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Romania

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 January 1983

Dear Tachean

I was very grateful for your letter of 28 January enclosing a note of your interesting talks with the Romanian President and Foreign Minister. There is much food for thought in it.

Thank you for handling the question of my possible visit to Romania in the way that you did. I do indeed think it would be very difficult to get there in anything like the near future.

Yours sincerely

Raymond

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

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FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.



Secret

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28th January, 1983.

Dear Margaret,

I was in Romania from 11th - 15th January at the invitation of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Stefan Andrej. Robert Cranborne came with me. I had a long talk with Andrej and we both had a very good audience of President Ceausescu at his chalet near Predeal in the Carpathian mountains. We also called on the Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Pungam and took part in a "Round Table" with a number of retired diplomats, newspaper editors and economists. Our Ambassador, Paul Holmer, was very helpful and, in addition to private talks, gave a successful lunch party for us, attended among others by former Foreign Minister Macovescu.

Notes of the different talks are attached. Some of them are lengthy so I have sidelined the passages you might find more interesting.

Our reception was extremely friendly and the atmosphere more relaxed than on previous occasions. For once we were given our full programme at the airport by the Deputy Minister, who met us there, instead of being kept in the dark about whom we were going to see and when!

On the other hand the Romanian ministers were much less critical of the Soviet leadership than on previous occasions and the views they expressed on disarmament and the Middle East seem at first sight very close to the Soviet line.

My talk with Mr. Andrej, though rather more open than our talk with the President, does not seem to differ from it in any material respect. I would judge that the Romanians do not want to put themselves forward as intermediaries with Moscow but want to give us a fairly straightforward assessment of the Soviet position as they see it.

I would add the following general points:

1. The Romanian leaders seem to have had little or no previous contact with Mr. Andropov. They are not yet sure what to make of the new regime.
2. They are distinctly nervous of the danger of a major confrontation between East and West and the position in which this would leave them.
3. I had expected that they would warn us of likely Soviet moves in the event of a breakdown in the disarmament talks. I "fished" indeed, for such warning both in the talks with the Foreign Minister and with the President. They were careful not to respond directly. There are however implied threats in Mr. Andrej's rather enigmatic answer to my question "whether the Soviets might try to take advantage of the window of opportunity while it remained open". (page 5 top para. of record of talk with Andrej). The same seems true of their rather curious plea that we should support Arafat since otherwise the PLO might become more radical; and again of their repeated statement that it would be difficult to reach an overall settlement in the Middle East without the Soviets. These may have been simply expressions of opinion. I am inclined to take them as warnings.

Both Robert and I felt that there was an indefinable atmosphere of crisis which they were doing their best to conceal by a show of serenity. We thought this probably concerned East/West relations. But from the little we saw of goods in the shops and queues at petrol pumps, several hundred cars long, the Romanian economy is clearly in difficulties.

As to a possible visit on your part to Romania, I would suggest that there is no hurry to respond as I doubt if the President would say much more at this stage than is reported here. On the other hand I am sure they meant it when they said your visit could be confined to 24 hours without any formality. It could well be that a talk

with Ceausescu later in the year would be revealing. It might also, if you so wished, allow you to say things which would be transmitted to Moscow without involving a verbal confrontation. There is also the consideration that an informal visit - normal enough between leaders of the Western alliance - is unusual, perhaps unprecedented, between Western and Eastern leaders and may be worth contemplating for this reason alone.

I would add that both Robert and I thought the President considerably diminished physically and perhaps in consequence, rather mellower than at previous meetings.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Francis Pym and Michael Heseltine. Francis will be the best judge of whether he need go to Bucharest. But unless you or he can go I would recommend that we invite Mr. Pungam to come here. He is due an invitation and was, certainly until recently, very close to the President.

Y am
Julian.

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

PS. We were amused to learn from our Foreign Ministry guide that the role of Vlad Dracul (Dracula) has been reassessed "positively" by a panel of Marxist historians. He was, apparently, a very good administrator if somewhat excessive in his use of impaling to punish wrongdoers. He was also a very patriotic warrior against the Turks. His tendency in old age to drink the blood of virgins as a restorative is of course deplored. But as our guide lamented, he would find it difficult nowadays to find an adequate supply!

