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FOR CII

PRIORITY 061015 MAY 82

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TO MODUK
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SIC A3A/A2N/19F

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FM BONN 061015 MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 412 OF 06 MAY

NFO PRIORITY PARIS UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

MX TELNO 408: YOUR MEETING WITH HERR GENSCHER TODAY.

1. I AM DELIGHTED THAT THIS MEETING IS ON AGAIN.

FALKLANDS

2. THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 21 (TO PARIS HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO GENSCHER'S OFFICE (I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT YOU SENT IT BEFORE TODAY'S MEETING WAS CONFIRMED)).

3. YOU WILL I KNOW BE BRINGING HIM UP TO DATE ON THE STATE OF PLAY. AT THE SAME TIME IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF, WHILE TAKING HIM INTO YOUR CONFIDENCE, YOU WERE TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE TONE OF RECENT GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS AND OFFICIALLY INSPIRED PRESS COMMENT HERE (SEE FOR EXAMPLE, MY TELS NOS 404 AND 410). FOUR SUCCESSIVE STATEMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SINCE 30 APRIL HAVE FAILED TO MAKE ANY MENTION OF CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE UK, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE VARIOUSLY EXPRESSED CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS AND APPEALED TO BOTH US AND THE ARGENTINES FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A QUOTE REAL EFFORT UNQUOTE TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. YOU MAY WISH TO SAY TO GENSCHER, AS WE HAVE BEEN SAYING FORCIBLY TO OFFICIALS AND JOURNALISTS HERE, THAT THIS LINE - WHICH APPEARS, APART FROM ENUFNE AND RATHER WEAK-KNEED CONCERN, TO BE BASED ON OVER-HASTY ACCEPTANCE OF PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT HEAVY ARGENTINE

CASUALTIES -

- (A) TAKES NO ACCOUNT WHATSOEVER OF THE ENORMOUS EFFORT HMG HAS ALL ALONG BEEN PUTTING INTO ITS SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION:
- (B) FAILS TO MENTION SCR 502 AND PARTICULARLY THE NEED FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL:
- (C) FAILS TO RECALL ARGENTINE AGGRESSION:
- (D) DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT A CEASE-FIRE WOULD MEAN E.G. WHETHER WE WOULD BE EXPECTED NOT TO FIRE AT ARGENTINE

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SHIPS ATTEMPTING TO REINFORCE THE FALKLANDS:
(E) BY WEAKENING THE SHOW OF EC SOLIDARITY, SENDS
THE WRONG SIGNALS TO THE ARGENTINES, AND REDUCES THE
CHANCES OF BRINGING THEM TO
THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, WHICH MAY JUST BE BEGINNING
TO INCREASE.

MANDATE

4. THE GERMAN HANKERING FOR THE EASY WAY OUT OVER THE FALKLANDS
ISSUE IS OF A PIECE WITH THE LINE THEY HAVE BEEN TAKING RECENTLY

OVER THE MANDATE. AT THE LAST FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE GERMANS, SUPPORTED BY THE OTHERS, HAVE BEEN URGING THAT WE SHOULD COME TO A RAPID SOLUTION SINCE, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD DETERIORATE AND THE READINESS TO MEET US WOULD DIMINISH. THERE IS, OBVIOUSLY, A LARGE TACTICAL ELEMENT IN THIS TALK. UNDERLYING IT IS THE GERMAN CONCERN TO GET THE SUBJECT OUT OF THE WAY QUICKLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE ITS CONTINUANCE WILL HAVE A QUOTE POISONING UNQUOTE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNITY GENERALLY AND ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE LOSING INTEREST IN IT. I BELIEVE THE GERMANS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL REORIENTATION OF COMMUNITY POLICIES AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE BUDGET HAS NOW DISAPPEARED AND THAT THE MANDATE PROBLEM SHOULD TAKE ITS POSITION AS JUST ANOTHER IN A LONG LINE OF COMMUNITY HORSE-TRADING DEALS.

5. FOR THESE REASONS, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO LEAVE GENSCHER IN NO DOUBT BOTH BY OUR DETERMINATION TO GET A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION AND OF OUR GENUINE READINESS TO NEGOTIATE. AS TO THE LINK BETWEEN THE AGRICULTURAL PRICE FIXING AND THE MANDATE NEGOTIATION, IT REMAINS AS IMPORTANT AS EVER TO MAKE IT FIRM, AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR RESERVE IS ONE OF SUBSTANCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WILL BE WORTH SAYING TO GENSCHER HOW DISAPPOINTED WE WERE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT AND PARTY COLLEAGUE ERTL FAILED AT THE LAST MINUTE TO MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITH US IN OUR ATTEMPTS IN THE AGRICULTURE COUNCIL TO LIMIT THE COSTS OF THE SETTLEMENT.

TAYLOR
BT

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*J. J. M.
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