



TOP COPY

7617 - 1

OO BONN
GRS 559
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 271830Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 27 MAY
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS
FALKLAND ISLANDS

- 1. SINCE GENSCHER WAS UNABLE TO SPEAK TO ME THIS AFTERNOON VON STADEN TELEPHONED ACLAND TO DISCUSS THE FALKLANDS. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE FRG WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO HELP THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WHO HAD ASKED THEM, AS HE HAS DONE THE FRENCH, TO SPEAK TO US IN SUPPORT OF THE MANDATE GIVEN HIM BY SCR 502. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REFERRING TO SIR A PARSONS' EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY, FELT THAT THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO FULFILL THE MANDATE HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AND SO FORCE HIM TO GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL VERY QUICKLY.
- 2. ACLAND SAID THAT WE WANTED TO HELP PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES AND WE WOULD BE RESPONDING TO HIS REQUEST THAT WE SET OUT WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPT-ABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE FIRE. BUT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAL-KLANDS AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN LONDON HAD TO BE FACED. AS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE OUR POSITION RESTED UPON SCR 502. IF THE ARGENTINES IMPLEMENTED THIS MANDATORY RESOLUTION THEN THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR FURTHER MILITARY ACTIVITY. OUR ESSENT-IAL AND REASONABLE CONDITION WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEASE FIRE LINKED WITH IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL BY A CERTAIN DATE. IF PARTS ONE AND TWO OF RESOLUTION 502 WERE MET WE WERE COMMITTED BY THE THIRD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE HAD VOTED YESTERDAY FOR A CEASE FIRE BUT IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT THAT THE AGGRESSOR AND THE AGGRESSED AGAINST SHOULD BE TREATED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THAT HAD HAPPENED AND THE LOSS OF LIFE WE HAD INCURRED, PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL WAS UNTHINKABLE.

/ WHAT

1 CONFIDENTIAL



WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD TRY TO OBTAIN FROM BUENOS AIRES A REAL CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE UNTIL THERE WAS FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THEY WOULD POSITION. WITHDRAW WE AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE STUCK. WE THOUGHT THAT HE OR AN EMISSARY MIGHT GO TO BUENOS AIRES IN ORDER TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION. VON STADEN PLEADED FOR SOME ELEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY IN OUR POSITION. OTHERWISE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE. HE RECALLED THE CONDITIONS WHICH GENSCHER HAD SET OUT AT BRUSSELS FOR GERMAN SUPPORT OF CONTINUING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. ACLAND POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD SHOWN GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN RECENT WEEKS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR MUST NOW TALK VERY SERIOUSLY TO THE ARGENTINES AND SEEK A CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION. PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A CEASE FIRE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE ARGENTINES ON THE ISLANDS TO RE-CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION AND BRING IN SUPPLIES. VON STADEN ASKED WHAT OPENING WE COULD GIVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR. ACLAND REPLIED THAT IN THE LONGER TERM THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDERS WAS AT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. IF THERE WAS NO RISK OF A FRESH ATTACK THEN OUR SOLDIERS WOULD NOT BE NEEDED. THE ABSENCE OF GUARANTEED SECURITY WE MUST SHOULDER OUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER TO PROTECT THE ISLANDERS. WE KNEW THAT THE GERMANS WOULD THINK THE SAME IF THEY WERE IN OUR SHOES. WE WELCOMED THE SUPPORT THEY HAD GIVEN SO FAR.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE LIMITED HD/EMERGENCY UNIT HD/S AM D HD/DEF D ED/PLANNING STAFF HD/UND ED/NEWS D HD/ERD HD/ECD (E) ED/PUSD DEP ED/PUSD HD/RES D PS/MR HURD PS/MR ONSLOW PS/LORD BELSTEAD PS/PUS MR BULLARD SIR I SINCLAIR MR GIFFARD MR WRIGHT MR GILLMORE MR URE MR BARRETT

COPIES TO PS/HOME SECRETARY PS/ S OF S DEFENCE PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG PS/SIR M PAILISER PS/SIR A DUFF MR WADE-GERY CABINET MR FULLER OFFICE MR O'NEILL HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF MR COLVIN DIO MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE DIRECTOR G C H Q