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SECRET

D E D I P

FM FCO 271514Z MAY 82

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1072 OF 27 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FALKLANDS: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR HAIG

1. HAIG PHONED ME ON THE SECURE LINE AT 1400Z IN ORDER TO TOUCH BASE BEFORE THE OAS MEETING. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP THE RESOLUTION FAIRLY INNOCUOUS 'THOUGH IT WON'T BE HELPFUL'. THE US WOULD WORK FOR MODERATION, AND HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL FOR THIS PURPOSE TO MENTION IN SOME DETAIL THE FINAL SET OF US PROPOSALS EVEN THOUGH WE HAD FOUND DIFFICULTY WITH THEM. THIS WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR WHAT IT WAS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT.
2. I WELCOMED HAIG'S INTENTION TO TRY TO KEEP THE TEMPERATURE DOWN AND SUGGESTED THAT SCR 505 SHOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT. SIR A PARSONS WOULD BE SEEING PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGAIN LATER TODAY. I ADDED THAT I UNDERSTOOD WHY THE AMERICANS WOULD WISH TO REFER TO THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HAIG SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THINGS HAD MOVED ON AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED. HAIG TOOK THE POINT AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING AS OFFERED AND REJECTED AND NOT (NOT) AS SOMETHING 'CONTEMPORARY'.
3. HAIG THEN MENTIONED PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S APPROACH TO HIM TO WEIGH IN HEAVILY TO PERSUADE US TO GIVE HIM A POSITIVE REPLY TO HIS QUESTION ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. DE CUELLAR HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT HE HAD NO BASIS FOR HIS EFFORTS IF OUR REPLY RULED OUT BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. I REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT NOW ACCEPT MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR DE CUELLAR TO SEE IF HE COULD GET EVIDENCE OF AN ARGENTINE CHANGE OF HEART.
4. HAIG SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HE ADDED THAT THE

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SECRET - D E D I P

AIRFORCE

AIRFORCE MEMBER OF THE ARGENTINE JUNTA WAS NOW PRESSING THE AMERICANS VERY EMOTIONALLY TO DO SOMETHING, AND WAS THREATENING TO CALL IN THE CUBANS IMMEDIATELY. HAIG CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT THE ARGENTINES KNEW THAT THEY COULD NOT HOLD ON IN THE FALKLANDS. IT WAS HOWEVER EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE READY TO MOVE QUICKLY WHEN WE HAD ACHIEVED WHAT WE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE ON THE MILITARY FRONT. I EMPHASISED THAT MILITARY FACTORS MUST BE DECISIVE AS FAR AS THE SPEED OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WAS CONCERNED, THOUGH WE WERE WELL SEIZED OF THE DESIRABILITY MOVING QUICKLY. AS HE KNEW (MY TELNO 1065) WE WERE ALSO THINKING URGENTLY ABOUT WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN THEREAFTER AND ABOUT HIS IDEAS ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS. HAIG EMPHASISED ONCE AGAIN THE NEED TO BE READY TO MOVE QUICKLY AND SAID THAT HE MIGHT HAVE FURTHER IDEAS TO PUT TO US LATER TODAY SO THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO MOVE TOGETHER WHEN THE RIGHT TIME CAME.

PYM

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LIMITED  
7 HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/BCD (E)  
HD/FUSD  
DEF HD/FUSD  
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PS  
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PS/MR ONSLOW  
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