Secret

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Note of a meeting at the President's Chalet, Predeal,
Romania

14th January 1983 - 10.30 a.m. - 12.30 p.m.

Present:

President Ceausescu
Foreign Minister Andrej
An interpreter

Mr. Julian Amery, M.P.
Lord Cranborne, MP

After an exchange of courtesies, President Ceausescu expressed the hope that Mrs. Thatcher would visit Romania this year. Mr. Amery explained that uncertainties over the timing of a UK election might make this difficult. President Ceausescu answered that he would like her to come even if it were just for the day!

President Ceausescu then said there were increasing problems in the world and that we now faced a very serious situation. The changes that had occurred in the USSR were changes of persons not policy, at least for the time being. This meant that Mr. Andropov would continue the existing policy of the USSR. That policy was directed towards reaching an understanding about armaments.

President Ceausescu referred to the recent Warsaw Pact meeting in Prague. The Romanians had not obtained everything they wanted but they could live with the Prague communiqué.

The most important matter to emerge from Prague was the need to stop the arms race and then make progress towards disarmament. Both the Russians and their allies genuinely wanted to reach agreement on the arms race.

Several ideas emerged at Prague, some new, some old. The main issue concerned medium range missiles. There was a deep anxiety within 1983 to halt the deployment of American missiles in exchange for at least the partial withdrawal of Soviet missiles. The Romanians felt that positive steps should be taken to this end. Even if it were not possible to dismantle ^{the} missiles altogether at least a balanced reduction should be possible, particularly as the Soviet proposals paved the way for some agreement on this.

A second Romanian proposal was to begin discussions between the nations of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact. Such discussions should not replace the US/USSR talks but would help disarmament and confidence-building in Europe. The two blocks possessed 80% of the world's armaments and therefore an understanding between them could have a big influence on the world situation. Romania was anyway for the abolition of both blocks. There was a need for new talks which would pave the way towards the dismantling of the two blocks. It was important that all the European countries should be present at such disarmament talks.

A third proposal at Prague was the idea of a non-aggression pact between the two blocks. This was not a new idea but it could be important.

The essential component of all three proposals was the need for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to halt the arms race and to begin disarming. Talks between the blocks should begin on these topics.

Meanwhile the Madrid conference should end as soon as possible. Even if it only ended with a decision to convene a new European conference and for such a conference to continue would be an important result. It was important not to try to solve everything at the first stage. The problems were very complex and we should therefore solve them step by step. We should get rid of the idea of all or nothing (presumably a reference to the zero option). Even small steps were preferable to increasing tension.

Mr. Amery said that he was aware of the views President Ceausescu had expressed earlier in the year and of his aim of a multi-polar rather than a bi-polar international structure, with which we had a certain sympathy. However, Mr. Andropov had raised difficulties for France and Britain by introducing the question of the independent French and British deterrents. Our missiles were not suitable for the defence of Germany. After all the original request for Cruise and Pershing had come from Chancellor Schmidt. Without Cruise or Pershing the Germans had but two options: to arm themselves or to become neutral.

President Ceausescu did not agree. Nuclear weapons did not increase anyone's security. Increasingly the number of weapons merely increased the danger of nuclear war and of destroying the territory on which the weapons were deployed. There were, therefore, no nuclear weapons in Romania. Safety lay with disarmament and by destroying nuclear weapons. Equally, deploying nuclear weapons in Germany increased the chances of the destruction of Germany. In the event of war the first Soviet step would be to destroy those missiles.

That would mean the destruction of the Federal Republic. It was, indeed, doubtful whether in a conflict the missiles would be used at all. However, if they were used, Soviet retaliation would destroy Germany. The only reasonable way forward, therefore, was not to deploy Cruise and Pershing and to agree a reduction in Soviet missiles.

As far as British and French missiles were concerned Russia was not suggesting their abolition, but merely that Russian and British and French missiles together should balance. This was a fair and reasonable proposal.

Mr. Amery said he understood the mathematical basis of Mr. Andropov's proposals, but the Germans would not consider themselves protected by French and British missiles. The problem was therefore a Germany problem.

