IN STRICT CONFIDENCE

Meeting held at British Antarctic Survey, Cambridge, on 28 April 1982

Present: Dr. R. M. Laws
Dr. R. J. Adie
Mr. J. Bawden
Mr. S. Martin
Mrs. M. Hallatt (Recorder)

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1. Purpose

RML had called this meeting because he wished to be clear about some of the less military aspects involved in the recent invasion of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. He wished to clarify the extent to which SM had been given instructions by the Governor, and the timetable involved. He asked SM to recall when he had the first inkling that anything was developing, how he had received his instructions, and the role played by Endurance - there had been apparent lack of communication although she had a sophisticated satellite link and the ability to send messages in cipher. She should have been able to inform MOD, if not BAS, in greater detail than she did. SM explained that he had had to leave his record of events behind, but he would do his best, although his recollection of dates and times might be imprecise.

2. The scrap merchant episode

On 19 March, when the report about activities at Leith broke, RML, then on Bransfield, had spoken with SM, who was expecting the Governor to ask him to put in a party to deliver a note of protest and instruct them to pull down their flag. The Governor was getting instructions from Whitehall as to what the note should contain. The following morning and on subsequent mornings, RML had overheard an 0800 sked between SM and the Governor, who read out what the protest was to be; he heard SM agree to maintain surveillance from Jason Peak by means of 2-man parties which would be relieved at intervals. The Governor did not contact RML. SM said he had asked the Governor to pass on everything to RML. In the event, nothing was passed on. The dialogue still continued after RML had returned to UK. SM had asked the Governor many times if RML was being kept informed. It seemed to him that RML should have been the first person to have been informed, as a matter of courtesy. RJA said that following the incident with the scrap metal people, when the Director was on board Bransfield, BAS HQ had assumed that SM was in direct touch with him. Whilst concerned that we were not getting information at HQ, he had felt confident that the Director was being informed and was in touch with the Governor. FCO had given BAS HQ no information; they had said they regarded the incident as closed. SM said that any time there was anything to pass to HQ he had passed it; RJA said that at that time very few messages were coming through Grytviken. SM said that this was because base routine had been disrupted. There were people on the observation post and Neil Shaw and Peter Stark were trying to keep the scientific work going and doing experiments.

There had been a number of signals in cipher from the Governor. This was a new, once only code. A BAS field party had reported an Argentine ship at Leith Harbour. Bob Headland knew how to use the code and the base had sent a very long tel. on emergency sked - half an hour's transmission - which was picked up by Endurance and passed through them. It was a number code. About three hours later, the base received a message asking what was going on; Endurance had passed the cipher message but the Governor couldn't decipher it! Therefore they had talked over the air. SM had also been in contact that evening with RML, who had asked to be given some inkling of what

was going on; at that time it was obvious that Stanley was not clear what was happening, although they must have got the word "Argentine" out of it. SM thought all subsequent instructions had come in the clear in the form of a voice conversation; he was kept busy typing out forms because he expected the scrap dealers to come round for Customs clearance. RML said he had understood one of the things Endurance was going to do was to go into Leith to bring the scrap metal men out. SM understood this plan was called off at the last moment.

RJA asked whether the scrap metal people were armed. SM replied that the BAS observation party did not see any weapons at all, but heard shots - presumably when the reindeer were shot. A protest was delivered about the reindeer and a number of other points. RML enquired if the French yacht had left earlier on. SM said the French yacht had a .22 rifle on board, with which they had been shooting at Grytviken; he had confiscated it, saying he would return it when they left the island. When the whole thing started, SM had told them not to go to Leith because the Argentines were there, but he didn't ask them to stay on at Grytviken. They left, and the observation party had reported they had gone to Leith. They departed after a few days. One of those on board was a radio ham, another a professional photographer.

