



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
PROCUREMENT

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PUS, DUS, DUS(P)

D/MIN/TT/12/3/2

5/21

FJS JS

Secretary of State

THE FALKLANDS

very good note -
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PUS - DUS(P). Does he

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We are all walking round saying we should not draw lessons from the present hostilities on half information too soon. We are also walking round saying that it is a very untypical operation and certainly has no direct bearings on our main threat and anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic. We have also been running round, until recently, saying it is a long time since we fought a war of any kind and most of our Service experts have no practical experience. Furthermore, it is obvious that there are some real lessons of a particular kind, but also of a general kind to be learned from a calm evaluation of the Falklands.

2. We are going to need substantially more money for greater quantities of weapons and equipments, the need for which is being proved. We are going to have to save that money elsewhere. On a guessing basis it looks as if the directions of your review last July are going to be very much confirmed, but I do not believe it is going to be possible to avoid modifying, indeed changing, our policy for future requirements.

3. To argue the case at this stage on insufficient information at too early a date is to do exactly what the purpose of this memorandum seeks to avoid, but I do not know how to convince you of the need to stop certain

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submissions and to have a pause for thought, without at least suggesting some of the lessons that may flow from a distillation of current experience.

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4. You made clear to me the other night that you think you need a virtually unaltered Type 23 requirement for the Atlantic role. Frankly, when I have discussed with the Navy the possibility of there being more economic ways of performing the ASW role in the North Atlantic, they have, to a degree, countered me by pointing out that they must have a general purpose frigate for out-of-area operations. They have produced really no other rational reason to counter the case for a reduction to some 30 frigates for the deep water role and some 20 or so corvettes for the nearer-in waters and for towed array, the latter backed by land based helicopters and perch pads. It is worth mentioning here in passing that we are, I think, the only country that is developing the concept of an all-purpose frigate to locate submarines, pinpoint them and kill them, which, of course, requires large indigenous helicopters. Even the Americans will rely in their case on their big carriers to a greater extent for kill by aircraft.

5. One of the areas where we are going to need more money as a result of the lessons of the Falklands is the AVSB, probably more of them, based on two carriers, but also land-based and capable of being based on improvised container ships if required. V-STOL aircraft have now probably proved their extreme manoeuvrability and combat worthiness. We are going to need more money to put more Sea Eagles and other weapons under their wings. Because we shall still have aircraft carriers and some general purpose

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frigates, we are going to need more money for improved vertical launched Sea Wolf systems. We are going to need more money for helicopters for a whole variety of purposes. You saw the amounts involved in Dougie Lowe's recent submission. ^{on EH 101} We may or may not need more money for reinstating [^] the improvements to Sea Dart which we previously cancelled. We are going to need more money for making prefabricated ski jumps and helicopter pads and other equipment for even quicker force multiplying applications to civilian ships. We are going to need more money for giving Tornado adequate weapons which we have not so far done. We shall need to save some.

6. There may or may not be a case to suggest that we should not replace the Type 42 at all. We shall need to look carefully at whether the Naval shore bombardments have had other than a morale effect. We may or may not need a new form of anti-aircraft ship, of much smaller size, with an area air defence capability. This, together with the need to have probably more maritime aircraft, possibly with a longer range, more sonarbuoys and more towed array and certainly if you then add the need for more submarines, there is only one area that will have to give further and that is the number of highly expensive general purpose surface ships. This will be forced upon us for another reason: there will undoubtedly be demands for them to have much more sophisticated weaponry than they have today. This may well lead to a requirement for them to be bigger, but they will certainly be more expensive.

7. I know all of this is a bit jumbled because actually I do not want to do it until three months after the Falklands hostilities are over, but equally I do not want

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to go on accepting detailed designs for the Type 23 frigate or taking other decisions about ships which were on the sale list until we have sorted through some of the above.

Tom

26th May 1982

PS I have no doubt your mind has gone fully over the question of what the situation would have been if all the bombs that hit had gone off, and must also have gone over the fact that a largely outdated, antiquated air force, operating at extreme range, has been able to penetrate, and the mind boggles at what it would have done if it had had an adequate degree of modern weapons.

TJ.

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