There was too, perhaps, a more fundamental problem. In view of the Russian advantage in certain areas with which the West would need time to catch up, would the Russians take advantage of this 'window of opportunity to consolidate their superiority in Europe or elsewhere? "

President Ceausescu doubted whether there was an imbalance between the sides. There might be an imbalance in certain weapons, but overall there was no imbalance. When each side could destroy the planet ten times over one could not speak of imbalance.

Mr. Amery replied that the USA might not wish to risk its own

destruction in order to protect Europe if the Americans had no weapons in Europe.

President Ceausescu replied that new missiles deployed in Europe could not provide new security if the USA was not prepared to take risks for the defence of Western Europe. Anyway Europe would be destroyed in either case. Security therefore lay through the destruction of existing weapons. It was, indeed, possible that the USA would honour its commitments. It had already worked out plans for a limited nuclear war in Europe. The American concept was one-sided. For the USSR it implied a threat from missiles which could penetrate its own home territory. This would apply to the USA. It followed therefore that the USA could not be left out of any Russian response to nuclear attack by American medium range nuclear missiles. No Soviet leader could accept the idea of half of Russia being destroyed without retaliating against the territory of the USA. If he himself were a Russian leader in such circumstances he certainly would retaliate in that way. If the USA deployed missiles in West Germany there could be no other target but Soviet territory for them. If other states were the only targets the existing tactical nuclear missiles would be enough.

Asked how dangerous he thought the present situation, President Ceausescu said he thought it very dangerous. But there was a way forward, first in Europe. The Soviets were serious about disarmament. The Romanians had advanced even more radical proposals in Prague, but the present proposals were reasonable. The Soviets understood that any resort to nuclear weapons would mean the destruction of the Soviet Union and they therefore wanted to reduce armaments and lower the balance.

Mr. Amery asked whether we could conclude that considerations both of security and of economics went hand in hand. President Ceausescu answered "yes".

Asked whether we should expect a forward Soviet policy in the Middle East, Ceausescu replied that it was important to reach a solution as soon as possible.

In the case of the Iran/Iraq war it was in the interests of both countries to end the war quickly, but particularly in the case of Iran. He would not be drawn further on this issue.

As far as the Arab countries' conflict with Israel was concerned several measures were necessary. First, all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the Lebanon. Then the Palestinians should acquire the right to decide whether they wanted to set up their own state; and finally the USSR should be involved in a comprehensive solution of the Middle Eastern question. An Israeli-Egyptian treaty might have been possible without the Russians. But an Israeli peace treaty with other states was not. There now existed, in addition, a favourable situation which could lead to a comprehensive peace in the area. This, however, could alter rapidly and Arab countries could become more radical. The Fez agreement anyway meant virtual Arab recognition of Israel. But if negotiations did not begin in 1983 the situation could change.

Mr. Amery said he was going to Amman in about two weeks' time. Mr. Begin had told him that if King Hussein asked the Israelis to negotiate with him they would have to accept. But would Arafat accept the leadership of King Hussein in such negotiations?

Ceausescu thought that at present Mr. Arafat represented the most rational force in the Middle East including Israel. He stood for a negotiated solution and was the most moderate force in the PLO. All others were more radical. If the opportunity to negotiate now were not taken the PLO was likely to change to a less moderate outlook. The strength of the PLO was still underestimated. The Palestinians should not be seen in the context of Lebanon alone. They were well established in the Gulf and had a strong economic position there. It was possible for Jordan to play a certain part but they could do nothing without the Palestinians. The situation of Jordan was different from the situation of Egypt. Sadat and Egypt had the force to act independently no matter what the USSR thought: Hussein could not.

Asked whether Mr. Breshnev, before he died had in mind a division of the Middle East as Europe was "divided at Yalta", Ceausescu said it was not possible to envisage a second Yalta in the Middle East even if the USA and Russia wished it. Times had changed since the 1940s. Russia had Afghanistan, it was true, but it had always dominated Afghanistan even when the monarchy was there. Even then Western influence had been very weak. On the other hand the Soviets could not secure domination over Iran or Iraq. Neither could the USA. Mr. Breshnev had simply called for a Middle Eastern conference linked to finding a solution of the Palestinian question and stopping the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. But, of course, the Soviets wanted to be directly involved in the settlement.

