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c Press Office
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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 October 1984

Dear Anthony,

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That study has now been undertaken, and its results have been submitted to me.

You will obviously not expect me to comment in detail upon it in this letter. I can say, however, that both Mr. Wright's thesis and the "evidence" adduced in support of it are basically the same as in Mr. Chapman Pincher's book "Their Trade is Treachery". Furthermore, his memorandum contains many factual inaccuracies. Many of the inferences he seeks do not follow from the material on which he seeks to base them. And he seems to shift his ground from one utterance to the next. It is, of course, eight years since he was officially concerned with these matters, and his account indicates that there were gaps in his information even then.

None of those known to have been Soviet agents since the Second World War were members of the Security Service. A few people believe, like Mr. Wright, that there is evidence that the Security Service was penetrated at a senior level at least until 1965, and that the available

information points in the direction of Sir Roger Hollis. Many others, who have taken a more responsible attitude towards their obligations of confidentiality but have had no less access to the relevant material, take an opposite view with no less conviction. They do not agree that there is evidence to prove that the Security Service has been penetrated since the Second World War, they are sure that Hollis was not a Soviet agent, and they think that there is not a shred of justification in Mr. Wright's material for the view that he was. They regard Mr. Wright's case as nothing but circumstantial innuendo completely unsupported by factual evidence.

Because it is usually impossible to prove a negative, it has not been possible to dispose conclusively of the allegation that Sir Roger Hollis was a Soviet agent. But the whole matter has been the subject of exhaustive investigation, inquiry and review over many years. There is nothing in Mr. Wright's memorandum, or in any of the various statements which Mr. Wright has made to the press, which would lead me to withdraw or alter anything that I said in the statement I made in the House of Commons on 26 March 1981, following the publication of Mr. Pincher's book. I do not believe that any further inquiry could offer any prospect of further clarification, let alone certainty, unless some totally new information were to become available.

Given my responsibilities for security and intelligence, I must also have regard for the need to maintain the effectiveness of the Security Service its primary role of safeguarding national security. The activities of Mr. Wright and one or two other former members of the security and intelligence services are, to say the least, unhelpful and damaging to morale. It would not be right for me to impose on the Service the additional burden and distraction that a further inquiry would entail, unless there were some very good reason (which there is not) to believe that it would serve a

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Y
Lambert

Rayner

Sir Anthony Kershaw, MC, MP.



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Surely it was - Philby? Or was he the other Service - This point will be worked up to the Downing records

~~He has never been established that the Security Service was penetrated by people disloyal to this country: Philby, Burgess, Maclean and Blount were not, of course, members~~

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Lindsay
Ragant*

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Sir Anthony Kershaw, MC, MP.



10 DOWNING STREET

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c Press Office

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Security Service: Mr. Peter Wright's Allegations

The Prime Minister has now signed the letter to Sir Anthony Kershaw and it has been delivered to his office. Sir Anthony Kershaw is away until the beginning of next week. I have told his secretary that we will not be giving any publicity to the letter in the meantime but that, if we are asked whether the Prime Minister has sent comments on Mr. Wright's memorandum to Sir Anthony Kershaw, our Press Office will confirm that she has.

I am copying this minute and attachment to Mr. Taylor (Home Office).

R.R.B.

8 October 1984

PRIME MINISTER

SECURITY SERVICE: MR. PETER WRIGHT'S ALLEGATIONS

I have made amendments, which I have cleared with Sir Robert Armstrong and the Home Office, to meet your comments on the letter to Sir Anthony Kershaw. I have also cut out repetition where I could.

A revised version of the letter is attached for your signature, if you agree. The draft, showing the amendments made to meet your point, is at Flag A.

R.R.B.

4 October 1984

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Ref. A084/2620

MR BUTLER

Security Service: Mr Peter Wright's Allegations

I am content with your redraft of the third paragraph of the letter to Sir Anthony Kershaw.

2. I have recast your first sentence of the fourth paragraph. I have also inserted a reference to the Second World War further down the paragraph.

3. I propose two minor drafting alterations in the first sentence of the sixth paragraph and the second sentence of the seventh paragraph.

4. These changes incorporate suggestions from the Home Office. --- The letter is now, therefore, clear to issue.

3 October 1984

R
Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence



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DRAFT



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