

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 4 JUNE 1982

United Nations

(a) Report

A: (UKMIS New
 York telno.
 024)

1. Sir A Parsons reports that as a result of vigorous lobbying by British posts abroad Spain and Panama were unlikely to be able to line up the necessary nine votes in favour of their draft Security Council Resolution. Panama therefore proposed an additional operative paragraph in the draft asking the parties to implement immediately SCRs 502 and 505 in all their parts. The Irish Representative meanwhile produced a not unhelpful draft Resolution on a personal basis but this was not actively discussed.

B: (UKMIS New
 York telno.
 025)

2. When the Security Council met in formal session the Spanish/Panamanian draft Resolution was tabled with the new operative paragraph inserted. Sir A Parsons indicated that this implicit call for a ceasefire simultaneous with withdrawal of Argentine forces improved the draft which would need overnight study. Spain tried to press for an early vote on the draft, or to get an assurance from Sir A Parsons that it was at least conceivable that HMG could accept it possibly with minor amendments. Sir A Parsons went no further than to say that the draft provided a basis for negotiation which might produce a draft acceptable to all. Eventually the Americans persuaded the Argentines to discourage the Spaniard from persisting, and the vote was postponed. The Security Council is to reconvene at 2000Z on 4 June.

C: (UKMIS New
 York telno.
 026)

D: (UKMIS New
 York telno.
 027)

3. Sir A Parsons comments that the Spanish Representative's insistence on an early vote was in fact bluster; but he convinced the Americans who were at great pains to postpone the voting in order to avoid having to veto. The Americans said they were sure the Argentines only wanted a fig-leaf in order to withdraw; Sir A Parsons commented that the Argentines had had ample opportunity to convey such a signal to HMG if such was indeed their wish. The French are also anxious to avoid having to veto.

4. There is a serious danger of our being isolated in the Security Council. If the Spanish/Panamanian draft, as amended, were put to the vote it would attract more than the necessary nine votes, and France and the US would be tempted to abstain.

(b) Recommendations

E: (UKMIS New
 York telno.
 028)

5. Sir A Parsons recommends that we put forward firmly the amendments necessary to make the draft acceptable, and suggests what these should be. Although this might lead Spain and Panama to call for an immediate vote, it could encourage others to try to persuade the Spaniard to allow a genuine negotiation to take place which could last into the weekend.

6. Sir A Parsons' amendments are designed to establish a firm link between the ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal and to eliminate any reference to SCR 505 in the operative part of the

Resolution though since we voted for it so recently, it would be hard to avoid the preambular reaffirmation of it. Some rôle for the Secretary-General probably has to be accepted to avoid charges that we were not negotiating seriously on the basis of the Spanish/Panamanian draft.

France/Argentina

F: (Paris
telno.590)

7. The French have told HM Embassy in Paris that Argentina is withdrawing its Ambassador from Paris in reprisal against French support for the UK over the Falklands. The French do not intend to withdraw their Ambassador from Buenos Aires.

Colombia

F: (FOO tel.
No.119 to
Bogotá)

8. The Colombian Ambassador delivered a message on 3 June from President Turbay to the Prime Minister, urging HMG to seek an honourable peace agreement with Argentina. Officials are considering advice on a reply.

Peru

F: (Lima
telno.225)

9. HM Ambassador in Lima delivered the message from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Peruvian Foreign Minister expressing concern at reports of Peruvian arms supplies to Argentina. The Minister insisted that Peru was not providing military assistance beyond that agreed in long-standing arrangements for Argentine/Peruvian cooperation. However, he warned that an event such as a British attack on the Argentine mainland would lead Peru to respond at least in a limited way to any call by Argentina for military assistance under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty.

COMMENT


10. Although our lobbying action on the original Spanish/Panamanian draft resolution was successful, it seems unlikely that we could secure sufficient support to resist their revised draft. The scope for avoiding a veto has therefore sharply narrowed. The Security Council will meet at 2000Z today and Sir A Parsons will need instructions before then.

11. Points for decision are:

- (a) whether we should confirm a decision to veto the revised Spanish/Panamanian draft as it now stands;
- (b) whether Sir A Parsons should be instructed to put forward the substantial amendments which he has suggested (UKMIS New York telno 928);
- (c) What attitude we might need to take on the Irish draft in the (unlikely) event of it surfacing formally;

/(d)

- (d) whether, following yesterday's efforts, further lobbying should be undertaken.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'P R Fearn'. The signature is stylized and cursive.

P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

4 June 1982