Mr. Amery recalled in 1979 President Ceausescu had strongly recommended Britain to support Mr. Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Mugabe, he had said, was independent while Nkomo was only a Soviet agent. Were external, perhaps Soviet, influences at work in the present confrontation between Matabele and Shona? President Ceausescu said he was not familiar with the situation but he did not think that henceforth Nkomo was likely to play an important part. There were also problems connected with South African support of certain forces in Zimbabwe. There were other problems, too: Namibia, in particular, where there was a need to change the policy of South Africa which should stop interfering in the internal affairs of Namibia.

Asked about Kosovo and Transylvania, President Ceausescu said Kosovo would be settled by Yugoslavia. As to Transylvania, there was no problem. It had been Rumanian for 2,000 years and he was not concerned about it although there had been one or two murmurings.

Pressed about internal tensions in the USSR, President Ceausescu said that the West attached too much importance to Russian economic problems. The USSR was a very powerful state and enjoyed a plentiful supply of raw materials which they even sold to NATO countries. The Soviets had difficulties over efficiency and technology but they would probably solve them. Those who wanted to deny Russia access to technology were wrong. They would only push Russia into trying to solve those problems by itself. Even the difficulties in

Soviet agriculture could be settled. Their grain production of 180 m tonnes could be a good crop, since if they used it properly, they would not need to import grain.

Mr. Amery asked whether in the light of this analysis we need not expect a confrontation with the Soviets. President Ceausescu replied that internal forces in the Soviet Union were probably working for a reconciliation with the West - for a return to detente. These forces understood that an arms race must lead to economic difficulties.

As far as Anglo-Romanian relations were concerned, President Ceausescu thought these good. To have differences of opinion was normal. In the economic field, however, some joint ventures, including aviation, were not quite on a proper path and the balance of trade was in the UK's favour. He wished relations to develop on a balanced basis.

Mr. Amery replied that he understood that agreement was in sight on the question of credits and that a Romanian delegation was expected shortly in London to discuss trade questions. We could perhaps judge what to do next after the delegation's visit.

President Ceausescu said Romania would like to sell more to the UK, particularly textiles. We could do more jointly in the third world. He emphasised the need to cut down on armaments in order to release resources for other purposes.

Secret

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Note of a conversation between the Romanian Foreign Minister,
Mr. Stefan Andrej, and Mr. Julian Amery
at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

12th January, 1983 - 9.30 - 11.30 a.m.

Present:

The Foreign Minister

Mr. Julian Amery, M.P.

Mr. Andrej asked me to come to the Ministry alone. We both spoke French, he said, and so could avoid the delays of interpreted conversation. He could then also speak more freely. In point of fact his Deputy Minister, Mr. Duma, was also present for most of the conversation.

After the usual exchange of courtesies, Mr. Andrej asked me for news about Britain. He showed particular interest in the sterling "crisis" but expressed no views on it. He had also been clearly impressed by the conduct of the Falklands Operation and its impact on our latest defence review. He then asked me about the British nuclear deterrent, its capability and its purpose. I told him, in broad outline, the published facts about Polaris and its successor, Trident, and explained that we regarded both as essentially strategic weapons to be used, as a last resort, to deter an attack against the British Isles. They were not intended or suited to serve as theatre nuclear weapons. I understood that the French attitude to their nuclear weapons was very much the same. Mr. Andrej said he would return to the subject later in our talk when we came to discuss disarmament.

Mr. Andrej then spoke about Romania. He thought the Romanians were close to an agreement on the rescheduling of their debts. They had proposed that 75% of their obligation should be postponed until 1985. The IMF thought only 60% should be rescheduled. He was confident that a compromise could be reached between these two figures.

He went on to say that the Government had had to adopt a number of austerity measures. They were seeking in particular to

modernise their agriculture which had lagged behind their industrial development. He also complained that the Soviets obliged them to pay for imports from the Soviet Union in hard currency or in goods that could otherwise have been sold for hard currency to the West. Even Yugoslavia was better treated by Moscow in this respect!