3. Prelude to invasion

SM could not remember exactly when the Endurance had arrived, but it had been quite a while before the fighting. There had been a fair amount of communication between the base and the ship and he had tried to make them welcome. They were anticipating quite a long stay and SM at that stage was trying to get some of their manpower ashore to help with base work. They were quite keen and were going out about every other day patrolling the harbours and also to check Bird Island, where they had landed and, he believed, had taken in some food. After one of these journeys, SM had received a message (he had his VHF with him) saying that the Captain wanted to see him immediately. He had gone on board and was met by Commander Ponsonby and the Captain, who said they had to return to Stanley. SM assumed they must have been informed that the invasion of the Falklands was on. Captain Barker said he was going to leave the Marines at Grytviken. SM asked Captain Barker where his orders had come from and was told they were from Whitehall; SM did not see the telegram. Subsequently, every time he gave SM an order, SM had asked who had issued the orders and every time he was told it was the Government. SM was not given any choice in having the Marines; he would have preferred not to have them. However, it was agreed that the Marines and the Base personnel should live together in one unit in Shackleton House, and cook as one unit. Their relations with the BAS people had been perfectly correct and there were no real problems. RML enquired whether there was a lot of apprehension among base members. SM said he had been concerned enough to say they were to play their presence down as much as possible.

The Marines were fairly sure they were going to have to do something, but it was agreed to keep cool and that they should say they were staying at Grytviken because Endurance was going back to Stanley. They did not want to make it look as if Endurance was deserting the island. They depoted their weapons in Quigleys (one of

the houses). They were there for two days prior to the arrival of the Argentines and just getting into routine by the time things had begun to hot up in Stanley. The base was keeping a radio watch. On the Wednesday night, 31st March, the Governor declared a State of Emergency in Stanley. SM had been in the base office when Lt. Mills came to tell him what was happening. They decided that if the Falklands were being invaded, they must assume South Georgia would be invaded. It was agreed that BAS personnel must not be involved in any skirmish that occurred and they must at all times remain detached from the military; therefore in the event of invasion becoming imminent, they would evacuate all BAS personnel from the Base, and move them to the church. It was decided that they should send some people to St. Andrew's Bay and some to the Lyell Glacier. It was assumed that all the parties would be picked up.

RML asked whether the base's last contact with the Governor was before Endurance left the Marines with them. SM replied that was not so, but he was given no instructions on how to deal with the situation; he was forbidden to mention the fact that the Marines were there and he couldn't remember any instructions coming through.

RML thought this seemed to contrast with the detailed instructions on how to deal with the scrap metal merchants. It seemed strange the Governor had not told SM who was in charge. SM said all that had been done via the Captain of Endurance. They had a regular sked at 1730 local - the 0800 one was dropped off and they had just one sked a day. He couldn't remember when the last one was.

SM said the last they had heard from Stanley was that a landing craft was coming through the narrows and it would be them next. SM's personal impression was that the forces were dying to have a go; they were trained for it.

RML asked SM whether Endurance's Captain had instructed SM that he was in charge. SM recalled that when he was summoned to Endurance to be told she was leaving (when Lt. Mills had been called to the cabin with Cdr. Ponsonby, the Captain and himself) he had asked who was in charge. The Captain had been non-committal to start with; he had to be pushed into saying SM was in charge until the fighting started, but once the fighting started it would become a military matter. SM had not been too sure of his ground. He was supposed to be a magistrate, but was not sure whether he was in a position to tell the military to go away. He had tried to establish the fact that it was his decision up to that point. Lt. Mills was aware of the situation. SM thought the only reason the Marines had been left there, other than to gain a political point, was to oppose the landing, but they had no support and no back up at all.

RML enquired if SM knew the Marines' rules of engagement. SM replied that a copy had been handed to Lt. Mills, which he had read, but they were very bureaucratic and wishy-washy - what was known among troops as a "yellow card" - you had to be dead before you could shoot! The fundamental instructions were not to shoot unless shot at. Lt. Mills was emphatic that the Argentines had fired first - but both he and SM were naturally concerned that their superiors should approve of their actions and were therefore trying to cover themselves.

On the morning Endurance came through she again broke radio

silence and said she would be with the base by p.m. on Saturday. She passed a message from the Governor (SM had specifically enquired if it was from the Governor and that was confirmed). It was said that if they received a message to surrender, it should be resisted. They had thought it ambiguous; they had the impression that all along the line everyone was trying to cover themselves, and that if a wrong decision were made, it could be interpreted one way or the other. There were no clear-cut instructions. Therefore SM had queried who it was from and queried the wording. He had received a very short reply; notes of everything had been kept in the radio shack but unfortunately, they had to be left there. But the note did clarify the situation to a degree. They were more or less satisfied that should they be attacked they were to defend militarily.

There were helicopters flying overhead before the ships came in. They were not buzzing the base, but were quite low, checking it out; they must have seen the tractor and trailer at the church and the slit trenches at Shackleton House. RML asked whether Lt. Mills had been in battle before. SM said he had been in Northern Ireland.

