

SECRET

MR. PATTISON

Sir Roger Hollis

In his minute of 10th December to Mr. Whitmore, Sir Robert Armstrong reported the likely appearance in The Times of an article by Chapman Pincher about the Hollis case. This article appeared in The Times of 12th December. I attach a copy of a note prepared by the Security Service which comments on the article. As the note makes clear, there is little in the article which is new and much which is a distortion of the facts.

2. In his article, Chapman Pincher also refers to correspondence with Lord Trend. I attach copies of an exchange of correspondence between Lord Trend and Mr. Pincher which took place in August this year. As you will see, Lord Trend (with the agreement of Sir Robert Armstrong) chose not to become involved in a detailed debate with Mr. Pincher about the nature of his inquiry. We are not aware of any other correspondence between Lord Trend and Mr. Pincher which would have allowed Mr. Pincher to write as he did in his Times article.


3. Mr. Pincher's reference to having "spent the intervening eight months trying to discover who has been misled", with the implication that he had done so in the interests of national security, is disingenuous. It is known that Mr. Pincher has been working on a paperback edition of his book and no doubt hoped that he would be able to include new material or allegations in this version (rather as Andrew Boyle succeeded in doing with the paperback version of "Climate of Treason"). As the Security Service note makes clear, it does not seem as if Mr. Pincher has succeeded in this end. We do not know when the paperback version will appear but this Times article appears to be something of a "pot-boiler" intended to keep interest alive, in the knowledge that the appearance of the paperback version is unlikely to be heralded with news of new revelations.

SECRET

3
4

SECRET

4. Sir Robert Armstrong recommends that if the Prime Minister is asked about the article this afternoon, she should say that she has nothing to add to the statement which she made to the House on 26th March.



D. J. Wright

15th December 1981

SECRET



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prm 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1951</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Note dated 15th of December 1981</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>A.C</i> <i>19/05/23</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Chapman Pincher reopens the MI5 mole controversy

Hollis: how the Prime Minister was misled

In March this year the Prime Minister confirmed in Parliament that Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director-General of MI5, had been deeply suspected of being a Russian spy but had been cleared by two separate inquiries. This clearance was so at variance with the evidence of those who had investigated him over seven years that I have spent the intervening eight months trying to discover who had been misled. Was it myself through the evidence against Hollis which I disclosed in my book, *Their Trade is Treachery*? Or was it Mrs Thatcher through the statement prepared for her (by Cabinet office and Home Office officials, with assistance from MI5), in direct response to my book? I am now in no doubt that it was the Prime Minister who was misled.

The first alleged clearance resulted from an internal inquiry by MI5 (the Security Service) with assistance from current and past officials of MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service). MI5 chiefs led by Sir Martin Furnival Jones, a solicitor, decided to close the case against Hollis with a judgment that, though his innocence could not be proved, there was no evidence which could have incriminated him in a British court of law. He was, therefore, judged to be cleared of suspicion.

This secret decision, which was not promulgated to those investigating officers who had produced the evidence, was taken in 1972. Yet I have now established that in May 1974 an official warning that Hollis might have been a Soviet agent for the whole of his 27 years in MI5 was given to security chiefs of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand so that they could take remedial action, even at that late stage,

against any damage which he might have inflicted on them.

It was considered necessary because Hollis had been deeply involved in setting up counter-espionage organizations in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and he had had close links with the CIA and FBI. No Whitehall official or politician was told about this warning but the Solicitor General of Canada, Mr Robert Kaplan, has recently confirmed that Canadian security received it "in the mid-1970s" and took what remedial action it could, an admission which has embarrassed Whitehall.

A few weeks after the warning Mr Stephen de Mowbray, one of the officers involved in the Hollis inquiries, was so incensed with what had occurred inside MI5 that he went to see the Prime Minister, then Harold Wilson. Instead he saw the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt (now Lord Hunt of Tanworth), who was so impressed by his allegations that he recommended a further inquiry by Lord Trend, his predecessor. Wilson concurred.