Mr. Andrej then raised the subject of the exchange of Ministerial visits between Britain and Romania. President Ceausescu attached great importance to these as he did himself. He very much hoped that the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would be able to come to Romania during the course of the year. I said that I was sure both Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Pym would like to come but there was the possibility - some thought the probability - of a general election; and he would understand that this might necessitate a postponement. Mr. Andrej replied that he fully understood our electoral concern. He stressed, nevertheless, that President Ceausescu very much wanted to have a talk with Mrs. Thatcher. There would be no need for her to stay more than 24 hours. The purpose of the visit would be simply to have a talk with the President - not the Romanian Prime Minister - and all ordinary formalities could easily be set aside. Mr. Andrej then mentioned that it was our turn to invite the Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Pungam. He was arranging for me to meet him before I left Bucharest.

I then asked Mr. Andrej what had been his impression of the Warsaw Pact meeting in Prague the week before.

He said there had been general satisfaction in Bucharest over the communique. The Romanians had restated their known position. This consisted in an immediate freeze in military budgets (since restated) to be followed by a reduction of 20% across the board by 1985. He could not claim that they had got all their ideas accepted but there was nothing in the communique that went contrary to them. In answer to a question, he denied strongly reports that President Ceausescu had been at loggerheads with his Warsaw Pact colleagues. The communique had been prepared well in advance of the meeting and the discussion of it had been unusually smooth.

I asked him how he saw the situation in the Soviet Union now that Mr. Andropov had taken the helm. He said that his fundamental impression was one of continuity of policy. Mr. Breshnev had been ill for the last few months but most of the current themes stressed by Mr. Andropov had been raised already. The new Soviet leadership would be more dynamic than it had been in the last phase of Mr. Breshnev's rule but everything indicated that they would pursue the same general lines of policy.

He and the President were convinced that Mr. Andropov genuinely wanted to reach an agreement on disarmament. Mr. Andropov needed one for economic reasons - the Soviet economy was in serious difficulties - but even more from the point of view of Soviet security. It was his impression that Mr. Andropov thought the Americans were stalling at Geneva and that they would not give up their plans to deploy the Cruise and Pershing missiles. If these plans went ahead the present military balance in Europe would be altered decisively in favour of NATO. That was why he had introduced the question of the British and French deterrents.

I explained again that we regarded these as strategic forces and not as nuclear theatre weapons and stressed that it was the Germans who had asked originally for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing. The Germans had certainly never regarded British or French nuclear forces as major elements in their own defence. If Cruise and Pershing were not deployed British and American troops in Germany would be in some danger with no adequate defence against the SS20s. The Germans themselves might then lose confidence in NATO. If that happened Germany would have only two options. One would be to become a nuclear power itself which the Russians would find difficult to accept. The other would be to go neutralist which would undermine NATO and the European Community.

Mr. Andrej replied that he saw my point but that we must realise that as far as the Soviets were concerned the British and French nuclear deterrents presented them with a threat which in physical terms, whatever their intended purpose, brought the Western arsenal

very close to the existing Soviet nuclear arsenal. President Ceasescu believed that all these matters should be discussed not just between the super powers at Geneva but in a conference of all the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. I asked whether Madrid did not provide such a forum or Vienna. He thought something more concrete was needed. I stressed that I did not think that Britain or France would agree to discuss their own nuclear forces in such a context.

At this point I recalled that the Romanian leadership had stressed to me in the past the power and influence of the Soviet military-industrial complex and its expansionist inclinations. The Western powers and in particular the US were seeking to close the "window of opportunity" which had developed in favour of the Soviets and which Dr. Kissinger had publicised. We had already seen in Poland the Communist Party lose control of economic, social and political life of the country and that this had led to a military take-over. Was the Soviet Union moving in a similar direction?