Once things started happening, on the Tuesday morning, SM was awakened about 0430 and told that a landing craft was going into Stanley. He awoke everybody and put into operation the plan they had conceived the night before. The launch "Albatross" took Stark, North and Plant to St. Andrew's Bay to join the two girls, and the others moved across to the church with food and fuel to last quite a while. SM tried to set up communications in the radio room. Sgt. Leach went out to pick up his observation party, by boat. Endurance was in radio silence, but they did not think she could have got back to Stanley, because she had not had time. On the Friday morning, a message was received (from Endurance) saying the base could expect to be invaded at 1 o'clock by 40 or 60 marines. They worked out a code to be used between base and boat and arranged an emergency frequency. But they were keeping a listening watch on 11255 and were monitoring all base transmissions. When SM received the invasion warning, he thought it unlikely because the weather was so awful. On the Friday morning he also received a message from the Director via Bransfield, to the same effect.

4. Arrival of Argentine ships

Later the same day, the Bahia Paraiso came into sight and established VHF contact. She asked SM to come up on Channel 16 the following morning. He had asked for a time, but was not given one. So he listened out from 0700 local. At that time SM was the only BAS person on base. He had one receiver tuned in to the field parties and was in regular contact with them, passing on anything he had to transmit. The other receiver was on 11255. (The BAS radio operator had spent 3 hours with SM one evening, then SM had sent him back to the church). All radio communications were done by SM. At about 1000 or 1100, he had made contact with the Bahia Paraiso and tried to sort things out.

Keith Mills and SM were in the radio shack and the rest of the Marines in Shackleton House. Then the talking started. In order to ensure that somebody else would hear what was going on, SM claimed that there was a fault in the transmitter on Channel 16. The Argentines made no objection. Endurance was keeping radio silence at that time. They had asked the base to keep transmissions to Endurance to a minimum because it was possible to scan frequencies and locate from that scanning - that was the reason for the radio

silence. Because of the way communications were going, i.e. fading and then strengthening, SM assumed they were near Bird Island.

They continued talking to the Argentine ship, who said they would land a helicopter full of armed marines. SM asked them not to, as it would be considered a very provocative act. He asked them to let the respective Governments settle it and told them that if they landed, there was a UK military presence who had received orders that morning to defend the island should they be asked to surrender. SM asked to speak to the Captain and asked to discuss the matter, because he was still in charge then and thought maybe they could come to a sensible arrangement. He would have tried to sort it out peacefully, but was not able to talk to the right people on Bahia Paraiso. RML enquired if he had received any instructions personally from the Governor. He had not.

In paragraph 7 of his statement (Appendix), SM had referred to conflicting instructions. He explained that the Bahia Paraiso was telling him he should have received instructions from our Governor to surrender. But he had received instructions from Endurance purporting to come from the Government in London saying he should resist.

5. The Invasion

Referring to SM's statement that Keith Mills had claimed the Argentines had fired the first shot, RML asked whether that had been from one of the helicopters. SM said he had claimed so. SM said he had not expressed doubt, but he did query it. Lt. Mills had been concerned that what he did was correct. His people were pretty pleased!

There was really nothing to add to the accounts about the battle, but RML enquired about damage to our buildings. SM replied that it had been minimal. There was a burst pipe in Shackleton House, in the kitchen. The big window at Colman's House had a bullet through it. Fortunately, our people had surrendered by the time the corvette was in a position to do much damage to the buildings.

JB enquired where SM had been during the battle. SM said that the corvette was opposite the radio shack with her gun pointing in; a helicopter was coming in to land, making her approach. At that stage, SM decided to get back to the church. He called up the field parties, telling them that there was an emergency and there was an Argentine ship in the Cove, and wished them good luck. He got to the door of the radio shack and was going across the tussock to the track in between the generator shed and the food store and was on the other side of the tussock when the shooting started. He ran across the gravel and dived into the tussock; he was there for about three hours. Fortunately, he did not encounter any elephant seals, but he did meet a rat face to face!

The helicopter was coming in to land on the Point somewhere, but fortunately not on the beach, where the Marines had laid lots of plastic explosives in the shingle. RML asked whether there were also explosives on the jetty. SM replied that there were 20 lb. of plastic explosives and a drum of petrol. If the ship had come alongside, she would never have left. SM had been aware of the explosives before the battle, but had not been consulted: however, it had all been done after the evacuation of the base and as far as he could see, if they were going to make a stand, that was OK.

