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Reference D/354300/2304/14 ✓

2 June 1982

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H1 J1 K K2 L M21 P S V V2 Z GCLO GCOL copy to each

DR-DP to see on file

FALKLANDS: NOTES OF MEETING HELD ON 1 JUNE 1982

Present: DP, H1, J1, K, P, ASO, V, Z1, D1A (des.), AD1.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. K reported the following items of interest:

- a. The Argentine Commander on the Falklands is expecting land/sea operations on 1 June.
- b. A message from the Commander, Task Group 79 indicated that diversionary operations were to be carried out to the North of the Falklands to cover unspecified operations to the South.
- c. TA evidence indicates that a message on the submarine broadcast suggesting that the SAN LUIS may be out, may not be valid. The report issued caused a furore in London. A further GCHQ comment will be issued. K would check on the evidence that the SAN LUIS was out.

Action: K

- d. A report had been issued on the CANBERRA bombings of the SAN CARLOS area. The operation had been conducted in poor visibility, but some casualties had been caused.
- e. Argentine authorities had commented on the level of aircraft losses.
- f. i. There was an Argentine report of an attack on the INVINCIBLE, with EXOCET missiles and bombs. The damage was unevaluated. (News reports of 1 June had indicated that one EXOCET missile had been destroyed and another had missed its target.)  
ii. P commented that the SHEFFIELD had problems with its satcom fit and interference. There were no ELINT problems with regard to EXOCET. P7 would keep in touch with the matter, but the problem was outside GCHQ's domain.
- g. There was a conversation between a unit commander about to surrender and an officer in Port Stanley about the fighting.
- h. i. There was some debate about the Argentine strength at Goose Green and Darwin. The reported strength (approx. 600) was lower than the number of prisoners taken (approx. 1400). The discrepancy may be due to the presence of our force personnel and marines in addition to Army personnel, or there may have been recent reinforcements of the Argentine garrison.  
ii. DP asked about the Argentine strength at Port Stanley. K referred to the orbat report which gave details of units. Reports had also been issued on Argentine strengths.

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2. V reported that Operation BLACK BUCK against the surveillance radar on the Falklands had been successful. The strike had been carried out in the morning of 31 May. V had provided 1/2-hourly sitreps throughout the previous night. [REDACTED]

3. There was a technical hitch with the third [REDACTED], but this was being worked on, and it should be operational soon.

4. DP commented that the long term plans so far had concentrated on COMINT - there may be a need for long-term ELINT planning. There was general discussion about the possibilities. P would approach DMSI to ask about the long-term ELINT requirement.

Action: P

5. J had been asked to determine whether the ZAPOROZHIE had reacted to Operation BLACK BUCK. The ZAPOROZHIE was located to the North of Ascension for replenishment and there was no evidence that she had passed any traffic.

6. One of the STYLO vehicles was ashore; this detachment had been tasked with VHF but had become bogged down. The STYLO detachment on the ship had been doing HF and had also tried to do VHF during the battle for Goose Green. The third vehicle may go ashore with the rest of the assault force. P thought that there may be a need for greater guidance on planned operations. K would discuss this in low-key with GC Rep.

7. The volume of ARN was at a greatly increased level. A slightly different procedure was in use: fills were being identified differently.

8. The submarine net had been active. There was some question whether the messages were valid or dummy. The manual was no longer being used to produce the fills. Some change had been expected.

9. Other traffic volumes were steady.

10. Some [REDACTED] had been received via JOPS, being used in an off-line mode. [REDACTED] had intercepted some synchronous [REDACTED] on a mainland-Falklands link. [REDACTED] had only taken hard-copy, which is not easily processable. [REDACTED] apparently does not have the necessary equipment to take this traffic. This was ARM: ARA [REDACTED] to date has mostly been admin; however it is known that there are island-mainland communications which have not been intercepted and K would be very interested to see the traffic. H1 would make enquiries about the equipment needed to take [REDACTED] then S would investigate the possibilities of installing the equipment at [REDACTED] or on FORT GRANGE, if it proved desirable.

Action: H1

11. The ARM transpo raw traffic was not being received in GCHQ: reports were being received from the Fleet in tecsum form.

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12. Progress was being made with the digraphic substitution system. Message content was possibly flight identification.

13. Intercept of [REDACTED] continues. The air net continues to use the same settings. The settings on the naval net on 31 May repeated those for 30 May. The material is being used tactically, and K is not getting a great deal of information back.

14. Ascension will continue to sample [REDACTED]

15. Any fit for HMS ILLUSTRIOUS should take into account the proposed function of the ship and the timing of her departure for the Task Force, and should not merely be a repeat of the fits currently in use.

16. Z had queried the distribution of the Northwood daily summary to the FORT GRANGE. An answer was awaited from Northwood.

[REDACTED]

18. Requests for action-on continue.

19. [REDACTED] had supplied missiles, possibly EXOCET, to Argentina. The Argentines had reported that they had received extra missiles, and they may have already launched more than they were known to possess originally.

20. The Secretary-General of the UN had put forward another proposed solution.

21. K and V were to visit Northwood on 2 June.

[REDACTED]

AD1

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