Mr. Andrej described what was happening in Poland as incompatible with Marxist/Leninism. A Government, ostensibly based on the working class could not remain indefinitely in the hands of a military junta. He agreed that the Polish regime was more like a Latin American military dictatorship than a Peoples' Democracy. He did not, however, think that things had moved anything like so far in the Soviet Union. For some years, it was true, and particularly in the later months of the Breshnev regime the armed forces and the KGB had been steadily increasing their influence. They had secured absolute priority in their command of economic resources and their view had prevailed in a recent controversy over the size of the Soviet Fleet. Beyond that they were likely to play an increasing part in such domains affecting public morale as education, and the promotion or censorship of books, newspapers and films. He did not think, however, that they were at all anxious to take over responsibility for the more intractable aspects of Soviet life such as agriculture and consumer production. I suggested that they might however, have to become involved if the civilian economy continued to deteriorate. He did not disagree but thought

they were certainly not pressing to become more involved than they were already in these domains. Was there, I asked, a danger that the Soviet regime might try to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" while it remained open? Mr. Andrej answered enigmatically that their main concern was the security of the Soviet Union and their immediate interest to secure agreement on disarmament.

I then raised the question of the recently increased Hungarian propaganda in support of the Hungarian minority population in Transylvania. There was also the question of the recent disturbances in the Kossovo. Could these developments be attributed in any way to Soviet encouragement? Did they represent an attempt to destabilise or limit Romanian or Yugoslav independence?

On Transylvania, Mr. Andrej seems reasonably relaxed. He had no concrete evidence that the Soviets were behind the recent Hungarian propaganda campaign. It was natural to deduce that they had done nothing to stop it. For the time being, however, he was inclined to attribute the campaign to the Hungarian Government's interest in deflecting criticism of the regime arising from the economic recession by beating a nationalist drum (the Romanian regime are of course adept at this particular technique).

As to the Kossovo crisis, Mr. Andrej thought, and Belgrade agreed, that the Yugoslavs had been far too liberal in their treatment of the Albanian minority. They had created an Albanian university of very substantial proportions. All the teaching was in Albanian. Most of the faculties had been concerned with law, history and philosophy and had thus been a natural breeding ground for agitators. They also had established some very modern factories. All this had led some Kossovo Albanians to conclude not so much that they should break away from Yugoslavia to join Albania but that they should break away from Yugoslavia to take over Albania. He could throw no light on the murders of Mehmet Shehu and his supporters but was contemptuous of Enver Hodja as a relic of the Stalinist past.

Summing up on Transylvania and the Kossovo, Mr. Andrej stressed that the Soviets were deeply attached to the principle of the immutability of post-war frontiers. They had expressed this clearly at Helsinki. This did not exclude the possibility that they might exploit local issues in order to keep countries like Romania or Yugoslavia closer into line with their own policies.

I then asked Mr. Andrej about the situation in South West Asia and mentioned my concern at the appointment of Mr. Aliyev as First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. My concern was partly due to the fact that Mr. Aliyev was prominent in one of the Soviet Islamic republics but even more to a speech he had made in Baku in June of last year, in front of Foreign diplomats, in which he was alleged to have spoken in favour of a ^{Union of} Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan. Did his appointment indicate a forward Soviet policy in South West Asia and in particular Iran?

Mr. Andrej at first dismissed the speech as of no importance but it presently became clear that he had not heard of it. He asked me for further details and said he would be grateful if I could send him a report of it. He went on to say that the Soviets had reason to be increasingly concerned about their Islamic republics and suggested that Mr. Aliyev's promotion might be defensive as well as offensive. He thought Moscow had been very concerned by the recent anti-Soviet demonstrations in Teheran on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The recent Soviet decision to rearm Iraq was probably a direct reply to these demonstrations. According to his latest information, Soviet FROG missiles had been fired at Desful in the last few days. Future developemnts in Iran were plainly of great concern to the Soviets.

Our discussions of Iran led on naturally to Afghanistan. On this Mr. Andrej said that the Russians would never go back to the situation which had existed at the time of President Daud. They had, he believed, encouruaged Nur Taraki's coup against Daud because they feared that the West was gaining undue influence over Daud through the Shah. He pointed out, with a mischievous smile, that the West had recognised both the Taraki and the Amin regimes.

Mr. Andrej thought the Soviets would welcome a political solution to the Afghan problem but he did not see how this could be brought about. I said that I doubted whether the Soviets could be easily persuaded to withdraw their military installations in Afghanistan which threatened the Straits of Hormuz. Mr. Andrej indicated that he could not disagree.

Mr. Andrej stressed that Romania enjoyed very good relations with Pakistan.

