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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 729 OF 11 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

M.I.P.T. :

FALKLANDS

1. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, OUR TACTICS HAVE WORKED. BY INSISTING THAT WE MUST HAVE AN ANSWER ON THE PREJUDGEMENT QUESTION BEFORE DISCUSSING THE DETAIL OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WE HAVE EXTRACTED THE ANSWER WE WANTED. I AM NOT BOTHERED BY THE REFERENCE TO GA RESOLUTIONS. THEY ARE ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 'TAKING INTO ACCOUNT' IS A RELATIVELY MILD INTRODUCTORY PHRASE. THE REFERENCE TO THE CHARTER IS MORE IMPORTANT. AND, MOST IMPORTANT, WE HAVE GOT OUR LANGUAGE ABOUT THE OUTCOME NOT BEING PREJUDGED.
2. FURTHERMORE, THE ARGENTINES HAVE SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY ABOUT THE TARGET DATE; THEY HAVE SCALED DOWN THEIR REQUIREMENTS ON RESIDENCE ETC; THEY HAVE SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY ABOUT ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, ALTHOUGH THEIR FORMULATION OBVIOUSLY WILL NOT DO AS IT IS; AND THEY SEEM TO HAVE COME OFF THE NONSENSE ABOUT 2000 MILE WITHDRAWAL.
3. WHAT ARE THEY UP TO? I AM INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE ON THE TRACK OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 686 IE BLOCKING AGREEMENT UNTIL 31 DECEMBER LEADING TO THE IMMEDIATE

ON THE TRACK OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 686 IE BLOCKING AGREEMENT UNTIL 31 DECEMBER LEADING TO THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE OF THE UN ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR WALKING IN THE NEXT DAY. AS I EXPLAINED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS EVENING, WE STILL NEEDED MORE LANGUAGE ON THIS, AND I SHALL FIGHT HARD FOR LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE COMPLETELY CLEAR THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED IF NECESSARY, AFTER THE TARGET DATE. HOWEVER, EVEN THE LANGUAGE THEY HAVE PROPOSED OFFERS SOME INSURANCE IE 'TO SEEK THE COMPLETION BY 31 DECEMBER 1982.' THIS DOES NOT INSIST THAT 31 DECEMBER IS AN ABSOLUTE CUT OFF DATE. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE THE POSITION IF NECESSARY, THAT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE MUST CONTINUE AFTER THE TARGET DATE. IF ANYONE TABLED A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE CONTRARY, WE COULD BE CONFIDENT OF THREE VEToes (UK, US, FRANCE), PROVIDED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD REPORT THAT WE WERE STILL NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY.

4. IT IS MORE LIKELY THEREFORE THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE EITHER SINCERE, OR THAT THEY ARE PURSUING THE TRACK OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 686, IE TRYING TO FORCE US TO BREAK THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A POINT OR POINTS WHICH WOULD LEAVE US SQUARELY ON THE WRONG FOOT. THESE POINTS WOULD BE EITHER THE NATURE OF THE UN ADMINISTRATION OR SOUTH GEORGIA OR BOTH.

5. WE WOULD BE MOST EXPOSED ON SOUTH GEORGIA. IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN BECAUSE WE HAD REFUSED TO WITHDRAW A SMALL MILITARY GARRISON FROM A VIRTUALLY UNINHABITED ISLAND WHERE WE HAD NO GARRISON BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS ERUPTED, WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES TOTALLY ABANDONED BY EVERYONE HERE, EVEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES SUCH AS THE OLD COMMONWEALTH AND THE TEN. IT WOULD SEEM REASONABLE TO EVERYONE THAT WE SHOULD WITHDRAW OUR GARRISON FROM SOUTH GEORGIA AND BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FALKLANDS NEGOTIATIONS, A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS PERHAPS ON ANTARCTIC TREATY LINES.

6. WE WOULD BE SLIGHTLY LESS EXPOSED IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN ON THE QUESTION OF ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION. IF THE ARGENTINES INSISTED ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION BY ARGENTINES IN ANY CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT, THIS WOULD BE SEEN AS UNREASONABLE. EVEN SO, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP, INCLUDING THE WEST, WOULD THINK US OBDURATE IF WE FAILED TO REACH SOME COMPROMISE ON THIS QUESTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SHORT PERIOD OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

7. THESE ARE THE TWO BASIC POINTS. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINES THIS EVENING SUGGESTS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS

CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SHORT PERIOD OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

7. THESE ARE THE TWO BASIC POINTS. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINES THIS EVENING SUGGESTS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE PHASING OF WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE, THE LIFTING OF MILITARY ZONES, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND SO ON.

8. I REALISE ONLY TOO WELL THAT THE PRESSURE IS NOW ON US (THIS WAS INEVITABLE IF THE ARGENTINES GAVE WAY ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION) AND THAT YOU FACE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF THESE DECISIONS THAT I MADE CLEAR TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR (WHO FULLY ACCEPTED THE POINT) THAT HE COULD NOT EXPECT ME TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE TOMORROW AFTERNOON NEW YORK TIME. PRESENTATIONALLY I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY TO HIM ON 12 MAY, HOWEVER LATE.

9. ON TIMING, I PUT IT TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS AFTERNOON (HE DID NOT DEMUR) THAT THIS NEW SITUATION WOULD REQUIRE THE REST OF THE WORKING WEEK IN WHICH TO CLARIFY WHETHER OR NOT AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. WHATEVER ARGENTINE MOTIVES MAY BE, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST, FROM THE UN POINT OF VIEW, THAT OUR FIRST RESPONSE SHOULD APPEAR POSITIVE EVEN THOUGH IT STILL LEAVES ROOM FOR FURTHER HARD NEGOTIATION ON THE IMPORTANT POINTS.

10. FINALLY A POINT ON PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE HERE. BEFORE THIS EVENING'S ROUND, THE ARGENTINES WERE SUCCEEDING IN PRESENTING THEIR POSITION AS HAVING BECOME MORE MODERATE VIZ NEW YORK TIMES HEADLINE "ARGENTINA EASES TERMS FOR PEACE IN THE FALKLANDS". WE HAVE HAD TO REFER TO FINE PRINT IN ORDER TO CORRECT THIS. SIR N. HENDERSON HAS CONFIRMED TO ME THAT THIS IMPRESSION OF ARGENTINE REASONABLENESS IS WIDESPREAD IN THE MEDIA.

PARSONS

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