
FC 913 D/DIS(CS)21/52 CAII PSO/CDS PS/PUS RELATIONS WITH FRG Ref: Bonn Telegram 398 (041700Z May) attached. I hope to discuss this later today with Antony Acland.
I will ask him to represent my views in any reply to Bonn, which I hope reflect those of MOD. Firstly on the intelligence side the important DIS links with BND and not FMOD. Liaison with FMOD Intelligence are with BND and not FMOD. is left largely to our DA in Bonn. Two weeks ago a DIS Director went to Munich to liaise with and brief BND. Subsequently their Deputy Chief of Station in London has been briefed by my staff. I have just written to the BND President offering further FMOD has not been neglected; there assistance if required. have been two briefings for Attaches in London and there is another, for old Commonwealth and NATO only, tomorrow afternoon. The German DA is to be offered a special briefing. 3. On the operations side DMSI and ACDS(Ops) have agreed that daily sitreps should be sent to our Attaches overseas, and the same signal used for limited circulation to Attaches in London. all for pignature. Note DGI 5th May 1982 DS12 is fr NATO. MA DOE to close the loop. CHIEF PFIDEFENCE STAFF DATES in COPIES 6 May CDS (A) CNS CGS Hd SCDS(A) CAS SCDS A T SECCOS VCDS (P&L) Hd SCOS(3) DCDS (I) SCDS S T DCDS (OR) SECRET UK EYES A ACDS (OPS) ADC ACDS (POL) SO/CDS ACDS (P&L) 9614 PA/CDS ACDS (S) FILE 2038 DS SEC-



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FOR ...

IMMEDIATE Ø417ØØZ MAY 82

FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON TO MODUK

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY BIC Z99 (INSERTED BY DCC NOT TO BE USED IN REPLY) FM BONN Ø41700Z MAY 82 TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 398 OF Ø4 MAY INFO IMMEDIATE MOD (UK) PERSONAL FOR DGI

PERSONAL FOR PUS YOUR TELEGRAM GUIDANCE NO 84: FALKLANDS: BRIEFING THE FEDERAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

1. YOU WILL SEE FROM THE REPORTS I HAVE TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY THAT WEST GERMAN OPINION, BOTH IN THE MEDIA AND IN GOVERNMENT. IS BEGINNING TO WAIVER. THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO OUTSIDE THE TEZ WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF LIFE HAS MADE A VERY UNFAVOURABLE IMPACT HERE AND HEIGHTENED GERMAN FEARS THAT THE WAR IS ESCALATING OUT OF CONTROL. OFFICIALS IN THE KANZLERAMT. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND AUSWAERTIGES: AMT HAVE ALL BEEN OPENLY CRITICAL, AND THERE HAS NOW BEEN A CROP OF UNHELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WITH THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSING HIMSELF AS QUOTE VERY DISTRURBED UNQUOTE.

2. IN THE FMOD, IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO MY DA THAT THEY ARE NOW LOOKING AT ARGENTINE AS WELL AS BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF DEVELOPMENTS. AROUND THE FALKLANDS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT: AND THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF LACK OF INFORMATION FROM US ON WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING. BECAUSE OF THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE USE OF CODEWORD MATERIAL (THE NEED FOR WHICH I WELL UNDERSTAND) WE ARE VIRTUALLY LIMITED TO TELLING THEM WHAT THEY HEAR FOR THEMSELVES ON THE BBC. THEY HAVE ALSO COMMENTED RATHER SADLY THAT THE GERMAN DA IN LONDON HAD RECEIVED ONLY TWO CONFIDENTIAL MOD WE BRIEFINGS SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN. F

3. IN SHORT, THERE IS A PERCEPTIBLE AND GROWING FEELING AT ALL LEVELS

IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE NOT TAKING THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AS PARTNERS: AND IN ONE OR TWO CASES THIS MAY EVEN BE BEGINNING TO AFFECT THE CREDENCE WHICH THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN WILLING TO GIVE TO BRITISH SOURCES OF INFORMATION. THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT ABLE TO KEEP THEM PROMPTLY AND FULLY INFORMED OF MILITARY EVENTS OFF THE FALKLANDS AS THEY OCCUR; OR OF THE REASONS FOR WHAT WE ARE DOING (EG ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON WHY THE GENERAL BELGRANO WAS ATTACKED OUTSIDE THE TEZ). IS REINFORCING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT!S ANXIETIES ABOUT THE COURSE AND LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIGHTING. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANCELLOR REALLY MADE THE

PAGE 12404316 SECRET RK ABOUT NOT GIVING BRITAIN A BLANK CHEQUE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO M IN THIS WEEK!S SPIEGEL, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT CORRECTLY F
REFLECTS WHAT HE IS NOW THINKING.

4. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUPPLYING
UP TO DATE INFORMATION IN A FAST MOVING SITUATION. I ALSO RECOGNISE
THAT CONSIDERATIONS OF SECURITY MUST BE PARAMOUNT WHERE INTELLIGENCE
SHARING IS CONCERNED. BUT I AM BOUND TO REPORT THAT, AS SEEN FROM HERE, WE ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER OF LOSING GERMAN SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT, ALONG WITH THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE, UNLESS WE CAN FIND SOME WAY OF KEEPING THEM AUTHORITATIVELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR, BOTH ON THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL FRONT. IT THEY OCCUR, BOTH ON THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL FRONT.
SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE GRATEFUL IF THOSE CONCERNED COULD LOOK AGAIN
URGENTLY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATING A LESS RESTRICTIVE POLICY
ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE GERMANS (AND PRESUMABLY OTHER
CLOSE EUROPEAN ALLIES AS WELL) AND IF CONSIDERATION COULD BE F
GIVEN TO BRIEFING THE EMBASSIES CONCERNED MORE REGULARLY PERHAPS
THROUGH THEIR DAIS AND IF POSSIBLE ON A DAILY BASIS. WOULD IT
BE POSSIBLE TO NOMINATE AN OFFICER WHOM THE EMBASSIES COULD
TELEPHONE FOR UP TO DATE INFORMATION WHENEVER THEY FELT THE NEED?
EVEN IF THIS BRIEFING COULD DO LITTLE MORE THAN PUT A GLOSS ON THE
REPORTS CARRIED BY THE BBC. IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE AUTHORITATIVE
AND THEREFORE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANYTHING WE CAN DO HERE. AND THEREFORE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANYTHING WE CAN DO HERE. DISTRIBUTION Z99,
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CYG 1 DG1 ACTION (CYG 1 DISDO)
CAB 1 PUS
CYR 1 RES CLERK
ZPA 1 DCC SPECIAL HANDLING