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Reference D/3516DQ/2304/14

36

26 May 1982

H1 J1 K K2 L M21 P S V V2 Z GCOL GCL0 copy to each

~~DR-DF~~ to see on file

FAIKLANDS: NOTES OF MEETING HELD ON 25 MAY 1982

Present: DR, H1, J1, K, P, ASO, V2, Z, AD1.

[REDACTED]

Action: ASO, J1, V2

[REDACTED]

3. H1 was unhappy about the speed at which ARN material was being received and processed. A system of prioritisation was needed: submarine broadcast messages should carry flash precedence. H1 would determine what difference a flash precedence would make. Once a message has found its way into HECTRA, there is no distinction of priority: however flash precedence messages are received in hard copy and can be punched in by hand.

Action: H1

4. K is to ascertain the whereabouts of the material recovered from the SANTA FE. H1 will then follow up.

Action: K, H1

[REDACTED]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

6. K reported the following items of interest.

- a. An [REDACTED] about the possible hard line to be taken by Argentina at the OAS meeting.
- b. Evidence of Argentine on-island SIGINT against the Task Force.
- c. Evidence of deficiencies in Argentine intelligence.
- d. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

e. Addresses in civil telegrams to the Falklands were providing valuable information about unit titles etc.

f. The on-island ARM system was continuing to provide valuable tactical information. This was particularly useful because it was being exploited locally.

g. [REDACTED] will be out of action for a number of days.

h. Task Group 81 had rescued an Argentine pilot who had ditched.

i. SALTA had been an action addressee on the sub broadcast on 23 May, and there was evidence that she had passed traffic, but the messages are not available.

7. HERMES had reported that the [REDACTED] being taken was not of great value.

8. V2 would investigate the possibilities of using a commercial airline device to determine aircraft positions.

Action: V2

[REDACTED]

11. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS is expected to join the Task Force in August. She will carry 4 COMINT personnel. She will replace either INVINCIBLE or HERMES.

12. A request had been received from Major Dawkins for a list of indoctrinees. This had now been sent.

13. P7B would send a signal of encouragement to STYLD, consulting K, S, Z.

14. Cdr Traill, DI24N will visit GCHQ shortly. P7B will arrange the visit. Cdr Traill will be discussing the lessons of the crisis and ideas for the future.

15. H1 reported that traffic volumes remained low. The submarine activity was of particular interest but messages were fairly short, and short messages are more difficult to read. Further programs were being developed to help on this.

16. Discussions were continuing about the equipment needed for an effort against the frequency hopper. We do not have the necessary equipment, and existing equipment is not robust enough for forward deployment. The project will probably be long-term.

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17. There had been a fire in the boiler room on 21 ^{May} June. K was to thank X for action which had avoided the powering-down of the main computers.

Action: K

20. ASO had received a statement from Northwood about [redacted] title and function. Northwood's response was to be copied to DR.

21. ASO's enquiries about the future deployment of the RAF linguists continue.

22. JIC continue to be pleased with the GCHQ service.

23. SAS are pleased with the service provided to them.

24. Requests for action-on continue.

26. An FCO telegram from Santiago gave an estimate of the continuing strength of the Argentine Air Force, and the capability of the Argentine submarines.

27. DR referred to an FCO telegram which reported Haig's worry about the dangers of increasing Soviet influence in Latin America. There may be a case for a JIC review of Soviet prospects and intentions in the region. Z would investigate the SIGINT view on this.

Action: Z

28. DR asked whether the current FCO service was satisfactory. No further help was necessary, other than guidance if there was to be a major switch in the centre of diplomatic activity.

29. DR said that R10 had made a damage assessment of the Sunday Times article. H1 should now prepare a damage assessment on the cypher aspects, basing his assessment on worst case assumptions.

30. The visit by Cranley Onslow had been very successful.

[redacted]
AD1

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