

with a Latin American country, a West European country, and perhaps one or two others. I said the advantage of having the U.S. in such a group was that we had considerable influence over the British, even though they did not advise us in advance of their military operations. He agreed and then said as second step President Galtieri and Mrs. Thatcher should get together in some third country under UN auspices to work out final details of an agreement. He did not seem to have a sense of urgency like Galtieri's. He said that the evacuation of U.S. dependents had produced an unfavorable impression among the Argentine military, who felt that service families should be the last to leave, not the first. He has been asked to remove or limit the flying of the U.S. Air Attache's aircraft and has refused to do so, saying that Argentina was a Western country and should not make the task of restoring relations with the U.S. after the present situation any more difficult.

2. He was very composed and moderate throughout and gave me the impression that the long-term relationship between the U.S. and Argentina is more important to him than the Malvinas. He addressed me as Dick and asked me to call him Arturo. (I have known him for several years) The meeting lasted about one hour and was conducted in Spanish. He said that either he or Galtieri would get back to me about the appointment with Admiral Anaya later in the day. He is quite an impressive figure, showing a considerable degree of thoughtfulness and moderation, a most unusual quality in the present circumstances here.

255. Editorial Note

On May 12, 1982, Brazilian President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo began a 2-day State visit to Washington, the first for a Brazilian head of state in 11 years. In a May 11 action memorandum to President Ronald W. Reagan, prepared in anticipation of Figueiredo's arrival, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William P. Clark indicated that the visit was "designed to cap a rapprochement" with Brazil "that began early in this administration." "Brasilia," he continued, "even before the Falkland crisis erupted, remains cautious. Few in the Brazilian establishment expect to return to the days of 'automatic alignment' with the United States." He concluded: "The issue that will probably dominate the discussion is the Falkland crisis. Figueiredo will explain Brazil's position which does not support Argen-

tina's use of force, but does accept Argentina's claim to the Malvinas. You should know, too, that Brazil is concerned about our tilt toward Britain. Moreover, President Figueiredo's interest is directly engaged because he is the author of Brazil's rapprochement with Argentina begun several years ago—a policy which ended decades of strained relations between Brasilia and Buenos Aires. Therefore, he wants to preserve good relations with Argentina. He will also express concern over the future of inter-American relations. Above all, he does not want this hemisphere polarized. He does not want to have to choose between friendship with the Spanish speaking republics and the United States." The memorandum forwarded a May 6 briefing memorandum prepared by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig as well as eight background papers prepared in the Department of State and a list of talking points and public statements for Reagan's use, and recommended that Reagan read them. All of Clark's recommendations outlined in the May 11 action memorandum were approved. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, Brazil—President Figueiredo Visit 05/11/1982–05/14/1982 (2))

According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Figueiredo on four occasions on May 12 and again on the morning of May 13, although no memoranda of conversation of any of these meetings have been found. The talking points prepared for Reagan's first meeting with Figueiredo, held in the Oval Office from 10:42 until 11:38 a.m., May 12, addressed the situation in the South Atlantic: "But as encouraged as I am with the state of our relations, Mr. President, a great tragedy is engulfing our hemisphere. In the South Atlantic two friends of Brazil and the United States are locked in combat. This matter has personally concerned me more than any other as President. My greatest wish which I expressed in my speech to the OAS in February was making this hemisphere secure, prosperous, and at peace because the peoples of this hemisphere have so much to offer the other. That dream is threatened and not by an alien and hostile power. But it is threatened by a quarrel by two friends of this country and yours. There is right on both sides. We need to find a just solution to this problem. I welcome your advice and counsel. My government will welcome your government's cooperation in peacefully resolving this dispute." The talking points continued: "(If asked) Mr. President, as you know my country does not support the first use of force in resolving disputes. If this were permitted in this hemisphere, there would be no end to the mischief created. At the same time, we are neutral on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. We have tried and Secretary Haig has made enormous efforts to help mediate this tragic situation. We still wish to help and again I welcome your views and advice." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, Department of State

Briefing Book Re: Visit of President Figueiredo of Brazil 05/11/1982–05/14/1982)

Following this first meeting, an expanded meeting between Reagan and Figueiredo, which included the full U.S. and Brazilian delegations, took place in the Cabinet Room from 11:38 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. The talking points prepared for Reagan's use in this meeting are *ibid.* Reagan and Figueiredo then participated in a meeting with a group of U.S. and Brazilian businessmen in the Roosevelt Room from 12:07 to 12:24 p.m.

On the evening of May 12, President Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan hosted President Figueiredo and his wife at a State dinner at the White House from 7:31 until 10:57 p.m. Although no official record of discussions between the two Presidents that evening has been found, Reagan wrote in his personal diary that he and Figueiredo discussed the South Atlantic at the dinner: "Tonite—State dinner—Sergio Mendez entertains. A really nice dinner & evening. The Pres. [Figueiredo] told me he had a call from his Amba[sador] in Buenos Aires to the effect the British were about to attack mainland bases in Argentina—that he (The Pres.) must try to intervene with Pres. Galtien [*sic*] & I should get to the British." (Reagan, *Diaries*, page 131) Reagan telephoned British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher the following day, May 13. For the memorandum of conversation of the telephone call, see Document 257.

A final meeting between Reagan and Figueiredo occurred over breakfast, from 9 until 9:43 a.m. on May 13. A copy of the talking points prepared for Reagan's use at the meeting, initialed by Reagan, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, Brazil—President Figueiredo Visit 05/11/1982–05/14/1982 (1). On the South Atlantic, the document made three points: "Understand you [Figueiredo] and Secretary Haig agreed we should both support Secretary General's efforts for now," "If it appears he [Pérez de Cuéllar] needs help, we should consult again," and "If he does not succeed, we must then consider what we can do together or with others to bring about a peaceful solution." No record of the referenced meeting between Figueiredo and Haig has been found.