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2038/1/1


Sec/CNS  
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CDS' DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES TO OD(SA)

A copy of the draft speaking notes which CDS intends to use at tomorrow's OD(SA) is attached for the information of your principal.



D C G BROOK  
Air Cdre  
PSO/CDS  
Ext 3353 MB

17 May 82

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ANNEX A TO

2038/1/1

DATED: 17 MAY 82

47

CDS' DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES

1. We have provided the military options against which diplomatic efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement could continue.

2. It now seems that a satisfactory settlement cannot be negotiated.

3. We now have to consider the next military

~~3. The next option we recommend is the landing to repossess the Islands.~~ option.

4. We support the C-in-C's assessment that a long blockade is not viable: All experience so far shows that attrition due to FwT,

~~4. A long blockade is not viable and we therefore~~

accident.  
puts us at a

5. We therefore

recommend that we should go ahead with the landing as soon as disav.

practicable, and that once ~~established~~ ashore we

should press on to establish the conditions for a satisfactory negotiated cease fire and ~~arm withdrawal~~ as

6. There are of course risks - from the Argentinian Fleet, ~~summar~~

including submarines; and <sup>note particularly</sup> from air attack. Attrition of

Argentinian forces has not been what we had hoped, <sup>alho still some chance of further red in cap.</sup> but we

~~believe the risks are militarily acceptable and that~~ <sup>to</sup> Once ashore,

the landing force would have a very good chance of success.

~~Once ashore~~

But both the C-in-C & <sup>COS</sup> ~~we~~ assess that the losses we might reasonably expect, & hence the risks, are militarily acceptable.  
C-in-C's plan is designed to reduce risks in landing critical landing phase to a minimum.

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ANNEX A TO 2033/1/1  
DATED 17 MAY 1982

CDS' DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES

- \*  
Have been  
and sent
1. We have provided the military options against which diplomatic efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement could continue.
  2. It now seems that a satisfactory settlement cannot be negotiated.
  3. We now have to consider the next military option.
  4. We support the CinC's assessment that a long blockade is not viable: All experience so far shows that attrition due to FW&T, accident puts us at a disadvantage.
  5. We therefore recommend that we should go ahead with the landing as soon as practicable, and that once ashore we should press on to establish the conditions for a satisfactory negotiated ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal - or surrender.
  6. There are, of course, risks - from the Argentine Fleet, including submarines; and more particularly from air attack. Attrition of Argentine forces has not been what we had hoped, although there is still some chance of a further reduction in their capability. But both the CinC and COS assess that the losses we might reasonably expect, and hence the risks, are militarily acceptable. CinC's plan is designed to reduce risks in the critical landing phase to a minimum.
  7. Once ashore, the landing force would have a very good chance of success.

Decision required:

Not time for a 'hold'

1 of 1

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2038/1

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18/5.  
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ANNEX A TO 2033/1/1  
DATED 17 MAY 1982

59.

CDS' DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES

- \* From review and report
1. We have provided the military options against which diplomatic efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement could continue.
  2. It now seems that a satisfactory settlement cannot be negotiated.
  3. We now have to consider the next military option.
  4. We support the CinC's assessment that a long blockade is not viable: All experience so far shows that attrition due to FW&T\*, accident puts us at a disadvantage.
  5. We therefore recommend that we should go ahead with the landing as soon as practicable, and that once ashore we should press on to establish the conditions for a satisfactory negotiated ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal - or surrender.
  6. There are, of course, risks - from the Argentine Fleet, including submarines; and more particularly from air attack. Attrition of Argentine forces has not been what we had hoped, although there is still some chance of a further reduction in their capability. But both the CinC and COS assess that the losses we might reasonably expect, and hence the risks, are militarily acceptable. CinC's plan is designed to reduce risks in the critical landing phase to a minimum.
  7. Once ashore, the landing force would have a very good chance of success.

Decision required:

Lat time for a 'hold'

1 of 1

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