

Emergency Whit

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cc: PS/Mr Onslow
Mr Bullard
Mr Giffard
Mr Wright
Sir I Sinclair
Mr Gillmore


Lord N Gordon Lennox

Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff
Mr Fearn, Emergency Unit
Mr Fenn, News Department
Mr Weston, Defence Department
Mr Williams, UND

FALKLANDS

1. The following is a brief summary of a number of telephone conversations which the PUS has had today with members of UKMIS New York.

- 2. In the first telephone conversation after lunch today Mr Goulding warned that it would be difficult to extract a public statement from the UN Secretary General, that his efforts had come to an end without at the same time precipitating a meeting of the Security Council. There was very great tension in New York and the Secretary General's first act on deciding that his efforts were fruitless would be to speak to the President of the Security Council who would quickly seek informal consultations.
- 3. Later Sir Anthony Parsons reported that the Argentine documentation had been received. It was worse than the summary we had seen last night and Sir A Parsons intended to provide the Secretary General with our final response later in the day. He said that Perez de Cuellar was desparate not to admit failure and to seek to extend the deadline in order that he might put forward two or threee new points as a last desperate throw to find a way of bridging the gap. Sir A Parsons intended to see him quickly and explain the full horrors of the Argentine paper. Apparently, Sir A Parsons said that Mrs Kirkpatrick had urged Perez de Cuellar to put forward a complete median paper. Perez de Cuellar had refused to do so; he is very suspicious of the Americans who he thinks are trying to torpedo his proposals in order to preserve Haig's position. Meanwhile he had made a **glob**myand contingent report to the President of the Security Council who was proposing informal talks tomorrow. Sir A Parsons referred again to the conundrum of how to secure a clear statement from the UN Secretary General without percipitating a full meeting of the Security Council given that Perez de Cuellar was so desperately keen to maintain his reputation.



- 5. Sir A Parsons said that Perez de Cuellar was thinking of not a full paper but proposals on non-prejudging, the target date and the interim administration. He would try to ride him off this and agreed he did not need any further instructions at that point.
- 6. When he telephoned later in the afternoon it was to say that after an internal UN meeting Perez de Cuellar had decided to send envoys to London and Buenos Aires. Sir A Parsons said that this was totally and utterly unacceptable. The Argentine paper showed that the gap was unbridgable. If the Secretary General appeared to assist Argentinian procrastination and allowed the deadline to pass there would be deep discontent in London. Sir A Parsons said that he would go and tell Perez de Cuellar that a line should now be drawn under the negotiations and that if he did not make this public we would do so. He went on to say however that he would be bound to run into very great criticism in the Security Council if he were to say this himself and that it would be much better if a public statement could be made in London. If Perez de Cuellar urged a further 48 hour delay in the Security Council for further consultations everyone would bring great pressures on us to agree. It would be a great help to Sir A Parsons to be able to refer to a statement coming out of London.
- 7. In a later telephone call we were told that the Security Council would be meeting at about 5.00/5.30 New York time. Sir A Parsons had had a long working lunch with the Secretary General who described in more detail his activities earlier in the day. He had spoken to the Argentinian Mission and asked if they had more flexibility. The answer was, yes. He had indeed spoken to Costa Mendez who had proposed the despatch of envoys. Sir A Parsons said that although air tickets had already been bought, he had squelched this idea. Costa de Mendez had urged Perez de Cuellar to speak to Galtieri, who was very flexible and had only authorized the latest tough Argentinian reply because the UK proposals had been so tough and had attacked Latin honour.

- 8. Sir A Parsons said that at his sandwich lunch with Perez de Cuellar he had urged him to tell Ross that the Argentine proposals were totally unacceptable and that the negotiating round should be terminated, quite realising that this could put us on the wrong footing. Perez de Cuellar had sent this message to Ross who had replied that he should tell Sir A Parsons that he quite understood and would transmit the message to his Government. Perez de Cuellar intended to telephone Galtieri this afternoon. He expected a last minute appeal and warmed to an idea that he should then speak on the telephone to the Prime Minister.
- 9. In further conversation with UKMIS New York and Number 10 it was agreed that the Prime Minister should be urged to telephone Perez de Cuellar herself immediately after he had spoken to Galtieri. UKMIS New York would telephone the Emergency Unit or Number 10 about developments in the Security Council meeting so that the PUS, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister could decide after the dinner at Number 10 this evening whether to issue a statement on the lines in the attached draft.
- 10. His final piece of news was that Perez de Cuellar was proposing to issue a public statement after the informal meeting of the Security Council appeal for a last effort for peace.

19 May 1982

R A Burns PS/PUS