

FC 913

*We might tell
FCO that I*

*ATTN
TO: Ps/PUS, HJ 85 11
PSC do note in final
for me to sign. Ref to
PSC/CD/9
B. This is DGI's note
to be looking for.
2nd
(A1)*

SECRET UK EYES A

D/DIS(CS)21/52

PSO/CDS
PS/PUS

*gave all NATO
CHOD's of a
very full brief
today*

*5 May
BND is to get specific info
on Blyrams.
5 May
5/5*

RELATIONS WITH FRG

Ref: Bonn Telegram 398 (041700Z May) attached.

FALICLANDS: BRIEFING THE FRG

I hope to discuss this later today with Antony Acland. I will ask him to represent my views in any reply to Bonn, which I hope reflect those of MOD.

2. Firstly on the intelligence side, the important DIS links are with BND and not FMOD. Liaison with FMOD Intelligence is left largely to our DA in Bonn. Two weeks ago a DIS Director went to Munich to liaise with and brief BND. Subsequently their Deputy Chief of Station in London has been briefed by my staff. I have just written to the BND President offering further assistance if required. FMOD has not been neglected; there have been two briefings for Attaches in London and there is another, for old Commonwealth and NATO only, tomorrow afternoon. The German DA is to be offered a special briefing.

3. On the operations side DMSI and ACDS(Ops) have agreed that daily sitreps should be sent to our Attaches overseas, and the same signal used for limited circulation to Attaches in London.

PSO

★

5th May 1982

Note att for signature.

DGI

DS12 is for NATO.

MA/DGI to close the loop.

6 May

*JW
(A1)*

CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF		
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FILE: 2038/1		DS SEC

SECRET UK EYES A

Q615

3/75

CHIEF OF
- 5 MAY 82
DEFENCE STAFF



PSO
DBZ has minuted about
5 May
Jm
(A)

SECRET

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FOR ...

IMMEDIATE 041700Z MAY 82

FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON
TO MODUK

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SECRET UK COMMS ONLY
SIC Z99 (INSERTED BY DCC NOT TO BE USED IN REPLY)
FM BONN 041700Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 398 OF 04 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE MOD (UK) PERSONAL FOR DGI

PERSONAL FOR PUS
YOUR TELEGRAM GUIDANCE NO 84: FALKLANDS: BRIEFING THE FEDERAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

1. YOU WILL SEE FROM THE REPORTS I HAVE TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY THAT WEST GERMAN OPINION, BOTH IN THE MEDIA AND IN GOVERNMENT, IS BEGINNING TO WAIVER. THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO OUTSIDE THE TEZ WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF LIFE HAS MADE A VERY UNFAVOURABLE IMPACT HERE AND HEIGHTENED GERMAN FEARS THAT THE WAR IS ESCALATING OUT OF CONTROL. OFFICIALS IN THE KANZLERAMT, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE ALL BEEN OPENLY CRITICAL, AND THERE HAS NOW BEEN A CROP OF UNHELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WITH THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSING HIMSELF AS QUOTE VERY DISTURBED UNQUOTE.
2. IN THE FMOD, IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO MY DA THAT THEY ARE NOW LOOKING AT ARGENTINE AS WELL AS BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE FALKLANDS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT; AND THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF LACK OF INFORMATION FROM US ON WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING. BECAUSE OF THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE USE OF CODEWORD MATERIAL (THE NEED FOR WHICH I WELL UNDERSTAND) WE ARE VIRTUALLY LIMITED TO TELLING THEM WHAT THEY HEAR FOR THEMSELVES ON THE BBC. THEY HAVE ALSO COMMENTED RATHER SADLY THAT THE GERMAN DA IN LONDON HAD RECEIVED ONLY TWO CONFIDENTIAL MOD BRIEFINGS SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN. F
3. IN SHORT, THERE IS A PERCEPTIBLE AND GROWING FEELING AT ALL LEVELS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE NOT TAKING THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AS PARTNERS; AND IN ONE OR TWO CASES THIS MAY EVEN BE BEGINNING TO AFFECT THE CREDENCE WHICH THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN WILLING TO GIVE TO BRITISH SOURCES OF INFORMATION. THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT ABLE TO KEEP THEM PROMPTLY AND FULLY INFORMED OF MILITARY EVENTS OFF THE FALKLANDS AS THEY OCCUR; OR OF THE REASONS FOR WHAT WE ARE DOING (EG ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON WHY THE GENERAL BELGRANO WAS ATTACKED OUTSIDE THE TEZ), IS REINFORCING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ANXIETIES ABOUT THE COURSE AND LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIGHTING. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANCELLOR REALLY MADE THE

ARE WORK ABOUT NOT GIVING BRITAIN A BLANK CHEQUE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS WEEK'S SPIEGEL, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT CORRECTLY REFLECTS WHAT HE IS NOW THINKING.

4. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUPPLYING UP TO DATE INFORMATION IN A FAST MOVING SITUATION. I ALSO RECOGNISE THAT CONSIDERATIONS OF SECURITY MUST BE PARAMOUNT WHERE INTELLIGENCE SHARING IS CONCERNED. BUT I AM BOUND TO REPORT THAT, AS SEEN FROM HERE, WE ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER OF LOSING GERMAN SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT, ALONG WITH THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE, UNLESS WE CAN FIND SOME WAY OF KEEPING THEM AUTHORITATIVELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR, BOTH ON THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL FRONT. I SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE GRATEFUL IF THOSE CONCERNED COULD LOOK AGAIN URGENTLY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATING A LESS RESTRICTIVE POLICY ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE GERMANS (AND PRESUMABLY OTHER CLOSE EUROPEAN ALLIES AS WELL). AND IF CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO BRIEFING THE EMBASSIES CONCERNED MORE REGULARLY - PERHAPS THROUGH THEIR DAIS AND IF POSSIBLE ON A DAILY BASIS. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO NOMINATE AN OFFICER WHOM THE EMBASSIES COULD TELEPHONE FOR UP TO DATE INFORMATION WHENEVER THEY FELT THE NEED? EVEN IF THIS BRIEFING COULD DO LITTLE MORE THAN PUT A GLOSS ON THE REPORTS CARRIED BY THE BBC, IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE AUTHORITATIVE AND THEREFORE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANYTHING WE CAN DO HERE.

TAYLOR
BT

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Z

CYG 1 DGI ACTION (CYG 1 DISO)
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