands.

Military:

Surprise might be achieved.

Bombing of airfields would reduce effectiveness of Argentine air force.

Special forces operations could be carefully controlled.

Feasibility:

- (1) Feasible now - Attacks on Argentine ports and air bases operating in support of Falkland Islands could be justified under terms of Article 51. Such attacks would not be as escalatory as any directed against less involved harbours and airfields.
- (2) The scale of raids would be limited by need to convert Vulcans to, and provide, AAR.
- (3) Surprise would be a key element of success.

CONSPolitical:

Difficult to justify attacks on military facilities not operating in support of Argentine effort.

Legitimacy might be challenged in context of Article 51 of UN charter.

International and domestic support for HMG could be severely affected.

Direct incentive for reprisals against British ex-patriates in Argentina.

Military:

Only a limited capability for air attack in view of range and AAR support needed.

Insertion and extraction of special forces would be difficult and could put at risk the delivery vehicles.

Could give rise to large number of civilian casualties.

Action might generate active military support for Argentine. British forces could be greatly outnumbered.

High risks are involved.

OPTION - Landing in Southern Argentine (Tierra del Fuego).

2. FORCES REQUIRED/AVAILABLE - Task Force and Amphibious Landing Force as deployed.
3. TIMING - From May at the earliest.

PROS

Political:

Devastating blow for junta.

Might provide bargaining counter for withdrawal of Argentine forces from Falkland Islands.

Would be positive measure of HMG resolve.

Military:

Demonstrates capability to extend conflict.

CONS

Political:

Legitimacy under Article 51 of UN Charter would be challenged.

International and domestic support could well be gravely damaged.

Any Chilean involvement would widen scope of conflict.

Likely to increase Argentinian resistance.

Military:

Very high risk involved.

Would greatly reduce capacity for subsequent operations against Argentine Forces on Falkland Islands, which is UK aim.

TEZ could not be maintained in parallel.

Feasibility:

(1) This option could only be achieved with either the full co-operation of the Chilean Air Force or use of appropriate Chilean airfields.

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