RML asked if the people who were in the church had come back immediately after the battle had stopped. SM said he could see the ship and the helicopter and had a good view of Gull Lake. The Argentines were landing helicopters on the far side and dropped some troops off; these were coming into Grytviken and made contact with our lads; SM thought Bob Headland had surrendered on behalf of the BAS personnel. Lt. Mills had surrendered and had gone round to our people with an Argentine officer. SM had lain there and saw them coming round the track, all unharmed: they were all there. He stayed put to see what was going on. Lt. Mills then came round shouting for him, because he probably thought he had been hit.

RJA sought SM's estimate of the casualties. SM thought there may have been some on the corvette; he was very unhappy about the way Lt. Mills had boasted about the casualties. He thought only one helicopter was in working order when they were put on the ship. The jetty was all right as far as he was aware - although it may have been damaged subsequently when the submarine went in. But all the explosives were removed by the Marines prior to their departure from Grytviken.

RJA enquired whether, when the Royal Marines had arrived, they had brought their own food and supplies. SM said the ship had been down to 2½ weeks' supply of food. SM had pointed out that the base was already short and would be unable to last the winter and they had given what they could. The Marines had used the rations they had brought ashore first and only started using BAS provisions when they had run out.

6. Field party dispositions

RML said he was not clear about the Lyell Glacier party. SM explained that Gemmell and Barker had been there for some time continuing with their work, but he had sent Trefor Edwards and Damien Sanders there to get away from the fighting and also to let Gemmell and Barker know what was going on. While they were up there, the fighting had started. They had gone prepared to stay and had sleeping bags with them. The reason SM had decided to send people out was mainly that he thought it was better for them to be in groups of about 4. He sent three people to St. Andrew's Bay. In deciding which people to send, he had to select somebody who knew the route. Peter Stark was to be in charge at St. Andrew's Bay. He had included Tony North because he was very fit. RML asked whether they had taken adequate clothing. SM said they definitely had sleeping bags, and when he had evacuated everyone to the Church, he had told them to take spare warm clothing, sleeping bags, etc. with them. They had left for the Lyell from the church, not from the base. The weather had been blowy, about 30 knots, gusting to about 60; visibility was decreasing and there were increasing snow showers. But when fighting broke out it was a "dingle" day. If the Marines had not been on base, SM would have recalled the Lyell and St. Andrew's Bay parties. RML said he was quite sure SM had taken the correct action in the circumstances. He felt that the St. Andrew's Bay party would have got on quite well. They had earlier been offered an uplift by Endurance, which they had turned down.

RML enquired if the Argentines had left King Edward Point once they had taken over. SM said that up until he left (he was the last to go, but they were embarked on the ship within a couple of hours or so) they had remained on base. He had told them about the field

parties and had asked three times if he could make radio contact with them and with Signy to let them know the Grytviken party was well, but the opportunity was denied him. SM was taken to the radio shack but was not allowed to send anything. The radio equipment was in perfect condition.

7. Period in Argentine hands

Asked whether there were any problems when they were captured and aboard the Argentine ship, SM said he thought everybody had been more concerned than the situation warranted; but they had behaved very well.

After the battle, they had been allowed to pack their belongings - they were allowed to take what they could carry, but time was short - they were taken in groups of five and given about 20 minutes each. This enabled them to get their most valuable possessions and scientific data. Dave Morris had taken his with him to the church, but had lost some. All the deep-frozen material was still in the freezers, also ice-core samples, so it was possible they were still intact. The Argentines had been asked to preserve the scientific samples and their reaction seemed favourable. They seemed concerned about the equipment and said they would box it up and send it on. SM had heard it said that the Argentines would not object to the English base as long as it flew the Argentine flag. Dave Morris had expressed great concern about Bird Island and all the work that had gone into the programmes, which were just coming to a productive period, and his pleas appeared to be received sympathetically. SM reported that the scientific equipment was not smashed. However, he thought that by now much would be missing, taken as souvenirs.

