



Secretary of State

FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS

1. I have discussed with Sir N Henderson and Sir A Parsons the paper which you put in to OD(SA) and which will be taken at Chequers tomorrow morning. The following represents a simplification of their views.

a. Sir N Henderson

He does not think that the Americans could conceivably be brought to support Article 6(3) which deals with the interim administration. If this were softened and brought back to something closer to the formula in the US/Peru proposals ('in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands'), the document would be seen as a thoroughly reasonable British proposal which would give us a good public posture. He realises that there may well be additional difficulty over withdrawal from and demilitarisation of South Georgia, but would recommend that this should be kept entirely separate from the present proposals and that we should ask the Americans in particular (perhaps enlisting the support of the Brazilians) to ensure that this is dealt with separately. Mr Haig has said that he does not think that South Georgia should be included and would probably therefore be willing to help.

b. Sir A Parsons

He thinks that if the text as drafted were put forward to the Secretary General and to the Argentines without any changes and without any willingness to make

/ any



any changes, a break would come fairly quickly because of Article 6(3). In that event, he doubts whether we would have the support in the United Nations of our European partners or even the old Commonwealth who would think our insistence on so much of the trappings of the previous administration to be unreasonable. If, on the other hand, Article 6(3) were softened as proposed above, it might lead to agreement, but this would take at least until Friday next for the discussions to be completed or for the break to be brought about. Sir A Parsons admits that there might have to be some additional minor concessions to bring about agreement and the problem of withdrawal from South Georgia would certainly be raised. He does not rule out the possibility of dealing with it as suggested by Sir N Henderson.

Given the timing of decisions on the military options, time is of the essence. Sir A Parsons does not think that we would seem to be serious if we were to put our paper to the Secretary General and not to wait for about 48 hours before publishing it. If the paper were modified so as to have a chance of reaching a substantive agreement, we would have to allow even more time. Thus while recognising the difficulty that Cabinet may have to approve whatever text is put forward, Sir A Parsons would greatly prefer to go into action on Monday rather than on Tuesday.

2. In the light of the foregoing, I think we need to be clear if possible on what we are aiming at. If we want a fairly quick break, we can almost certainly get it on the

/ basis



basis of the text which you have submitted, because of Article 6(3). In that event, we will not have solid American support nor the support of our European and other allies. If, on the other hand, we are still going for a negotiated settlement, this might be achievable given more time and given some changes to the present text which might be very difficult to get accepted by the Cabinet and Parliament.

Sir A Acland

15 May 1982