Lord Trend did no more than review the previous internal inquiry, interviewing witnesses and examining old files. People who have read his secret report confirm that no effort was made to secure any new evidence, though I believe that crucial new information might be available if the Government wished to obtain it. Lord Trend consulted former MI5 and MI6 chiefs who had been party to the original "clearance" and was impressed by their view that if Hollis had been a spy for so long there would have been clinching evidence from a defector or some other source.

In fact one reliable defector, Igor Gouzenko, had reported in 1945 that Soviet

military intelligence had a spy inside MI5 in England for whom Hollis is a near perfect fit. A would-be defector called Volkov had also told of a spy in what now seems to have been MI5 though his information was at first interpreted as applying to Philby, who was in MI6.

Mrs Thatcher's statement, which revealed that Lord Trend had agreed with the original clearance, has been analysed by some of the former investigating officers. They have found at least six areas where it is grossly at variance with the facts as they knew them. The statement was worded to give the impression that all the events I described in my book were very old when in fact Hollis was not interrogated until 1970 and was still being investigated in 1975, two years after his death.

It indicated that the inquiries leading to the suspicion of Hollis arose from routine investigations after the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951. In fact they were undertaken because so many MI5 operations in the 1950s and 1960s went so seriously wrong that they could be explained only if there was a high-level spy still in the organization.

The statement compounded this misleading suggestion by saying that the case against Hollis was based on "certain leads that suggested, but did not prove, that there had been a Russian Intelligence service agent at relatively senior level in British counter-intelligence in the last years of the war (my italics)".

This innuendo that the only leads pointing to Hollis dated from 1945 and before is so opposed to the evidence that I wrote to Lord Trend. I knew that he had examined leads which had arisen in the 1960s and his reply indicates



Sir Roger Hollis: new evidence if the Government had wanted it

that he is not prepared to be associated with the restriction of them to "the last years of the war".

Mrs Thatcher also told Parliament that "each of the leads pointing to Hollis could also be taken as pointing to Philby or Blunt". Blunt left MI5 in 1946 and Philby left MI6 in 1951. So this was clearly an attempt by the officials who prepared the speech to lumber Blunt and Philby with penetrations achieved by the KGB long after they had ceased to have access to secret information.

The MI5 investigators and others associated with the Hollis inquiries have no hesitation in calling this part of the statement a fabrication. Philby and Blunt were always agents of the KGB while the evidence indicates that the suspected spy in MI5 was working for the GRU — Soviet military intelligence, which operates independently.

The Prime Minister's statement said the MI5 clearance was challenged by "a very few of those concerned". While few may have chal-

lenged it, many disagreed with it. The so-called Fluency Committee which made the original investigations and concluded that Hollis was the prime suspect consisted of seven experienced officers. This was replaced by a permanent section, K7, set up to investigate possible penetrations of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the radio-intercept agency, and involving about a dozen officers who had not served on the Fluency Committee. Independently they recommended that Hollis should be interrogated in the belief that he might break down and confess.

This interrogation was carried out by Mr John Day of Section K7 under the tightest secrecy because there were high-level fears that a leak to the Russians might result in Hollis's defection, with appalling international consequences. Day was so unimpressed by Hollis's defence of his innocence that he supported de Mowbray in challenging the decision to close the case. It was the decision that Hollis should be given an umpire's verdict of "Not out" that was supported by "a very few of those concerned."

Mrs Thatcher's assurance that no evidence had been found which "incriminated" Hollis was also true of Fuchs, Blake, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Long, against whom all the evidence was circumstantial or so secret that it could not be used in a British court unless they voluntarily confessed. To cast further doubt on my Hollis disclosures, the briefers ensured that the Prime Minister would smear my book as being "inaccurate and distorted."

Since then there have been a number of confirmations. My disclosure that Blunt was "blown" by an American, now known to be Mr Michael Straight, has been confirmed by Straight himself. The London woman who "blew" Philby has been identified as Mrs Flora Solomon. My account of Blunt's confession, including his naming of Leo Long, who was clearly described in the book, has been fully justified. The revelation that Tom Driberg, later Lord Bradwell, the Labour MP and Labour Party chairman, had been recruited by MI5 to penetrate the Communist Party and later spy on MPs was dismissed as laughable but has been confirmed by a former woman officer of MI5. Critics were quick to discount my statement that Gouzenko had indicated an MI5 spy with the code-name "Elli", but the unexpected release of his original testimony has confounded them. There will be further confirmations as inquiries continue.