We turned next to the Levant.

Mr. Andrej said that President Ceausescu envisaged a solution on the following lines.

1. There should be a total withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and PLO fighters from the Lebanon. This should be accompanied by an understanding between the Lebanese Government and the PLO about the future status of civilian Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
2. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be granted autonomy in association with Jordan. Autonomy should be according to the Egyptian interpretation of Camp David and not the Israeli.
3. After a lapse of time, as envisaged in Camp David, the people of the West Bank and Gaza should be entitled to vote to decide whether they wished to be an independent state or confederated with Jordan.

Mr. Andrej claimed that Mr. Arafat had agreed to this formula. He was now free to act on his own after the way the Arabs had let him down in Beirut. On the other hand, he went on, if Mr. Arafat could not get something like these terms his movement would become increasingly radical. The Palestinian refugees were numerous and strong in the Gulf states. They could be a serious threat to the Conservative regimes there, some of which were very fragile. (I rather enjoyed the thought of "Sheikh Nicholae" marching to the defence of the monarchies of South Arabia).

In further discussion on the Levant Mr. Andrej recognised that King Hussein had an important part to play. He also accepted that it

was difficult for the American Administration to risk a confrontation with American Jewry until the Arabs were in a position to come to the negotiating table.

I said that I thought the Romanians had been very wise to have diplomatic relations with both Arabs and Israelis and that the Soviets had made a great mistake in not doing the same. Mr. Andrej agreed but said that he did not believe a final settlement in the Middle East could be reached without the Soviets. They would use every means in their power to block arrangements to which they were not a party.

He concluded our talks on the Levant by stressing the good relations that Romania enjoyed with Egypt.

I asked Mr. Andrej in conclusion how he saw the attempted Soviet rapprochement with China. He said the President's visit to Peking had been highly successful but he did not expect any rapid developments on this front. The Chinese were very sensitive to the large Soviet military presence on their northern border and even more to their efforts to establish hegemony over Vietnam and Cambodia. They also disliked the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless a rapprochement between the two great powers was to be welcomed.

Mr. Andrej thought the Soviets had finally given up their hopes of reestablishing control over China. This was now something that could be ruled out.

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At the conclusion of our meeting, Mr. Andrej said that he looked forward to receiving Robert Cranborne and myself at lunch in the Titulescu Villa at 1 p.m. He would assemble some of his staff to continue our conversation. Lunch was at first delayed until 1.30 on account of Government business but when we got there Mr. Andrej's place as host was taken by Deputy Minister Mrs. Groza, a daughter of the former President. Mrs. Groza herself, though a lady of some charm, seems to be more decorative than politically

influential but my neighbour at lunch was Mr. Niageu. (I hope I have got the spelling right). He is, I understand, the head of the West European Desk. He had been engaged for some 3 weeks over the drafting of the Prague communique and had been at the Prague conference himself.

Mr. Niageu began our talk by launching into a strong defence of the Andropov proposal equating the Soviet SS20s with the British and French nuclear deterrents. In reply I explained why we regarded our deterrent forces as our ultimate national reinsurance against attack and why a failure to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles at least in equivalent strength to Soviet SS20s would leave the Germans with no options but to become a nuclear power themselves or go neutralist. Without hesitation he replied "but what is wrong with a neutral Germany?" He went on to talk about how Finland enjoyed ideological freedom with neutrality and even with a special relationship with the Soviet Union. I said that Romanians should perhaps reflect on their previous experience of an independent and united Germany before both the first and second world wars.

We left it at that, but I was struck between the orthodox Warsaw Pact tone of his comments and those of Mr. Andrej in the morning meeting.

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The same afternoon, again in the Villa Titulescu, Robert Cranborne and I attended what was called a Round Table Conference of some 30-40 Romanians identified mainly as former ambassadors, newspaper editors, economists and jurists. They^{may}/have have looked somewhat seedy and underfed but their mood, for Romania was pleasantly relaxed.

There was much talk in the course of discussion that the present was "a decisive moment" in international affairs. It proved impossible to pin them down on what was the decision to be taken. But we sensed, and so I think did H.M. Ambassador, that their reception of us was not just cordial but expressed a mood of some anxiety.