



Sir A Acland

cc: Mr Wright  
Mr Ure  
Mr Mallaby  
Mr Fearn

1. The Prime Minister saw UKMIS telegram No.679 at 22.45 on 8 May and commented that it was important to get instructions to New York by first thing Sunday, 9 May, New York time, to enable Sir A Parsons to give the Secretary-General the impression of a prompt response.

2. She saw little point in a meeting of OD(SA) tomorrow, since she believed that the most important of the points on which the Secretary-General has asked for a reaction have already been given sufficient consideration (she referred to the US/Peruvian proposals). She is aware of your meeting with FCO officials at 10.30 on 9 May to consider developments in New York and has indicated that she would like your advice by telephone thereafter. (I have agreed with the Duty Private Secretary at No.10 that we will be in touch about this on Sunday morning after you have returned to the Office.)

3. I have spoken to the Private Secretary in Brussels. He will report either by telephone or telegram if the Secretary of State has immediate comment on the UKMIS telegrams but thinks it more likely that the Secretary of State would prefer to speak to you on the telephone before you call Chequers. I agreed with him that you will telephone the Secretary of State at around 11-11.15 tomorrow morning (the best point of contact would be through Michael Butler), before speaking to the Prime Minister.

4. The Duty Private Secretary/No.10 has given me some comment on the Prime Minister's initial reactions to UKMIS telegram No.679. On Point 1 (the length of time T) she felt that the formula contained in the US/Peruvian proposals could be accepted without difficulty though she was in the hands of her military advisers on this. On the period of withdrawal, she questioned whether 14 days would be long enough but again observed that on this MOD advice would be essential.

5. On phasing (Point 3) she envisaged that the Task Force would be withdrawn in step with the Argentine withdrawal and presumably to the same distance from the Islands as the Islands were to the mainland. She had no comment on Point 4 (terminal date for the negotiations). On Point 5 (venue) she assumed that negotiation would be under the direction of the Secretary-General though the disadvantages of New York were self-evident. She wondered whether Mexico or Geneva might be alternatives, but was content to await Foreign Office advice.

*A J Payne*

8 May 1982

A J Payne  
Emergency Unit