The analysis of Mrs Thatcher's statement to Parliament leaves me in little doubt that it was an Establishment concoction intended to bury the horrific Hollis Affair and anything connected with it. No doubt the officials who prepared it convinced themselves that they were acting in the best national interest, but all the Prime Minister needed to have said was that Hollis had been suspected, had been investigated and that the case remains unproven. Instead she was induced to go out on to a limb from which she might be sawn off any day, for it is far from impossible that proof that Hollis was a spy might still emerge.

RIA

CABINETS
A 5251 12th August, 1981
13 AUG 1981
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. _____

Dear Mr. Pincher,

Thank you for your letter of 6th August. I think that, in reply, I can only confirm that, so far as the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament was concerned with my own part in the matter in question, it had, of course, my full agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Dunke Lind

Chapman Pincher, Esq.,
Church House,
16 Church Street,
Kintbury,
Nr. Newbury,
Berks, RG15 0TR.

Telephone
Kintbury (04885) 8855
or 397

Church House
16 Church Street
Kintbury, Nr. Newbury
Berks. RG15 0TR

6.8.81

Dear Lord Trend,


I am completing the paperback version of my book Their Trade is Treachery and wish to ensure that any inaccuracies in the first edition are rectified.

The changes and expansions I have made take full account of your decision-unknown to me before - that you had decided that Sir Roger Hollis had not been an agent of the Russian intelligence service, as the Prime Minister told Parliament. I understand that you are also on record as saying that you agree with all that the Prime Minister said, concerning your inquiry, to Parliament. I would welcome your confirmation of this because I am anxious not to misrepresent your findings in a book which is to have world-wide distribution.

The part of the Prime Ministerial statement which worries me - and others - is the paragraph indicating that each of the leads on which the case for investigating Hollis was based could also be taken as pointing to Philby or Blunt. The evidence presented in my book, much expanded in the paperback, indicates that much of it eventuated after 1951, by which time both Blunt and Philby were out of the picture.

I appreciate the sensitivity of the situation but I do not wish to attribute that view to you without giving you the opportunity to say whether it also your opinion or not.

Yours sincerely,


Chapman Vincher

SECRET

Prime Minister.

3

Ref. A06887

MR. WHITMORE

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Sir Roger Hollis

I have heard from the Security Service that a delicate source has revealed to them that The Times may shortly carry an article by Chapman Pincher about the Hollis case. From what they know of the proposed article, it seems to be largely a rehash of Pincher's book and the press articles which he has written about Hollis, and is intended to keep up interest in the Hollis case and other spy cases in preparation for the forthcoming launch of the paperback version of Pincher's book. The article is expected to question whether the Prime Minister was misinformed when she said in her 26 March statement that all of the leads involved in the investigation of Sir Roger Hollis could be explained by reference to Blunt and Philby. Pincher may say that there were at least seven people involved in the investigation of Sir Roger Hollis who rejected this conclusion.

In naming de Mowbray Pincher will say that the Trend inquiry was called for because Sir John Hunt had been very impressed with de Mowbray's line and that in the light of this he thought a further inquiry was necessary. The article is also expected to be critical of the way in which the Trend inquiry was conducted.

2. From what we know of the proposed article, it does not seem likely to contain anything new and it should be possible to refer any inquiries which result from it in either the House or from the press to what the Prime Minister had to say on 26 March.

RAA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Prime Minister.

10th December 1981

The article appeared in last Saturday's Times. A copy is attached.

I have indicated the more interesting passages. The only new point is the revelation that Pincher has been in touch with Lord Trend and the allegation that Lord Trend did not go along with the remark in your statement that certain leads suggested that there had been an RIS agent or a relatively senior member of the SIS who had been in contact with the Hollis case.

←
RAA 14xii

SECRET