From South Georgia, they were taken across the top of the Falklands to the Argentine coast, he believed to Bahia Blanca, where the wounded were flown ashore. They had not berthed anywhere to his knowledge, although it had been rumoured that one night they had put into a port during a storm. From the ship they were eventually landed at what he assumed was Puerto Belgrano, where they spent three days and two nights. They were well accommodated, well fed and in the circumstances, were treated very well and there was no show of belligerence. They had agreed to play things down because of the people remaining on the island. SM had spoken to Admiral Busser, who seemed very pleasant. They were treated as civilians, which they had asked for, although it seemed the Argentines really believed that the BAS people, especially SM himself, were military personnel. They sought as much information as possible about BAS operations, ships, where the money came from etc., but never asked how long the Marines had been at Grytviken.

From Puerto Belgrano the party was flown direct to Montevideo. The Embassy staff looked after them. They met John McGhee, but not the Ambassador. They were all asked not to use the phone, but the Marines did. The Naval Attache took SM and Keith Mills, plus one guest each, out to dinner, so he made no distinction, but while in MOD hands, the Marines were given preferential treatment although SM thought this was understandable as they were MOD personnel. They flew out through Ascension and arrived at Brize Norton at 4.30 in the morning. Hotel staff gave them a meal and Lt. Mills and Sgt. Leach, Bob Headland and SM were de-briefed that morning.

De-briefing by MOD was undertaken mostly on the plane. Of most interest, it seemed, were the terrain, routes, depots and people. In retrospect, SM had the impression that Lt. Mills had generalized on some of the points. Maybe SM himself was doing the same. On the question of instructions from the Governor, he might have thought he had given SM some instructions, but SM could not recall them. There was a lack of communication. He thought that Lt. Mills shared his own impression that they were all trying to cover themselves. SM had a personal feeling that if the Argentines had got away with this, it would have been the Antarctic Peninsula next, and Signy and Faraday. He knew harassment had been going on for about 15 years, but he thought this was a long-thought-out plan. He believed that the Bahia Paraiso had gone South to the bases and had come back north to South Georgia without going back to Argentina; she had supplies, plant, fuel and equipment on board. The drums were marked "G". A Hercules had landed in Stanley. He couldn't help wondering what the Embassy in BA had been doing. Surely they must have heard something? Captain Barker had also been very scathing about the Embassy in BA. They had found out about the Argentine submarines and the Argentine fleet putting to sea via the Chileans!

8. The future

RML asked SM if he thought the decision to evacuate all our people from South Georgia, including Bird Island, was correct, and whether the Bird Island people might wish to stay. SM thought Paul Copestake might wish to stay on, but Hector was due to come out anyway. RML had thought there might be some resistance and for that reason, MOD had been told our people were to be brought out whether they wanted to come or not. SM agreed that it was the right action.

SM said several of the Grytviken party had lost at least £1,000-worth of personal possessions; he himself had not lost much, but Dave Morris had lost about £1,500 and Brian Lockwood about £2,000. Brian Lockwood was out of pocket because he had taken all the "goodies" orders and several people owed him nearly £100 because they had not come to base. Tony North's underwater camera equipment was at Grytviken. RML said the first step should be for people to prepare a list of missing possessions. Even if insured, it was unlikely they would be paid out because of exclusion clauses.

In answer to RML's query about the reaction of next-of-kin to events, SM confirmed that there had been some criticism. The next-of-kin probably thought BAS knew more than they did. JB felt that 90% of the next-of-kin had accepted the situation.

RML was thinking about getting someone from BAS back into Grytviken to report on the state of the base and see what personal possessions remained. SM thought Brian Lockwood would almost certainly be prepared to return and he himself might, depending on the time-scale.

RML said we would have to consider how to deal with those people remaining on our books. RML asked if SM had any idea who might consider returning. SM could think of several who would want to be employed; he would suggest somewhere like Faraday (where they had new generators) for Dermot Hopkins. Chris Bales would like to do a winter at Rothera - a suggestion SM would support whole-heartedly. Alex Torres would like to winter also. Lockwood would like to go down, but maybe not to winter; Stanswood would probably accept Radio

Officer, Signy; he was not outstanding, but adequate. Miles Plant might accept Rothera or Signy, but he thought nowhere else.

9. Communications

RML enquired whether SM had seen the Governor at Brize Norton. SM said he had a brief chat with him, when he had mentioned a message which the Argentines had asked him to tape to be transmitted to the base. SM had gained the impression he had not wanted the base to surrender; anyway, no taped message had been received, but there may have been one.

RJA asked if SM had always had a clear distinction between the Government in Whitehall and the Governor. SM said the distinction he had made was between BAS and the Government. He considered himself primarily responsible to BAS and secondarily to the Government.

