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*From the Private Secretary*

24 October, 1986.

*Dear Colin,*

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN:  
PRESS STATEMENT**

We have done some thinking about the sort of statement which the Prime Minister might try to agree with President Reagan for use with the press following her meeting with him at Camp David. I enclose an illustrative draft. Paragraph 8, which is in square brackets, is intended as a fall back if the Americans were unwilling to accept the more robust formulation in paragraph 5.

Several reservations need to be made. This is simply work in hand. Any text to be agreed with the President would have to be shorter than this. Much of the present text may well be overtaken by events before 15 November. There may be a case for an additional paragraph referring to wider aspects of East-West relations.

Obviously we do not want to let the Americans know that we are considering this tactic (which is of course the same as that which we used at the Camp David meeting in December, 1984). I would not therefore want the text - with which the Prime Minister is generally content - seen outside a very small circle here. But, with that caveat, I would welcome comments and improvements.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*  
*Chris Powell*

C.D. Powell

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

POINTS FOR PRESS STATEMENT

1. The President and I discussed the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit and the way ahead. I congratulated the President on the stand he took at Reykjavik. He was superb.
2. The various proposals put on the table in Reykjavik are now being considered in detail within NATO so that we can formulate a common position of the Alliance in the further negotiations we want to see.
3. We share the view that negotiations for an agreement to put limits on Intermediate Nuclear Weapons (INF) should be given priority. I told the President that Britain could support an agreement which would provide for the elimination of all such weapons in Europe and the western Soviet Union. The conditions are that there must be effective verification and early negotiations to achieve equal ceilings on shorter-range Nuclear Weapons (SRNF). We want to see negotiations on intermediate nuclear weapons brought to a conclusion rapidly without being linked to progress in other areas. We hope that the Soviet Union will not impose conditions which would needlessly delay such an agreement.
4. We also agree that every effort should be made to reach agreement permitting 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons over a five year period. The proposals discussed in Reykjavik provide a good basis for this.
5. At the same time, the President and I confirmed that, because of great superiority of Warsaw Pact capabilities in chemical and conventional weapons, the security of the Western Alliance would continue for the foreseeable future to rest on nuclear deterrence and in particular on

the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. Nuclear weapons cannot be treated in isolation without taking into account the overall balance of forces between East and West.

6. We therefore declare our readiness to press ahead with negotiations to reduce chemical weapons and conventional forces, in parallel with, and linked to progress in, negotiations on nuclear weapons.
7. I confirmed to the President Britain's firm support for continued research [and testing] within the ABM Treaty into a system of strategic defence. This is of course essential given the Soviet Union's extensive work on ABM systems, lasers and other forms of strategic defence. The President, for his part, welcomed the growing role being played by British firms and institutions in such research. We both take the view that the goal of strategic defence is not to achieve military superiority but to strengthen mutual security and deterrence.
8. [We look forward to a day when such a system might allow us to reduce [or even ultimately eliminate] dependence on offensive nuclear weapons for deterrence. But that must of course depend on progress in negotiations about chemical and conventional weapons and towards removing the basic causes of East/West conflict. Until that time, we are agreed upon the need to maintain adequate nuclear and conventional defences.]
9. The President confirmed the United States' full support for the modernisation of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent with Trident. This is of course already in progress and will be completed by 199[ ].