

VCDS(P&amp;L) 127/3/2

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5/21

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→ PS/S of S  
CFS  
QMG  
AMSO  
ACDS(Ops)  
DCDS(OR)  
DUS(PL)  
ACNS(O)  
DMO  
ACAS(Ops)*Some salvage being investigated today*

7

LOGISTIC IMPLICATION OF THE LOSS OF MV ATLANTIC CONVEYOR

1. You will wish to see the immediate initial assessment of the logistic implications of the loss of the equipment and stores carried in MV Atlantic Conveyor, which I asked my staff to prepare. It is based on the assumption that the cargo is a total loss and that little was trans-shipped prior to the ship's loss. Clarification on what might have been transferred to other ships of the Task Force is being sought with the staff of CTF.
2. There will be serious operational penalties consequent upon the loss and until replacement stores can arrive, but the loss should not be regarded as catastrophic.
3. I have not attempted to assess the effect of the loss of the uncertain number of helicopters, and this will be done in due course by ACDS(Ops).

26 May 1982

VCDS(P&amp;L)

VCS(P&amp;L) 127/3/2

VCDS(P&amp;L)

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DNAP  
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LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOSS OF MV ATLANTIC CONVEYORINTRODUCTION

1. You asked for an initial assessment of the consequence of the loss of logistic equipment and stores in MV Atlantic Conveyor. This is a serious setback, but not catastrophic and it should not inhibit or delay operations.
2. Some equipment and stores had been unloaded or transferred before MV Atlantic Conveyor was attacked and there is some uncertainty over what has actually been lost. A meeting is being held at HQ CINCFLEET at Northwood on 27 May 1982 to assess what has been lost, what are the implications and what needs to be replaced.
3. An initial worst case assessment by the individual Services is given below and assumes total loss of the vessel and its cargo.

ENGINEER RESOURCES FOR HARRIER SITE CONSTRUCTION

4. Some 450 tons of RE construction equipment are believed lost. This was ground support equipment for one squadron of Harrier and included hide pads and camouflage. This equipment was also available for carrying out emergency repair at Port Stanley airfield.
5. RFA Stromness holds sufficient landing/take-off/taxiway construction stores for the construction of 1600 ft x 38 ft wide

STOL runway to minimum standard. Taxiways and parking pads will reduce this figure to 800/900 feet, with attendant penalties of fuel consumption and/or lower potential weapon loads. Further Harrier support stores are carried on MV Atlantic Causeway.

6. Full replacement of stores lost could only be achieved in the short term, at the expense of Harrier special task stores (STS) held in BAOR. Lead time from trade is 4 to 6 months, but an urgent operational requirement for £0.8M is being processed to restore UK STS already depleted.

#### HARRIER GR3 AND CHINOOK SPARES SUPPORT

7. MV Atlantic Conveyor carried one fly away pack (FAP) to support 6 aircraft for 30 days at NATO rates, enhanced with GR3 special to type, second-line items. It is not yet known whether some or all of this equipment was transferred to HMS Hermes.

8. Also embarked was the only FAP 60-day support for Chinook deployed to the Falkland Islands. Assets held at RAF Odiham have already been severely depleted in order to provide this and to support the two Chinooks deployed to Ascension Island.

9. Although additional spares support is available both with the Task Force and in the UK, if the FAPs on MV Atlantic Conveyor have been lost, this will have severe support implications for RAF aircraft in the Falkland Islands as well as leading to depletion of war reserve stocks in RAF(G) and the UK. Operational and engineering concessions may be required; additional "robbing" of aircraft in the UK and RAF(G) will also be necessary and numbers of aircraft on the ground will increase.

755 CLUSTER BOMBS

10. MV Atlantic Conveyor carried 240 BL 755 Cluster Bombs which is 30% of the total stock deployed in the South Atlantic. The loss will restrict the operational capability of the Harrier force, but replacements are available from UK without detriment to war reserve requirements.

TACTICAL REFUELLING CAPABILITY

11. MV Atlantic Conveyor carried tactical refuelling equipment comprising 4 x 10,000 gallon pillow tanks, 14 airportable fuel cells and associated pumping equipment for the support of Harrier ashore. In addition a 1,890 litre LOX tank was also carried. The tactical refuelling equipment is for use at the Harrier sites which are supplied by means of the emergency fuel handling equipment system which is laid and operated by the Army.

12. RFA Fort Austin carries sufficient additional refuelling equipment to enable the Harrier force to operate ashore, but does not carry a supply of LOX. Other LOX production options are available afloat, but the loss of this container could impose a constraint on operations. Action has been taken to replace the lost LOX and refuelling assets from within RAF resources and to arrange for priority movement.

TENTAGE

13. 650 tons of tentage have been lost. This would have been sufficient tentage to accommodate 4,500 men and represented the only emergency accommodation available.

14. Further tentage and accommodation stores for 3,500 men are already earmarked in the UK and action is in hand to find additional assets for a further 1,000/2,000 men. The provision of more permanent accommodation (hutting) is also under urgent consideration.

GENERAL STORES

15. Some 160 tons of general stores, 15 tons of electronic stores and 20 tons of weapon control stores were loaded on MV Atlantic Conveyor. These were back-up stocks to stores held on the RFAs and their loss will have no effective operational implications. The resupply system is adequate to cope with any replacement items needed.

FOOD

16. First indications were that 3,000 man days of fresh and frozen food were embarked. This represents only 4 days supply and it is now believed that this was unloaded before the ship was hit. Food stocks in the South Atlantic are adequate.

NAAFI STORES

17. The 53 tons of NAAFI stores originally reported as having been on MV Atlantic Conveyor are, in fact, on MV Geest Port.

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION

18. Total stocks of 7.62mm ammunition carried with the Task Force are in excess of 14,000,000 rounds of various natures. The 100,000 rounds believed lost are a small proportion of the total holding.

26 May 1982

CSO(L)