RML referred to a signal received from the base via Bransfield on the Friday morning at 0930: "All 40 base members are well. Base life not exactly normal - but no visitors". This had indicted to him that there were 22 Marines ashore.

RML had contacted Admiral Whetstone, who gave the information that the rules of engagement had been revised and there was a self-protection role. The Bahia Paraiso had been and gone and it was thought she had instructions to evacuate the UK people from South Georgia. RML had asked what instructions should be given. Admiral Whetstone said he thought the Argentines were eager to minimise violence. Our people should just sit tight. Endurance had been instructed to give all support possible. Endurance was monitoring everything to Signy and they could flash it to MOD. They could send it scrambled, but evidently they didn't. But FCO had considered this the best communications link.

On Saturday, RML had sent a signal to Grytviken; this reached the field parties but not Grytviken. It was passed 10.32 our time to Bransfield but RML had previously asked, and MOD had agreed, to pass it via Endurance. It read: "Martin from Director. Regret unable to pass instructions sooner, but situation has been confused. Your position fully appreciated here. You should remain as cool and calm as you can. MOD and FCO do not consider that you are in danger. You should co-operate fully with Military Governor, including evacuation if this is instruction. In that case, please do best to ensure that all BAS supported personnel at South Georgia (28) are evacuated. We are considering whether voluntary evacuation is desirable, but you should use your own judgement on the various options and we will support you. In any case you should, if practicable, take with you what low bulk valuable equipment you can. Please pass to Bird Island and field parties. NOK being kept informed as and when they enquire. Best wishes and good luck from all here."

SM said that had he received that message, he would probably have been able to convince Lt. Mills he should not engage the Argentines. Endurance could have passed that message; if it had come from Whitehall, Lt. Mills would have thought he was not clear to go ahead and they could have had discussions.

JB said we had felt at the time our signals were being blocked. SM was sure it could have been passed by Endurance. He had since heard that after he had left the radio shack, Signy were calling

Grytviken saying they had a message from the Director. RML assumed that the message could have been passed, but Captain Barker claimed signals were being jammed. He had put that over the media; he seemed to be covered. SM said there had been no problems with communications with him before that - all morning they had been passing coded messages. JB said as he recalled it, we had arranged to pass it to MOD and Bransfield simultaneously, but had to wait for a sked with Bransfield, so MOD got it first. Endurance had stated on television that they were trying to pass a message to the base.

SM said Endurance had very poor communications. Pete Bayman (senior radio operator at Grytviken) had had to tell them how to contact a field party, which was only 5 miles away. (Similarly at Rothera RML had heard the hydrographic party all day trying to make contact with Endurance.) When Endurance had arrived at Grytviken she had taken over the Observation Post. Her people were standing with a £5,000 radio and didn't know how to work it. Their relations with the ship had been satisfactory and SM had no complaints.

RML thought a lot of the problems were due to bad communications with Endurance. Despite her presence there, Endurance had not been able to do anything. The base would have been better off without the Marines. Furthermore, when Endurance came back she did nothing. Grytviken would have fallen anyway. The potential danger was unnecessary. If the idea was to protect the civilian population, it would have been better if the Marines had not been there. If their job was to make a show for the Government, they were successful. It was possible that the Government wished it to be seen that South Georgia was taken by aggression.

RML said the matter might be taken up with MOD but he would try not to involve SM. He thought there would be a follow-up, as NERC and BAS were concerned to get the record straight; it was important for future relations. From the BAS/NERC point of view, as a scientific organisation caught up in events, we would have expected to have been better briefed and consulted; we should have been intimately informed.

RML thought it was most odd that he had had no communication from the Governor, especially as he knew him. There was also the question of transporting the Marines from South America to the Falklands. RML had agreed to take them on Bransfield, but he did not know that the Marines were being landed at South Georgia and was not consulted. Otherwise he would not have sent certain signals. SM said he had not known, when RML had talked in one of the signals of "unwelcome visitors", whether he was referring to the Argentines or the Marines.

But the Governor must have known. As Commander-in-Chief, it may have been his decision. SM said he didn't know whether on paper, as magistrate (even though not yet sworn in) he out-ranked Captain Barker and could have said he didn't want the Marines there. Maybe he could have asked for evidence from a higher authority. When Captain Barker had said he was going but the Marines were staying, SM got the impression that he might have been "pushing it".