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Private Secretary

FALKLANDS: REPLY TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

I attach a copy of our reply to the UN Secretary-General's ideas, incorporating the amendments introduced by Sir A Parsons in his telegram No. 661.

(245)

P J ROBERTS
United Nations Dept.

7 May 1982

Copies to: PS/PUS
PS/Mr Onslow
Mr Bullard
Mr Giffard
Mr Wright
Mr Freeland
Mr Ure
Mr Gillmore
Mr Fearn (Emergency Unit) ✓
Mr Mallaby (Planning Staff)
Mr Weston (Defence Dept.)
Mr Jay (Planning Staff)

UNITED KINGDOM REPLY TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON THE
FALKLANDS

DELIVERED ON 6 MAY 1982 IN NEW YORK

1. As you know I have been considering very carefully the ideas about the Falkland Islands which you put to me in New York last weekend. I accept the general approach embodied in your ideas. Indeed the elements for a solution which you mention are close to those which have been the basis of Britain's efforts for a negotiated settlement since the present crisis started in early April.
2. Your ideas were naturally stated briefly and in general terms. I should like in this reply to explain the British position and offer comments on the elements needed for a settlement. I think you will see that our views are fully compatible with yours.
3. I must first reiterate that the present crisis has arisen because Argentina illegally used force to prosecute a claim to the Falkland Islands when active negotiations were already in progress. The United Nations Security Council, in its mandatory Resolution No 502 which my government at once accepted, set out more than a month ago the requirements for ending the crisis. It remains imperative that this resolution be implemented without delay. You will understand that, until it is implemented, Britain could not accept a call for an unconditional cessation of hostilities which would have the effect of inhibiting its right of self-defence as recognised by Article 51 of the Charter.
4. In order to bring about the implementation of Resolution 502, and to avoid further bloodshed, Britain is willing to accept and immediately implement an interim agreement which would prepare the way for a definitive settlement.

5. Such an interim agreement could provide for a ceasefire to come into effect as soon as possible after Britain and Argentina had stated formally in writing that they accepted the interim agreement. Instructions for a ceasefire could be issued immediately after conclusion of that agreement, to come into effect as soon as both parties could guarantee compliance by their forces.
6. But such a ceasefire cannot simply leave Argentina in illegal occupation of the Islands, in contravention of Resolution 502 and with the ability to continue to build up the occupation forces. Implementation of the ceasefire must therefore be unambiguously linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal, which as you recognise is the priority element in any agreement. Withdrawal would be completed within a fixed number of days. The British forces would stand off at a reasonable distance from the Falkland Islands, thus providing mutual withdrawal of the forces of both sides.
7. After mutual withdrawal, the two sides would suspend the exclusion zones now in force. Steps would be taken to lift the economic measures introduced in connection with the present crisis.
8. As regards the transitional arrangements, the United Kingdom would be prepared to accept an interim administration of the Islands, to be undertaken by a Contact Group of a small number of states other than Britain and Argentina, which would act in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands. The same Contact Group could verify the withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and the non-return of forces pending a definitive settlement.
9. Britain would be ready with Argentina to acknowledge the existence of different and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands. We would be willing to engage in negotiations, without prejudice, for a definitive agreement on the status of the Islands and to accept a target date - perhaps one year later - for conclusion of an agreement which would accord

with the wishes of the Islanders. We should be willing to accept that the Contact Group mentioned above should have a role in relation to these negotiations.

10. I believe that the views that I have expressed accord fully with your own ideas. Indeed they have the effect of amplifying your suggestions. Let me conclude by repeating that the United Kingdom stands ready to consider all constructive suggestions for a United Nations role in future arrangements concerning the Falkland Islands.